
TRIDENT: Towards Detecting and Mitigating Web-based Social Engineering Attacks

Zheng Yang⁺, Joey Allen⁺, Matthew Landen⁺, Roberto Perdisci⁺[‡], Wenke Lee⁺
[†]Georgia Institute of Technology
[‡]University of Georgia




Web-based Social Engineering Attacks



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Prior State-of-the-art Solution: Tech-support Scam



Miramirkhani et al.

(NDSS'17)



Prior State-of-the-art: Directly Detect SE Attacks

Tech-support Scam

Miramirkhani et al. (NDSS'17)

Notification Spam

Subramani et al. (ACM IMC'20)

Dating Scam

Suarez-Tangil et al. (TIFS'19)



(a) Scan







Nelms et al. (Usenix'16)





Unwantedsoftware Download


DeKoven et al. (Usenix'17)


Prize Scam

Kharraz et al. (IEEE S&P'18)



Prior State-of-the-art: Directly Detect SE Attacks





Ad Publishers

SE Attacks

Generic Ad Blockers Are Ineffective

Blocklist-based Solution

- Brave Shield [49]
 - Ad-blocking module for Brave Browser.
 - **14.74% false negative rate** on 1,479 social engineering attacks.

ML-based Solution

• AdGraph [19]

Model	Accuracy	Precision	Recall	F1
Original	90.52%	88.32%	88.33%	88.32%
Retrained	83.25%	80.12%	81.65%	80.88%
SE-Ads	81.51%	71.34%	75.33%	73.28%

Social engineering "ads" can evade state-of-the-art ad blocking tools easily!



Tech Challenges: SE Ads Are Not Traditional Ads

- Invisible on the DOM or misleading content.
- Obfuscated JavaScript code from low-tier ad networks.
- Frequently updated URLs.






Invisible

Misleading Content

Obfuscated Code




Design Overview



Design: Monitor JavaScript Actions

var func = {init: function(event) {



Home

/ Movies / Spider-Man: No Way Home

- JavaScript function calls
 - Callbacks
 - Event listeners

•


- DOM manipulation
 - Create/modify/remove nodes
 - Open new tabs

..

- Network communications
 - Request resources
 - Navigation requests
 - ...




Design: Web Action History Graph






Design: Navigation Initiator




Initiated by A Mouse Event Listener


Initiated by Anchor Links





Design: Block The Navigation





Evaluation

Oct. 2021

Started crawling **100,000+ ad publishers using low-tier ad networks to distribute** social engineering ads/attacks.

Oct. 2022

- Crawled another batch of testing data.
- Achieved 97.37% accuracy and 97.81% F1 score.

Jan. 2022

- Collected 259,487 navigation events.
- 1,479 were labeled as social engineering attacks.
- Obtained 92.63% accuracy and 93.37% F1 score with a Random Forest classifier with 10fold cross validation.



Evaluation: Training with A Diverse Dataset

• Training in Jan. 2022

- Covered more than 10 low-tier ad networks (e.g., AdSterra, PopCash) and top-tier ad networks (e.g., Google, Facebook, Amazon).
- Found 6 types of social engineering attacks with a semi-auto labeling technique.
 - 857 Unwanted-software Download
 - 222 Dating Scam
 - 177 Prize Scam
 - 148 Push Notification Spam
 - 51 Scareware
 - 24 Tech-support Scam



Evaluation: Performance Over Time

- Testing in Oct. 2022
 - 2.57% false positive rate.
 - Inject DOM elements for benign purpose such as AddThis.



- Inject social engineering ads, but do not take the user to social engineering websites.
- Inject social engineering ads and take the user to adult websites which do not launch social engineering attacks immediately when labeling.
- 0.13% false negative rate.
 - Only 1 case that embedded a malicious link as an image in the first party website. That link leads to a malicious software download website.
- Detected social engineering attacks distributed by two unseen low-tier ad networks.
 - PopAds 2 SE attacks out of 296 navigation events.
 - PopMyAds 2 SE attacks out of 349 navigation events.



Why The Performance Went Up?

Same-tab Nav.

0%

10%

50%

100%

Random Sampling

No Sampling


New-tab Nav.

100%

90%

50%

0%




We choose a conservative model for focusing on data points near the borderline. More details are available in the paper.



Overfitting

Feature Importance

- Evaluated by the Leave-One-Group-Out approach
 - Action + Consequence feature groups perform the best (AUC=0.9867)
 - Property + Action + Consequence features groups perform more robust (AUC= 0.9864).



Feature Importance by Groups

Evaluation: Evasion Attempts


- Include the malicious script as the **first**-**party script**.
- Put the malicious script as an inline script (implying first-party).
- Directly take the user to social engineering websites without redirects.
- Behave as benign scripts while stealing clicks.

Approaches	Evasion Rate	
First-party script (Fst.Pty.)	2.13%	
Inline script (Inl.)	5.11%	
No redirects (NoRdr.)	3.62%	
NoRdr. + Fst.Pty.	2.56%	
NoRdr. + Inl. + Fst.Pty.	9.17%	
Do not request external resources	1.49%	
Do not add callbacks	1.49%	
Do not attach iframes	1.92%	
Do not modify node attributes	1.70%	



Runtime Overhead

- Event monitoring agent implemented in Chrome DevTools Protocol with <800 lines of C++ code.
- 2.13% runtime overhead when browsing the Internet.
- Negligible resource overhead.



Conclusion

- A novel online system for indirectly detecting and blocking social engineering attacks.
- 92.63% accuracy, which outperforms the state-of-the-art generic ad-blocking tools by more than 10% with negligible runtime overhead.
- Robust to evasion attempts.

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Q&A

