

Dumbo-MPC: Efficient Fully Asynchronous MPC with Optimal Resilience


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
In Need of Practical Asynchronous MPC

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Prior Art & Remaining Challenges

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
Our Solution: Dumbo-MPC



In Need of Practical Asynchronous MPC

Secure Multi-Party Computation

Collectively compute: $Y = F(x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4, x_5)$



■ Jointly and privately compute function

- **Correctness (integrity):** correct evaluation result
- **Privacy:** leaking nothing except the result

MPC-as-a-Service (MPCaaS)

MPCaaS with offline-online paradigm

Offline phase


Beaver triples $([a], [b], [c])$ where $c = ab$

Random shares $[r]$


Online phase

Handle private inputs


Privately evaluate function f



Call for Robustness (G.O.D.)



In the application of private smart contract, we expect **G.O.D. !!!** Otherwise, censorship !!!



Private Smart Contract



Enigma Project

6.5K Followers

Follow

Home About

Enigma Project in Enigma

Introducing Secret Network


Our mainnet blockchain is now known as Secret Network, thanks t...



May 27, 2020 626 1




Call for Robustness (G.O.D.) in Asynchrony




Transaction's cipher

TX Execution Result



MPCaaS



Most Earlier MPCaaS:
In-house deployment in
Local Area Network !!!



New Demand:
Global deployment over
unreliable **Internet !!!**

- Transmission interruption
- Fluctuating bandwidth
- Internet attacks
- Network misconfiguration

Call for Robustness (G.O.D.) in Asynchrony

■ We separate the network conditions as:


- **Synchronous Network:**

Exist **known** upper bound of network delay

- **Asynchronous Network:**

Network delay is not only **unknown** but also **unfixed**;
Nevertheless, messages can be **eventually** delivered;
Make *minimal* assumptions about the network condition.

Network	Computationally-Secure Robust MPC
Sync.	$t < n/2$
Async.	$t < n/3$



TCP (enhanced by TLS)
is Asynchronous !!!

Vulnerabilities of Sync. MPC in Asynchrony

Most (practical) MPCaaS is synchronous !!

■ G.O.D. Violation in Async.

- Excluding those inherent impossible: $t < n$
- Many expected robust MPC:
 - ✓ Not *robust* at all in async.

Why cannot wait messages forever to restore robustness ?

Protocols	Thld. ($t <$)	IT online	asyn. securities	
			Privacy	GOD
HN06 [56]	$n/2$	✗	✗	✗
GLZ20 [51]	$n/2$	✓	✗	✗
GLS19 [49]	$n/3$	✓	✗	✗
DN07 [41]	$n/3$	✓	✗	✗
BH08 [13]	$n/3$	✓	✗	✗
VIFF [37]	$n/3$	✓	✓	✗
HyperMPC [9]	$n/3$	✓	✓	✗
SPDZ [40, 42]	n	✓	✓	✗
EMP [78]	n	✗	✓	✗

Taking BGW as example:

Have to gather all honest parties' shares to correct malicious shares, which is impossible !

That's the challenge of asynchrony !!!

Vulnerabilities of Sync. MPC in Asynchrony

Most (practical) MPCaaS is synchronous !!

■ Privacy Breach in Async.

- Many expected robust MPC:
 - ✓ *not private* in async.

Many sync. robust MPC “eject” unresponsive parties !

In asynchrony, honest parties can be eventually all “ejected” !

Protocols	Thld. ($t <$)	IT online	asyn. securities	
			Privacy	GOD
HN06 [56]	$n/2$	✗	✗	✗
GLZ20 [51]	$n/2$	✓	✗	✗
GLS19 [49]	$n/3$	✓	✗	✗
DN07 [41]	$n/3$	✓	✗	✗
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VIFF [37]	$n/3$	✓	✓	✗
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SPDZ [40, 42]	n	✓	✓	✗
EMP [78]	n	✗	✓	✗

Design Objective

■ Threat model:

- **Full Asynchrony:**
 - ✓ adversary can arbitrarily delay messages
- **Optimal Resilience:**
 - ✓ against $t < n/3$ malicious corruptions (servers)

■ Security goal:

- **Private and G.O.D.**

■ Efficiency requirement:

- almost **I.T. online** phase
- concretely and asymptotically efficient

Protocols	Thld. ($t <$)	I.T. online	asyn. G.O.D.	comm. / gate		# secrets to be shared per triple
				Good	Bad	
CHP13 [30]	$n/4$	✓	✓	$O(n)$	$O(n)$	48
CP17 [32]	$n/4$	✓	✓	$O(n)$	$O(n)$	48
DXKR23 [41] [‡]	$n/3$	✓	✗	$O(n^3)$	–	$2n$
	$n/4$	✓	✓	$O(n^3)$	$O(n^3)$	$2n$
hbMPC [66]	$n/3$	✓	✗	$O(n)$	–	12
HNP08 [60]	$n/3$	✗	✓	$O(n^2)$	$O(n^2)$	-
CP15 [31] [†]	$n/3$	✗	✓	$O(n)$	$O(n)$	-
CHL21 [28]	$n/3$	✗	✓	$O(n^2)$	$O(n^2)$	-
PCR08 [60]	$n/3$	✓	✓	$O(n^5)$	$O(n^5)$	$9n + 6$
CP23 [33]	$n/3$	✓	✓	$O(n^4)$	$O(n^4)$	$6n$
SS23 [77]	$n/3$	✓	✓	$O(n^2)$	$O(n^3)$	$6n$
GS23 [54]	$n/3$	✓	✓	$O(n^2)$	$O(n^3)$	$3n$
GLS24[52]	$n/3$	✓	✓	$O(n)$	$O(n)$	$\sim 230K$
Dumbo-MPC	$n/3$	✓	✓	$O(n)$	$O(n^2)$	$n + 6$




Prior Art & Remaining Challenges

GRR98/GS23

- Random sharing + degree reduction
+ Pedersen polynomial commitment + proof-of-product over Pedersen

1. Generation of random sharing



GRR98/GS23



■ Random sharing + degree reduction + Pedersen polynomial commitment + proof-of-product over Pedersen

PoK_Prod_Ped

$\{ ([a]^i, [b]^i, [ab]_{2t}^i) :$
 $[ab]_{2t}^i = [a]^i [b]^i$
 C_a^i commits $[a]^i,$
 C_b^i commits $[b]^i,$
 C_{ci}^0 commits $[ab]_{2t}^i \}$

Homomorphism allows to
 compute each share's
 Pedersen commitment
 \Rightarrow
 Then prove prod of shares
 over Pedersen

2. Degree reduction of product's share



GRR98/GS23

- Random sharing + degree reduction
+ Pedersen polynomial commitment + proof-of-product over Pedersen

- Remaining efficiency issues:


- Worst-case *cubic* communication complexity per triple
(due to large size of Pedersen commitment)
- Require $3n$ secrets to be shared per triple
(due to inefficient generation of random sharing)

HoneyBadgerMPC: sacrifice offline robustness

- Robust online phase + **non-robust** offline phase (requiring all parties honest)

=> **no G.O.D.**, but can generate triples much faster than GS23 in very good case

Non-robust
offline
eventually
means
non-robust
online




Recap the state-of-the-art

- **GS23**: all-phase **robust**, but very **inefficient**
- **hbMPC**: offline **non-robust**, but **more efficient in good case**
- **Question: Can we have the best-of-both ?**
 - **Bad case**: both asymptotically and concretely better than GS23
 - **Good case**: at least as high performant as hbMPC and can securely fallback when optimistic condition fails



Our Solution: Dumbo-MPC


High-level overview



Proof of secrets' product over KZG

■ Devise proof-of-product relation over KZG commitment

- why Pedersen convenient \Rightarrow interpolate in exponent to derive any evaluation's commitment
- Augment KZG commitment by introducing **hidden evaluation interface**





- Hidden evaluations are:
 - ✓ **Binding** \Rightarrow cannot open as secrets not binding to C
 - ✓ **Hiding** \Rightarrow all $\{T_i\}$ and all $\{w_i\}$ do not leak extra information
- Then, can prove correct multiplication by zk-PoK of product relation over Pedersen

Efficient AVSS instantiation w/ concurrent composability

■ Using KZG to instantiate the state-of-the-art batch AVSS (hbACSS)

■ Remaining non-triviality: lacking concurrent composability in hbACSS


- drop-in IND-CCA PKE + using different keys in different dealer's instances



More efficient triple generation protocol

Efficient triple instantiation from compact KZG commitment:


- Asymptotically more efficient AVSS for secret sharing (as succinctness of KZG)
- Good-case **round-reduced** async. Byzantine agreement (**good-case terminate in 5 rounds**)
- Extract random sharing via super-invertible matrix (as homomorphism of KZG) => **reducing # of secrets to share from $3n$ to $n+O(1)$**



Dual-mode triple generation framework

■ Fast Path and Fallback:


- **Fast-path features:** when abort in round r , all honest parties must finish round $r-2$
 \Rightarrow all triples before round $r-2$ can be finalized
- **Fallback implementation:** two-consecutive-value Byzantine agreement
 \Rightarrow conceptually minimal BA (choose one out of two integers)




Evaluations

- **Bad case faster than GS23**
- **Good case faster than hbMPC + secure fallback**

triple throughput for varying n




$n=4$ in face of a dynamic crash




Evaluations

- **Bad case faster than GS23**
- **Good case faster than hbMPC + secure fallback**

Latency of pre-processing triples for (a) Vickery auction and (b) mixing net



(a) Vickery auction



(b) Switching network

Summary

Async. MPC-as-a-Service framework Dumbo-MPC (BGW paradigm from SS):

- **More efficient async. triple generation**
 - ✓ efficient instantiation as proof-of-product over KZG
 - ✓ asymptotically and concretely better than GS23
- **Good-case fast path + secure async. fallback**
 - ✓ slightly faster than hbMPC by reducing redundant rounds
 - ✓ Secure async. fallback

Thanks !