



# Scoop: Mitigation of Recapture Attacks on Provenance-Based Media Authentication

Yuxin (Myles) Liu,

Habiba Farrukh, Ardalan Amiri Sani, Sharad Agarwal, Gene Tsudik



In the digital world, information spreads fast



zoom



# So does fake and fraudulent information

- Great advances in AI facilitate equally impressive advances in deep fakes




# So does fake and fraudulent information

- Great advances in AI facilitate equally impressive advances in deep fakes

Detection-based approaches are an endless race that's unlikely to win




# Provenance-based media authentication




# Provenance-based media authentication




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
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
# Provenance-based media authentication




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
ProvCam (MobiCom '24)




Vronicle (MobiSys '22)




# Provenance-based media authentication



ProvCam (MobiCom '24)



Vronicle (MobiSys '22)



Are we safe now?

# Are we safe now?

- NO!

# Challenge 1

- Provenance authenticates the origin and history of the content, but not the information within the content

# Recapture attack in the provenance era

# Recapture attack in the provenance era



# Recapture attack in the provenance era



# Recapture attack in the provenance era



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


Prov. 

# Classic recapture attack --- renewed

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- Ease of content manipulation/fabrication (e.g., deepfake)



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
- Ease of content manipulation/fabrication (e.g., deepfake)
- Illusion of reality (e.g., advanced displays)




# Classic recapture attack --- renewed

- Ease of content manipulation/fabrication (e.g., deepfake)
- Illusion of reality (e.g., advanced displays)
- False sense of trust (by provenance-based systems)

ProvCam (MobiCom '24)




Vronicle (MobiSys '22)




Any existing countermeasures?

# Existing countermeasures

- Screen-based (e.g., LCD and OLED) recapture detection (e.g., using moiré pattern)
- Print-based (e.g., poster) recapture detection (e.g., using micro-surface pattern)



(Jeong et al.)



(Costa et al.)

# Do they really work?

# Do they really work?

- Not really


# Do they really work?

- Not really
- Majority of them depend on prior knowledge of the recapture medium and camera

# Do they really work?

- Not really
- Majority of them depend on prior knowledge of the recapture medium and camera
- **Attackers** are **in control** here (for both the recapture medium and camera)






Spoiler alert



## **Chimera: Creating Digitally Signed Fake Photos by Fooling Image Recapture and Deepfake Detectors**

Seongbin Park<sup>\*</sup>, Alexander Vilesov<sup>\*</sup>, Jinghui Zhang, Hossein Khalili,  
Yuan Tian, Achuta Kadambi, Nader Sehatbakhsh  
*University of California, Los Angeles*  
*\*{parkseongbin,vilesov}@ucla.edu*

**I'M BUILT DIFFERENT**



# User study

---

- 16 photos (8 original / 8 recaptured)
- 43 adult participants
- All done on one 14-inch 2K display laptop



(a)




(b)



(c)



(d)



(e)



(f)




(g)



(h)




(i)




(j)



(k)




(l)



(m)



(n)



(o)



(p)

# User study

---

- 16 photos (8 original / 8 recaptured)
- 43 adult participants
- All done on one 14-inch 2K display laptop
- Accuracy (correct classification) at 50.15% ( $t(42) = 0.071, p = 0.944$ )



(a)



(b)



(c)




(d)



(e)



(f)



(g)



(h)



(i)




(j)



(k)




(l)



(m)



(n)



(o)



(p)

So how do we tackle such an attack?

# So how do we tackle such an attack?


- Aftermath analysis-based approaches are an endless race that's unlikely to win

# So how do we tackle such an attack?


- Aftermath analysis-based approaches are an endless race that's unlikely to win
- **Provenance** can still help


# Depth-enabled provenance


- Time-of-Flight depth sensors (dToF and iToF)
- Measure distance to a target
- Equipped on modern smartphones (e.g., Apple, Samsung, etc.)





Depth Prov. 




Depth Prov. 

# Challenge 2

- Not all flat surfaces are recaptures

Depth Prov.





Depth Prov.




# Catching misleading recaptures

# Catching misleading recaptures

- Let's compare human perception of depth with the provenance depth

# Catching real recaptures

- Let's compare human perception of depth with the provenance depth
  - Learning-based monocular depth estimation



# Introducing Scoop

- **In:** A photo/video with depth-enabled provenance
- **Out:** The same photo/video with misleading recapture regions highlighted

# Scoop's design




Digital Content


The diagram consists of two overlapping rectangular boxes. The larger, light gray box on the left contains the text 'Digital Content'. A smaller, darker gray box with a green border overlaps the bottom-right corner of the larger box and contains the text 'Prov.'.

Prov.


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
# Scoop's design




# Scoop's design



# Scoop's design



# Scoop's design



# Scoop in action



Captured photo  
(w/ Depth Provenance)

# Scoop in action




Captured photo  
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
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


Learning-based point cloud




Ground truth point cloud

# Scoop in action



# Scoop in action




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
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(w/ Depth Provenance)

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


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
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Captured photo  
(w/ Depth Provenance)




Learning-based point cloud




Ground truth point cloud

# Scoop in action



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Captured photo  
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


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
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


Learning-based point cloud




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
# Scoop in action



# Prototypes



# Prototypes

- A desktop Viewer application (OpenCV and Point Cloud Library)






# Prototypes

- A desktop Viewer application (OpenCV and Point Cloud Library)
- An iOS camera application



# Prototypes

- A desktop Viewer application (OpenCV and Point Cloud Library)
- An iOS camera application
- An Android camera application





# Evaluation

# Challenge 3

- No existing dataset designed for evaluating systems like Scoop



# A first-of-its-kind dataset

- Captured using our two smartphone prototypes





# A first-of-its-kind dataset

- Captured using our two smartphone prototypes
- 122 unique data points
- 78 recapture scenarios (TVs, cardboard cutouts, projector, and mixed)





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
# A first-of-its-kind dataset

- Captured using our two smartphone prototypes
- 122 unique data points
- 78 recapture scenarios (TVs, cardboard cutouts, projector, and mixed)
- Both photos and videos
- Cornerstone for evaluating systems such as Scoop




# Effectiveness

**True positive rate (TPR):** Rate of correctly identified misleading recapture




# Effectiveness

**False positive rate (FPR):** Rate of incorrectly identified benign as recapture




# Overhead

(a) Runtime



(b) Storage



# Summary

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- Design of Scoop, an effective countermeasure against recapture attacks
- A first-of-its-kind dataset for evaluating systems like Scoop
- Fully functional Scoop prototype based on commodity devices

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Paper:



Code:



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# Thank you!

Questions? Feel free to email to [yuxin.liu@uci.edu](mailto:yuxin.liu@uci.edu)