

“It’s the Company, the Government, You and I”: User Perceptions of Responsibility for Smart Home Privacy and Security

Julie Haney*, Yasemin Acar*[†], and Susanne Furman*,

*National Institute of Standards and Technology, [†]Leibniz University Hannover
{julie.haney, susanne.furman}@nist.gov; acar@sec.uni-hannover.de

Abstract

Smart home technology may expose adopters to increased risk to network security, information privacy, and physical safety. However, users may lack understanding of the privacy and security implications. Additionally, manufacturers often fail to provide transparency and configuration options, and few government-provided guidelines have yet to be widely adopted. This results in little meaningful mitigation action to protect users’ security and privacy. But how can this situation be improved and by whom? It is currently unclear where *perceived responsibility* for smart home privacy and security lies. To address this gap, we conducted an in-depth interview study of 40 smart home adopters to explore where they assign responsibility and how their perceptions of responsibility relate to their concerns and mitigations. Results reveal that participants’ perceptions of responsibility reflect an interdependent relationship between consumers, manufacturers, and third parties such as the government. However, perceived breakdowns and gaps in the relationship result in users being concerned about their security and privacy. Based on our results, we suggest ways in which these actors can address gaps and better support each other.

1 Introduction

While early adopters of IoT smart home technology have typically been more technically savvy, smart home devices are increasingly being purchased by non-technical users [31] who may not understand the technology’s privacy and security implications. Within the current dynamic threat and technology environment, the uptick of smart home technology adoption may expose users to increased risks to their network security, privacy of their information, and quite possibly their physical safety [26]. In addition, global surveys have identified that

security and privacy are significant concerns among both IoT adopters and non-adopters [9, 49], and that consumers would like more information about security and privacy when purchasing devices [33]. Therefore, it is imperative that smart home consumers be empowered to protect the security and privacy of their devices while still being able to enjoy the benefits of the technology. This would result in consumers feeling more comfortable with their devices and encourage additional adoption among those who currently have concerns.

Unfortunately, smart home devices may fail to provide transparency of privacy and security protections and may lack adequate security and privacy controls [24], while manufacturers may be unsure as how best to implement these [25]. Generally, third-party guidance on desirable privacy and security controls has not yet entirely converged and is not currently widely adopted since many of these efforts are nascent and reflect in-progress work.¹ In combination with users’ lack of in-depth understanding of smart home device technology, privacy, and security, the result is limited meaningful mitigation actions being taken to protect consumer security and privacy [1, 32, 42, 49, 66]. For example, some users leave the room to have sensitive conversations out of earshot of the technology, unplug devices, or tape over cameras.

In order to create meaningful and effective privacy and security controls, interfaces, guidelines, and other resources to support users, it is important to understand who users believe are the responsible parties for privacy and security. Responsibility can be viewed as being active: “the state or fact of having a duty to deal with something.”² A better understanding of perceptions of responsibility and framing within the context of duty/obligation might shed further light on what actions users are willing and able to take on their own versus which functions they feel are the duty of or would be better suited to others. Knowing the will of the consumer may then

*Certain commercial companies/products are identified in this paper to foster understanding. Such identification does not imply recommendation or endorsement by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, nor does it imply that the companies/products identified are necessarily the best available for the purpose.

¹E.g., NISTIR 8259 was published in May 2020 [23]; ENISA published the updated *Good Practices for Security of IoT* [22] in November 2019; the UK published *Code of Practice for Consumer IoT Security* [17] in October 2018.

²<https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/responsibility>

put more pressure on others to take action. We also consider that responsibility may be perceived in a more negative light as “the state or fact of being accountable or to blame for something.”³ Viewing responsibility through this lens may reveal areas of discomfort. These areas of discomfort could illuminate gaps that need to be filled in order to provide a more private and secure smart home experience and make adoption more palatable. However, it is currently unclear where users think responsibility for smart home privacy and security lie.

To address this gap, we uncovered perceptions of responsibility during a semi-structured interview study of 40 smart home users by seeking to answer two research questions:

RQ1: Who do users believe is responsible for the privacy and security of their smart home devices?

RQ2: What is the relationship, if any, between perceptions of responsibility, concern, and taking mitigative action?

Our study revealed that user concerns about the possibility of undesirable security and privacy situations (e.g., as found in [56, 66]) can stem from the perception of insufficient controls on manufacturers and inadequate user support. We found that users primarily assign privacy and security responsibility to three actors or a combination of those - smart home owners (personal responsibility), manufacturers, and government/regulatory bodies - with manufacturers being most frequently held responsible. Responsibility is often viewed as being an interdependent relationship between those actors in the pursuit of robust smart home privacy and security. Part of this relationship relies on actors taking voluntary action (e.g., users configuring security options) and supporting the others in their goals (e.g., a manufacturer providing security tips to consumers). However, when a user is either unwilling or unable to take necessary action, participants desired better information and built-in protection by manufacturers, facilitated by the government. When manufacturers do not use privacy and security standards or support privacy/security controls, standards or guidance can help them target a privacy/security baseline, with “checks and balances” (e.g., regulations, certification) enforcing action.

Our study makes several contributions:

- We provide novel insight into where smart home users place responsibility for the privacy and security of their devices and how those perceptions may relate to concerns and implementation of mitigations. We identify a theme of an interdependent relationship between users, manufacturers, and the government/third parties.
- Our findings extend prior literature related to perceptions of privacy/security responsibility for conventional technology into the smart home domain.

- We give practical guidance for how users, manufacturers, and government/third party organizations might support each other by filling current gaps.
- We suggest future research directions to address how best to enhance the interdependent relationship necessary for smart home privacy and security.

2 Background

To help frame our smart home privacy and security study, we describe prior research and background information related to privacy/security perceptions, smart home privacy/security, responsibility, and third-party efforts.

2.1 Related Work

2.1.1 Privacy and Security Perceptions

Prior research on privacy perceptions can serve as a foundation when exploring user beliefs and opinions of smart home privacy. Researchers have suggested the existence of a “privacy paradox” [2, 7] in which, although users often state that they care about privacy, they may fail to mitigate privacy risks and choose to use privacy-violating technology. Users may also willingly or reluctantly trade privacy and security for convenience and perceived benefits [2, 47, 48]. One study suggests that users value privacy more when they have it than when they do not, i.e., efforts to re-establish privacy may be less spirited than staying private in the first place [3]. Default settings and hard-to-navigate configuration options also contribute to behavior that does not preserve privacy [46]. Furthermore, privacy policies are often mistakenly assumed to contain the promise to respect user privacy or understood as implicit recommendations [41]. The concept of “privacy resignation” in response to repeated privacy violations has also been identified [52].

We also turn to prior literature on perceptions and security mitigations employed with traditional information technology (IT) and online applications as a potential basis of comparison. Typical, non-technical end users rarely view security as a primary goal when interacting with technology, often lack security knowledge, and have low self-efficacy when it comes to taking security-related action [54]. This is opposed to security experts who have very different ideas of which actions help with online security [39, 58]. Wash and Rader [62] surveyed U.S. internet users and found that those with weakly held beliefs about viruses and hackers were the least likely to take protective actions. Stanton et al. [54] discussed “security fatigue,” a weariness towards security when it becomes too burdensome. Herley [36] similarly claimed that users may ignore security advice due to being overwhelmed by the sheer volume of advice, viewing security as being a high cost to themselves, and because they perceive security actions to be

³Ibid.

inadequate in the face of myriad threats. West et al. [63] examined why people make poor security decisions, finding that the tendency to satisfice, cognitive biases, time pressures, and inattentive obliviousness contribute to this.

In this paper, we explore whether users' general views of privacy and security found in the literature are reflected in the perceptions of privacy/security responsibility for a specific technology (smart homes).

2.1.2 Smart Home Security and Privacy

In recent years, many researchers have examined smart home privacy and security from a user perspective. In this section, we highlight several relevant efforts that identified user perceptions and experiences that can be confirmed or extended in our own study. Early work pointed out a lack of transparent privacy controls in smart home devices [61]. A subsequent study identified additional challenges and tensions in smart home hubs, including security and privacy issues [44].

Research and industry surveys have shown that security and privacy concerns can be barriers to adoption of smart home devices [11, 21, 57, 64]. For example, Lau et al. [42] found that some non-users are privacy conscious and distrustful of privacy and security of smart home devices and their manufacturers, and that smart home devices generally cross these non-users' privacy thresholds.

Even adopters have privacy and security concerns. For example, Sanguinetti et al. [51] found that owners of smart home devices were just as concerned as those who chose not to purchase the devices. Malkin et al. [43] observed that users express concern about smart home speaker recordings and reject the use or sharing of recordings for purposes other than voice commands because of a violation of contextual integrity (i.e., not adhering to user expectations of how data flows and is used for a specific service). Users also have complex, but incomplete threat models, which include a general sense of being surveilled by manufacturers or the government and the possibility of being attacked by hackers, while lacking awareness of botnets and the sale of inferred data [1, 21, 67]. Users were generally more concerned when the privacy of children was at stake [4, 43].

Smart home users also express that they lack information to evaluate device privacy and security features. Emami-Naeini et al. [21] found that, although participants ranked privacy and security as important factors when purchasing IoT devices, information was difficult to find. This was also confirmed by researchers at the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) who found that open-source security information for smart home devices often lacked specificity or was unavailable [24].

Multiple studies found a lack of substantive mitigation actions to address security and privacy concerns for various reasons, including lack of agency, lack of option availability, and trust in other entities to take action [1, 32, 42, 56, 66].

Adopters may also fail to take action because they typically have higher tolerances for privacy violations, willingly or reluctantly accept the trade-off in exchange for the convenience and utility offered by smart home devices, and often express that they have "nothing to hide" [42, 56].

Other researchers identified privacy and security options desired by users. In a co-design exercise, Yao et al. [65] found that data localization and a private mode were among desired items for privacy protections. Haney et al. [32] identified wishlists for both privacy and security mitigations, which included more transparency about data collection and use and easy-to-configure options. However, availability of options must be balanced with usability, as expressed by Colnago et al. [12] who found that, while participants desire more control over their data and privacy settings, they are concerned about being overloaded with configuration options and "notification overload."

Several studies investigated the use of smart home devices in multi-user homes, finding power imbalances in that secondary users often have less agency in purchase and configuration and use decisions, which creates a potential for abuse [28, 42, 66]. These findings are corroborated by Huang et al. [37], who observed that users of multi-user devices adopt all-or-nothing mitigation strategies similar to mitigations against external actors, and desire more control options over their data. Tabassum et al. [57] found that users desire sharing options with people outside their home to increase their security. Based on a 2018 online study, He et al. suggested that smart homes need granular configuration options based less on device type and more on user type (e.g., neighbor vs. spouse) [35]. On the manufacturer side, Chalhoub et al. interviewed smart camera designers, and found that user experience (UX) is considered important in communicating privacy configurations, but is under-utilized when it comes to security [10]. While prior studies identified smart home privacy and security concerns and mitigations, to the best of our knowledge, none explored *perceptions of responsibility* in detail. This is a gap our research hopes to address.

2.1.3 Perceptions of Responsibility

As a possible comparison point to our findings related to responsibility of *smart home* security and privacy, we look to prior work addressing general security and privacy responsibility. Past research has shown that consumers often feel that security is the responsibility of a third party (for instance, the government, vendors, or IT professionals) and may delegate security decisions because they feel they lack knowledge and technical skills to take action [27, 30]. From a privacy perspective, Renaud et al. [50] explored why end-to-end email encryption solutions have not been widely adopted. They found that, although participants were privacy aware, they were often not overly concerned enough to take additional action, partially because they abdicated responsibility to service providers that

they felt were better equipped. Bandyopadhyay [5] proposed a theoretical framework to explore factors influencing privacy and security concerns of consumers who use the internet. He suggested that there is a consumer trust problem which necessitates increased assurance that security and privacy are being protected. Therefore, the responsibility of assurance was viewed as three-fold, falling on governments, vendors, and, to a lesser degree, consumers. Dogruel and Joeckel [19] interviewed U.S. and German smartphone users and found that most felt the responsibility for privacy protection lies primarily in their own hands. While some participants assigned third party responsibility to government and commercial entities, most believed both carry at least some responsibility for privacy. German participants were much more likely to desire government intervention in the case of privacy, for example by setting minimum privacy standards and establishing legal frameworks. U.S. participants, however, were more likely to place accountability with commercial entities.

A global Mozilla survey of close to 190,000 people asked "Who is most responsible for protecting the online safety, privacy, and security of the connected apps and devices you own?" [9]. Thirty-four percent of respondents placed responsibility on the makers of apps and devices, with roughly the same percentage saying that it was up to them. Twenty percent selected government. The survey also revealed variances in responsibility perceptions among different countries. For example, respondents from Mexico and the U.S. were much more likely to claim personal responsibility (41% and 43%) and less likely to put most responsibility on the government (13% and 12%) as compared to those from other countries.

While these prior studies examined perceptions of responsibility, none focused on smart home devices. It is unclear as to whether responsibility for smart home devices is viewed differently than traditional online or information technology, potentially because of inherently unique characteristics of the devices, such as them being always on and collecting data within highly personal and private spaces. Our study begins to address this unknown.

2.2 Third-Party Efforts

Government, regulatory bodies, non-profits, and other certification authorities have demonstrated initiative in protecting consumers' digital privacy and security, with differing levels of success. Recent developments in privacy-protecting laws reflect that some responsibility for keeping user data private is being shifted from users to corporations via government intervention. For example, the European Union (EU) enacted the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [60], which provides individuals with rights related to the collection and storage of their personal data and requires that developers implement privacy by design. In the U.S., the state of California recently implemented the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) [55], a statute that addresses online privacy and

states that a consumer has rights regarding transparency of data collection and the right to request that their data not be sold and be deleted. Reactions and implementations for these regulations have been mixed since privacy may be viewed as a conflict between allowing the free market to trade data as a commodity and empowering end users to control their own data. With respect to GDPR, while some vendors have added configuration options, many are still difficult to navigate for average users. Other vendors block access to their services when accessed from within the EU to avoid having to comply [16].

With respect to IoT, several industry, government, and non-profit organizations have issued voluntary security guidance for manufacturers, most of which is too new to have been widely adopted. Recent government guidance includes NIST's *Foundational Cybersecurity Activities for IoT Device Manufacturers* [23] in the U.S., the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA)'s *Good Practices for Security of IoT - Secure Software Development Lifecycle* [22], and the United Kingdom (U.K.)'s *Code of Practice for Security of IoT* [17]. Industry consensus groups have also provided privacy and security baseline resources for manufacturers, for example, the Internet of Things Privacy Forum [38], IoT Security Foundation [40], and the Council to Secure the Digital Economy [14]

Recently, there has also been considerable attention and advocacy for IoT product security and privacy labels as both an aid to consumers and way to increase manufacturer transparency and accountability [18, 33, 53]. For example, the Underwriters Laboratory (UL) now provides an IoT security rating backed by a standardized process to evaluate security aspects of smart products [59] and the wireless industry association implemented the CTIA IoT Cybersecurity Certification Program [15]. Carnegie Mellon University proposed IoT security and privacy labels based on studies of consumers and experts that suggested that labels could aid in consumer purchase decisions while holding manufacturers accountable for product privacy and security implementations [20, 21].

3 Methods

Between February and June of 2019, we conducted an exploratory, semi-structured interview study of 40 smart home users to understand their perceptions of and experiences with the devices. This paper describes a subset of collected data which is novel to prior smart home research and centered on user perceptions of privacy and security *responsibility*. The study was approved by our institution's research protections office. Prior to data collection, participants were informed of the study purpose and how their data would be protected. Data were recorded without personal identifiers (using generic identifiers such as P10_A) and not linked back to individuals.

3.1 Participant Recruitment & Demographics

To be eligible for the study, participants had to be adult users of smart home devices. We hired a consumer research company to recruit general public participants, who were compensated with a \$75 prepaid card. Prospective participants were members of the consumer research company's research panel, a database comprised of over 6,000 participants located in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area in the U.S. who had agreed to be contacted about consumer research opportunities. The recruitment company emailed a subset of 444 members of the research panel, selected for demographic diversity. They also recruited via social media posts and requested direct referrals.

To determine eligibility, those interested in the study first completed an online screening survey about their smart home devices, their role with the devices (e.g., administrator, user), professional background, basic demographic information (age, gender), and number of household members. After reviewing the screening information, we purposefully selected participants for interviews if they had two or more different smart home devices for which they were an active user (as opposed to being a bystander). We did this to engage with users who actually had *smart homes*, which we define as using multiple, diverse smart home devices, as opposed to those with only one individual smart home device. Smart TVs were not included in this initial count (but were addressed in the interviews) because most TVs now come with smart functionality and do not necessarily represent a deliberate choice to purchase a smart device.

We ultimately selected and interviewed 41 individuals. Despite a review of the screening questionnaire, during the interview, one participant (P5) was found not to have any smart home devices, so was removed from the study.

We defined smart home devices as being networked devices in the following categories, which were developed after consultation with IoT experts in our institution and used in the screening survey to focus responses. Number of participants with each type of device is indicated in parentheses.

- **Smart security (n=35):** e.g., security cameras, motion detectors, door locks
- **Smart entertainment (n=38):** e.g., smart televisions, speakers, streaming devices, connected media systems
- **Home environment (n=38):** e.g., smart plugs, energy consumption monitors, lighting, thermostats, smoke and air quality sensors
- **Smart appliances (n=15):** e.g., smart refrigerators, coffee pots, ovens, washing machines
- **Virtual assistants (n=36):** e.g., voice-controlled devices such as Amazon Echo/Alexa and Google Home

Initially, although not a major focus of this project, we also wanted to examine potential differences between smart home users living in the same household. Therefore, the survey was administered over the phone to another household member if interested. This recruitment only yielded four additional participants, so we ultimately decided not to pursue this vein of comparison. Since few participants were recruited in this way, it is unlikely that their opinions caused undue data bias, especially since most had different perspectives from their housemates.

Of the 40 participants, 32 had installed and administered the devices (indicated with an A after the participant ID), and eight were non-administrative users of the devices (indicated with a U). Twenty-two (55%) were male and 18 (45%) were female. The majority (70%) were between the ages of 30 and 49. Participants were highly educated with 18 (45%) having a master's degree or above and another 20 (50%) with a bachelor's degree. Thirty-four participants lived in multi-person households, with four couples among the participants (interviewed individually). All but one participant had three or more individual smart home devices, with 34 having devices in three or more categories. Refer to Appendix A for detailed participant demographics.

3.2 Data Collection

In addition to the screening survey responses, our data consisted of transcripts from 40 in-person, semi-structured interviews lasting on average 41 minutes. All interviews were audio recorded and then transcribed by a third party service provider. We chose semi-structured interviews over other methods, such as surveys, due to the exploratory nature of our investigation. Interviews afforded a greater richness of data, the ability to ask follow-up questions to more deeply explore participant responses, and the opportunity for participants to add other relevant information not explicitly targeted [13].

To develop our interview protocol, we conducted an extensive review of prior literature and market research up through 2018 to understand recent research, trends, and the state-of-the-art in smart home technologies. We also examined existing smart home devices ourselves to understand their usage. Based on these investigations, we crafted questions to address research gaps and explore multiple aspects of smart home device ownership and usage, including privacy and security. We asked an IoT domain expert to review our interview questions to ensure we were using correct terminology and considering appropriate facets of smart home ownership and use. We then piloted the interview protocol with four smart home owners from our institution (two device administrators and two non-administrators/users) to determine the face validity of questions and language. Pilot participants were not compensated. We made minor adjustments to the interview instrument based on feedback from the content expert and the pilot experience. Because modifications were only minor to

improve clarity and comprehension, the pilot interviews were included in the final data set.

Interview questions addressed several areas in the following order: understanding of smart home terminology; purchase decision process; general use; general concerns, likes, and dislikes; installation and maintenance; privacy; security; and safety.⁴ During the interviews, we differentiated between privacy and security by giving the participants definitions and examples of what each term meant. Security concerns relate to safeguarding of data/devices while privacy is safeguarding user identity (which can be gleaned from certain types of data). In this paper, we focus only on collected data pertaining to privacy and security *responsibility* since this topic has not yet been explored in detail by other researchers. Note that participants may have mentioned privacy and security responsibility concepts throughout the interview (for example, when asked if they had any hesitations prior to device purchase), not just during the designated privacy and security sections.

We interviewed until we reached two conditions. First, we monitored for theoretical saturation, the point at which no new ideas emerge from the data [13]. We also wanted to ensure we had a participant sample with a diverse set of smart home devices to account for potentially different experiences depending on the types of devices.

3.3 Data Analysis

Data analysis included both deductive and inductive coding practices, which allowed for an emergence of core concepts. Analysis of the interview transcripts began with the development of an *a priori* code list based on the research questions. Using the initial code list, each of the three research team members individually coded a subset of four interviews (4936 lines, 214 minutes of audio), then met as a group to discuss code application and develop a codebook. The final codebook addressed all data concepts (e.g., purchase, installation, usability, privacy, security, safety). All codes were “operationalized,” which involves formally defining each code to ensure understanding among all coders.⁵

Using the codebook, we then coded the remaining interviews independently, with each transcript coded by two researchers and one primary coder (the first author) coding all interviews. Each pair of coders then examined and resolved differences in code application. In accordance with the recommendation of qualitative methodologists (e.g., [6, 45]), we focused not just on agreement but also on how and why disagreements in coding arose and the insights afforded by subsequent discussions. This focus was especially valuable in pursuing alternate interpretations of the data given the diverse perspectives of our multidisciplinary research team. When

⁴Interview questions can be found in an extended form of this paper at <https://go.usa.gov/xGwP7>.

⁵The codebook for privacy and security concepts informing this paper are included in the extended version.

disagreement occurred, we discussed as a group to reach consensus. In rare cases where agreement could not be reached, the primary coder made the final decision.

Throughout the data analysis phase, we progressed to the recognition of relationships among the codes and examined patterns and categories. We met regularly as group to discuss our interpretations and emergent ideas. This process allowed for the development of central concepts, including the topic of this paper: perceptions of privacy and security responsibility as an interdependent relationship.

3.4 Limitations

As with any interview study, participant responses are subject to recall, self-report, and social desirability biases. In addition, our study only captures perceptions of smart home adopters of multiple devices, so does not adequately capture those of limited adopters or non-adopters. The participants, who were generally highly educated professionals in a high-income metropolitan area, may not be fully representative of the smart home user population in the U.S. However, our sample appears to mirror smart home adopters characterized in prior industry surveys [29]. We also acknowledge that U.S. smart home users may have different privacy and security attitudes from those in other countries, for example, due to political or cultural factors related to privacy expectations and tolerance. However, since other regions in the world, such as Europe, lag behind North America in terms of smart home market penetration and maturity [8], our findings may identify potential areas that other countries may want to consider as adoption increases. These limitations could be addressed with replication of this study in other countries or a global quantitative survey informed by the results of our study.

Since the smaller sample common to qualitative research does not lend itself to generalizability, we did not perform analysis to identify differences based on demographics (e.g., gender, age). We also did not differentiate responsibility based on device type but rather asked about general perceptions. We plan to explore the effect of demographic characteristics as well as per-device differences in a follow-up quantitative survey administered to a larger sample.

4 Results

In this section, we report results about perceived responsibility for smart home privacy and security. Example quotes from participants are provided throughout. Counts are provided in some cases, not as an attempt to distill our qualitative data to quantitative measures, but rather to illustrate weight or unique cases.

We first provide a brief overview of the privacy and security concerns and mitigations voiced by participants during the interviews. Although these concerns and mitigation strategies are not novel as compared to those identified in several of




Figure 1: Participant concerns.

the studies cited in Section 2.1.2, we summarize our own findings here in order to contextualize the focus of the paper: the assignment of *responsibility* for security and privacy.

4.1 Concerns and Mitigations

Early in the interview, we asked participants a general question, “What concerns, if any, do you have about the devices?” We later asked, “What are your concerns, if any, about how information is collected, stored, and used and who can see that information?” and “What are your concerns, if any, about the security of your devices?” In some cases, participants were personally concerned about privacy or security (28 for privacy and 26 for security) but to varying degrees. Several participants mentioned concerns that were expressed by others (e.g., family members, friends, media) but not personally held (4 for privacy, 6 for security). The most frequently mentioned concerns for both privacy and security in our study are summarized in Figure 1.

We also found evidence of lack of concern. In 24 cases, participants did not value the information collected by smart home devices, believing they would not be a worthwhile target. Therefore, they felt that there was a low probability that their devices would be hacked (5 participants). In addition, unconcerned participants often demonstrated privacy resignation [42] in which users believe that their data is already publicly available via other means and that there is nothing they can do about it (8 participants).

Privacy and security mitigations enumerated by participants were often simplistic or non-technical. Examples of simplistic mitigations include: setting a device app password, password-protecting the Wi-Fi network, and disabling the option to order items via virtual assistants. Non-technical mitigations included: not having sensitive conversations near virtual assistants, not placing devices with cameras or microphones in private rooms of the house (like bedrooms), or unplugging the




Figure 2: Shared privacy and security mitigations.

device when not in use. Figure 2 shows the most frequently-mentioned mitigations. Note that all of these were discussed at least once within both the privacy and security contexts.

We observed that being concerned about smart home privacy and security did not always translate into action. This inaction was due to several reasons. First, smart home device ownership was often viewed as a conscious choice to accept risks in exchange for perceived benefits, described as “*willful ignorance*” by P1_A. This same participant commented, “*It’s a trade-off... I know that it’s collecting personal data,... and I know there’s the potential of a security leak, but yet, I like having the convenience of having those things*” (P1_A). Second, users may not be aware of available options or were not given options by the manufacturer. For example, one smart home user commented, “*I’ve been given very little methods to alleviate the concerns. Usually the description of the controls aren’t specific enough for me to alleviate my concerns*” (P13_A). In addition, some do not have enough knowledge to be able to select and implement mitigations, especially security ones (8 participants). A participant said, “*I know it is password protected. That’s as far as my knowledge. I don’t know more than that. I’m not certified with cybersecurity*” (P41_U). As with concerns, we also observed the influence of resignation as well as loss of control and fatalism, which are characteristics of security fatigue. One participant exhibited this resignation when he said, “*I just kind of assume if it exists, there’s a way to hack into it*” (P18_A).

4.2 Responsibility

Participants were asked “Who do you think is responsible for protecting the privacy of information collected by your smart home devices?” and, later in the interview, “Who do you think is responsible for the security of your devices?” Participants may have also discussed concepts related to responsibility in response to other questions, e.g., those pertaining to concerns and “What kind of things would you like to be able to do with your devices, but haven’t, don’t know how, or are not sure that you can?”.




Figure 3: Perceptions of responsibility for smart home privacy and security.

Most responses fell into one of three categories or a combination of those: personal responsibility (smart home owners), device manufacturers, and government/regulatory bodies (see Figure 3). Two participants did not have an answer for privacy, and three did not have a response for security. One owner of a smart thermostat thought the power company was responsible for privacy, and one participant said internet service providers were partially responsible for security.

4.2.1 Personal Responsibility

Eighteen participants claimed at least partial personal responsibility for **privacy** (6 of those with sole responsibility). For example, P1_A expressed, “It starts with us. We’re bringing this device into our home.” Twenty-eight participants claimed some personal responsibility for **security** (7 with sole responsibility): “It’s on you to either put extra restrictions in place or just be okay with the fact that [a breach] is going to happen” (P8_A). Note that several participants placed responsibility on a housemate or spouse who was more involved with the devices. However, we considered personal responsibility as being that of smart home owners in general.

Eleven participants viewed personal responsibility as holding themselves accountable for accepting risks. For instance, personal privacy responsibility was often described as being implicit with device purchase and continued use. When asked who was responsible for privacy, a participant said:

“The owners. In my opinion, if you don’t want stuff exposed, you shouldn’t have those devices in your house to begin with. You’re accepting a risk by taking those on in your home” (P35_A).

Another commented, “You buy the device and realize what you’re getting yourself into. . . Buyer beware. Operate at your own risk” (P26_A).

We also observed that viewing responsibility as personal could also be a justification for inaction in taking mitigation actions, even if privacy and security were concerns. In these

cases, participants accepted personal blame for their own perceived deficiencies, such as not looking into what options were available, having incomplete threat models, or not taking the time to learn more about how to secure their devices or home networks. For example, P14_U believed device owners are to blame if they do not adequately secure their devices: “I think that’s probably a shared thing. . . A lot of people don’t put secure passwords and stuff on their systems. . . People don’t use the tools that are out there, like VPNs. . . I think that’s all responsibility of you.” Although P8_A believed he is solely accountable for the security of his smart home devices, he did not take many substantive mitigation actions because “I’m not going to educate myself on network security. . . This stuff is not my forte. I’m very accepting to the fact that it is what it is.”

Conversely, participants who approached personal responsibility as an active, obligatory role were those who implemented mitigations above and beyond setting a password at installation and incorporated security and privacy considerations into their purchase decision-making process. Regarding the obligation to configure privacy settings, a smart home owner remarked, “I feel like the default is always full access, so you have to really look for and pursue stricter settings” (P18_A). Especially in the case of security, responsibility was viewed as requiring some effort on behalf of users. For example, P15_A addressed most of his concerns by doing extensive research on the devices prior to purchase. He then only selected those he felt adequately implemented security and privacy protections, including “good authentication, encryption, secure protocols being used.”

Some participants did not mention taking personal responsibility for smart home privacy and security (22 for privacy, 12 for security). We note that most of these participants did not explicitly deny responsibility, but rather assigned responsibility to other actors when asked. An older smart home user was one of the few to overtly abdicate responsibility when she said, “I’ll leave that to the next generation” (P38_U).

The study results also revealed a disconnect between being concerned and accepting responsibility. Among those participants who accepted personal responsibility, the majority did express personal concern (13 concerned vs. 5 unconcerned for privacy and 20 concerned vs. 9 unconcerned for security). However, privacy concern did not necessarily mean that participants accepted responsibility (15 concerned did not accept responsibility for privacy vs. 13 that did). Being concerned with security was more likely to be associated with personal responsibility (20 accepting responsibility and 6 who did not).

4.2.2 Manufacturer Responsibility

As the most frequent response, 28 participants believed manufacturers share some responsibility for **privacy**, with nine of those assigning sole responsibility to manufacturers. For

example, a participant remarked, “Any single person who was involved in the creation of the product is responsible for what it does, including collecting information” (P30_U). Another felt that manufacturers “have a responsibility to make sure that information is where it’s getting sent to, who’s getting it, and that it’s safe, and it’s not going to get taken away or stolen” (P32_A).

Thirty participants said manufacturers have at least some responsibility for **security** (only 6 for solely responsible). For instance, one participant who thought manufacturers are solely responsible said, “I would say the manufacturer. I don’t think they can expect all of us to be cybersecurity experts. That’s why we bought the product” (P29_A). Another commented,

“[Manufacturers] are the prime people who are responsible for things they’re making because we’re not putting all the time, and energy, and money on building that stuff. So, we really don’t know what is inside of this” (P9_A).

The data revealed an attitude that manufacturers have an obligation to the buyers of their products to adequately protect their privacy and security, with this being part of an unstated manufacturer-consumer contract put in place at time of device purchase. One participant remarked, “They need to do everything [since they are] taking so much money for all that” (P9_A). Another commented, “If I’m going to buy your product, I think you owe it to me to not abuse that. I did give you money for it” (P29_A).

However, there were differing levels of confidence in whether manufacturers could adequately uphold this obligation. Participants who put their trust in manufacturers to protect their privacy and security often did so based on a perceived competence due to company size or reputation. For example, a user trusted larger companies to build secure devices: “Maybe that’s why I’m feeling a little more secure than not because I’m like, oh, this is a big company. If something happens, hopefully, they have the money to figure it out” (P6_U). One participant felt that it was beneficial for manufacturers to implement strong privacy and security measures because “If they have a bunch of massive security breaches, people are going to stop buying their products. So our interests are aligned there” (P17_A).

Even though they placed responsibility on manufacturers, others expressed varying levels of distrust. Only 11 participants relied on manufacturer-supplied information when researching potential products, while 34 looked at other, often subjective online sources, such as customer reviews. While 10 participants believed data was sent to manufacturers for beneficial reasons (e.g., product improvement and tailoring to consumer habits), others felt that they were at the mercy of manufacturers who do not have consumers’ best interests in mind, for example, believing manufacturers were purposely vague in terms and conditions statements so that consumer data could be more easily monetized. When asked if he ever reads any of the privacy agreements, P10_A said, “I don’t

have much trust in what companies say they collect and don’t collect. I think they collect what they can and use it.” Others felt that manufacturers were powerless to prevent data breaches and device compromise when up against a determined adversary. For example, a participant commented, “I would say that I think they try to do a good job of being secure, but we see hacks all the time... I think that sooner or later they will get hacked” (P26_A).

In all of these cases, participants felt that manufacturers *should* have a duty to implement adequate security and privacy mechanisms but were not certain they *would* or *could*. However, manufacturers were still not exempt from being accountable or blamed if something should go wrong.

4.2.3 Government Responsibility

Fifteen participants thought that the government or some regulatory body was at least partially responsible for smart home **privacy**, with only one viewing government as being solely responsible. In general, participants viewed the government as having an obligation to protect its people from harm from security and privacy breaches. For example, a participant saw government regulation of smart home privacy as being associated with consumer safety:

“I think the other half of the responsibility goes on the government to protect your citizens... There’s other safety precautions put in other industries. I don’t see why that shouldn’t be something applied to this industry as well” (P29_A).

P31_A did not think the government would do the best job, but felt regulation had some benefit:

“We’ve got to do something to protect people’s information, or at least make them more aware of what exactly is being utilized and sold, and having opportunities to opt-out, taking at least some steps.”

The assignment of government privacy responsibility was at times ironic because several participants also expressed that they believed the government was performing surveillance of citizens via smart home devices. Potential surveillance bothered some, but others were not concerned because they felt they were not doing anything illegal or of interest to the government. Even though P26_A thought the government was partially responsible for privacy, he remarked:

“I’d like to regulate our government, but that’s not gonna happen. Right? I don’t mean to sound so flip-pant, but I wish they would stop watching and collecting data, but that’s not going to happen. It is what it is.”

Interestingly, while over a third of participants allocated at least partial responsibility for privacy on the government, there was less expectation that the government should regulate **security** (5 participants, none holding the government solely responsible). Among those five, P32_A thought the government’s duty was in “*setting guidelines, enforcing them.*”

P7_A felt that a regulator's role was not about constant auditing but rather holding manufacturers responsible if they were to "mess up" with respect to security.

4.2.4 Shared Responsibility

Responsibility for **privacy** was often viewed as being shared by some combination of consumers, manufacturers, and government (21 participants). For instance, one participant thought both she and the manufacturer are obligated:

"I think I'm partially responsible in making sure that I don't put too much out there. But I think that the companies that control and own these, they need to make sure that people's information is not being put out there. Because at the end of the day, it affects us" (P37_A).

Twenty-four thought responsibility for **security** was shared, mostly between user and manufacturer. A tech-savvy participant talked about this mutual obligation:

"If you have stronger security features that the device offers the user doesn't use, that's kind of the user's fault. If it doesn't offer certain level of security, that's the manufacturer's fault" (P10_A).

We observed that participants perceived each actor (consumer, manufacturer, government) as having a role in filling in the gaps when other parties cannot or choose not to enact strong privacy and security measures. In the remainder of this section, we present the different combinations of responsible actors discussed by participants and how they viewed each actor as balancing the others.

Personal and Manufacturer. Most responses about shared responsibility for **security** were between device owners and manufacturers (19 participants), with much fewer (7) for **privacy**. From our analysis, we observe that the difference may be due to a recognition that both the device itself and the environment in which it is placed need to be secured, with only users themselves having the ability to secure the home network and set strong passwords on device companion apps. However, some acceptance of personal responsibility and mitigation implementation did not abdicate manufacturers, since there are aspects of security and privacy that users will never have control over (e.g., secure code, security of cloud services, protection of stored data and data in transit). Therefore, responsibility was often viewed as being shared, as expressed by a participant:

"I need to protect my passwords and things like that. But at the same time... you don't know what security features are built in, you don't know what any potential vulnerability might be. I think it's certainly a shared responsibility" (P24_A).

As another example case, P1_A assumes personal responsibility both in purchase decision ("It starts with us. We're bringing this device into our home") and by taking some simple mitigative actions (e.g., taping over cameras, not placing

devices in more private areas of the home like bedroom). Yet, she also expects the manufacturer to do what she is not able to do with respect to managing data "appropriately and securely" and producing secure devices.

Given that smart home users may not know how to protect their devices and data, they look to manufacturers to provide them with more usable and transparent options. A smart home administrator commented about the need for better usability:

"I think the ability to control that data should be simpler than a multistep process, especially because the smart homes are very popular with people who don't know how to use technology" (P29_A).

P3_A placed partial responsibility on herself for privacy ("To the extent that you can do something about it, you should"), but also felt the manufacturer should be more transparent:

"There's a certain responsibility to be transparent about what you're doing with people's data, protect personally-identifiable information, and to make it clear how you will use it up. I would want to know what their rules are about law enforcement, state access, and how they deal with data brokers and other companies."

Even technology-savvy, advanced smart home users wanted manufacturers to fill in current gaps in available options. For example, when asked who he thinks is responsible for the privacy of data collected by his smart home devices, P15_A commented: "My personal perspective on it is that it's up to the user to be aware of what the device is doing and configure and use them appropriately according to your own needs." However, he did not believe that consumers were given enough control:

"I think it would be ideal if the companies running the back end systems for these devices would give you either a little bit more control or be a lot more transparent about what they do with it and show themselves to be more responsible with that data."

There is also a tension in that users do not always trust manufacturers' motives and ability to implement strong security, so they feel the need to take personal action. For example, P15_A viewed himself as being responsible in order to fill a gap left by manufacturers who fail to produce secure products:

"I'd like to see the vendors take more responsibility and take more action to secure their own devices. But because they don't always do that, and I don't always necessarily trust them to do that, I take it upon myself to be responsible for the security of these systems" (P15_A).

Personal and Government. Only two participants thought that they and the government were responsible for **privacy** (none for **security**). One of those two, P31_A, discussed, "We haven't even begun to really go down the road what the EU has as far as protecting privacy, but it's the government... and you personally, as much as you can to the extent practical."

Manufacturer and Government. Nine participants thought

manufacturers and government were jointly responsible for **privacy** but only three for **security**. Assignment of responsibility to the government or other regulatory bodies was usually rooted in response to lack of trust in manufacturers and belief that manufacturers were monetizing and selling smart home data. Government intervention was viewed as a standardizing construct that provides “*all the checks and balances*” (P3_A) on manufacturers so they do not circumvent privacy protections. For example, one participant commented:

“Voluntary consensus on privacy issues is almost impossible to get from the commercial sector. . . I think they need privacy guidelines at least from the government in order to adhere to them” (P13_A).

Another participant claimed that companies are

“supposed to respect your privacy. . . If they fail, . . . next jurisdiction would be a government. The government has to watch them to make sure information is used for the right purposes” (P36_A).

Personal, Manufacturer, and Government. Five participants viewed responsibility for **privacy** as being shared amongst themselves, manufacturers, and the government: “*It’s the company. . . It’s the government. But ultimately it’s you and I*” (P26_A). Two participants viewed **security** as being shared among all three actors. A participant viewed privacy responsibility as being “*three-pronged. . . A third as a consumer, I should be aware, a third the company, and a third regulators and the government*” (P25_A). Another had a more in-depth explanation of his view of privacy responsibility:

“I think the company is responsible for it. . . in terms of government oversight, the government is in some way, shape, or form. . . Ultimately - and we’re talking about accountability - you are responsible for your information because everyone else doesn’t really care about you any more than you care about you” (P8_A).

5 Discussion

In this section, we situate our results within prior literature on smart home privacy/security and IT responsibility. We then discuss the interdependent relationship between users, manufacturers, and third parties, and identify gaps and recommendations for how each actor can support the others.

5.1 Advancing Smart Home and Responsibility Research

In our study, we confirmed results of prior smart home studies indicating that well-known concepts in privacy and security translate into perceptions of smart home devices (cf. 2.1.1). As demonstrated in past studies [2, 47, 48], our research showed that users may have concerns, but they accept the risk in favor of perceived benefits. They choose to adopt privacy-violating

technology and rarely take mitigative action, while accepting accountability for purchase and subsequent use. These behaviors reflect the privacy paradox [7]. This inaction may be due to several reasons. Users may have low security and privacy self-efficacy and experience security fatigue [54] and privacy resignation [42]. In addition, we found that taking action may be complicated due to hard-to-navigate configuration options or lack of any options at all (e.g., [34, 46]).

We advance research on responsibility by extending the investigation into the smart home domain, which has unique attributes as compared to traditional online and IT technology. For example, in our study, we observed that smart home devices are perceived as intrusive—always on and collecting sensitive data with ties to physical safety. Unfamiliarity with a new technology and the potential for many more devices in the home as compared to traditional IT devices adds complexity and vulnerability to the home network.

Similar to prior responsibility research (cf. 2.1.3, (especially [5])), we identified that users view smart home responsibility as being shared. We observed both active and passive responsibility, a perceived interdependent relationship, and, when necessary to motivate, a desire for a system of checks and balances for positive privacy/security outcomes. Although our participants felt that they bear some personal responsibility (as also discovered previously [5, 9, 19]), they often delegate responsibility to other entities (like manufacturers and government) when they do not feel equipped or incentivized to take action [27, 30, 50]. Tension may arise when users do not always trust the actors to whom they relegate responsibility, so they then look to others (government, industry oversight) to provide extra assurance [5]. Conversely, users may be resigned to having to take personal responsibility as a stopgap for lack of meaningful action on the part of manufacturers and government.

Moving beyond these similarities, we also identified differences from previous work. In prior smart home research (cf. 2.1.2), manufacturers and government are portrayed more as risks and bad actors [56, 66]. While some participants in our study did see these entities in potentially negative lights, they also recognized them as active partners in finding holistic solutions for smart home privacy and security. In addition, compared to prior findings that U.S. consumers rarely assign responsibility to their government for the protection of their digital assets [9, 19], we observed an appreciable number of our participants (roughly 37%) who thought government had responsibility for protecting smart home device privacy. This difference may be due to several potential reasons. First, the prior studies did not focus on smart home devices, rather connected devices in general, and may have lumped security, privacy, and safety together. Second, as compared to closed-ended survey choices, in our study, participants were able to organically assign responsibility in open-ended discussion. In addition, our study population was located in an area where the U.S. government is a major employer and more familiar.




Figure 4: Perceived relationship between smart home users, manufacturers and third parties.

Progressing responsibility research into the smart home domain allows for identification of areas where users voiced the desire for immediate improvement (as described in the next section). The identification of perceived gaps is particularly valuable, given that this is a fledgling industry that currently lacks the maturity and full spectrum third-party support and guidance currently afforded to traditional IT.

5.2 Addressing Gaps

An overarching theme was the perceived interdependency between users, manufacturers, and government in a triad of responsibility. Through the eyes of smart home users, we observed disparities between the status quo and what consumers think should be happening. Disparities can point to future directions where researchers and practitioners should focus attention. As an example, if users accept responsibility but lack the ability to take action, discomfort with their smart home security and privacy may warrant action and investigation into how manufacturers can better support users or where third-party guidance or regulation may be beneficial.

In this section, we summarize problem areas and provide suggestions on how each actor can better be empowered to contribute to smart home security and privacy. The desired interdependent relationship identified by participants in our study is illustrated in Figure 4. Note that participants had a narrow view of oversight only coming from the government. However, recognizing that other, non-governmental organizations (e.g., non-profits, industry groups, standards organizations) may also be able to provide manufacturers and users with support, standards, and evaluations, we expand the government/regulatory actor into a broader third-party role. Our study also motivates future work related to each actor’s potential contribution and needed support.

5.2.1 Problem Areas and Gaps

Users. We observed inconsistent relationships between being concerned, accepting personal responsibility, and taking privacy and security mitigative actions. Concerned participants did not always take action because of lack of knowledge, accepting trade-offs, and not valuing data collected by smart home devices (4.1). Those with privacy and security concerns did not always accept personal responsibility, and, sometimes, those who did not express concern still accepted responsibility (4.2.1).

There was also a marked disconnect between *feelings* of personal responsibility and *ability* to take active responsibility. While users may blame themselves for not actively protecting their security and privacy, they feel essentially powerless, resulting in a sense of privacy resignation and security fatigue. Most participants therefore believed that the privacy and security of their smart home should be a shared responsibility. Unfortunately, most of the burden is currently put on the user.

In order for users to be able to take *informed* personal responsibility, they need to better understand the risks, be given the opportunity to take action, and be educated about what steps they need to take. They also require reliable, objective information from manufacturers or trusted third parties to aid in purchase decisions. However, when researching smart home privacy and security, a minority relied on manufacturer-supplied information, with most participants trusting other online sources more.

Users who did not mention that they felt personally responsible mostly assigned responsibility to other actors, and not without reason. Concurrent research agrees that users’ security and privacy needs in smart homes should go beyond what users can do (or are willing to do) and should be extensively supported by more powerful actors, like regulators and manufacturers (cf. Sections 2.1.2 and 2.2). This is complicated by users sometimes not trusting manufacturers or the government even when expecting support.

Manufacturers. Some participants believe manufacturers are competent with respect to privacy and security, often based on manufacturer reputation as opposed to transparent communication. Others doubt the willingness of manufacturers to implement strong privacy and security measures. They believe that manufacturers may not be incentivized to spend extra time/money on privacy and security for relatively inexpensive and disposable devices. Plus, added privacy restrictions may be counter to their business model of monetizing data, so participants believe that manufacturers may be purposely vague in what they reveal about data collection and use. Even though participants viewed manufacturers as being responsible, the reality is that some manufacturers may not know how to properly implement privacy and security, partly because many are new to developing smart products [25]. In addition, manufacturers may be unsure of what third-party guidance to

follow since smart home privacy and security guidelines have not yet converged into widely agreed-upon standards.

The notion of manufacturers may also extend beyond those who develop smart home products. Third-party cloud and internet service providers and makers of the devices upon which smart home companion apps reside (e.g., smartphone and tablet manufacturers) may also hold some responsibility for security and privacy.

Government and Third Parties. While participants did not necessarily trust the government, they voiced a desire for third parties (including government) to develop smart home privacy and security regulation and guidelines to uphold and support manufacturer responsibility in a system of checks and balances. Participants were less understanding of how government guidance and regulation could help with security. This might be because participants were less clear about what security of smart home devices and data would mean for them.

While general privacy and security regulation is slowly being rolled out (e.g., CCPA and GDPR), few authoritative government regulations or guidelines for IoT/smart home privacy and security are available or widely adopted. Even though manufacturers sell devices globally, individual government organizations may create their own guidance or regulation that they want manufacturers to follow. (We note that none of the participants in this study lived in an area covered by any of the new privacy laws). In addition, industry groups may issue their own recommendations. Various guidelines from these organizations may or may not be consistent, which could result in manufacturer confusion on which to follow.

From a legal perspective, there is also debate on who should protect data and the boundaries of protection. Considering the newness of mandates in this area, legal constructs and interpretations will likely evolve.

5.2.2 Opportunities for Improvement

Based on identification of actions participants are willing/able to take and what they desire others to do, we offer the following suggestions for strengthening the three-pronged, interdependent privacy/security relationship. We refer back to Results sections that inform our recommendations where appropriate.

What users can do. While manufacturers have a substantial responsibility to ensure smart home devices are privacy-respecting and secure, they cannot do everything and require users to be willing and active partners.

- **Protection of data, devices, and home networks** - Participants in our study thought they have some responsibility for configuring device options and setting strong passwords on device apps (4.1, 4.2.1). Recognizing that manufacturers have no control over the environment in which smart home devices are placed, users also need to protect their home networks, control device placement, and understand

device capabilities and how those may impact or be used for privacy/security (4.1).

- **Due diligence in understanding and accepting risks** - Smart home users make privacy and security tradeoffs (4.1). Although they should be better supported in making these decisions and understanding risks, they are ultimately responsible for making informed decisions in line with their own privacy and security expectations and needs (4.2.1).

What third parties can do. Third parties, including oversight, government, and consumer-focused organizations, can provide support and guidance for smart home users and manufacturers. Users seem receptive to some government oversight and outside guidance for manufacturers, especially in the privacy area (4.2.3).

- **Oversight and development of standards and guidelines for smart home privacy and security** - Government bodies can protect consumers' privacy and security and aid manufacturers by issuing voluntary guidance or regulations when appropriate on recommended privacy and security implementations and options (e.g., [22, 23]). Non-profits, industry forums, standards organization, etc. can also contribute to building a more universal consensus of what constitutes minimum privacy and security measures in smart home devices, for example via baselines [14, 40] and product labels/certifications [15, 21, 59]. Because users often lack the knowledge to take action on their own (4.1), recommendations should take user considerations into account, for example, with suggestions on how manufacturers might consider user limitations throughout the entire product life-cycle [23].

- **Consumer education** - Third parties can provide resources that educate users on smart home privacy and security issues and provide actionable configuration tips (4.1).

What manufacturers can do. Because smart home users may not be technology- or security-savvy (4.1), we found that users often want to rely on manufacturers (4.2.2) to fill this gap in several ways:

- **Usable privacy/security interfaces** - Provide an interface that makes it easy for users to configure privacy/security options (e.g., opt in/out), while not overburdening users with too many options.
- **Transparent privacy and security practices** - Be more forthcoming about what privacy and security options are available, which features are built into the products, and options/features that are not available but may be expected. To address user's distrust of manufacturer motives (4.2.2), make this information easier for consumers to find (e.g., on vendor websites or device help/support screens). Also provide more readable and accessible privacy policies that transparently communicate how data is collected, stored, and used.

- **Privacy and security by design** - Alleviate user burden of having to configure extra privacy and security options (4.1) by making an honest effort to provide strong “out-of-the-box” privacy and security features. Care should be taken, however, to ensure these features do not impact usability. Follow privacy/security guidance provided by reputable third parties, for example, practicing data minimization principles by only collecting data that is required to fulfill functionality and not violating contextual integrity (e.g., Alexa transmitting audio to find answers, but not storing voice recordings).
- **Standards and guidance participation** - In conjunction with our participants’ desire for third parties to develop privacy/security guidance and standards (4.2.3), manufacturers should actively engage in coming to consensus on minimum smart home privacy/security recommendations. These recommendations can then be used in evaluations that contribute to product labels and certifications.
- **Consumer education** - Via app interfaces and help/support documentation, give consumers objective tips on how to best configure their devices with privacy/security in mind to account for users’ uncertainty on what to do and how to do it (4.1).

5.2.3 Research Opportunities

Our exploratory study motivates future research direction into product labels, privacy/security education and communication efforts for users and smart home device manufacturers, interface design for configuring privacy and security features, and suggested standards for smart home privacy/security. There may also be value in more exploration into who should be responsible for implementing these improvements as well as receptivity and ability to take on additional duties. For example, little research has been done to capture the smart home manufacturer perspective. As such, future research may be warranted to determine where manufacturers are most challenged and how to best provide support and value. The practicalities of manufacturers implementing our proposed security/privacy recommendations also need to be better understood, (e.g., whether certain features can be implemented on devices with limited memory and processing power). Exploration of appropriate incentives that might frame the production of secure and private devices as a competitive advantage would also be valuable. We acknowledge that responsibility perceptions may be influenced by cultural, national, and political factors, so there is a need for extending current research into broader populations, including those outside the U.S. We also see an opportunity for increased real-world transfer of the knowledge gained from user-centered research efforts in this area to inform manufacturers and guideline developers. This study has already informed some of the user-centric considerations in NIST security guidance for manufacturers [23].

6 Conclusion

In a qualitative research study of 40 smart home users, we expand the discourse on smart home security and privacy by investigating where users perceive responsibility for their smart home security and privacy. We find a theme of an interdependent relationship in which participants assume some personal responsibility but also assign responsibility to manufacturers and government/third parties when they cannot or are not willing to mitigate their concerns. We identify areas needing improvement in the current smart home privacy and security domain and distill how actors can take steps to fill these gaps. Achieving a more balanced relationship may take some of the burden off of users and provide better support to manufacturers, leading to less vulnerable systems and greater adoption of smart home technologies.

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A Participant Demographics

ID	Gen	Age	Ed	Occupation	Device Type				
					Sec	Ent	Env	Appl	Asst
P1_A	F	50-59	M	Liaison	X		X		X
P2_A	M	30-39	M	Lead engineer	X	X	X		X
P3_A	F	40-49	M	Professor	X	X	X	X	X
P4_A	M	60+	M	Retired	X	X			
P6_U	F	30-39	B	Events manager	X	X	X	X	X
P7_A	M	30-39	B	Software engineer	X	X	X	X	X
P8_A	M	30-39	B	Federal employee	X	X	X	X	X
P9_A	F	30-39	M	Educationist	X	X	X		X
P10_A	M	30-39	B	Computer scientist	X	X	X	X	X
P11_A	M	50-59	M	Electrical engineer	X	X	X		X
P12_U	F	30-39	M	Administrative assistant	X	X	X		X
P13_A	M	50-59	M	Manager, cognitive scientist	X	X	X	X	X
P14_U	F	40-49	H	Information specialist	X	X	X		X
P15_A	M	30-39	B	Computer scientist	X	X	X		
P16_A	M	40-49	M	Research chief	X	X	X		X
P17_A	F	30-39	M	Systems engineer	X	X	X	X	X
P18_A	M	30-39	B	Business consultant	X	X	X		X
P19_A	M	50-59	B	Retail services specialist	X	X	X	X	X
P20_A	F	30-39	B	Administrator		X			
P21_U	F	18-29	B	Human resources manager	X	X	X	X	X
P22_A	M	30-39	B	Executive admin assistant	X	X	X	X	X
P23_A	F	40-49	M	Community arts specialist	X	X	X		X
P24_A	M	40-49	B	Operational safety analyst		X	X		X
P25_A	M	30-39	B	Program management analyst	X	X	X	X	X
P26_A	M	30-39	B	Analyst	X	X	X		X
P27_A	F	40-49	M	Program coordinator	X	X	X	X	X
P28_A	F	50-59	B	Consultant	X		X		X
P29_A	M	18-29	M	Events coordinator	X	X	X		X
P30_U	F	18-29	B	Event planner	X	X	X		X
P31_A	F	30-39	M	Lobbyist	X	X	X		X
P32_A	M	30-39	B	Health educator		X	X	X	X
P33_A	M	18-29	B	Senior technology analyst	X	X	X		X
P34_A	M	40-49	B	Financial analyst	X	X	X	X	X
P35_A	M	40-49	M	Accountant	X	X	X	X	X
P36_A	F	30-39	B	Project manager	X	X	X		X
P37_A	F	40-49	M	Assistant principal	X	X	X		
P38_U	F	60+	M	Special educator		X	X		X
P39_U	M	60+	M	Retired		X	X		X
P40_U	F	30-39	C	Customer service rep	X	X	X		X
P41_A	M	40-49	B	Security	X	X	X		X
Total					35	38	38	15	36

Table 1: Participant Demographics. ID: A - smart home administrators/installers, U - smart home users; Gen (Gender); Ed (Education): M - Master’s degree, B - Bachelor’s degree, C - some college, H - High school; Device Type: Sec - Home security, Ent - Home entertainment, Env - Home environment, Appl - Smart appliance, Asst - Virtual assistant. Interviewed couples: P6_U and P7_A, P29_A and P30_U, P38_U and P39_U, P40_U and P41_A.