WiP: Where's Eve? Evaluating Student Threat Modeling Performance & Perceptions

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Motivation

Modeling Threat in industry important and required in some cases by federal regulation.


Research Questions

- 1.Can students find threats in a given system?
- 2.Which parts of STRIDE do students find challenging?

STRIDE Method

Spoofing	Impersonating another user
Tampering	Altering data
Repudiation	Claiming you didn't do something
Information disclosure	Leaking or accessing information
Denial of service	Exhausting resources or blocking access
Elevation of privilege	Completing root-level actions

Threat Model Activity



Participants

Junior/Senior undergrad CS students at Tufts University:

- 2 no security courses
- 1 cyber warfare course only
- 1 intro security course only
- 1 intro security and internship

Preliminary Results Participant Threat Modeling Performance 25 Attack-focused approach use beneficial Threats were overall Lower scores low quality had more invalid threats 10 Total Threats Assumptions Score No Experience Security Course(s) Professional Experience Perceived Utility and Usability Repudiation was most difficult. Which parts of STRIDE Both definition of the term and are most difficult? where it applies were confusing. Requires further investigation. One

Which stages of TM is

STRIDE most useful for?

student liked that it elicited both

technical and nontechnical threats.