



UNIVERSITÄT ZU LÜBECK  
INSTITUTE FOR IT SECURITY

# Cipherfix: Mitigating Ciphertext Side-Channel Attacks in Software

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Jan Wichelmann & Anna Pätschke, Luca Wilke, and Thomas Eisenbarth


August 11, 2023

32<sup>nd</sup> Usenix Security Symposium







How can we protect our code against ciphertext side-channels?



Without TEE




- Run code in the cloud




- Run code in the cloud

# Confidential Cloud Computing



- Run code in the cloud
- Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) encrypts code and data


# Confidential Cloud Computing



- Run code in the cloud
- Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) encrypts code and data
- Constant-time code protects against timing side-channels




# Confidential Cloud Computing




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# Ciphertext Side-Channel




- Constant-time swap operation

# Ciphertext Side-Channel




- Constant-time swap operation
- Memory encryption should protect secret **U**

# Ciphertext Side-Channel




- Constant-time swap operation
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- *D*                      memory encryption

# Ciphertext Side-Channel




- Constant-time swap operation
- Memory encryption should protect secret **U**
- $D$  memory encryption ) ciphertext leaks **U**

# Enforcing Ciphertext Changes




- Add random mask on every write

# Enforcing Ciphertext Changes



- Add random mask on every write
- Ciphertext always changes


# Enforcing Ciphertext Changes




- Add random mask on every write
- Ciphertext always changes ) no leakage




# From Vulnerable to Hardened Binary



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# From Vulnerable to Hardened Binary



	public				secret			
plaintext	11	22	33	44	11	22	33	44



mask	00	00	00	00	48	d3	f3	0d
data	11	22	33	44	59	f1	c0	49

- Back data with a


	public				secret			
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
- Back data with a
- Store random mask in mask buffer



- Back data with a
- Store random mask in mask buffer
- Mask is zero for public data



- Back data with a
- Store random mask in mask buffer
- Mask is zero for public data



- Store secrecy information in separate





- Store secrecy information in separate
- All 1 for secret data, all 0 for public data

- **eVETaW**Secure

- **eVeTaW** Secure and slow

# Mask Generation







- **eVETaW** Secure and slow
- **KFf** : Well-known **KbeF[\Yg\$%+t** RNG

# Mask Generation


- **eVETaW**: Secure and slow
- **KFf**: Well-known **KbeF[\Yg\$%+H** RNG
- **48F**: Custom RNG based on one AES round

# Mask Generation


- **eVETaW**: Secure and slow
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	Performance	Security
<b>rdrand</b>		
<b>XS128+</b>		
<b>AES</b>		

# Summary




# Summary







# Summary



<https://github.com/UzL-ITS/cipherfix>




@JanWichelmann  
@paetscan

## Runtime Performance Overhead

	<b>AES</b>	<b>XS128+</b>	<b>rdrand</b>
<b>Cipherfix-Fast</b>	2.4x	2.7x	16.8x
<b>Cipherfix-Base</b>	3.9x	4.0x	17.3x
<b>Cipherfix-Enhanced</b>	5.1x	5.3x	17.5x

- Average performance overhead factor of multiple primitives
- Slowdown is restricted to few isolated code sections

# Cipherfix-Enhanced



- Store secrecy information in separate
- All 1 for secret data, all 0 for public data
- Enforce minimum size of memory writes