Abuse Vectors A Framework for Conceptualizing IoT-Enabled Interpersonal Abuse

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IoT devices

69%

of US households have at least one IoT device

[Martin 2019]



IoT devices are used in interpersonal abuse



EVA GALPERIN

IDEAS MAY 13, 2021 9:00 AM

Apple's AirTags Are a Gift to Stalkers

Thermostats, Locks and Lights: Digital Tools of Domestic Abuse

"loT abuse"

IoT device

FAMILY & TECH: JULIE JARGON

These Parents Use Baby Monitors to Track Older Children— Even Teens

[Cahn 2021] [Bowles 2018] [Jargon 2022]

researchers are investigating IoT abuse

Characterizing Everyday Misuse of Smart Home Devices

Phoebe Moh*, Pubali Datta†, Noel Warford*, Adam Bates†, Nathan Malkin*, Michelle L. Mazurek* *University of Maryland

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Anticipating Smart Home Security and Privacy Threats with Survivors of Intimate Partner Abuse

Threat Modeling Intimate Partner Violence: Tech Abuse as a Cybersecurity Challenge in the Internet of Things

Julia Slupska and Leonie Maria Tanczer

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Are Smart Home Devices Abandoning IPV Victims?

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Characterizing Everyday Misuse of Smart Home Devices

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Threat Modeling Intim Violence: Tech Abuse: Challenge in the Intern

Julia Slupska and Leonie Maria

We need a better understanding of the problem we are trying to solve.

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Partner Abuse

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ndoning IPV Victims?

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
research questions

RQ1 Which IoT **devices** can be involved in abuse, and **in what ways** are they misused?

RQ2 Which **properties** of these devices enable abuse?


 $\mathbf{RQ3}$ How can we better **conceptualize** this problem?

method: systematic survey of web content



spy on [agent] using [device]

method: systematic survey of web content



overview of web pages

types

- News articles
- Forum posts
- How-to pages for potential abusers

• ...

targets

- Intimate partners
- Family members
- Roommates
- Neighbors

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IoT abuse

- First-person accounts
- Third-person accounts (e.g., news stories)
- Potential for abuse (e.g., how-to articles)

characterizing IoT abuse

Context	Category	Device	Discussed Strategies		Abus
			Spy	Harass	Vector
Shared-use devices	Home control	Smart speaker	40 84 - 6	# - C	- U I
		Control tablet	40 E4		— U I
	Smart appliances	TV	4 9 ■ 4	#	- U
		Thermostat	9 -	# A –	— U
		Lights	9 -	#	— U ·
		Router	🔓	#	
		Plug	9 -	#	
		Kettle		#	
		Smoke alarm		#	
		Fridge	9 -		
		Mattress	🔓		
	Security systems	Doorbell	49 EM 🖓 🖴	#	- U
		Security camera	- ■ - •		— U ·
		General camera	40 ■4 — —		CU
		Baby monitor	40 m 4		C
		Lock	9 -	# A -	— U ·
		Motion sensor	9 -		C
		Presence sensor	9 -		C
		Garage door opener		- A -	
	Vehicles	Car	9 -	# A -	
		Car accessory	9 -	B	С —
Personal-use devices	Tracking devices	Watch	40 🔤 🛭 🔓		
		Item tracker	v -		C -
	Entertainment	Bluetooth headphones	4) − ♀ −		C U
		Smart toy	40		
	Covert spying technologies	Hidden camera	49 ■4 — —		C
		Spy drone	- ■ ? -		C
		Thermal camera			C
		Listening device	<0		C
		Landline recorder	49		C
		GPS tracker	9 -		C -
		USB keylogger			C

Full spying: Remote audio (♠) and video (♠) surveillance, precise location tracking (♠), and accessing private data (♠).

Limited spying: Distance-limited audio/video spying (♠), ♠); location tracking with stationary device (♠).

Harassment: Disrupting the home environment (♠), threatening physical safety (♠), and manipulating private data (♠).

Abuse vectors (discussed in ♠ ?): Covert Soving (C). Unauthorized Access (U). Repurposing (R). Intended Use (T)

many IoT devices can be used for abuse

shared use



Home control



Smart appliances



Security systems



Vehicles

personal use



Tracking devices



Entertainment (e.g., AirPods)



Covert spy devices (e.g., hidden cameras)

abusers can spy with IoT devices

01 Audio surveillance 02 Video surveillance

03 Location tracking 04 Accessing private data


abusers can harass with IoT devices

- Ol Disrupting the home environment
- O2 Threatening physical safety

Manipulating private data

 $04\,$ Psychological control

the abuse vectors framework



method

tailored solutions for each vector

Covert Spying	Unauth. Access	Repurposing	Intended Use
 □ Detecting hidden devices □ Preventing sale of spy devices □ Announcement of dual-use devices 	□ Easier access revocation □ Providing more legal options	ldentifying dangerous secondary functionality	 □ Updating access control protocols □ Improving transparency of IoT devices □ Increasing attestability

leveraging the abuse vectors framework

researchers

Work towards addressing each vector

Focus on holistic solutions

manufacturers

Consider vectors during design

policymakers

Promote protective legislation [NY CPL 530.12]

Require action from vendors

Abuse Vectors:

A Framework for Conceptualizing IoT-Enabled Interpersonal Abuse




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