

Are You Spying on Me?

Large-Scale Analysis on IoT Data Exposure through Companion Apps

Yuhong Nan^{1*}, **Xueqiang Wang**^{2*}, Luyi Xing³, Xiaojing Liao³,
Ruoyu Wu⁴, Jianliang Wu⁴, Yifan Zhang³, and XiaoFeng Wang³

Sun Yat-sen University¹, University of Central Florida², Indiana University Bloomington³,
Purdue University⁴



中山大學
SUN YAT-SEN UNIVERSITY



UNIVERSITY OF
CENTRAL FLORIDA



INDIANA
UNIVERSITY

PURDUE
UNIVERSITY

Are You Spying on Me?

Large-Scale Analysis on IoT Data Exposure through Companion Apps



Home automation



Health monitoring

Are You Spying on Me? Large-Scale Analysis on IoT Data Exposure through Companion Apps



TECH \ AMAZON \ ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE \

Amazon's Alexa isn't just AI — thousands of humans are listening

One of the only ways to improve Alexa is to have human beings check it for errors

By Nick Statt | @nickstatt | Apr 10, 2019, 8:25pm EDT

f t SHARE

SECURITY CAMERAS

Google calls Nest's hidden microphone an 'error'

The tech giant didn't inform customers that the home security hub had a microphone.

Key questions to address privacy concerns

- What types of data are being collected by IoT devices?
- How is the data collected, and to which party is it shared?




Prior research & limitations

inspect all	Device	IP Addr	MAC Addr	Network Chipset
inspect	Unnamed Device 1	172.24.1.82	AC:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx	Hi-flying electronics technology Co.
inspect	Unnamed Device 2	172.24.1.138	D0:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx	LIFI LABS MANAGEMENT PTY LTD
inspect	Unnamed Device 3	172.24.1.99	B0:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx	D-Link International
inspect	Unnamed Device 4	172.24.1.98	D8:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx	
inspect	Unnamed Device 5	172.24.1.133	D0:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx	



Monitoring network traffic
[IMC19, CCS19, PETS19]



- Small device set, lab-environment ☹️
- Data encryption, not scale-well ☹️



Crowd source
[SEC19,Ubicom2020]

- Collecting real user data and leads to big privacy concern ☹️

Observation 1 - Two typical data management modes in IoT ecosystem




Observation 2 – Semantics-rich IoT companion apps

```
1 public class StdDeviceStatus extends BluetoothEvent {  
2     private int deviceId;  
3     private boolean a;  
4     private int b, c, d;  
5     private string pkgName;  
6  
7     public void setDeviceStatus(byte[] bluetoothData)
```

```
public String updateDevStatus() {  
    String devStatus =  
        "DeviceInfo_[deviceId_" + this.deviceId +  
        "_,isRunning=" + this.a +  
        "_,vibrationMode=" + this.b +  
        "_,batteryLevel=" + this.c +  
        "_,temperature=" + this.d +  
        "_,eventTime=" + Utils.getCurrentTime() +  
        "_,packageName=" + this.pkgName +  
        "]" ;  
    HTTPRequest.send(devStatus);  
}
```

- IoT Code Block
 - **A cluster of texts** (in a method) which includes meaningful labels describing IoT device data.
- IoT Data Point
 - **Individual IoT data** if the text label indicates information related to IoT Devices.

IoTProfiler



A taxonomy of privacy-sensitive IoT data


- Challenge: Diversity of privacy-sensitive IoT data.
- Construct an IoT taxonomy by analyzing known IoT reports, papers, documents and industry standards, etc.
- 550 data items, with 8 sub-categories
 - Released at <https://sites.google.com/view/iotprofiler>.



Category	Subcategory
Device Tracking Data	Device Identifier
	Network Identifier
Sensor Data	Biometric Data
	Location Data
	Environmental Data
Device-attached Data	Device Metadata
	Device Usage
	Timing Info

IoT data point identification

- Challenge: IoT data handled in companion apps are often kept together with the app local data
- Solution: A two-stage classifier
 - Only considers **clustered IoT data labels**




Variable binding and data exposure detection

➤ Alias data labels

```
intent.putExtra("voltage_val", dev.battery_level)
```

➤ Link data labels to program variables

```
JsonObject.put("walk_distance", a)  
a = JsonObject.get("walk_distance")
```



E.g., are these data flows disclosed within the application's privacy policy, or data transmitted securely?

Please check our paper for further technical details.

Datasets

- IoT companion apps collected in the wild.
 - 6,208 IoT apps as of Aug. 2020
 - <https://www.cs.ucf.edu/~xwang/datasets/IoTProfiler-Apps/>

IoT data exposure in the wild

App Store	Data Type		Exposure w/o Disclosure		Insecure Transmission		Share to Third Party		Total	
			# Items per App	# Apps	# Items per App	# Apps	# Items per App	# Apps	# Items per App	# Apps
Any Store	Device Tracking Data	Device Identifier	1.2	525 (8.6%)	1.2	96 (1.5%)	1.2	127 (2.2%)	1.2	568 (9.1%)
		Network Identifier	1.8	823 (13.3%)	1.6	130 (2.1%)	1.6	208 (3.4%)	1.8	833 (13.4%)
		Subtotal	1.9	1,078 (17.4%)	1.6	197 (3.2%)	1.7	292 (4.7%)	2	1,102 (17.8%)
Any Store	Sensor Data	Biometric Data	2.1	278 (4.5%)	1.8	76 (1.2%)	1.8	82 (1.3%)	2.1	285 (4.6%)
		Location Data	1.9	290 (4.7%)	1.9	73 (1.2%)	1.9	83 (1.3%)	1.9	318 (5.1%)
		Environmental Data	1.6	287 (4.6%)	1.6	60 (1.0%)	1.5	78 (1.3%)	1.6	287 (4.6%)
		Subtotal	2.3	711 (11.5%)	2.2	172 (2.8%)	2.1	199 (3.2%)	2.3	735 (11.8%)
Any Store	Device Attached Data	Device Metadata	1.9	841 (13.5%)	1.7	142 (2.3%)	1.8	223 (3.6%)	1.9	860 (13.9%)
		Device Usage and Status	2.4	1,128 (18.2%)	2.1	218 (3.5%)	2.1	288 (4.6%)	2.4	1,177 (19.0%)
		Timing Data	2.6	1,225 (19.7%)	2.3	243 (3.9%)	2.2	311 (5.0%)	2.6	1,238 (19.9%)
		Subtotal	4.3	1,722 (27.7%)	3.6	350 (5.6%)	3.5	476 (7.7%)	4.4	1,742 (28.1%)
US Store	Any Data Type		5.5	1,560 (29.2%)	4.6	289 (5.4%)	4.6	416 (7.8%)	5.7	1,579 (29.6%)
Chinese Store			6.2	413 (47.5%)	4.5	136 (15.6%)	4.8	141 (16.2%)	6.3	413 (47.5%)
Any Store			5.6	1,973 (31.8%)	4.6	425 (6.8%)	4.7	557 (9.0%)	5.8	1,992 (32.1%)

- 50,667 IoT code blocks and 174,943 IoT data points from **5,795/6,208(93.3%)** apps.

IoT data exposure in the wild


App Store	Data Type		Exposure w/o Disclosure		Insecure Transmission		Share to Third Party		Total	
			# Items per App	# Apps	# Items per App	# Apps	# Items per App	# Apps	# Items per App	# Apps
Any Store	Device Tracking Data	Device Identifier	1.2	535 (8.6%)	1.2	96 (1.5%)	1.3	137 (2.2%)	1.2	568 (9.1%)
		Network Identifier	1.8	823 (13.3%)	1.6	130 (2.1%)	1.6	208 (3.4%)	1.8	833 (13.4%)
		Subtotal	1.9	1,078 (17.4%)	1.6	197 (3.2%)	1.7	292 (4.7%)	2	1,102 (17.8%)
Any Store	Sensor Data	Biometric Data	2.1	278 (4.5%)	1.8	76 (1.2%)	1.8	82 (1.3%)	2.1	285 (4.6%)
		Location Data	1.9	290 (4.7%)	1.9	73 (1.2%)	1.9	83 (1.3%)	1.9	318 (5.1%)
		Environmental Data	1.6	287 (4.6%)	1.6	60 (1.0%)	1.5	78 (1.3%)	1.6	287 (4.6%)
		Subtotal	2.3	711 (11.5%)	2.2	172 (2.8%)	2.1	199 (3.2%)	2.3	735 (11.8%)
Any Store	Device Attached Data	Device Metadata	1.9	841 (13.5%)	1.7	142 (2.3%)	1.8	223 (3.6%)	1.9	860 (13.9%)
		Device Usage and Status	2.4	1,128 (18.2%)	2.1	218 (3.5%)	2.1	288 (4.6%)	2.4	1,177 (19.0%)
		Timing Data	2.6	1,225 (19.7%)	2.3	243 (3.9%)	2.2	311 (5.0%)	2.6	1,238 (19.9%)
		Subtotal	4.5	1,722 (27.1%)	3.6	350 (5.6%)	3.5	476 (7.7%)	4.4	1,742 (28.1%)
US Store	Any Data Type		5.5	1,560 (29.2%)	4.6	289 (5.4%)	4.6	416 (7.8%)	5.7	1,579 (29.6%)
Chinese Store			6.2	413 (47.5%)	4.5	136 (15.6%)	4.8	141 (16.2%)	6.3	413 (47.5%)
Any Store			5.6	1,973 (31.8%)	4.6	425 (6.8%)	4.7	557 (9.0%)	5.8	1,992 (32.1%)

- 1,973 apps (31.8%) from at least **1,559 unique device vendors** are found to collect sensitive IoT data without proper disclosure.
- Each app exposes **5.6 IoT data items** on average.

IoT data exposure in the wild

Data Type	Data Item	# Apps	
		US Store	Chinese Store
Device Tracking Data	device id	318 (6.0%)	113 (13.0%)
	wifi password	247 (4.6%)	110 (12.6%)
	mac address	154 (2.9%)	36 (4.1%)
	ssid	154 (2.9%)	32 (3.7%)
Sensor Data	body weight	135 (2.5%)	42 (4.8%)
	temperature	69 (1.3%)	23 (2.6%)
	altitude	39 (0.7%)	21 (2.4%)
	humidity	37 (0.7%)	9 (1.0%)
Device Attached Data	start/end time	251 (4.7%)	97 (11.1%)
	model name	244 (4.6%)	62 (7.1%)
	device name	210 (3.9%)	71 (8.2%)
	duration	162 (3.0%)	29 (3.3%)

IoT data exposure for users of different regions






Cross-region IoT data flows

For more findings, please check out our paper.

Example

➤ Health monitoring device



Own server:
https://d37se***.37bit.net:8**3




healthlink.cn

Case study

- Cigarette holder – use expected data
 - Harmful substances (e.g., nicotine)
 - Number of cigarettes smoked
- Data without the user's awareness
 - Smoking habits: **smoking times (puff)**, **locations**
 - Health conditions: **breathing capacity**



smoking times (puff)



breathing capacity

Summary

- New techniques to enable fine-grained analysis of IoT data exposure.
- Large-scale understanding of IoT data exposure.
- Potential applications include the auto-generation of privacy labels, which can help IoT apps/devices become privacy compliant.



UNIVERSITY OF CENTRAL FLORIDA

Cyber Security and Privacy Cluster



Software Supply Chain
Security

Privacy Compliance
Automation

Mobile & IoT Security

Thank You!