

# A Mixed-Methods Study of Security Practices of Smart Contract Developers



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# Motivation

**Long-term goal:** design tools to identify and mitigate smart contract vulnerabilities

**This study:** understand how smart contract developers currently deal with security

## Code with Reentrancy

```
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.10;
contract Dao {
    mapping(address => uint256) public balances;
    function deposit() public payable {
        require(msg.value >= 1 ether, "Deposits must be no
less than 1 Ether");
        balances[msg.sender] += msg.value;
    }
    function withdraw() public {
        // Check user's balance
        require(
            balances[msg.sender] >= 1 ether,
            "Insufficient funds. Cannot withdraw"
        );
        uint256 bal = balances[msg.sender];
        // Withdraw user's balance
        (bool sent, ) = msg.sender.call{value: bal}("");
        require(sent, "Failed to withdraw sender's balance");
        // Update user's balance.
        balances[msg.sender] = 0;
    }
    function daoBalance() public view returns (uint256) {
        return address(this).balance;
    }
}
```

## Fixing Reentrancy

```
Contract Dao {
    ...
    function withdraw() public {
        // Check user's balance
        require(
            balances[msg.sender] >= 1 ether,
            "Insufficient funds. Cannot withdraw"
        );
        uint256 bal = balances[msg.sender];
        // Update user's balance.
        balances[msg.sender] = 0;

        // Withdraw user's balance
        (bool sent, ) = msg.sender.call{value:
bal}("");
        require(sent, "Failed to withdraw sender's
balance");
        // Update user's balance.
        balances[msg.sender] = 0;
    }
}
```

# A Developer Journey (P1)

## Justification

Working on a De-fi Project Development




Already **vett**ed by **community**, so secure



Will have the **audit afterward** anyways internal / external



**Forked** codes of popular projects  
Uniswap V2



Structure code **design**, format used standard **library code**



**Reengineered** Uniswap V2  
Changing logic pair/factory contract



**Optimized swap**, used invariant used by **Curve**



Offtime don't get time to delve into security vulnerability check



**Fast shipping** products to grow client/community

Check lock modifier, **look for common vulnerabilities**, e.g. reentrancy



Use **extra code size** to check code **vulnerability**



# Research Questions

RQ1


How do smart contract developers ensure their smart contracts are secure against potential attacks?

RQ2

How do smart contract developers conduct code reviews and whether they are able to identify common smart contract security vulnerabilities in the code?

# Interview + Code Review

We conducted an interview and code review session with **29** Smart Contract Developers from 10 countries



## Gender

24 | Male  
5 | Female

## Geography

1 | USA  
1 | India  
5 | Canada  
2 | Australia  
2 | Germany  
2 | New Zealand  
1 | Greece  
1 | China  
1 | Egypt  
1 | Ghana  
1 | Iran  
1 | UK

## Years of Experience

10 | <1 years  
10 | 1-3 years  
9 | +3 years

## Occupation

14 | Full-time DeFi smart contract Developer  
3 | Freelance smart contract Developer  
8 | Smart contract Developer-student  
3 | Software developer different domain  
1 | Professor 6

# Survey + Code Review

We conducted online survey with **171**  
Smart Contract Developers



**Survey**  
Current  
Experience &  
Practice



**Code Review**  
To identify  
vulnerabilities

## Gender

69% | Male  
31% | Female



## Occupation

79% | Full-time DeFi smart contract Developer  
44% | Smart Contract Protocol development  
35% | Smart Contract Development  
13% | Smart Contract Research/security assessment



## Years of Experience

7.6% | <1 years  
25.7% | 1-3 years  
66.7% | +3 years



# Results


- **Security Perceptions**
- **Security Practices**
- **Security Behaviors**



## “Security was not a priority”

*“If you’re planning to do an audit anyway, it kind of makes sense from a business perspective to ship code and then run it through multiple audits, instead of having your internal team [...] review the security at the same time.”*

**- P8**



# “Smart of Contract Security is Hard”

*“Contract work[s] like state machine when send a transaction. It only appears like state changes. But in regular program, you can differentiate read-only calls and state changes. Solidity can not do that.” –*

**P19**





**Developers had broadly 3 common practices for security in smart contracts**

# Smart Contract Security Practices

## Software engineering best practices

Importance of code refactoring & using vetted libraries

*“write the most simple code that you can and draw the diagram to visualize the flow of smart contract code design” - P20*

## Common software testing techniques

Code reviews, input validations, and static analyses

*“Having internal team for code review... in this culture of moving fast and breaking things. Also audits from external entities. - P10”*

## Specialized strategies

Creating own bytecode dictionary

*“I created own bytecode (error code) dictionary to represent different cases of reverting transactions in his smart contracts for an NFT (non-fungible token) project - P18.”*

Frequently used **Truffle testing suite, Remi, Hardhat, Slither, MythX**

Existing **symbolic execution based tools**, are limited in identifying edge case,

**Use of Security Tooling, Limitations of smart contract security tools, & Code Review Practice**

**Manual inspection (64%)** was frequently used method for smart contract security




# Developers Security Practices in Action

# Code Review Result - Interview




Overall, **55% of (16 out of 29)** identify one or more vulnerabilities. **28% (N=8)** of identified both (all) vulnerabilities




# Survey



**20.5% (n: 171)** identified vulnerability.



# Smart Contract Security Practice in Action



*it is withdrawing if the amount is less than the amount to just return false and subtracts the amount before it does the accounting before it's sending anything out, which is pretty crucial for preventing someone re-entering the function, which would be bad. - P14"*



# Design implications

## Education & Standards


Hands-on exercises or labs,  
incorporate education  
teachable moments in  
Compilers, Security tools, IDEs,  
Testnets



# Design implications

## User interfaces & user experience

Actionable insights through  
Error / warning messages -  
zooming into where exactly the  
problems are in the code and  
how significant the effect can  
be



# Thank you!

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Paper QR Code:



## Key Takeaways

### ❖ **Limitation in tooling**

- Tailored Education, Standards, hands on Lab based on experience level
- Hierarchical and self explainable Error Message in security/ development platform
- Comprehensibility of Code libraries, symbolic execution tooling

### ❖ **Future Research can explore**

- Impact of Smart Contract Development Culture's impact on security
- Comparison study with developers of different smart contracts language (e.g. solidity, vyper, etc)



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