

UVScan: Detecting Third-Party Component Usage Violations in IoT Firmware

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Background

- Third-party components are widely used in IoT firmware to shorten the development cycle.



Background

- TPCs usually have **strict usage specifications**, e.g., checking the return value of the function.
- Violating the usage specifications of TPCs can cause **serious consequences**.

CVE-2020-17533 Detail

Description

Apache Accumulo versions 1.5.0 through 1.10.0 and version 2.0.0 do not properly check the return value of some policy enforcement functions before permitting an authenticated user to perform certain administrative operations. Specifically, the return values of the 'canFlush' and 'canPerformSystemActions' security functions are not checked in some instances, therefore allowing an authenticated user with insufficient permissions to perform the following actions: flushing a table, shutting down Accumulo or an individual tablet server, and setting or removing system-wide Accumulo configuration properties.

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Major Vulnerability in Qualcomm QCM6125

By Ori Hollander and Asaf Karas | October 14, 2020
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TPC Usage Violation

- **Deprecated API violation:** A set of APIs will be deprecated or abandoned for various reasons, e.g., security issues.
- **Return value violation:** Return values usually need to be checked after the API call.
- **Argument violation:** The arguments that are passed into APIs often have strict constraints.
- **Causality violation:** Many APIs may have a strict causal relationship, e.g., lock/unlock, fopen/fclose, and malloc/free.

Building a Practical System from Scratch



Two Challenges:

1. How to fill the gap between the *high-level specifications* from TPC documents, and the *low-level implementations* in the IoT firmware?
 - Previous works only perform well on *well-formatted* TPC documents and are hard to handle *unusual* or *ambiguous* API specifications.

Building a Practical System from Scratch




Two Challenges:

2. How to perform the TPC usage violation analysis on closed-source binaries?
 - Previous works only focus on source-level API misuse detection.

UVScan


UVScan: The first automated and practical system to detect TPC usage violations in binary IoT firmware.




Framework of UVScan

Component 1: API Specification Extraction

- **Goal:** Extract the API specifications from corresponding TPC documents.




Step 1-1: Document Distillation

- **Goal:** Filter out irrelevant API descriptions and dig for relevant API descriptions.
- Previous research indicates that relevant API descriptions usually have a strong sentiment^[1].
- This observation does not apply to all scenarios when analyzing the TPC document and will introduce false positives.
-  The sentence “additionally *it* indicates that the session ticket is in a renewal period and *should be replaced*” has a strong sentiment word “should” but it is not a relevant API description.

^[1]Lv et al., “Automatic Assumption Discovery and Verification Derivation from Library Document for API Misuse Detection”, CCS 2021.

Step 1-1: Document Distillation

- **Our Approach:**
 - Leverage WL-Coref, an off-the-shelf coreference resolution model, to resolve the coreferences in the TPC document.
 - Adopt BiLSTM model with the multi-head self-attention mechanism to capture the sentiment of a sentence.



Sentiment-based Document Distillation Model

Step 1-2: MRC-driven Extraction

- **Goal:** Extract precise API specifications from relevant API descriptions.
- **Our Approach:** Adopt the Machine Reading Comprehension (MRC) system with well-designed question sets.

“SQLITE_OK be returned by `sqlite3_snapshot_recover` if successful, or an SQLite error code otherwise”



“SQLite error code be returned by `sqlite3_snapshot_recover` if failed.”

Question Sets

Category	Question
Return Value	What are return values supposed to be? In which condition does the function have a return value?
Causality	What operation is required if the return value is <i>ReturnValue_i</i> ? What operation is required if <i>Condition_i</i> ? Which function should be called before the API? Which function should be called after the API?
Argument	What is the value of the N-th argument supposed to be before the API? What is the value of the N-th argument supposed to be after the API? How to check the N-th argument before the API? How to check the N-th argument after the API?

Step 1-2: MRC-driven Extraction

- **Goal:** Extract precise API descriptions.
- **Our Approach:** An MRC (MRC) system with

“SQLITE_OK be returned by sqlite3_... successful, or an SQLite error code if failed.”



“SQLite error code be returned by sqlite3_... If failed.”

API: int pcap_activate(pcap_t *p);
Distilled Document: pcap_activate() returns 0 on success without warnings, a non-zero positive value on success with warnings, and a negative value on error. A non-zero return value indicates what warning or error condition occurred. A program should check for positive, negative, and zero return codes, and treat all positive return codes as warnings and all negative return codes as errors. If pcap_activate() fails, the pcap_t * is not closed and freed; the pcap_t * should be closed using pcap_close().

Question 1: What are return values supposed to be?
Answer: 0 on success without warnings; a non-zero positive value on success with warnings; a negative value on error

Question 2: In which condition does pcap_activate have a return value?
Answer: success without warnings; success with warnings; error

Question 3: What operation is required if the return value is 0?
Answer: No answer

Question 4: What operation is required if the return value is a non-zero positive value?
Answer: No answer

Question 5: What operation is required if the return value is a negative value?
Answer: the pcap_t * should be closed using pcap_close()

Question 6: What operation is required if successful without warnings?
Answer: No answer

Question 7: What operation is required if successful with warnings?
Answer: No answer

Question 8: What operation is required if there is an error?
Answer: the pcap_t * should be closed using pcap_close()

Question 9: Which function should be called before pcap_activate?
Answer: No answer

Question 10: Which function should be called after pcap_activate?
Answer: No answer

Question 11: What is the value of the first argument pcap_t *p supposed to be before pcap_activate?
Answer: No answer

Question 12: What is the value of the first argument pcap_t *p supposed to be after pcap_activate?
Answer: No answer

Question 13: How to check the first argument pcap_t *p before pcap_activate?
Answer: No answer

Question 14: How to check the first argument pcap_t *p after pcap_activate?
Answer: the pcap_t * should be closed using pcap_close()

relevant API descriptions.

Comprehension sets.

Question Sets

Question

What are return values supposed to be?
Which condition does the function have a return value?


What operation is required if the return value is $ReturnValue_i$?

What operation is required if $Condition_i$?
Which function should be called before the API?
Which function should be called after the API?

What is the value of the N-th argument supposed to be before the API?
What is the value of the N-th argument supposed to be after the API?
How to check the N-th argument before the API?
How to check the N-th argument after the API?

Component 2: Programming Expression Generation


- **Goal:** Transfer natural language-based API specifications into machine-readable representations.
- **Our Approach:**
 - Use POS tagging to annotate each word in an API specification.
 - Create a dependency tree by combining words with a close relationship.
 - Map common phrases into programming expressions, *Operation(argument1, argument2, ...)*.



An Example of Programming Expression Generation

Component 3: Rule-driven Analysis Engine

- **Goal:** Leverage the generated programming expressions for usage violation detection.
- **Our Approach:** Encode the binary into Datalog facts and perform the usage violation check on the generated facts.



Step 3-1: Binary Encoding

- **Goal:** Encode the binary into Datalog facts.
- **Our Approach:** Leverage *Ddisasm* to encode the binary.

(address) A
(size of the instruction) S_{instr}
(size of the data element) S_{de}
(register) R
(segment register) R_{seg}
(base register) R_{base}
(index register) R_{idx}
(instruction code) I
(unique identifier of the i-th operand) O_i
(immediate) IM
(multiplier) M
(displacement) D
<hr/>
<i>Predicate</i> ::= <i>instruction</i> ($A, S_{instr}, P, I, O_1, O_2, O_3, O_4$)
<i>invalid</i> (A)
<i>op_regdirect</i> (O_i, R)
<i>op_immediate</i> (O_i, IM)
<i>op_indirect</i> ($O_i, R_{seg}, R_{base}, R_{idx}, M, D, S_{de}$)

```
.decl function_r0_usage_blez0(EA:address)
.output function_r0_usage_blez0

function_r0_usage_blez0(EA:address) :-
    instruction(EA,_,_, "BLEZ",_,_,_,_,_),
    instruction_get_op(EA,_,0p),
    op_regdirect_contains_reg(0p,"R0").
```

An example of A Rule that Checks the Return Value

Initial Datalog Facts Used by *Ddisasm*

Step 3-2: Checker Implementation

- **Goal:** Perform the usage violation check on the generated facts.
- **Our Approach:** Design four checkers based on the features of different TPC usage violations
 - **Deprecated API violation checker:** Maintain a list of deprecated APIs for each TPC.
 - **Return value violation checker:** Focus on the operation of the registers that hold the return value of the function, e.g., the R0 register in ARM32.
 - **Argument violation checker:** Focus on the operation of the registers that hold the arguments of the function, e.g., the R0-R3 register in ARM32.
 - **Causality violation checker:** Focus on the functions that are called before or after the API, and the operations under certain return values.

Evaluation

- **Goal:** Evaluate the performance of **key components** in UVScan and the **overall performance** of UVScan.
- Evaluate UVScan on **four popular TPCs** for concept validation.

OpenSSL
Cryptography and SSL/TLS Toolkit



TCPDUMP
& **LIBPCAP**



Evaluation: API Description Extraction Accuracy

- **API description dataset (D_{DESC_test}):** Train and evaluate our sentiment-based document distillation model.
- Compare UVScan with three off-the-shelf tools: *Advance*, *RCNN*, and *ALICS*.

API Description Extraction Accuracy

Tool	D_{DESC_test}	
	Accuracy	F1
UVSCAN	92.41%	85.24%
<i>Advance</i> [30]	85.07%	74.37%
<i>RCNN</i> [27]	76.25%	61.50%
<i>ALICS</i> [33]	38.43%	29.02%

Evaluation: Usage Violation Detection Accuracy

- **Real-world usage violation dataset ($D_{Real-UV}$)** includes 77 known usage violations.
- **Artificial usage violation dataset ($D_{Real-UV}$)** includes 69 manually created usage violations.
- Compare UVScan with three state-of-the-arts: *Advance*, *APISAN*, and *APEX*.

Usage Violation Detection Accuracy

Performance	UVSCAN			<i>Advance</i>	<i>APISAN</i>	<i>APEX</i>
	x86	ARM	MIPS			
$D_{Real-UV}$						
Precision	72.84%	74.70%	77.03%	80.72%	17.31%	23.07%
Recall	76.62%	80.52%	74.03%	87.01%	11.69%	7.79%
$D_{Artif-UV}$						
Precision	68.92%	74.32%	76.47%	77.33%	25.49%	34.62%
Recall	73.91%	79.71%	75.36%	84.06%	18.84%	13.04%

Large-scale Analysis on IoT Firmware



- Conduct a large-scale analysis on **4,545** firmware images.
- **Research Question ①**: Which are the **most prevalent TPC usage violations** in IoT firmware?
- Detect **27,621** potential usage violations of the four TPCs in the **4,545** firmware images.

Usage Violation Distribution

TPC	# Deprecated API Violation	#Causality Violation	# Return Value Violation	# Argument Violation
OpenSSL	4,831	3,679	3,521	1,073
SQLite	2,740	1,996	931	112
libpcap	3,359	2,515	1,364	857
libxml2	418	114	75	36
Overall	11,348	8,304	5,891	2,078

Large-scale Analysis on IoT Firmware



- **Research Question ②:** What are the **practical impacts** of TPC usage violations on IoT firmware?
- **Impacts:**
 - **Security vulnerabilities:** Can be exploited to perform attacks, e.g., the Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attack.
 - **Ordinary bugs:** May result in the malfunctioning of firmware but cannot be leveraged for attacks.
 - **No impact:** Will not affect the operation of the device and cannot be used for attacks.

Conclusion

- Propose UVScan, the **first automated and practical system** to detect TPC usage violations in binary IoT firmware.
- Conduct the **first large-scale analysis** on TPC usage violation problem in IoT firmware.

Thanks!