Disrupting *Continuity* of Apple's Wireless Ecosystem Security: New Tracking, DoS, and MitM Attacks on iOS and macOS Through Bluetooth Low Energy, AWDL, and Wi-Fi

Milan Stute, <u>Alexander Heinrich</u>, Jannik Lorenz, and Matthias Hollick








## Roadmap



Complex and proprietary wireless protocols





#### Methodology


"A Hacker's Guide to Apple's Wireless Ecosystem"

#### Application

Security and Privacy Analysis (today: Wi-Fi Password Sharing)



## How secure are proprietary wireless protocols?






## Goals


1. Define a structured approach on how to reverse-engineer proprietary wireless protocols in the Apple ecosystem

2. Apply our method on multiple protocols to uncover new security and privacy vulnerabilities

### The ecosystem is complex




### The ecosystem is complex





## Roadmap




#### Problem

Complex and proprietary wireless protocols

#### Methodology

"A Hacker's Guide to Apple's Wireless Ecosystem"




#### **Application**


Security and Privacy Analysis (today: Wi-Fi Password Sharing)



# **Universal Clipboard System Architecture**







Vantage Point 1 System

#### Tools


• System logs

ioctl

#### Information

- Processes
- Frameworks
- Log Strings





Vantage Point 1 System


#### Tools

• System logs

ioctl


#### Information

- Processes
- Frameworks
- Log Strings





DARMSTADT




### Vantage Point 2 Binary Analysis

#### Tools

- Disassembler
- otool
- strings
- Frida

### Information

- Message structure
- Encoding/Decoding
- Encryption Algorithms




### Vantage Point 3 Network Interfaces

#### Tools

- Wireshark
- PacketLogger
- BTLEmap

### Information

- (Public) Keys
- Certificates
- Static identifiers



Vantage Point 4 Keychain


#### Tools

• Security framework

#### Information

- Public & Private Keys
- Certificates
- Shared Keys






Automated Reverse Engineering Toolkit

**Identifying Interesting Binaries** 

**Reading Continuity Messages** 

**Accessing Relevant Keychain Items** 

## Roadmap




# 0111010001 010011111 101010010 0101100110

#### Problem

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"A Hacker's Guide to Apple's Wireless Ecosystem"



#### **Application**


Security and Privacy Analysis (today: Wi-Fi Password Sharing)





## Vulnerabilities, Attacks, and Mitigations

#### Handoff + Universal Clipboard



#### Tracking

via asynchronous identifier randomization fixed in iOS 13.4 and macOS 10.15.4



#### **Denial-of-Service**

via IV desynchronization not fixed (yet)

**Tracking** [MAB+19] via linear IV *not fixed (yet)* 

#### **Wi-Fi Password Sharing**




#### **Denial-of-Service** via settings app crash *CVE-2020-9827*



#### Machine-in-the-Middle via Wi-Fi password auto-fill not fixed (yet)










## Wi-Fi Password Sharing




Simplified version of the protocol

Apple Continuity | 30th USENIX Security Symposium | August 2021




## Wi-Fi Password Sharing



Simplified version of the protocol




# **Wi-Fi Password Sharing**




Simplified version of the protocol






#### Malicious access point and grantor







# **Attacking Wi-Fi Password Sharing**



Malicious access point and grantor



# Software

## Disclosure

# Outlook

#### apple-continuity-tools

::

Reverse engineering toolkit for Apple's wireless ecosystem

#### openwifipass

...

An open source implementation of Apple's Wi-Fi Password Sharing protocol in Python.

● Python ☆ 621 ♀ 21

**Discovered 4** distinct vulnerabilities and proposed **1** mitigation for a previously discovered flaw

Apple **fixed 2** so far...

... and several more at https://owlink.org

... but 3 remain unfixed (including MitM)

Crowd-sourced Bluetoothbased location tracking [HSKH21]



Graphics from apple.com



## References

- [HHSSW21] Alexander Heinrich, Matthias Hollick, Thomas Schneider, Milan Stute, Christian Weinert. PrivateDrop: Practical Privacy-Preserving Authentication for Apple AirDrop. USENIX Security, 2021.
- [HSKH21] Alexander Heinrich, Milan Stute, Tim Kornhuber, and Matthias Hollick. Who Can Find My Devices? Security and Privacy of Apple's Crowd-Sourced Bluetooth Location Tracking System. PoPETs, 2021.
- [MAB+19] Jeremy Martin, Douglas Alpuche, Kristina Bodeman, Lamont Brown, Ellis Fenske, Lucas Foppe, Travis Mayberry, Erik Rye, Brandon Sipes, and Sam Teplov. Handoff All Your Privacy – A Review of Apple's Bluetooth Low Energy Continuity Protocol. *PoPET*s, 2019.
- [SHLH21] Milan Stute, Alexander Heinrich, Jannik Lorenz, and Matthias Hollick. Disrupting Continuity of Apple's Wireless Ecosystem Security: New Tracking, DoS, and MitM Attacks on iOS and macOS Through Bluetooth Low Energy, AWDL, and Wi-Fi. USENIX Security, 2021.
- [SNM+19] Milan Stute, Sashank Narain, Alex Mariotto, Alexander Heinrich, David Kreitschmann, Guevara Noubir, Matthias Hollick. A Billion Open Interfaces for Eve and Mallory: MitM, DoS, and Tracking Attacks on iOS and macOS Through Apple Wireless Direct Link. USENIX Security, 2019.



## References

- [SKH18] Milan Stute, David Kreitschmann, Matthias Hollick. One Billion Apples' Secret Sauce: Recipe for the Apple Wireless Direct Link Ad hoc Protocol. MobiCom, 2018.
- [120] Ian Beer, An iOS zero-click radio proximity exploit odyssey, Google Project Zero, 2020.
- [H19] Hexway.io, Apple bleee, Hexway.io, 2019.

### Icons

• **Icons** are part of the IcoFont, available at: **icofont.com**