



DNS FLaRE: A Flush-Reload Attack on DNS Forwarders



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
USENIX Security, 2025 Seattle USA

DNS FLaRE: A Flush-Reload Attack on DNS Forwarders

- Cache-based **side channel attack**.
- Infer **browsing & IoT** activity within the victim's home network.
- Threat model – nothing malicious installed on victim's computer.

Use-case 1 - Browsing Activity


👹 Attacker : knows when victim visits a website like a **bank website**.




Threat model:
Victim tricked to visit a malicious website.

Nothing malicious installed on the victim's computer.

Use-case 2 - IoT Activity

 Attacker : knows when an IoT event occurred like movement detection



Threat model:
Victim tricked to visit a malicious website.
Nothing malicious installed on the victim's computer or IoT device.

Attack Flow

Flush & Reload



NS w/ attacker

Zone file

Cache Flush

Forwarder's DNS Cache



Victim's
Home Network



https://bank.com

Bank

a.flush.com	1.2.3.4
b.flush.com	5.6.8.3
c.flush.com	9.8.7.6
bank.com	21.32.135.84
i.flush.com	2.3.4.5
j.flush.com	3.5.8.9
k.flush.com	3.5.8.9
p.flush.com	6.7.8.7
q.flush.com	6.7.8.7
r.flush.com	7.1.9.2

Using attacker webpage's JS:

1. **Cache flushing:**
 - Attacker owned domains
 - Cache Flush attack
2. **Wait 30s**
3. **Indirectly observe the cache** by cache reload
 - If **fast** reload → bank **in** cache
 - If **slow** reload → bank **not in** cache
4. **Done repeatedly to map activity across time.**

4 major challenges

Challenges


- How to flush?
- Which cache?
- How to time a re-load?
- Circumvent other caches?



Solutions idea





- DNS Cache Flush [[UseenixSec24](#)]
- Forwarder cache small enough
- (1) Port 0 technique (2) HTTP reload
- Different domain origins

DNS cache levels, at home



✖ 2 major challenges

Challenges

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Cache Timing:


Challenge: JS cross-origin/site DNS time measurement impossible [[PerformanceResourceTiming](#)].

We designed two measurements techniques:

1) Direct DNS technique - request a **HTTP** resource from the **domain on port 0**.

On most OSs: connect() + port 0 = Exception!

Still several technical difficulties which are discussed in the paper.




2) HTTP - measuring total time to receive an HTTP response.

Cache Timing


Method 1:

DNS Resolution Time



Method 2:

HTTP Resource Response Time



We use Gaussian Naive Bayes classifier on a per-website basis.

✖ 2 major challenges

Challenges


- How to flush? ✓
- Which cache? ✓
- How to time a re-load? ✓
- Circumvent other caches? ?

Solutions idea

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Ongoing Timing Measurements

1. Problem: Browser & OS caches !! before the forwarder




2. Mechanism: Network State Partitioning

[Chromium team mitigating Felten et. al. attack]

Partitions the browser's DNS cache, by origin domain (■ ■)


*Different origins
different cache!*



3. Solution:

Reload measurement with different origin !

Use Network State Partitioning! Buy extra domains: attack1.com, attack2.com...




The number of required domain names

$$\max \left(C, \frac{TTL_{max}}{I} \right)$$








- C - Number of iterations in the calibration
- TTL_{max} - Maximum authoritative-TTL
- I - Time interval between measurements


Vulnerable {OS x Browser} configurations

Browser		Chromium	Safari	Firefox
OS				
Windows				
Mac OS				
Linux				
Linux				







Vulnerable {OS x Browser} configurations

Browser		Chromium	Safari	Firefox
OS				
Windows		HTTP, DNS ✓	N/A	✗
Mac OS		HTTP, DNS ✓	✗	✗
Linux		HTTP ✓	N/A	HTTP ✓
Linux		HTTP ✓	N/A	HTTP ✓



4 major challenges

Challenges

- How to flush? 
- Which cache? 
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Solutions idea

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DNS FlaRE using Multiple FQDNs per Website

Why use one FQDN for a website when you can use multiple!?

Visiting **x.com** goes to:

1. [x.com:](https://x.com/)
2. <https://abs.twimg.com/responsive-web/client-web/vendor-91c40cd8.e33ef86a.js>
3. <https://video.twimg.com/>
4. [abs-0.twimg.com,](https://abs-0.twimg.com/)
5. [api.x.com,](https://api.x.com/)
6. twitter.com

Classification


We use Gaussian Naive Bayes classifier on a per-website basis.

In the multiple-FQDNs approach, the response times of each domain serve as individual features .

Experimental Results

Results

86% avg. accuracy in hit/miss classification.



IoT profiling




Movement at victim's home

Get alert-3.eye4.com

alert-3.eye4.com is now
in DNS cache

Alert movement detected



Responsible Disclosure

- Chromium: Blocked Port 0 in recent releases
- Opera: Updated base to Chromium 135 (which includes the fix)
- Safari :Patched and issued CVE-2025-43227.
- systemd: Acknowledged the issue; will open a public ticket post-embargo
- dnsmasq: Declined changes; noted cache size is configurable

Thank you.

For more information
<https://deepness-lab.org>

