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“There will be less privacy, of course”: How and why people in 10 countries expect AI will affect privacy in the future

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Abstract

The public has many concerns and fears regarding artificial intelligence (AI). Some are general or existential, while others are more specific with personal repercussions, like weakened human relationships, job loss, and further erosion of privacy. In this work, we provide a deeper understanding of how AI privacy concerns are taking shape. We surveyed public opinion of AI’s expected effects on privacy with 10,011 respondents spanning ten countries and six continents. We identify four main themes regarding how the public believes AI impacts privacy: vulnerability of data, highly personal data and inference, lack of consent, and surveillance and government use. Unlike many aspects of AI and algorithmic literacy, for which public perception is often reported to be riddled with inconsistency and misconceptions, these privacy concerns are well-reasoned and broadly aligned with expert narratives. Based on our findings, we provide a roadmap of public priorities to help guide researchers and the broader community in exploring solutions that ameliorate AI’s impact on privacy, and to inform efforts related to civic participation.

1 Introduction

From facial recognition to smart home devices or self-driving cars, AI continues to spread quickly into people’s daily lives. As people experience AI themselves, or hear about it in the media and through peers, they develop and refine their opinions of it. Researchers, corporations, governments, and public interest groups all seek to understand, measure, and potentially shape these opinions [14, 24–26, 51, 52, 73, 92, 103, 104]. Current assessments of public opinion of AI reveal both optimism about future benefits of AI as well as concerns about how AI may negatively affect people’s lives and society in the future [5, 43, 63, 74], from questions about loss of human jobs to existential risks that AI may pose for humanity [5, 18, 38, 75, 96].

In this work, we focus on one particular concern that is commonly raised about AI: privacy [6, 56, 57, 82, 89]. Specifically, we explore how and why people believe AI will affect

privacy in the future based on a survey of 10,011 respondents spanning ten countries and six continents (encompassing in total Australia, Brazil, China, Germany, Japan, Kenya, the Philippines, Russia, South Korea, and the United States). This contributes an international perspective on AI and privacy attitudes, including several countries in developing regions. We base our analysis on open-ended responses about how AI may affect privacy, supplemented by responses to closed-form questions. While the reader may expect there to be divergent views or misconceptions, many respondents expressed aspects of a coherent narrative that is broadly aligned with experts and privacy advocates. We found four main themes in all countries studied:

Data at Risk – Respondents believe that AI needs (lots of) data, which is gathered from multiple devices, crosslinked, aggregated, and made available online, where it is vulnerable to misuse and hackers.

Highly Personal – Respondents express that this large-scale collection includes highly personal data, which can be used to develop precise, personal insights that can be leveraged to influence or manipulate people for commercial or other purposes.

Without Consent – Respondents feel this scaled, personal data collection occurs without meaningful consent, and often without awareness, and they are often required to provide data to get access to useful AI services.

State and Surveillance – Our respondents identify ways that AI supports surveillance and governments through omnipresent monitoring and identification.

In light of these themes, we discuss how researchers and the broader community can work to mitigate the privacy risks of AI. Potential solutions range from technical design—such as the adoption of differential privacy or federated learning to minimize sensitive data—to privacy policies and platform adoption of AI principles. Critically, our findings show that the public has nuanced, well-reasoned concerns around pri-

vacy and AI that enable civic engagement and participatory democracy in shaping the future of privacy and AI.

2 Background

Much of the research on public perception of AI has been survey-based, often conducted in Western, English-speaking countries such as the US and the UK [14, 25, 38, 75, 104] but also in other regions or globally [5, 43, 63, 74, 92, 103]. Respondents typically expect AI will have a significant impact on the future, and often anticipate that its effects will be positive, with the most favorable impressions in emerging and/or Asian markets and more negative impressions (particularly recently) in the countries such as the US [5, 38, 43, 63, 74, 75, 92, 103]. At the same time, AI is neither interpreted as exclusively beneficial nor exclusively disadvantageous, and public response often indicates contradictory emotions [14, 56, 57, 73]. Privacy, job loss, increased social isolation, and other social topics have been highlighted as key concerns in surveys on AI [6, 38, 56, 57, 82, 89], and privacy has also been highlighted as a concern (either at a high level or in some cases specifically, e.g., government surveillance or lack of control) in surveys on autonomous vehicles, connectedness, facial recognition, IoT, personal data collection, and smart speakers [4, 8, 10, 13, 20, 51, 59, 65, 68, 102]. Some surveys have shown public support for responsible development and regulation of AI to address concerns [38, 92, 104].

Qualitative work has explored public perception of algorithmic systems, for example, finding that perception of algorithmic systems can vary substantially by individual factors or platform [37], and that end users often have fundamental questions or misconceptions about technical details of their operation [19, 39, 81, 90, 94, 95]. Qualitative studies with smart home device users primarily in the US and UK revealed privacy concerns such as constant monitoring, other parties' use of their data, or consent [1, 29, 49, 61, 71, 106]. These studies also reported that users had an incomplete or inadequate understanding of technical aspects of the systems' operation, particularly related to data processing, storage, and sharing.

AI is not only heavily discussed in academia, but is also a popular topic in public media and entertainment [27, 38], and studies have shown the public is likely to get information about AI from movies, TV, and social media [14, 28]. While researchers have argued that media narratives and fiction may be disproportionately frightening, especially in Western, English-speaking regions [26], studies have suggested that news reports may be more balanced or appropriately critical [32, 40, 78]. The popular press often features stories related to AI and privacy [3, 17, 30, 46, 48, 55, 64, 67, 70, 72, 84, 99], and privacy has been identified as a key concept in newspaper reports on AI [32]. Research has considered how media affects public opinion on privacy concerns such as government surveillance, data sharing, and companies' use of social media content [36, 41, 87], and smart home study participants have

shared that their privacy concerns have been influenced by news reports and social media [29, 49].

Overall, our work sits within a growing body of research on people's perceptions of AI, across disciplines including critical studies, HCI, law, marketing, policy, psychology, usable privacy and security, and more. Perception of AI is highly complex, multi-dimensional, and far from fully understood. Methodologically, this means that techniques such as *triangulation* (studying the same phenomenon from multiple vantage points, in order to cross-check and more fully capture richness and complexity, e.g. using both qualitative and quantitative methods to see if the findings are consistent) [85] and *replication* (the reproduction and extension of prior work) [98] are particularly useful for this topic. Accordingly, we seek to broaden and enrich the understanding of people's perception of the relationship between AI and privacy by looking for emergent themes in a large number of open-ended responses from a wide range of countries.

3 Methodology

In order to better understand public perception of AI, we partnered with Ipsos, a global market research firm, to field our survey in August 2021. Methodologically, this work falls in the genre of public opinion polling, as described below. Our study plan was reviewed by experts at our institution in domains including ethics, human subjects research, policy, legal, and privacy. Our institution does not have an IRB, though we adhere to similarly strict standards.

3.1 Instrument Development and Translation

The survey instrument builds on previous versions which we deployed in 2018 and 2019 [56, 57]. To develop concepts and questions for all versions, we consulted experts at our institutions, reviewed published work, and drew on our own previous unpublished research. The 2021 version has some substantial modifications from previous versions, including the addition of an open-ended question about privacy which is the focus of this paper. Many questions in the final instrument were written uniquely for this survey while others were modified from or replicate other questions in the literature or the canon of public opinion surveys. In order to more accurately reflect real-world settings, we did not define AI, and left interpretation of the term to the respondents.¹ We did ask respondents two questions that serve as a knowledge check, which provide us some assessment of people's familiarity and understanding of AI. We included primarily closed-form questions as well as a few open-ended questions for free responses. We also included standard demographic questions such as age, gender, education, income, region, and urbanicity. The final

¹In 2018, we had two versions of the survey (one that defined AI and one that did not) and responses to subsequent questions were similar regardless of whether a definition had been provided.

instrument included several dozen questions on topics related to artificial intelligence (see Appendix, Section 7).

After completing the instrument in English, we engaged cApStAn, a linguistic quality assurance agency with expertise in survey translation which had also partnered with us on the previous translations. cApStAn provided a translation style guide consistent with the previous rounds and identified complexities for particular concepts and languages. Ipsos' in-country translation teams and third party vendors referred to this guidance while translating the instrument to all target languages and iterated with cApStAn to finalize. Legacy translations were preserved when question/language pairs were identical to previous versions. See Appendix, Table 3 for languages offered. After fielding was complete, the responses were coded in-language as described below.

3.2 Deployment

We selected a range of countries with different characteristics, such as stage of technological development, nature of the workforce, and varied development indices. The survey was fielded to online panels (groups of respondents who have agreed to participate in surveys over a period of time) representative of the online population in each country. Consistent with the best panels available for online market research, such panels tend to be broadly representative of the general population in countries with high access to technology, but less representative of the general population in countries with more limited access to technology; for example, in developing countries they tend to skew urban. Respondents were recruited using stratified sampling (a method of recruiting specific numbers of participants within demographic subgroups), with hard quotas on age² and gender in each country.³ The median survey length was 27 minutes across all completions. All respondents received incentives in a point system or cash at an industry-standard amount for their market. A summary of countries and demographics is provided in the Appendix, Table 3.

3.3 Data Processing and Analysis

Quality Checks. Ipsos conducted quantitative and qualitative checks to remove low quality responses on an ongoing basis until the quota was reached in each country. Example grounds for removal included being identified as a bot, speeding (answering substantially more quickly than the median time), or providing nonsensical or profane responses to open-ended questions. Overall Ipsos removed and replaced 9.4% of responses for quality.

²Ages ranged from 16 to 85, with a small recruit of 16 and 17 year olds in each country (between 19 to 80 youth participants per country), who participated with parental consent.

³The US was the only exception since the panel there operates by sending the survey to a representative sample, eliminating the need for quotas.

Weighting. After data collection was complete, standard procedures were followed to apply a weighting adjustment to each respondent so that the samples in each country are more representative [12]. The variables considered in weighting appear in the Appendix, Table 3. This weighting is reflected in the data shared in Section 4.

Research Objective and Data. In this paper we focus on the following research objective: How do people believe AI will affect privacy in the future? Specifically, we present emergent themes, descriptive statistics, and illustrative quotes for the following open-ended question about AI and privacy:

'Now we would like to ask you to think about Artificial Intelligence (AI) and privacy. In what ways will Artificial Intelligence (AI) affect privacy in the future? Please be specific.'

This question and the four other closed-form questions we use in our analysis are provided in the Appendix, Section 7.

Coding and Analysis of Open-Ended Responses. As we reviewed responses from all countries, we iteratively refined a codebook built in previous rounds, based on emergent themes [11]. The final codebook has 368 codes on topics such as examples of AI or sentiment towards AI, 36 of which focus on privacy specifically. Any code, and multiple codes, can be assigned to a response to any open-ended question. For example, a response to the privacy question might include a code for home assistants as well as a code for hacking.

The open-ended responses were coded in the source language by Ipsos' dedicated coding team or one of their third party coding vendors. As described in McDonald et al., a variety of different approaches may be employed to improve the reliability of qualitative analysis [69]. In our case, following best practices in public opinion research for coding against multiple languages, we used professional coders, followed an iterative process to continuously improve the codes, and performed a series of hierarchical quality checks. While coders were specialized by language, they worked together to ensure consistency, sharing notes in specialized coding software. We performed multiple levels of quality checks on the resulting coding, randomly sampling from all responses in each country as well as checking all instances of select codes. In the final round, a researcher checked 10% of all responses; for the privacy question the researcher was in full agreement with all codes for 88% of the sampled responses, and the researcher was not in agreement with one or more codes for 12% of the sampled responses (range 6% to 15% across the countries) and noted that the disagreements often related to subtle coding distinctions that seemed unlikely to substantially affect broader analysis. For the privacy question, 9,765 respondents provided an answer,⁴ which totaled a complete corpus of just over 100,000 words, with an average of 10.2 words per re-

⁴All respondents were required to enter text in this field, except in the United States which uses a panel that does not require responses.

sponse. Those responses were then assigned a total of 24,100 codes, an average of 2.5 codes per answer.

We used an inductive approach to explore emerging themes and common patterns in the data [33]. After the codes were assigned and we reviewed the open-ended verbatim responses in detail, four thematic groups of codes (identified separately by two different researchers) emerged as common and semantically distinct: **Data at Risk**, **Highly Personal, Without Consent**, and **State and Surveillance**. For example, **Data at Risk** encompassed codes such as ‘Collection,’ ‘Available,’ and ‘Hacking.’ We assigned each of the 368 codes to exactly one of these four thematic groups, or to a negative privacy sentiment group, a positive privacy sentiment group, an ‘other privacy’ group, a ‘don’t know’ group, or an ‘unrelated’ group which covered a long tail of non-privacy related comments e.g., “AI causes job loss”. Based on the codes that each response had been assigned, each response was assigned to one or more of these groups – for example, if a response had been assigned the code ‘Hacking’ and the code ‘Unaware,’ that response was part of the privacy groups **Data at Risk** and **Without Consent**. We summarize group/code assignment in the Appendix, Table 5.

Quantitative Analysis. While our work focuses on a thematic analysis of open-ended responses related to privacy concerns surrounding AI, we support our findings with survey statistics and modeling where appropriate. We use a χ^2 test for assessing statistical significance for survey responses involving unranked, categorical data (e.g., where a valid response may include “Don’t know”). When comparing multiple distributions, we use an omnibus χ^2 test, following by pairwise χ^2 tests with a Bonferroni correction. For all models, we use a binomial distribution $Y_i \sim B(n_i, \pi_i)$ using a logarithmic link function. We report complete model odds and p-values in the Appendix for all our analysis. All calculations use the weighting adjustments of individual responses.

3.4 Limitations

We note several limitations of our methodology that should be considered when interpreting this work. First, it carries with it the standard issues attendant with survey methodology, such as the risk of respondents misunderstanding questions, poor quality translation, or respondents satisficing [47] or plagiarizing open-ended responses. We have worked to minimize these risks through piloting, use of open-ended questions in conjunction with closed-form questions, use of a translation style guide and translation review, and data quality checks. Second, online panels are not representative of the general population. While we have used a high standard of currently available online panels, we caveat our findings as not representative of the general population, particularly in China, Brazil, the Philippines, and Kenya. Third, while members of the research team have experience conducting research in all markets studied, members of the team reside in Western countries. We

Area of life	Negative impact	Positive impact	No change	Don't know
Job availability	51%	23%	12%	13%
Privacy	49%	22%	15%	14%
Personal relationships	46%	21%	19%	14%
Income equality	37%	23%	21%	19%
Job quality	26%	40%	15%	18%
Creativity	25%	47%	13%	15%
Environmental sustainability	18%	45%	17%	19%
Education	15%	52%	17%	16%
Quality of life	15%	52%	16%	17%
Healthcare	10%	59%	16%	15%
Transportation	7%	64%	14%	14%

Table 1: Ranking of which areas of life people believe AI will have the largest impact on, sorted by negative sentiment. Privacy was the second highest concern for respondents, after job loss.

have worked to minimize the risk of misinterpretation by collaboration and discussion with in-country partner teams but recognize that our interpretations may lack context or nuance that would have been more readily available to local residents.

4 Results

We find that privacy is one of the top-most negative expectations of how AI may impact the future. In Section 4.1 we detail the strength of these concerns and explain our modeled results. Grounded in this understanding, we explore four dominant themes that underpin respondent beliefs around privacy and AI in Section 4.2. We explore solutions respondents suggested for addressing these concerns in Section 4.3.

4.1 Privacy as a Top Concern

Across the areas of life where AI may have a transformative impact in the next ten years—either positive or negative—privacy ranked as the second highest source of concern, after job loss (Table 1). In all, 49% of respondents said they expect “less privacy” due to AI.⁵ While respondents recognized the potential benefits of AI—such as improving transportation, healthcare, overall quality of life, and education—our results highlight how respondents are nevertheless concerned with how AI advancements will impact their privacy.

⁵The omnibus variations between these areas of life are statistically significant ($\chi^2(30) = 17,822.47$, $p < .001$), as are all pairwise comparisons (all $p < .001$).

Zooming in further, we modeled how belief that AI will result in “less privacy” in the future correlates with factors such as a respondent’s age, gender, and education. Here, we binarized our four answer options, treating “Less privacy” as positive samples, while treating the other three options (e.g., “More privacy”, “No change”, and “Don’t know”) as negative samples. We also controlled for various AI understanding variables including closed-form questions on how respondents define AI and how much they have heard about AI. We exclude respondents who answered “Prefer not to say” for any demographics, leaving $N=9,867$. We discuss our statistically significant model results below. See the Appendix, Table 6 for full modeling results.

Influence of demographics. We find that after controlling for all other factors—such as geography and AI understanding—people who are 65+ have higher odds (1.53, $p < 0.001$) of believing that AI will negatively impact privacy compared to those who are 16–24. This suggests that the experiences of, or the narratives exposed to, younger audiences may differ from older audiences. Education also has a statistically significant influence, with a higher education attainment (Bachelor’s degree or more) correlating with higher odds (1.59, $p < 0.001$) of expectation that AI will negatively impact privacy compared to a lower education attainment (some primary or secondary education). We did not observe any statistically significant variations among genders.

Influence of AI understanding. Apart from demographics, a variety of dimensions for AI understanding correlate with increasing perception that AI will negatively impact privacy. As part of our quality checks, we asked respondents “Which of the following best describes Artificial Intelligence (AI)?” and provided six closed-form responses. Respondents who select “Technology that can learn or think” have much higher odds of worrying privacy will negatively impact privacy (3.13, $p < 0.001$) compared to an answer of “Not sure”. Similarly, respondents who select “Self-driving car” as the “best example of Artificial Intelligence (AI)” have higher odds of privacy concerns (2.27, $p < 0.001$) compared to a selection of “Spreadsheet”. Combined, both results highlight how AI understanding correlates with elevated privacy concerns, indicating that privacy concerns are not a default choice. A complete summary, by country, of the knowledge question results can be found in the Appendix, Table 4.

Exposure to news articles and narratives from peers also has a statistically significant correlation with privacy concerns. We asked respondents “In the past 12 months, how much have you heard about Artificial Intelligence (AI)?”, with options ranging from “Nothing at all” to “A great amount”. Respondents who select “A great amount” have lower odds of privacy concerns (0.76, $p < 0.001$) compared to those who hear “a moderate amount”. Conversely, respondents who select “A little bit” have higher odds (1.23, $p = 0.001$). This suggests that cursory exposure to AI narratives correlates with elevated

privacy concerns, whereas people with broad exposure to AI narratives (potentially due to personal interest) may be more excited by the possibilities that AI might achieve.

Influence of geography. We find that after controlling for demographics and understandings of AI, the United States has the strongest belief that AI will negatively effect privacy, which we treat as a baseline for modeling. In terms of odds, our remaining countries rank as follows: Germany (0.61), Australia (0.61), Brazil (0.52), South Korea (0.50), the Philippines (0.48), Kenya (0.47), China (0.42), Russia (0.40), and Japan (0.24), all with $p < 0.001$. As such, the United States represents an outlier where respondents have strong privacy concerns surrounding AI, while China, Russia, and Japan are outliers where respondents have lower privacy concerns.

4.2 Privacy Themes

We investigated respondents’ expectations regarding AI and privacy by analyzing their open-ended responses. Table 2 shows the prevalence of each theme by country, with **Highly Personal** being the most common at a 31% global average and **Without Consent** being the least common of our themes at a 5% global average. In total, 58% of respondents touched on one of our four themes, or generally expressed a negative expectation. Even if they did not express one of our themes, many respondents expect that AI will have a negative effect on privacy, or even inevitably lead its complete dissolution. Some said the deterioration of privacy due to AI is already (far) underway and will only get worse over time. While negative sentiments were predominant, 12% of respondents expressed that AI could be positive for privacy. While we do not include analysis of positive expectations in the paper, we include a sampling for the interested reader in the Appendix, Section 8.

There will be less privacy, of course. —*Russia*⁶

It is likely to adversely affect privacy —*South Korea*

I believe that every day our privacy will be increasingly invaded, until the time comes when we will have no more privacy —*Brazil*

It will wreck privacy —*Australia*

Overall, most respondents—75%—shared relevant comments on the state of privacy and AI. The remaining 25% of responses included ‘don’t know’ or responses which only had codes that seemed unrelated to privacy. For the remainder of this section, we focus on our four major themes that explain why respondents feel AI will lead to less privacy in the future.

⁶Throughout the paper, we share complete verbatim responses (in some cases translated). In some cases we have made minor edits for readability, e.g., to correct typos or grammatical errors.

<i>Privacy themes, from open-ended coding</i>	Global average	Australia	Brazil	China	Germany	Japan	Kenya	Philippines	Russia	South Korea	United States
Highly Personal	31%	33%	32%	33%	17%	26%	43%	45%	20%	26%	42%
Data at Risk	29%	35%	29%	29%	15%	26%	44%	41%	13%	22%	35%
State and Surveillance	12%	20%	13%	8%	15%	6%	14%	9%	8%	10%	25%
Without Consent	5%	6%	4%	5%	2%	6%	7%	7%	1%	3%	8%
<i>Privacy sentiment, from open-ended coding</i>											
Negative sentiment or part of a theme	58%	66%	57%	58%	45%	46%	75%	68%	42%	54%	77%
Positive sentiment	12%	8%	11%	17%	8%	4%	23%	11%	11%	17%	4%
<i>Overall response quality</i>											
Expressed any privacy statement	75%	76%	73%	81%	67%	64%	94%	81%	61%	69%	82%
Don't know	18%	20%	17%	11%	25%	30%	3%	10%	21%	24%	16%
Any other response	8%	4%	10%	8%	8%	6%	4%	9%	18%	7%	2%

Table 2: Breakdown of privacy themes across countries. Themes do not add up to 100% due to the possibility of zero or multiple themes per response. We also report the aggregate frequency of responses that fit into a theme along with other negative leaning responses which did not fit into a theme and for comparison responses which showed positive sentiment towards privacy. The final section shows overall response quality, which does sum to 100%, consisting of privacy-related responses, ‘don’t know’ responses, and a small number of responses that were assigned codes that seemed unrelated to privacy.

4.2.1 Data at Risk

Respondents believe AI increases privacy risks due to the *scale of data collection*. They expressed concern that because AI requires data to work, more data will be gathered; it will be collected from more devices, many of which are networked; it will then be aggregated and linked together, potentially across products and surfaces; and data and inferences will then be available in online databases and servers. Our respondents felt this accumulation increased the risks to their data, as it could more easily be accessed or misused, or it could leak or be breached by hackers. This theme is most prevalent in the Philippines and Kenya and less prevalent in Russia and Germany (Table 2). Concern is also higher among younger people ages 16–24 (odds = 1.91, $p < 0.001$). See the Appendix, Table 7 for full modeling results.

AI needs data. Respondents observed that AI needs data in order to learn and operate, and that the more information it gets about people, the more efficient and accurate it will become. The view that AI inevitably encourages the accumulation of large amounts of data led to the conclusion that AI is negative for privacy.

I don't think there will be much privacy, because artificial intelligence needs a lot of data and information to work! – *Brazil*

AI requires a lot of human data – *China*

For machines to think, they need to analyse and base their decisions on data. Data will be a hot commodity and companies

will look for all ways for you to give them your data to use as inputs for AI – *Kenya*

The collection of personal data and information is one of the fundamentals of artificial intelligence. For this reason, I believe there will be a negative impact on users' privacy. – *Brazil*

Our data will be constantly collected, even more so than it is now, to feed machine systems. Nothing will be private or sacred anymore. – *Australia*

Multiple, connected sources. Respondents spoke of increasingly expansive data collection and user tracking across smartphones, computers, smart home devices, IoT devices, self-driving cars, and more. They described data being constantly extracted from devices, often highlighting that network connectivity facilitates data collection and increases personal exposure. Some also observed that AI gathers data from the internet or social media.

It's already here. Every time I use my phone or the internet, AI is at work gathering all information passing through my devices – *Philippines*

It makes me think I shouldn't use any connected devices as AI will know exactly what I'm doing at all times. I don't like that at all – *United States*

With everything interconnected privacy will not exist – *Brazil*

there will be no privacy - the AI will have access to ALL information – *Russia*

Crosslinked and aggregated. Beyond tracking across different devices, AI-related data collection and cross-linking was

seen as occurring across different services and systems, and some respondents suggested that different companies or organizations share data with each other, perhaps indiscriminately. This contributed to a sense that a growing amount of personal information is flowing together.

AI could easily connect seemingly innocuous information from across the internet to gain insight into the lives of people and reveal things they might want to keep to themselves –*United States*

Facial recognition and other ways to track people will negatively affect privacy. AI will allow a lot more information to be gathered and collated. –*Australia*

Everything about us will be collected and placed on one platform that can easily be accessed by governments or advertising agencies –*Kenya*

Available and vulnerable. Respondents felt troves of personal data, once accumulated, were available online and vulnerable to legitimate or illegitimate misuse, mishaps, and more. Cloud storage, internet connectivity, or data being held in multiple places were seen as increasing exposure. Respondents described multiple actors who posed a risk to this data. Some might have legitimate but still problematic access, e.g., companies, governments, or wealthy and powerful people who control AI were often characterized as suspicious or bad actors, and respondents observed that the concentration and availability of large amounts of information might provoke unethical use, particularly given lack of strong regulations. Respondents also pointed out that both system errors and human mismanagement of data can compromise security, and even inadvertent leaks can make data completely public.

I'm afraid that there will be some glitch in the system and all my information will be open to a stranger –*Russia*

People will trust AI with more and more personal information and there could be a big leak of that data into the open space of the Internet –*Russia*

Cyberattacks, hackers. Beyond those with legitimate access, others might gain access through illegitimate means. AI was seen as prone to cyberattacks, hackers, criminals, malfunction, and more. Potential data breaches or leaks were particularly concerning because AI was seen as having such a large amount of personal data. Respondents were worried that hackers would be able to take advantage of vulnerabilities and security holes to steal their confidential information, or to take over devices to spy on them. Respondents said that even if careful protective measures were taken, safety against hackers was not guaranteed.

If it's in a computer it can be hacked –*Philippines*

all personal data will be input to a cloud system that can possibly be hacked by an advanced person –*Philippines*

More and more our data will be in databases exposed to strong intrusions by increasingly skilled hackers. –*Brazil*

There will be no privacy since access of personal information will be easy. I also do not think that artificial intelligence can prevent hackers from accessing information. –*Kenya*

No matter how secure it is, I think it will make it easier for leakage of personal information to occur. –*Japan*

I think AI will have access to all our personal data and I believe that there is always a way for malicious people to circumvent security. –*Brazil*

4.2.2 Highly Personal

Beyond scale, respondents characterized how AI increases risks due to *sensitivity of collected data and derived insights*. They pointed out that as AI advances, it becomes better at finding out about people's private lives, AI's data and inferences can be highly personal, and these personal insights are leveraged to influence decisions and behavior. This theme is prominent for people from the United States, Kenya, and the Philippines; and less prevalent in Germany and Russia (Table 2). Concern is higher among younger people ages 16–24 (odds = 1.51, $p < 0.001$). See the Appendix, Table 8 for full modeling results.

Personal data. Respondents described a wide range of sensitive or confidential data that is gathered about people: financial, health, relationships, social media and internet history, entertainment, hobbies, education, occupation, demographic data such as race and religion, household activities, location, and more. There was a strong sense of intrusion and loss of privacy, with the sentiment that this highly detailed data penetrates all aspects of life, seems like more information than necessary, and may be more than people want to share. The view was expressed that people's entire lives will be documented, and they will become entirely "transparent" since everything about them will be known.

Much more private data will be collected and used. Contacts, places you have been to, people you call, websites you visit, what books and articles you read, products you buy and use. Tracking via face recognition. Masses of information to be used to predict behaviour. –*Australia*

Collecting our words and actions down to the smallest detail –*South Korea*

will brazenly violate personal life –*Russia*

I think it will affect privacy in that AI will be privy to immense amounts of our personal data which we do not even realise is available...e.g. doctors' records on us, school records, tax account records, etc. –*Australia*

Personal insights. Respondents explained that this data is combined and processed to yield personal insights. For example, AI was seen as leveraging large data sets to learn people's tastes and interests, surface behaviors and habits, predict future actions, create profiles, or infer feelings or personality traits. Respondents highlighted that such use of big data leads directly to loss of privacy. They also shared that AI may infer

things that people would prefer to keep private, or perhaps reach profound insights about them that they are not even aware of themselves. A few mentioned that AI may have a superhuman capacity to draw conclusions or even look into people's thoughts and read their minds.⁷

Big data will reveal you –*China*

Our privacy will be totally affected because technologies will capture data about our conversations, consumption habits, medication, contacts and everything else to create a database and predict things that may interest us –*Brazil*

Privacy is violated, any citizen can be tracked, their psychological portrait can be created, conclusions can be drawn about their character, etc. –*Russia*

Accumulation and analysis of privacy information. Before you know it, you will learn things that you don't know about yourself. –*Japan*

AI will be able to predict all human individuals' decisions in society. It is connected to devices that are always listening and watching us and will have access to every electronic communication or record that we have ever had. It will know us better than any human possibly could. –*United States*

Influencing decisions and behavior. Companies, governments, and powerful people were seen as using these personal insights for profit or other motives. Information was seen as a tool to influence or manipulate people's decisions and behavior, purchasing and otherwise. Some saw AI as controlled by and benefiting the wealthy, and expected that those with limited means would have more difficulty maintaining their privacy than those with substantial means. Respondents also spoke of companies pushing people towards consumption with targeted advertising and customized services, and sentiment towards companies' use of AI was often extremely negative. We discuss government use of information in more detail below.

It can be used in an evil way by powerful groups in order to take advantage of the personal data of the population, to manipulate and control them –*Brazil*

In the future, people will have no privacy, and any personal data will be controlled by a few people or the government –*China*

All data will be stored in the "Cloud" on which people with power and technology will be able to access it at any given time. –*Philippines*

Large corporations will ruthlessly use AI to market their products or services to a wider demographic by sharing clients' private information with each other. –*Australia*

it will be impossible to resist the advertising, it will be very personalized and literally force you to make the decisions the advertiser wants –*Russia*

⁷If a sentiment was rare and did not occur robustly in the data, we note that it was expressed by "a few" respondents.

4.2.3 Without Consent

Apart from scale and sensitivity, respondents expressed concern that people do not give meaningful *consent* because they are not asked and may not even be aware of how their data is used or gathered, and also because users of online services are required to provide personal data in order to use AI services. Of our themes, this is the least prevalent across countries as shown in Table 2. See the Appendix, Table 9 for full modeling results.

Data gathering and use occur without consent. Respondents expressed concern that AI-powered products and systems gather and use data without people's consent or authorization. Some called out AI's ability to make predictions or draw inferences about non-disclosed aspects of people's lives, without their permission. Others emphasized that once AI gains access to data, people have no control over how it is used or shared.

People's data will be invaded whether they know and give their consent or not. –*Kenya*

Invasion of privacy by spying on me without my consent –*South Korea*

Am not sure I will feel safe in a society where even nanny cams, smart tvs and others will collect personal data without my consent. –*Kenya*

The vast amounts of data now possessed or readily available will be even more searched and analyzed to predict any one individual's patterns and tendencies. The individual has very little meaningful control over how that will be used to influence them or society. –*United States*

Unaware. AI was also seen as operating without people's knowledge. As seen in Section 4.2.4, activities such as spying were particularly likely to be called out as occurring without people being aware. But beyond that, respondents expressed concern that people would not know what AI systems knew about them, what inferences had been drawn, when data was being gathered, whether their information had been stolen, or when or how AI was being used. This lack of information was seen as concerning not only because it compromised trust and transparency, but also because it compromised people's ability to directly manage and control their privacy. Some respondents suggested that some people are more savvy about technology than others, and therefore better able to protect themselves from possible AI-related privacy infringements, and emphasized that those who are less aware of privacy can not protect themselves effectively and will be disproportionately negatively impacted.

It has already invaded households beyond what the majority of people know. There is no privacy now. –*United States*

We will not have privacy anymore. Companies will use our data and we won't even know. –*Brazil*

The public is deceived and privacy continues to be violated behind the scenes. –*Japan*

Personal information required to use services. As has been observed in other contexts [15, 16], respondents felt they were required to provide personal information in order to access services and participate in modern society. For example, some said personal or identifying details are required to register for AI-powered websites, services, and products. This was viewed transactionally, that users provide private information to access services, and further, provide larger amounts of information to get the personalized services and efficiency that AI offers. This contributed to a sense that individuals must give up privacy to improve algorithmic decisions and gain convenience.

We will be forced to give up more private information or will not be able to use new products or systems –*Australia*

Useful features will be available in exchange for the disclosure of personal information. –*Japan*

Artificial intelligence requires people to reveal themselves, while inevitably exposing their privacy –*China*

We lose some privacy in exchange for more efficiency. –*Philippines*

4.2.4 Surveillance and State

Independent of how AI obtains data, respondents shared concerns about how AI can conduct constant surveillance and can be used by governments to fight crime or for population control. This theme is most prevalent for people from Australia, Germany, and the United States as shown in Table 2. This theme is also more popular among men (odds = 1.43, $p < 0.001$). Conversely, this theme is less prevalent in Japan (odds = 0.24, $p < 0.001$), China (odds = 0.31, $p < 0.001$), and Russia (odds = 0.35, $p < 0.001$). See the Appendix, Table 10 for full modeling results.

AI conducts surveillance. AI was often described as an instrument of surveillance. The sense of being surveilled made some respondents feel strange, creepy, or that they had nowhere to hide, or even that they were naked or in a “glass house”. Voice assistants and smart home devices such as Siri and Alexa were highlighted as listening devices that collect information, and AI was characterized as surreptitious, for example, spying, eavesdropping, or watching covertly. Sometimes it was explicitly called out as taking these actions without consent. AI was further described as constantly operating, recording, and analyzing people’s every move, which contributed to respondents’ sense of being continuously monitored and evaluated.

AI will be the ultimate spy –*Australia*

I feel like I’m being monitored at all times. –*Japan*

An AI is like a device with eyes and ears that is watching you 24/7, and storing your personal information –*Philippines*

you won’t know who or what is watching –*Germany*

We have become a surveillance society and privacy is no more. –*Japan*

AI is omnipresent. Respondents also called out AI’s ubiquitous nature, often describing specific devices or locations which contribute to the sense that AI can be all-seeing and all-knowing. For example, respondents mentioned increased prevalence of cameras (CCTV and otherwise), proliferation of electronic devices, drones overhead, and the watchful eyes of robots that observe and evaluate people. They spoke of being monitored at home, in public spaces, on public transportation, in the car (e.g. self-driving Ubers with cameras), and more generally, “everywhere you go”, as well as during all online activities.

It will be everywhere and in everything we use, being able to monitor us –*Brazil*

You cannot dress freely at home, in case AI is out of control –*China*

If everything is artificial, people will be afraid to go to the bathroom and out of the blue the toilet will turn a robot or whatever. –*Brazil*

Surveillance cameras are located everywhere, AI will be able to find any person everywhere and monitor their entire path and actions. –*Russia*

AI identifies people. Beyond this type of monitoring, AI’s ability to identify people through mechanisms such as facial recognition was called out as a key enabler of increased surveillance, and correspondingly AI was seen as reducing people’s ability to be anonymous. Accordingly, AI was viewed as making it easier for governments to manage and evaluate citizens. While effects such as improved policing and criminal investigations were seen as beneficial, facilitating greater access to personal information by law enforcement and security agencies was raised as a concern.

Facial recognition makes it much easier to follow individuals and spy on them. That is good when looking at crime but it is very different when it comes to people going about their normal legal life –*Australia*

I think that even faster and more accurate identification of individuals is progressing, and in some cases, I think that constant observation is also possible. –*Japan*

The government can find out the identity of any individual without having their permission. –*Philippines*

AI makes it easier to find a human being in all the data chaos –*Germany*

AI serves state purposes. Beyond use for law enforcement, AI was seen as serving state purposes such as government control, and was associated with a police state or surveillance state. In fact, some suggested that law enforcement was a pretext to gather data for other government purposes. Regardless, use of AI for state purposes was generally viewed negatively, and respondents across a wide range of countries positioned AI as a potential tool of government oppression, propaganda, or human rights violations.

The use of machines to determine a person's risk to the country will be a breach of one's privacy. *–Kenya*

Data about all citizens will be collected, everybody will be under the state's microscope *–Russia*

It will be possible to spy on the population even more easily than it is now. It will be even easier to control our lives. *–Germany*

In dictatorships, artificial intelligence can be used to identify potential political crimes, resulting in violations of freedom of conscience. *–Japan*

There will be no privacy. They're going to use AI to predict and control the behavior of the population. *–Brazil*

Respondents connected AI with existing real-world and fictional examples of government surveillance and control, such as the Chinese Social Credit System and Big Brother in George Orwell's 1984. Respondents expressed concern that AI would bring these scenarios to fruition in their own countries.

Artificial intelligence will make it easier for governments and companies to monitor the population in a more aggressive way. The personal credit system deployed in China and which has been gaining ground in other countries is an example of this. *–Brazil*

I feel there will be little to no personal privacy, and that worries me. I believe that the Orwellian world will become more reality than fiction. *–Australia*

As in Orwell's book, the more technology, the more observation, and the more exposure, the less privacy *–Brazil*

4.3 Solutions

Respondents said it is important to take steps to alleviate privacy concerns with AI, for example by pursuing responsible development, regulation, the development of new privacy and security technologies, or setting expectations that end users will manage their own privacy. While these ideas were expressed less frequently than our four main privacy themes, we share them here to provide insight into public attitudes regarding potential improvements.

Responsible development. Respondents observed that the impact of AI on privacy depends on the choices and moral character of the people who design, build, and deploy it. Some alluded to principles of responsible development, expressing optimism that careful design and strict security measures can mitigate privacy risk. On the other hand, others called out companies and governments as untrustworthy or unethical, e.g., raising concerns that companies would make questionable choices to maximize profit, that organizations might not be competent to execute well-intended protection plans, or that governments do not have a favorable historic track record for handling sensitive information. Open questions regarding responsible development left AI's expected future impact on

privacy uncertain, but respondents felt one way or another AI would have a big impact on privacy.

I don't think it will affect privacy in a negative way if it is designed correctly *–Australia*

I think it's not so much AI itself, but how data stored by AI is handled. *–Japan*

It's not that I don't trust AI, it's that I can't trust the humans in charge of it. *–South Korea*

Regulation. While some respondents focused on responsible development (which is sometimes associated with self-regulation, although it can also occur within more formal legal frameworks), others focused more directly on formal regulatory measures. Some believed that protective laws are already in place in their countries, while others expressed concern that currently there are no guardrails and said such laws urgently need to be developed. Some were optimistic that regulatory protection would be sufficient while others expressed concern that its effectiveness would depend on the values and priorities of the government, or concern that regulatory response will lag development and deployment of new AI technologies.

Nowadays artificial intelligence is already invasive. I believe that in the future it will worsen if the authorities do not have greater control. *–Brazil*

Without the right protections AI will be able to obtain sensitive data in ways that currently don't exist. This will require new laws to be created to protect privacy in ways that have not been considered to date. *–Australia*

My opinion is that AI will cause loss of privacy if the rules and regulations are not properly managed. *–Kenya*

I think that technology will develop in the future, but privacy protection measures or laws will be stronger. In other words, the state will control AI in terms of privacy. So I think what happens to us now, will happen in the future in terms of privacy. *–China*

Bad actors will use it for morally dubious purposes. Some will use it to improve lives. Our laws will take decades to catch up to the technology to appropriately regulate it. *–United States*

Advanced protective technology. Respondents sometimes framed AI technology and privacy/security technology as opposing forces, and spoke of the need to develop new privacy/security measures to keep pace with new threats posed by AI. While it has long been a desire of the Privacy Enhancing Technology community to develop useful, usable technologies that help people protect their privacy, progress has been limited [44, 83].

There is a war between a robot that steals and a robot that tries to protect. *–South Korea*

The technology to avoid exposure to privacy and the technology to acquire private information are developing at the same time *–South Korea*

Perhaps a lot more user data will be collected hence a higher risk to exposure in the case of hacking incidents. Hence, cyber security will need to be top notch. –Kenya

Individual action. While the predominant attitude was that companies and governments should work to protect users’ information, for example, via responsible development or regulation, a few respondents did value individual action especially in combination with end user privacy controls. A few mentioned that while individuals need to manage their own privacy in theory, some people do not have the information or tech savvy to do so, which will lead to privacy exposure.

5 Discussion

Here we show how the themes we identified come together to build one common, overarching narrative of how our respondents believe AI will shape the future of privacy. We discuss ways the research community, regulators, and technologists can consider mitigating these privacy issues for AI systems, and conclude with further suggestions for engaging the public.

5.1 Overarching Narrative

In working with the data, a dominant, interconnected narrative emerged. While most respondents did not cover all aspects of this narrative, many of them spoke to one or more pieces of it. This narrative encompasses our main themes as well as specific ideas they are composed of.⁸ In this overarching narrative, many ideas are causally connected, e.g. AI needs data, therefore AI involves creating a large dataset, which is then at risk from hackers. To illustrate this narrative, we created the following composite consistent with the content, language, and tone of responses we received across countries [35, 97].

Data is the foundation of AI, so it involves gathering massive troves of data from cameras, smartphones, home assistants, self-driving cars, robots, social media, and many other connected devices and products that touch all aspects of people’s lives. Often this data is collected surreptitiously or without consent, and AI can conduct constant surveillance, identifying people and tracking their movements and activities with technologies like facial recognition. AI combines and analyzes all this data to draw highly personal or even invasive conclusions about individuals, which can be used to influence or manipulate their decisions and behavior, purchasing or otherwise. Between data and inferences, AI may learn essentially everything about a person. All this personal information sits around online or in the cloud where it is at risk from hackers and malfunction. Companies, governments, and powerful people

⁸From an analytic perspective, specific ideas in the narrative generally correspond to codes in our analysis, e.g. AI needs data, AI listens, data is available, and each of these codes is assigned to one of our themes. Solutions are a logical extension of the main narrative, and while less common, respondents sometimes included them along with other ideas from the narrative. Ideas that were positive about AI’s expected impact on privacy generally seemed separate and did not tend to co-occur with the overarching narrative.

control AI and can use it for good or bad purposes. Companies typically use it for profit and governments typically use it to fight crime or control the population. Because of AI’s nature and capabilities, its use leads to substantial or even total loss of privacy. –Composite Across Respondents and Countries

This narrative appears across all countries in our sample, with varying emphasis and some local twists (e.g., elevated antagonism towards corporate marketing in the United States, or particular emphasis on government surveillance in Russia). Similarly, many individual respondents touched on various combinations of these ideas, often calling out two or three (or more) ideas from this overarching narrative (one common pattern was to connect personal data and hackers). For example, here is a particularly long response:

AI will become more intrusive and we will continue to lose the last bits of privacy we have if we don’t enact laws to restrict how it is used. The most obvious example is more cameras will be installed in all public places, using AI to process the images/video for various reasons such as safety (criminal “behaviour”), access to places, identification verification, etc. London already has a network like this so they have already lost any privacy in public. Technology already tracks where we go via our phones that are ubiquitous, AI will continue to expand to use that information along with previous behaviour that is stored to do things like show us “personalized” advertising. The data will be sold to other companies to use with their proprietary AI that will be used to evaluate people for jobs, loans, housing, etc. Basically, data collection will increase and AI will be developed to connect a lot of disparate information to personally identify us and then AI will be used to influence important decisions about our lives - and we won’t even know it. A combination of super data collection and AI will be the death of privacy in the future. –United States

Beliefs about technology are often grounded in folk models, with inconsistent or inaccurate elements. By contrast, this narrative and its language are well-aligned with messages in the popular press, e.g., [3, 17, 30, 46, 48, 55, 64, 67, 70, 72, 84, 99] as well as expert opinion expressed in policy briefs [34, 58] and scholarly articles [2, 29, 31, 60, 66, 76, 101]. Further, it is largely consistent with common factual representations, and does not appear to contradict itself. While expressions of ideas were sometimes hazy or incomplete, respondents across countries largely seem to be discussing pieces of the same coherent narrative, rather than expressing completely different ideas. An area for future work is to investigate how specifically respondents came to have these beliefs. Further, these beliefs merit further study as AI becomes more common and as the most visible examples or messages in the press shift. As an example, the recent rise of generative AI technologies (e.g., ChatGPT, Midjourney) may or may not lead respondents in future surveys to have different privacy considerations.

5.2 Mitigating Concerns

Addressing the four privacy themes that we observed in our study will require a unique combination of education, technol-

ogy design, and policy changes.⁹ We describe an initial set of potential directions for researchers, platforms, and policy makers to help mitigate user concerns.

Highly Personal. One potential direction to address the sensitivity of data *ingested* by AI models would be to leverage privacy enhancing learning algorithms. These strategies—such as student-teacher models [79], federated learning [62], and differential privacy [53]—help to ensure that models do not memorize an individual’s sensitive training data, which might otherwise be leaked depending on the model’s architecture [21, 22]. However, while these strategies may add protection in some cases, they may not be suitable or effective in other cases. For example, these strategies do not address user concerns that AI systems can be used to *infer* sensitive attributes; or indeed, surface inferences about an individual they might otherwise have thought private or idiosyncratic [45]. While the Overton window around acceptable AI applications is likely to shift in the next few years (e.g., due to benefits of new AI technologies), commitments around AI principles from platforms and potential privacy regulation can help to assuage concerns that technical solutions are presently unable to address.

Data at Risk and Without Consent. Addressing privacy concerns around data collection for AI algorithms and consent is more challenging. These concerns dovetail long-standing user sentiment that platforms monitor every transaction, interaction, or click for advertising and recommendation algorithms [42, 91, 94, 105] and are thus likely only to be exacerbated by emerging AI technologies. Policies such as the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)¹⁰ have attempted to ensure any data collection that occurs has a pre-defined use case, and requires “freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous” consent, which users must be able to withdraw. Policy makers might explore similar applications to AI training data. Concerns around inadvertent exposure are easier to address: techniques like federated learning [62] represent a promising direction to ensure that non-aggregated data never leaves a user’s device, thus providing some mitigation against data breaches or insider risk [80].

State and Surveillance. Addressing potentially harmful applications of AI—particularly those operated by government or quasi-government actors—remains an open challenge. Platforms can help to prevent state surveillance by committing to responsible practices that constrain the use or distribution of certain technologies, or even prohibit their development entirely [54]¹¹. Researchers have considered adversarial

⁹While we do see some differences based on age, education, understanding of AI, and country on overall attitudes regarding the impact of AI on privacy, we see the same four themes arising across the countries studied. Therefore, we believe that when we consider mitigations, we can take a global perspective.

¹⁰<https://eugdpr.org/>

¹¹<https://ai.google/principles>,
<https://www.ibm.com/artificial-intelligence/ethics>,
<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/ai/our-approach>

techniques to deceive facial recognition [86] and audio tracking [23], as well as jamming data collection entirely [31], but these remain proof-of-concept only. Further research is needed into policy and technical mitigation of AI-assisted surveillance.

5.3 Civic Participation

Experts and members of the public have called for greater public participation in policymaking and decisions about AI [101]. Such civic engagement can encompass a wide range of activities, from attending city council meetings to express opinions about whether local law enforcement should use facial recognition, to voting for laws or candidates aligned with one’s own beliefs about the use and development of AI, or participating in joint problem-solving with policy makers and technologists.

However, public knowledge has been viewed as a significant barrier to such participation for many aspects of AI such as explainability and automated decision-making [77, 88, 100, 101], sometimes addressed through small-scale interventions in which members of the public receive training in order to provide feedback on a policy question [7, 9, 50, 93]. Happily, our research is cause for optimism that the public may be better prepared than expected to discuss privacy-related aspects of AI. While some members of the public may not have a full general understanding of AI and many may not have a detailed understanding of its specific operations, many members of the public do appear to be conversant in high level-issues and have well-described concerns regarding AI’s impact on privacy, and these attitudes are broadly aligned with issues raised by experts. Our findings are encouraging for both immediate public participation and facilitated joint problem-solving.

6 Conclusion

In this work, we surveyed 10,011 respondents in 10 countries to understand how and why people believe AI will affect privacy in the future. We found that privacy was a consistent, global concern, with 49% of respondents saying they would have “less privacy” due to AI over the next 10 years. We presented a thematic analysis of privacy concerns surrounding AI and identified four key themes, which align with experts and privacy advocates. These themes struck on how the substantial data required to train AI models may be misused or hacked; how data and inferences may reveal highly personal details; that data collection and use can occur without meaningful consent; and that AI may be used for surveillance or government purposes. We discussed avenues that researchers, industry, and policy makers might explore to mitigate these concerns, such as adopting privacy enhancing technologies or AI principles. In light of the public’s comprehension of the benefits and potential harms surrounding AI, discussions on the future of AI and privacy can potentially leverage civic participation to arrive at the best balance of solutions.

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Appendix

7 Survey Instrument – Select items

Exposure to AI

In the past 12 months, how much have you heard about Artificial Intelligence (AI)?

- A great amount
- A lot
- A moderate amount
- A little bit
- Nothing at all

Knowledge – best description

In your own understanding, which of the following best describes Artificial Intelligence (AI)?

- Any advanced technology
- A system of connected devices
- Technology that can learn or think
- Robot
- Fake News
- Not sure

Knowledge – best example

Which of the following do you think is the best example of Artificial Intelligence (AI)?

- Self-driving car
- Computer
- Fast internet connection
- Spreadsheet

Next 10 Years – privacy

In the next ten years, what do you think will happen in [COUNTRY LABEL] because of Artificial Intelligence (AI)?

- More Privacy
- No Change
- Less Privacy
- Don't know

For each of the questions in Table 1 a parallel Next 10 Years question was asked, e.g., “More jobs created” vs. “More jobs lost” or “Better healthcare” vs. “Worse healthcare”, etc.

How will AI affect privacy?

Now we would like to ask you to think about Artificial Intelligence (AI) and privacy. In what ways will Artificial Intelligence (AI) affect privacy in the future? Please be specific.

{ Open-end }

8 More Privacy

While the preponderance of our respondents expect AI to have a negative effect on privacy, some expect it to have a positive effect. While many respondents did not offer an explanation, some shared reasons they are optimistic that AI will protect people's privacy, and often connected these ideas with security protection as well.

While one might expect that positive responses may have just been a “halo effect” due to a general belief that AI will affect everything in society in a positive way, some respondents shared specific reasons why they believed AI could truly improve their privacy. We detail four of those types of responses here:

AI defends against hackers. Some respondents suggested AI will keep people's information more secure by defending it against malicious actors. Some even suggested AI could use its learning capabilities to profile and defeat hackers. Others proposed that AI would be useful in detecting security or data breaches.

AI can identify scams and keep private information safe – *Australia*

AI can prevent you from being hacked and information is therefore more secure. – *Germany*

Reinforcing defense capabilities by learning attack patterns against hacking – *South Korea*

If used properly it could continuously monitor your personal data and search for breaches – *United States*

AI provides safe storage. Some respondents also believe AI keeps data safe. AI was associated with safe storage, secure networks, and encryption. For example, respondents observed that in the era of AI, records will be digitized rather than remaining in paper format and will be securely stored and encrypted.

Massive data will be stored on the AI side, paper files will be eliminated, and privacy will be effectively protected – *China*

There will be less reliance on humans to protect the privacy of users, and AI will be able to create more complex systems to encrypt and protect our data – *Australia*

AI will likely improve privacy since the information fed into the computer is safely stored and no person handles it directly – *Kenya*

AI provides advanced authentication. Some respondents mentioned that AI's authentication capabilities offers them

improved privacy or security as compared with alphanumeric passwords. For example, they called out the use of AI-driven biometric affordances such as facial or fingerprint recognition to unlock phones or voice recognition to authenticate a user to a robot or assistant.

Artificial intelligence may increase privacy in general if someone is able to set their devices to recognize only them but not strangers. –*Kenya*

I don't know for sure, but you can have a fingerprint recognition system without password that brings security against hackers. –*Brazil*

AI reduces human involvement. Some participants shared that AI will improve privacy by reducing human-human interaction and human involvement in data processing tasks, and suggested that AI can handle information more reliably and

discreetly than humans.

I imagine AI will allow people to interface with intelligent computers rather than people for sensitive matters like banking. It might make things more secure. –*United States*

less contact with human hands would mean there would be minimal loss of data or selling of data. –*Kenya*

If artificial intelligence manages privacy, leakage by humans will be eliminated. –*Japan*

In public opinion polling, the position that AI may have a positive effect on privacy is often dismissed as naive or non-specific. For example, positive responses may reflect a general belief that AI will affect everything in a very positive way. Notably, however, some respondents shared specific reasons that would likely be viewed as legitimate by privacy and security experts.

<i>Country</i>	Australia	Germany	Japan	South Korea	United States
<i>HDI Rank</i>	5 th	9 th	19 th	19 th	21 st
<i>Languages offered</i>	English	German	Japanese	Korean	English
<i>Weighting</i>	age, gender, education, region, smartphone OS	age, gender, education, region, smartphone OS	age, gender, education, region, smartphone OS	age, gender, education, region, smartphone OS	age, gender, education, region, smartphone OS, race, HH income, metropolitan status
<i>Respondents</i>	1000	1001	1001	1000	1002
<i>Gender</i>	47% men 52% women	49% men 50% women	53% men 47% women	46% men 53% women	51% men 48% women
<i>Age</i>					
16-24	11%	15%	10%	16%	10%
25-34	15%	16%	23%	19%	13%
35-44	17%	16%	22%	23%	15%
45-54	11%	14%	15%	27%	16%
55-64	17%	15%	11%	11%	22%
65+	30%	23%	18%	3%	24%
<i>Education</i>					
Some primary/secondary	21%	32%	4%	10%	12%
Completed high school	16%	17%	29%	15%	25%
Some college or vocational	29%	27%	17%	6%	28%
Completed Bach. or more	33%	22%	50%	66%	35%

<i>Country</i>	Russia	China	Brazil	Philippines	Kenya
<i>HDI Rank</i>	52 nd	79 th	87 th	116 th	152 nd
<i>Languages offered</i>	Russian	Chinese	Brazilian Portuguese	English, Tagalog	English
<i>Weighting</i>	age, gender, education, region, smartphone OS	age, gender, education, region, smartphone OS	age, gender, education, region, smartphone OS	age, gender, education, region, smartphone OS	age, gender, education, region, smartphone OS
<i>Respondents</i>	1000	1004	1001	1000	1002
<i>Gender</i>	46% men 54% women	54% men 46% women	46% men 54% women	45% men 55% women	52% men 48% women
<i>Age</i>					
16-24	10%	16%	34%	30%	26%
25-34	35%	26%	23%	35%	39%
35-44	20%	25%	22%	21%	20%
45-54	21%	23%	12%	10%	10%
55-64	12%	8%	8%	3%	4%
65+	3%	2%	2%	1%	1%
<i>Education</i>					
Some primary/secondary	3%	3%	12%	3%	4%
Completed high school	6%	10%	29%	15%	9%
Some college or vocational	27%	20%	17%	29%	38%
Completed Bach. or more	63%	66%	42%	53%	49%

Table 3: Country details, respondent summary and demographics. Percentages for gender and education may not add up to 100% due to participants who preferred to self-describe or not disclose. All numbers and percentages here are unweighted; throughout the rest of the paper all numbers are weighted, by country, based on the weighting variables above. We show HDI ranks from the 2022 Human Development Report <https://hdr.undp.org/content/human-development-report-2021-22>, which uses HDI values from 2021, aligning with the dates of our survey deployment.

	Global average	Australia	Brazil	China	Germany	Japan	Kenya	Philippines	Russia	South Korea	United States
<i>AI Knowledge – best description</i>											
Technology that can learn or think	47%	49%	50%	38%	53%	53%	38%	41%	57%	27%	63%
Robot	21%	18%	17%	24%	20%	18%	27%	20%	23%	30%	10%
Any advanced technology	15%	13%	12%	14%	5%	21%	19%	24%	6%	24%	9%
A system of connected devices	10%	8%	14%	20%	10%	6%	7%	8%	6%	14%	3%
Fake news	1%	3%	1%	1%	2%	1%	1%	1%	1%	2%	1%
Not sure	7%	9%	5%	3%	10%	2%	10%	5%	7%	3%	13%
Refused	0%	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1%
<i>AI Knowledge – best example</i>											
Self-driving car	57%	68%	44%	58%	61%	63%	39%	55%	59%	55%	71%
Computer	27%	24%	34%	13%	23%	24%	45%	32%	30%	23%	22%
Fast internet connection	13%	6%	21%	25%	12%	11%	14%	10%	9%	18%	3%
Spreadsheet	3%	3%	1%	4%	5%	2%	2%	3%	3%	4%	1%
Refused	0%	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	3%

Table 4: Summary results for our two AI knowledge questions. Item selection was based on open-ended responses in our own previous research as well as iterative piloting in an online survey platform.

Privacy Themes		
31%	Highly Personal	Personal Data, Intrusive, Tracking, Corporations/Companies, Location, Personalization, Data Analysis, Targeting, Social Media, Other Services and Retail, Ads, Daily life, Ads Follow Me, Self-driving, Other Internet Services, Profit, Home Appliances, Search Engine, Deep Fakes, Amazon, Google [the company],...
29%	Data at Risk	Hacking, Collection, Available, Needs Data, Connected, Bad Purposes, Big Data, Devices, Phone, Internet, Collation,...
12%	State and Surveillance	Listening, Surveillance, Governments, Biometrics, Security Cameras, Camera, Control Population, Conversation, Criminals, Catch Criminals, Country, Assistant,...
5%	Without Consent	Consent, Unaware.
Privacy Sentiment		
58%	Negative sentiment or part of a theme	Codes used in all themes above, and: Less Privacy, No Privacy, Facilitation, Danger, Fear, Privacy, Hurt.
12%	Positive sentiment	More Privacy, Security, Less Human Contact.
Overall Response Quality		
75%	Expressed any privacy statement	All codes above, and other non-sentiment privacy codes, including: No Effect on Privacy, Data, Effect on Privacy Depends, It Will Impact Privacy, Other Remediation, Other Privacy, Regulation, Too Early to Tell,...
18%	Don't know	I don't know, Inarticulate, Blank or no comment, Unable to code.
8%	Any other, unrelated response	Any other code, including: Technology, Computer, Advanced, Inevitable, Useful, AI Takes Over, Other, Job loss, Productivity, Learn, Future, Think, Robot, Helpful, Concern, Machine, Other Applications, AI Replaces Humans, Makes Mistakes, Improves Quality of Life, Program, Could Go Either Way, Home/House, Good and bad, Automated, Intelligence, Benefits, Unfair, Other Sentiment, Responsibility, Powerful, Humans Get Less Skilled, Bad, Autonomy, Not Trustworthy, Assist, Communication, Mechanical,...

Table 5: Open-ended codes used to create each theme, sentiment grouping, and to describe overall response quality. This table shows all codes that had 25 or more uses, totaled across all countries. Codes were assigned to themes based on emergent clustering. For example, the “Corporations/Companies” code was assigned to the “Highly Personal” theme because mentions of corporations/companies in the context of the privacy question were typically about invasive corporate use of personal data.

Factor	Control	Treatment	Odds	P> z
Country	United States	Japan	0.24	0.000
Country	United States	Russia	0.40	0.000
Country	United States	China	0.42	0.000
Country	United States	Kenya	0.47	0.000
Country	United States	Philippines	0.48	0.000
Country	United States	South Korea	0.50	0.000
Country	United States	Brazil	0.52	0.000
Country	United States	Australia	0.61	0.000
Country	United States	Germany	0.61	0.000
Age	16-24	25-34	0.89	0.088
Age	16-24	35-44	0.99	0.879
Age	16-24	55-64	1.03	0.763
Age	16-24	45-54	1.11	0.146
Age	16-24	65+	1.53	0.000
Gender	Male	Female	1.07	0.099
Gender	Male	Prefer To Self-Describe	4.31	0.070
Education	Some primary or secondary	Completed high school	1.20	0.017
Education	Some primary or secondary	Some college or vocational studies	1.24	0.003
Education	Some primary or secondary	Completed Bachelor's or more	1.59	0.000
Definition of AI	Not Sure	Any Advanced Technology	1.94	0.000
Definition of AI	Not Sure	Robot	2.32	0.000
Definition of AI	Not Sure	A System Of Connected Devices	2.39	0.000
Definition of AI	Not Sure	Fake News	2.69	0.000
Definition of AI	Not Sure	Technology That Can Learn Or Think	3.13	0.000
Example of AI	Spreadsheet	Fast Internet Connection	1.28	0.098
Example of AI	Spreadsheet	Computer	1.62	0.001
Example of AI	Spreadsheet	Self-Driving Car	2.27	0.000
Exposure to AI	A Moderate Amount	A Great Amount	0.76	0.000
Exposure to AI	A Moderate Amount	Nothing At All	0.84	0.027
Exposure to AI	A Moderate Amount	A Lot	0.95	0.365
Exposure to AI	A Moderate Amount	A Little Bit	1.23	0.001

Table 6: Odds of a respondent believing they will have “less privacy” in ten years due to AI when holding all factors but one constant. Reporting includes all data, irrespective of $p < 0.05$.

Factor	Control	Treatment	Odds	P> z
Country	United States	Russia	0.23	0.000
Country	United States	Germany	0.37	0.000
Country	United States	South Korea	0.53	0.000
Country	United States	China	0.70	0.002
Country	United States	Japan	0.74	0.008
Country	United States	Brazil	0.75	0.011
Country	United States	Australia	1.12	0.285
Country	United States	Philippines	1.14	0.239
Country	United States	Kenya	1.16	0.178
Age	16-24	65+	0.52	0.000
Age	16-24	55-64	0.59	0.000
Age	16-24	35-44	0.63	0.000
Age	16-24	45-54	0.69	0.000
Age	16-24	25-34	0.78	0.000
Gender	Male	Female	1.09	0.088
Education	Some primary or secondary	Completed high school	1.39	0.000
Education	Some primary or secondary	Some college or vocational studies	1.66	0.000
Education	Some primary or secondary	Completed Bachelor's or more	1.95	0.000
Definition of AI	Not Sure	Fake News	1.90	0.026
Definition of AI	Not Sure	Robot	2.59	0.000
Definition of AI	Not Sure	Any Advanced Technology	2.61	0.000
Definition of AI	Not Sure	A System Of Connected Devices	3.36	0.000
Definition of AI	Not Sure	Technology That Can Learn Or Think	3.62	0.000
Example of AI	Spreadsheet	Fast Internet Connection	1.80	0.007
Example of AI	Spreadsheet	Computer	2.51	0.000
Example of AI	Spreadsheet	Self-Driving Car	3.21	0.000
Exposure to AI	A Moderate Amount	Nothing At All	0.71	0.000
Exposure to AI	A Moderate Amount	A Great Amount	0.86	0.049
Exposure to AI	A Moderate Amount	A Little Bit	0.87	0.037
Exposure to AI	A Moderate Amount	A Lot	1.06	0.382

Table 7: Odds of a respondent sharing a theme coded as **Data at Risk** in their top-of-mind concerns related to privacy and AI. Reporting includes all data, irrespective of $p < 0.05$.

Factor	Control	Treatment	Odds	P> z
Country	United States	Russia	0.31	0.000
Country	United States	Germany	0.32	0.000
Country	United States	South Korea	0.54	0.000
Country	United States	Japan	0.59	0.000
Country	United States	China	0.65	0.000
Country	United States	Brazil	0.74	0.007
Country	United States	Australia	0.81	0.046
Country	United States	Kenya	0.97	0.807
Country	United States	Philippines	1.18	0.117
Age	16-24	65+	0.66	0.000
Age	16-24	45-54	0.86	0.064
Age	16-24	35-44	0.87	0.066
Age	16-24	25-34	0.90	0.147
Age	16-24	55-64	0.95	0.578
Gender	Male	Female	1.06	0.219
Education	Some primary or secondary	Completed high school	1.58	0.000
Education	Some primary or secondary	Some college or vocational studies	2.08	0.000
Education	Some primary or secondary	Completed Bachelor's or more	2.18	0.000
Definition of AI	Not Sure	Fake News	1.45	0.165
Definition of AI	Not Sure	Any Advanced Technology	1.62	0.001
Definition of AI	Not Sure	Robot	1.67	0.000
Definition of AI	Not Sure	A System Of Connected Devices	2.08	0.000
Definition of AI	Not Sure	Technology That Can Learn Or Think	2.59	0.000
Example of AI	Spreadsheet	Fast Internet Connection	1.43	0.067
Example of AI	Spreadsheet	Computer	1.72	0.004
Example of AI	Spreadsheet	Self-Driving Car	2.38	0.000
Exposure to AI	A Moderate Amount	Nothing At All	0.52	0.000
Exposure to AI	A Moderate Amount	A Great Amount	0.74	0.000
Exposure to AI	A Moderate Amount	A Little Bit	0.86	0.025
Exposure to AI	A Moderate Amount	A Lot	0.88	0.039

Table 8: Odds of a respondent sharing a theme coded as **Highly Personal** in their top-of-mind concerns related to privacy and AI. Reporting includes all data, irrespective of $p < 0.05$.

Factor	Control	Treatment	Odds	P> z
Country	United States	Russia	0.15	0.000
Country	United States	Germany	0.28	0.000
Country	United States	South Korea	0.36	0.000
Country	United States	Brazil	0.60	0.018
Country	United States	China	0.60	0.016
Country	United States	Kenya	0.73	0.113
Country	United States	Australia	0.81	0.273
Country	United States	Japan	0.88	0.535
Country	United States	Philippines	0.92	0.684
Age	16-24	65+	0.66	0.065
Age	16-24	45-54	0.85	0.324
Age	16-24	35-44	0.91	0.531
Age	16-24	25-34	1.02	0.868
Age	16-24	55-64	1.13	0.500
Gender	Male	Female	1.13	0.219
Education	Some primary or secondary	Completed high school	0.93	0.724
Education	Some primary or secondary	Completed Bachelor's or more	1.42	0.063
Education	Some primary or secondary	Some college or vocational studies	1.47	0.040
Definition of AI	Not Sure	Fake News	0.46	0.406
Definition of AI	Not Sure	A System Of Connected Devices	1.33	0.417
Definition of AI	Not Sure	Any Advanced Technology	1.35	0.362
Definition of AI	Not Sure	Robot	1.42	0.282
Definition of AI	Not Sure	Technology That Can Learn Or Think	2.03	0.023
Example of AI	Spreadsheet	Computer	1.73	0.298
Example of AI	Spreadsheet	Fast Internet Connection	2.16	0.151
Example of AI	Spreadsheet	Self-Driving Car	2.90	0.040
Exposure to AI	A Moderate Amount	Nothing At All	0.51	0.002
Exposure to AI	A Moderate Amount	A Great Amount	0.83	0.231
Exposure to AI	A Moderate Amount	A Little Bit	0.90	0.458
Exposure to AI	A Moderate Amount	A Lot	0.97	0.824

Table 9: Odds of a respondent sharing a theme coded as **Without Consent** in their top-of-mind concerns related to privacy and AI. Reporting includes all data, irrespective of $p < 0.05$.

Factor	Control	Treatment	Odds	P> z
Country	United States	Japan	0.24	0.000
Country	United States	China	0.31	0.000
Country	United States	Russia	0.35	0.000
Country	United States	South Korea	0.50	0.001
Country	United States	Philippines	0.56	0.007
Country	United States	Germany	0.58	0.008
Country	United States	Brazil	0.69	0.065
Country	United States	Kenya	1.08	0.699
Country	United States	Australia	1.19	0.319
Age	16-24	35-44	1.39	0.040
Age	16-24	25-34	1.44	0.015
Age	16-24	65+	1.56	0.025
Age	16-24	55-64	1.59	0.015
Age	16-24	45-54	1.62	0.003
Gender	Male	Female	0.70	0.000
Education	Some primary or secondary	Completed Bachelor's or more	1.48	0.031
Education	Some primary or secondary	Some college or vocational studies	1.57	0.013
Education	Some primary or secondary	Completed high school	1.65	0.008
Definition of AI	Not Sure	Fake News	1.56	0.509
Definition of AI	Not Sure	Robot	2.29	0.026
Definition of AI	Not Sure	A System Of Connected Devices	2.80	0.008
Definition of AI	Not Sure	Any Advanced Technology	3.18	0.002
Definition of AI	Not Sure	Technology That Can Learn Or Think	3.18	0.001
Example of AI	Spreadsheet	Fast Internet Connection	2.08	0.155
Example of AI	Spreadsheet	Computer	2.59	0.057
Example of AI	Spreadsheet	Self-Driving Car	2.90	0.031
Exposure to AI	A Moderate Amount	Nothing At All	0.69	0.057
Exposure to AI	A Moderate Amount	A Little Bit	1.00	0.994
Exposure to AI	A Moderate Amount	A Lot	1.07	0.610
Exposure to AI	A Moderate Amount	A Great Amount	1.38	0.024

Table 10: Odds of a respondent sharing a theme coded as **State and Surveillance** in their top-of-mind concerns related to privacy and AI. Reporting includes all data, irrespective of $p < 0.05$.