

Bots can Snoop

Uncovering and Mitigating Privacy Risks of Bots in Group Chats

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Group Chatbots



Alice

Hey! We should talk about our plan.



Bob

[/meet](#)



Meet Bot


<https://meet.example/abc-def-ghi>

- On Discord, about **430,000 bots** were active across roughly **30% of groups**.
- Telegram hosts over **10 million bots**, one of the largest bot ecosystems.

Chatbots Read Irrelevant Messages




Case study:
A Discord chatbot accesses
400× more messages than
necessary.




Selective Message Access

Chatbots Learn Sender Information



Case study:
3.6% of users encounter
the same chatbot in multiple
groups.




Sender Anonymity

Evaluation of Existing Platforms


No platform supports **all** desired properties.

	Userbots on WhatsApp, Viber, and Signal	LINE	Telegram	Discord	Slack	Keybase
E2EE	✓	▲				✓
Selective Message Access			✓	✓	✓	✓
Sender Anonymity					✓	


Challenge: Chatbots May Miss Key Updates



Challenge: Chatbots Know the Keys




Challenge: Key Updates Leak Senders



Our Solution: SnoopGuard

Built on tree-based continuous group key agreement (CGKA) schemes.



- ✓ Selective message access
- ✓ Sender anonymity
- ✓ End-to-end encryption




Easy integration with existing protocols.




Compressed Multi-Roots Tree (CMRT)

- CMRT extends an existing CGKA scheme.




Compressed Multi-Roots Tree (CMRT)

- Chatbot addition




Compressed Multi-Roots Tree (CMRT)

- A user shares a message with chatbot 1.




Compressed Multi-Roots Tree (CMRT)

- A user shares a message with chatbot 2.



Compressed Multi-Roots Tree (CMRT)

- Chatbot 1 sends a message.



Theoretical Performance Analysis


For a group with n users and m chatbots:

	Chatbot Addition	Sending a Message	Receiving a Message
SnoopGuard + MLS	$O(n+m)$	$O(\log(n)+m)$	$O(\log(n))$
MLS	$O(n+m)$	$O(\log(n+m))$	$O(\log(n+m))$
Sender Keys Protocol	$O(n+m)$	$O(1)$	$O(1)$


Empirical Performance Analysis

SnoopGuard introduces minimal overhead:

Adding Chatbot



Sending Messages




Limitation: Trigger Function Dependence

- Effectiveness of SnoopGuard relies on trigger function accuracy.
- Poorly designed or malicious functions could mark all messages as relevant.

Potential Mitigation:

- Vetting process to detect misuse.



Roadmap Toward a Privacy-Preserving Solution for Chatbots

1. Enhancing Usability
 - a. Design intuitive interfaces for chatbot presence and permissions
 - b. Provide clear workflows to grant/restrict access
2. Designing Permission Models
 - a. Need dynamic, adaptive frameworks for evolving group dynamics
3. Understanding User Perceptions
 - a. Study user trust, acceptance, and privacy concerns in group chats

Summary

- We showed that chatbots can learn irrelevant messages and identify senders.
- We highlighted the challenge of limiting chatbot access without breaking end-to-end encryption.
- We proposed *SnoopGuard*, a secure group messaging protocol that enables selective message access and sender anonymity while preserving end-to-end encryption.

Thank You