


# SoK: So, You Think You Know All About Secure Randomized Caches?


USENIX Security 2025 Track 4: Thursday, August 14, 2025

**Anubhav Bhatla** Hari Rohit Bhavsar  
Sayandeep Saha Biswabandan Panda

Indian Institute of Technology (IIT), Bombay



**CASPER**






**SHArC**



**usenix**



THE ADVANCED  
COMPUTING SYSTEMS  
ASSOCIATION

# Background



Size: Registers < Cache < RAM  
Speed: Registers > Cache > RAM



# Background



LLC is **shared** among all processes

Cache hierarchy in modern processors



# Occupancy-based Attacks





Last Level Cache

**Website Fingerprinting**  
[USENIX SECURITY '19]



# Occupancy-based Attacks



# Occupancy-based Attacks





# Conflict-based Attacks





Last Level Cache

**PRIME+PROBE**  
[S&P '15]



# Conflict-based Attacks



# Conflict-based Attacks




# Conflict-based Attacks




LLC Miss for B  $\Rightarrow$   
Victim Accessed V

A cache miss results in a  
**timing difference** in  
access due to high  
DRAM latency


# Popular Secure Randomized Designs




## Randomization + Remapping




# Popular Secure Randomized Designs



## Randomization + Remapping




## Skews + Randomization + Remapping





# Overview





We **systematize** the design space for secure randomized caches by identifying key **security knobs**

We perform security analysis of each knob against **conflict-based attacks**. We also study which **combinations** of these knobs work


We analyze these knobs against **occupancy-based attacks** and compare them with **partitioning**-based designs

# Security Knobs



- Identified various **knobs and sub-knobs** used in modern secure randomized caches
- **Randomization** using block cipher is assumed **by default**


# Metrics Used



**METRIC I:  
Eviction Rate**

**METRIC II:  
Ease of Eviction Set  
Creation**

# Metrics Used




## METRIC I: Eviction Rate

Measures the **probability (or rate)** of evicting the target address using a **perfect eviction set**

ScatterCache [USENIX Security '19]  
Song et al. [S&P '21]  
ClepsydraCache [USENIX Security '23]

## METRIC II: Ease of Eviction Set Creation

# Metrics Used




## METRIC I: Eviction Rate

Measures the **probability (or rate)** of evicting the target address using a **perfect eviction set**

```
Loop start
1. Select random target  $x$ 
2. Generate eviction set  $E$  for  $x$ 
3. Access  $x$ 
4. Access  $E$ 
5. Check whether  $x$  is evicted
end
```

## METRIC II: Ease of Eviction Set Creation

# Metrics Used



## METRIC I: Eviction Rate

Measures the **probability (or rate)** of evicting the target address using a **perfect eviction set**


```
Loop start
1. Select random target x
2. Generate eviction set E for x
3. Access x
4. Access E
5. Check whether x is evicted
end
```

## METRIC II: Ease of Eviction Set Creation

Quantify in terms of **number of LLC evictions needed** to create a fixed-size eviction set

We **test popular algorithms** such as Conflict Testing and Prime, Prune and Probe (PPP)



# Knob 1: Skewing





Random  
Skew Selection

Load-aware  
Skew Selection

# Knob 1: Skewing





# Knob 1: Skewing



**Skewing helps  
improve security**

**LA does better  
than Random**

# Knob 1: Skewing




**Skewing helps  
improve security**

**There are hidden nuances to consider!**

**LA does better  
than Random**


# Knob 2: Extra Invalid Tags



Eviction Strategy

Decoupling

# Knob 2: Extra Invalid Tags





Eviction Strategy



Decoupling

Decoupling has **no**  
security impact



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

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

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



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


Skew + LA + Inv ❌

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



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


Skew + Inv + GE ❌


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


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



Extra invalid tags can improve security, but they need to be **coupled** with appropriate knobs and sub knobs

# Knob 3: High Associativity





# Knob 3: High Associativity





High associativity provides **significant security gains**, even with just two skews.

# Knob 3: High Associativity





High associativity provides **significant security gains**, even with just two skews.

# Knob 4: Replacement Policy





# Knob 4: Replacement Policy



Random **performs worse**  
than LRU and RRIP



# Knob 4: Replacement Policy





Random **performs worse**  
than LRU and RRIP

GRPLRU performs similarly to  
GLRU, while being **more practical**

# Knob 5: Remapping





# Knob 5: Remapping




Conflict Testing is  
**faster** than PPP

# Knob 5: Remapping





High associativity designs have **higher remapping periods** compared to CEASER-S and Skew-16. **Inv + LA + GE** improves this further.

# Evaluation against Occupancy Attacks





# Evaluation against Occupancy Attacks




Only **partitioning**-based mitigations are effective

# Evaluation against Occupancy Attacks




Random policy > Deterministic policy; Local eviction ~ Global eviction

# Impact of Warm-up State



```
Loop start
1. Select random target  $x$ 
2. Generate eviction set  $E$  for  $x$ 
3. Access  $x$ 
4. Access  $E$ 
5. Check whether  $x$  is evicted
end
```


# Impact of Warm-up State



Cache initialized  
as empty

```
Loop start
1. Select random target  $x$ 
2. Generate eviction set  $E$  for  $x$ 
3. Access  $x$ 
4. Access  $E$ 
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end
```

# Impact of Warm-up State




Cache initialized  
as empty

Cache state  
continues from  
previous iteration

```
Loop start
1. Select random target  $x$ 
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```

# Impact of Warm-up State




Cache initialized  
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Cache state  
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5. Check whether  $x$  is evicted
end
```

Shows the effect  
of **average cache  
warm-up state**


# Impact of Warm-up State



Loop start

1. Reset cache warm-up state
  2. Select random target  $x$
  3. Generate eviction set  $E$  for  $x$
  4. Access  $x$
  5. Access  $E$
  6. Check whether  $x$  is evicted
- end


# Impact of Warm-up State



```
Loop start
1. Reset cache warm-up state
2. Select random target  $x$ 
3. Generate eviction set  $E$  for  $x$ 
4. Access  $x$ 
5. Access  $E$ 
6. Check whether  $x$  is evicted
end
```

**Why not use this technique by default?**

# Impact of Warm-up State





Loop start

1. **Reset cache warm-up state**
  2. Select random target  $x$
  3. Generate eviction set  $E$  for  $x$
  4. Access  $x$
  5. Access  $E$
  6. Check whether  $x$  is evicted
- end



**Why not use this technique by default?**  
**>10x slower** than the original

# Impact of Warm-up State



Cache warm-up state has a **significant impact** on security

# Impact of Warm-up State



Cache warm-up state has a **significant impact** on security

# Evaluating Design Trade-offs


Security

Knobs Used


Performance

Logic

Power



# Evaluating Design Trade-offs



Security

Knobs Used

Performance

Logic

Power

Design	LLC Evictions Needed to Create Eviction Set	Knobs Used	Performance Overhead	Logic Overhead	Dynamic Power Overhead	Static Power Overhead
Skew-2 (CEASER-S)	0.5 million	Skews, Remapping	-1.3%	1.9%	2.5%	2%
Skew-16 (ScatterCache)	2.8 million	Large number of skews, Remapping	0.1%	1.7%	0.5%	1.4%
Skew-2-LA-Inv2-GLRU	2.3 million	Skews, Load-aware, Invalid Tags, Global Eviction, Remapping	1.3%	1.9%	5.2%	2%
Mirage	Not Possible	Skews, Load-aware, Invalid Tags, Global Eviction	0.2%	18.6%	-0.2%	19.6%
Skew-2-Ass64	3.8 million	Skews, High Associativity, Remapping	-2.1%	2.3%	1.8%	3.3%
Skew-2-Ass128	7.9 million	Skews, High Associativity, Remapping	-2.2%	2.4%	1.7%	6.4%
Skew-2-Ass64-LA-Inv2-GLRU	6.1 million	Skews, High Associativity, Load-aware, Invalid Tags, Global Eviction, Remapping	-2.2%	2.3%	1.8%	3.3%
Skew-2-Ass128-LA-Inv2-GLRU	11.0 million	Skews, High Associativity, Load-aware, Invalid Tags, Global Eviction, Remapping	-2.5%	2.5%	1.7%	6.4%
SassCache (coverage = 39%)	Not Possible	Skews, Soft Partitioning	2.3%	2.4%	7.4%	1.2%

# Thank You!

