

SpectrEM: Exploiting Electromagnetic Emanations During Transient Execution

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COSIC

Can transient instructions create physical covert channels?

Transient Execution Attacks



```
if (index < array_size) {  
    value = array[index];  
    leak(value);  
}
```



index in bounds
index in bounds
index in bounds
index out of bounds



```
value = access_secret();  
leak(value);
```


Generate fault

Physical Covert Channels




Physical Covert Channels

Setup A



\$25 000

Setup B




\$1000

Target: Arm Cortex-A72

EM Covert Channels


Operand-dependent timings

- Example: `udiv`
 - Divide by 0 (4 clock cycles)
 - Divide by -1 (6 clock cycles)



Control flow dependencies

- Nested branch prediction
 - Correct prediction
 - Misprediction



SpectrEM: A Physical Spectre Attack

Instruction gadget

```
if (index < len) {  
    bit = array[index] & bitmask;  
  
    res = dividend / (bit-1);  
}
```

Control flow gadget

```
if (index < len) {  
    bit = array[index] & bitmask;  
  
    if (bit) {  
        ...  
    }  
}
```

Meltdown: A Physical Meltdown Attack


Instruction gadget

```
bit = access_secret();  
res = dividend / (bit-1);
```


Control flow gadget

```
bit = access_secret();  
if (bit) {  
    ...  
}
```



Evaluation




FFT



Evaluation



Clustering





- + No training data
- Lower accuracy

Neural Network



- Requires training data
- + Higher accuracy

Evaluation



Evaluation

	Covert channel	Code Execution	Physical Access	Bitrate [bit/s]	BER [%]
Spectre	Cache	Yes	No	80 000	<0.01
NetSpectre	Cache	No	No	0.004	–
NetSpectre	AVX	No	No	0.017	–
SpectrEM – Instruction	EM	No	Yes	366	<0.01
SpectrEM – Control flow	EM	No	Yes	350	0.769

Case Study: OpenSSH

```
Channel *channel_by_id(struct ssh *ssh, int id) {
    if (id < 0 || (u_int)id >= ssh->chanctx->channels_alloc) {
        logit_f("%d: bad id", id);
        return NULL;
    }

    Channel *c = ssh->chanctx->channels[id];

    if (c == NULL) {
        logit_f("%d: bad id: channel free", id);
        return NULL;
    }
    return c;
}
```

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KU LEUVEN



COSIC

Artifact



KULeuven-COSIC/SpectrEM

