

The Impostor Among US(B): Off-Path Injection Attacks on USB Communications

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
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
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USB Overview

- USB 1.0 (1996), ..., USB4 (2019)
- Various speed modes, electrical interfaces & connector types
- Tree topology:
 - host = root
 - hubs = nodes
 - devices = leaves
- Backward compatibility built-in
- Host-arbitrated shared bus




USB 1.1 & 2.0 Communication Model




USB Built-in Security Measures

Masquerading Attacks



- Innocuous devices with unexpected function
- Typically emulating keyboards
- Leverages:
 - Default trust
 - User-understanding gap
- Firewall approach in software is the go-to defence




USB 1.1 & 2.0 Prior Attacks



Our Work – Off-Path Injection



Keystroke Injection Demo !



Impact

- Can exploit **any** USB interface trusted in software
- 48% of hubs found vulnerable
- Some motherboards also found vulnerable
- Keystroke injection
- OS install hijack


Policies bypassed:

- USBFilter (**Sec. '16**)
- GoodUSB (**ACSAC '15**)



-  **USBGuard**


- Oracle VirtualBox



Responsible Disclosure

Contacted affected parties (14):

- USB-IF
- Hub vendors
- Software vendors



Summary

Hardware-level signal injection bypassing software-based protections

- Keystroke injection using adjacent mouse
- OS installation hijack using adjacent serial device
- **Open Source** – Keystroke injector source RTL available at:

<https://github.com/0xADE1A1DE/USB-Injection>



Paper



Code

