SWIFT: Super-fast and Robust Privacy-Preserving Machine Learning
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Abstract
Performing machine learning (ML) computation on private data while maintaining data privacy, aka Privacy-preserving Machine Learning (PPML), is an emergent field of research. Recently, PPML has seen a visible shift towards the adoption of the Secure Outsourced Computation (SOC) paradigm due to the heavy computation that it entails. In the SOC paradigm, computation is outsourced to a set of powerful and specially equipped servers that provide service on a pay-per-use basis. In this work, we propose SWIFT, a robust PPML framework for a range of ML algorithms in SOC setting, that guarantees output delivery to the users irrespective of any adversarial behaviour. Robustness, a highly desirable feature, evokes user participation without the fear of denial of service.

At the heart of our framework lies a highly-efficient, maliciously-secure, three-party computation (3PC) over rings that provides guaranteed output delivery (GOD) in the honest-majority setting. To the best of our knowledge, SWIFT is the first robust and efficient PPML framework in the 3PC setting. SWIFT is as fast as (and is strictly better in some cases than) the best-known 3PC framework BLAZE (Patra et al. NDSS’20), which only achieves fairness. We extend our 3PC framework for four parties (4PC). In this regime, SWIFT is as fast as the best known fair 4PC framework Trident (Chaudhari et al. NDSS’20) and twice faster than the best-known robust 4PC framework FLASH (Byali et al. PETS’20).

We demonstrate our framework’s practical relevance by benchmarking popular ML algorithms such as Logistic Regression and deep Neural Networks such as VGG16 and LeNet, both over a 64-bit ring in a WAN setting. For deep NN, our results testify to our claims that we provide improved security guarantee while incurring no additional overhead for 3PC and obtaining $2 \times$ improvement for 4PC.

1 Introduction
Privacy Preserving Machine Learning (PPML), a booming field of research, allows Machine Learning (ML) computations over private data of users while ensuring the privacy of the data. PPML finds applications in sectors that deal with sensitive/confidential data, e.g. healthcare, finance, and in cases where organisations are prohibited from sharing client information due to privacy laws such as CCPA and GDPR. However, PPML solutions make the already computationally heavy ML algorithms more compute-intensive. An average end-user who lacks the infrastructure required to run these tasks prefers to outsource the computation to a powerful set of specialized cloud servers and leverage their services on a pay-per-use basis. This is addressed by the Secure Outsourced Computation (SOC) paradigm, and thus is an apt fit for the need of the moment. Many recent works [11, 14, 15, 41, 43, 45, 48, 50, 55] exploit Secure Multiparty Computation (MPC) techniques to realize PPML in the SOC setting where the servers enact the role of the parties. Informally, MPC enables $n$ mutually distrusting parties to compute a function over their private inputs, while ensuring the privacy of the same against an adversary controlling up to $t$ parties. Both the training and prediction phases of PPML can be realized in the SOC setting. The common approach of outsourcing followed in the PPML literature, as well as by our work, requires the users to secret-share their inputs between the set of hired (untrusted) servers, who jointly interact and compute the secret-shared output, and reconstruct it towards the users.

In a bid to improve practical efficiency, many recent works [5, 11, 14, 15, 19, 24–26, 33–35, 48] cast their protocols into the preprocessing model wherein the input-independent (yet function-dependent) phase computationally heavy tasks are computed in advance, resulting in a fast online phase. This paradigm suits scenario analogous to PPML setting, where functions (ML algorithms) typically need to be evaluated a large number of times, and the function description is known beforehand. To further enhance practical efficiency by leveraging CPU optimizations, recent works [6, 20, 23, 25, 27] propose MPC protocols that work over 32 or 64 bit rings. Lastly, solutions for a small number of parties have received a huge momentum due to the many cost-effective

\footnote{The threshold of the secret-sharing is decided based on the number of corrupt servers so that privacy is preserved.}
customizations that they permit, for instance, a cheaper realisation of multiplication through custom-made secret sharing schemes \([3, 4, 11, 14, 15, 48]\).

We now motivate the need for robustness aka guaranteed output delivery (GOD) over fairness\(^2\), or even abort security\(^3\), in the domain of PPML. Robustness provides the guarantee of output delivery to all protocol participants, no matter how the adversary misbehaves. Robustness is crucial for real-world deployment and usage of PPML techniques. Consider the following scenario wherein an ML model owner wishes to provide inference service. The model owner shares the model parameters between the servers, while the end-users share their queries. A protocol that provides security with abort or fairness will not suffice as in both the cases a malicious adversary can lead to the protocol aborting, resulting in the user not obtaining the desired output. This leads to denial of service and heavy economic losses for the service provider. For data providers, as more training data leads to more accurate models, collaboratively building a model enables them to provide better ML services, and consequently, attract more clients. A robust framework encourages active involvement from multiple data providers. Hence, for the seamless adoption of PPML solutions in the real world, the robustness of the protocol is of utmost importance. Several works \([14, 15, 43, 48, 55]\) realizing PPML via MPC settle for weaker guarantees such as abort and fairness. Achieving the strongest notion of GOD without degrading performance is an interesting goal which forms the core focus of this work. The hallmark result of \([17]\) suggests that an honest-majority amongst the servers is necessary to achieve robustness. Consequent to the discussion above, we focus on the honest-majority setting with a small set of parties, especially 3 and 4 parties, both of which have drawn enormous attention recently \([3, 4, 8, 9, 11, 13–15, 30, 44, 46, 48]\). The 3/4-party setting enables simpler, more efficient, and customized secure protocols compared to the \(n\)-party setting. Real-world MPC applications and frameworks such as the Danish sugar beet auction \([7]\) and Sharemind \([6]\), have demonstrated the practicality of 3-party protocols. Additionally, in an outsourced setting, 3/4PC is useful and relevant even when there are more parties. Specifically, here the entire computation is offloaded to 3/4 hired servers, after initial sharing of inputs by the parties amongst the servers. This is precisely what we (and some existing papers \([11, 42, 48]\)) contemplate as the setting for providing ML-as-a-service. Our protocols work over rings, are cast in the preprocessing paradigm, and achieve GOD.

**Related Work** We restrict the relevant work to a small number of parties and honest-majority, focusing first on MPC, followed by PPML. MPC protocols for a small population can be cast into orthogonal domains of low latency protocols \([12, 13, 47]\), and high throughput protocols \([1, 3, 4, 6, 9, 14, 16, 29, 30, 46, 48]\). \([4, 14]\) provide efficient semi-honest protocols wherein ASTRA \([14]\) improved upon \([4]\) by casting the protocols in the preprocessing model and provided a fast online phase. ASTRA further provided security with fairness in the malicious setting with an improved online phase compared to \([3]\). Later, a maliciously-secure 3PC protocol based on distributed zero-knowledge techniques was proposed by Boneh et al. \([8]\) providing abort security. Further, building on \([8]\) and enhancing the security to GOD, Boyle et al. \([9]\) proposed a concretely efficient 3PC protocol with an amortized communication cost of 3 field elements (can be extended to work over rings) per multiplication gate. Concurrently, BLAZE \([48]\) provided a fair protocol in the preprocessing model, which required communicating 3 ring elements in each phase. However, BLAZE eliminated the reliance on the computationally intensive distributed zero-knowledge system (whose efficiency kicks in for large circuit or many multiplication gates) from the online phase and pushed it to the preprocessing phase. This resulted in a faster online phase compared to \([9]\).

In the regime of 4PC, Gordon et al. \([31]\) presented protocols achieving abort security and GOD. However, \([31]\) relied on expensive public-key primitives and broadcast channels to achieve GOD. Trident \([15]\) improved over the abort protocol of \([31]\), providing a fast online phase achieving security with fairness, and presented a framework for mixed world computations \([27]\). A robust 4PC protocol was provided in FLASH \([11]\), which requires communicating 6 ring elements, each, in the preprocessing and online phases.

In many recent works \([9, 11, 13]\), including this work, GOD is achieved by having an honest party, identified as a trusted third party (TTP), compute the function on the ‘clear’ inputs of all the parties (in the case of a misbehaviour). The classical security definition allows this leakage of inputs since the selected TTP is honest. There has been a recent study on the additional requirement of hiding the inputs from a quorum of honest parties (treating them as semi-honest), termed as Friends-and-Foes (FaF) security notion \([2]\). This is a stronger security goal than the classical one. Recently, the work of \([22]\) attempts to offer a variant of GOD, referred to as private robustness in 4PC setting. As per the authors, in a private robust protocol, no single honest party learns the other honest parties’ input. We want to point out that \([22]\) does not achieve FaF security notion \([2]\), since an adversary can reveal its view to an honest party, making it obtain the inputs of the other honest parties. \(^4\)

In the PPML domain, MPC has been used for various ML algorithms such as Decision Trees \([40]\), Linear Regression \([28, 51]\), k-means clustering \([10, 32]\), SVM Classification \([54, 57]\), Logistic Regression \([53]\). In the 3PC SOC setting, the works of ABY3 \([43]\) and SecureNN \([55]\), provide security with abort. This was followed by ASTRA \([14]\), which

\(^2\)This ensures either all parties or none learn the output.

\(^3\)This may allow the corrupt parties alone to learn the output.

\(^4\)Lastly, but importantly, the precise security notion achieved in \([22]\) is unclear due to the lack of formal details.
improves upon ABY3 and achieves security with fairness. ASTRA presents primitives to build protocols for Linear Regression and Logistic Regression inference. Recently, BLAZE improves over the efficiency of ASTRA and additionally tackles training for the above ML tasks, which requires building additional PPML building blocks, such as truncation and bit to arithmetic conversions. In the 4PC setting, the first robust framework for PPML, was provided by FLASH [11] which proposed efficient building blocks for ML such as dot product, truncation, MSB extraction, and bit conversion. The works of [11,14,15,43,45,48,55] work over rings to garner practical efficiency. In terms of efficiency, BLAZE and respectively FLASH and Trident are the closest competitors of this work in 3PC and 4PC settings. We now present our contributions and compare them with these works.

1.1 Our Contributions

We propose, SWIFT [36], a robust maliciously-secure framework for PPML in the SOC setting, with a set of 3 and 4 servers having an honest-majority. At the heart of our framework lies highly-efficient, maliciously-secure, 3PC and 4PC over rings (both \( \mathbb{Z}_2 \) and \( \mathbb{Z}_{2^l} \)) that provide GOD in the honest-majority setting. We cast our protocols in the preprocessing model, which helps obtain a fast online phase. As mentioned earlier, the input-independent (yet function-dependent) computations will be performed in the preprocessing phase.

To the best of our knowledge, SWIFT is the first robust and efficient PPML framework in the 3PC setting and as fast as (and is strictly better in some cases than) the best known fair 3PC framework BLAZE [48]. We extend our 3PC framework for 4 servers. In this regime, SWIFT is as fast as the best known fair 4PC framework Trident [15] and twice faster than best known robust 4PC framework FLASH [11]. We detail our contributions next.

Robust 3/4PC frameworks The framework consists of a range of primitives realized in a privacy-preserving way which is ensured via running computation in a secret-shared fashion. We use secret-sharing over both \( \mathbb{Z}_{2^l} \) and its special instantiation \( \mathbb{Z}_{2^k} \) and refer them as arithmetic and respectively boolean sharing. Our framework consists of realizations for all primitives needed for general MPC and PPML such as multiplication, dot-product, truncation, bit extraction (given arithmetic sharing of a value \( v \), this is used to generate boolean sharing of the most significant bit (MSB) of the value), bit to arithmetic sharing conversion (converts the boolean sharing of a single bit value to its arithmetic sharing), bit injection (computes the arithmetic sharing of \( b \cdot v \), given the boolean sharing of a bit \( b \) and the arithmetic sharing of a ring element \( v \)) and above all, input sharing and output reconstruction in the SOC setting. A highlight of our 3PC framework, which, to the best of our knowledge is achieved for the first time, is a robust dot-product protocol whose (amortized) communication cost is independent of the vector size, which we obtain by extending the techniques of [8,9]. The performance comparison in terms of concrete cost for communication and rounds, for PPML primitives in both 3PC and 4PC setting, appear in Table 1. As claimed, SWIFT is on par with BLAZE for most of the primitives (while improving security from fair to GOD) and is strictly better than BLAZE in case of dot product and dot product with truncation. For 4PC, SWIFT is on par with Trident in most cases (and is slightly better for dot product with truncation and bit injection), while it is doubly faster than FLASH. Since BLAZE outperforms the 3PC abort framework of ABY3 [43] while Trident outperforms the known 4PC with abort [31], SWIFT attains robustness with better cost than the known protocols with weaker guarantees. No performance loss coupled with the strongest security guarantee makes our robust framework an opt choice for practical applications including PPML.

Applications and Benchmarking We demonstrate the practicality of our protocols by benchmarking PPML, particularly, Logistic Regression (training and inference) and popular Neural Networks (inference) such as [45], LeNet [38] and VGG16 [52] having millions of parameters. The NN training requires mixed-world conversions [15,27,43], which we leave as future work. Our PPML blocks can be used to perform training and inference of Linear Regression, Support Vector Machines, and Binarized Neural Networks (as demonstrated in [11, 14, 15, 48]).

Comparisons and Differences with Prior Works To begin with, we introduce a new primitive called Joint Message Passing (jmp) that allows two servers to relay a common message to the third server such that either the relay is successful or an honest server is identified. jmp is extremely efficient as for a message of \( \ell \) elements it only incurs the minimal communication cost of \( \ell \) elements (in an amortized sense). Without any extra cost, it allows us to replace several pivotal private communications, that may lead to abort, either because the malicious sender does not send anything or sends a wrong message. All our primitives, either for a general 3PC or a PPML task, achieve GOD relying on jmp.

Second, instead of using the multiplication of [9] (which has the same overall communication cost as that of our online phase), we build a new protocol. This is because the former involves distributed zero-knowledge protocols. The cost of this heavy machinery gets amortized only for large circuits having millions of gates, which is very unlikely for inference and moderately heavy training tasks in PPML. As in BLAZE [48], we follow a similar structure for our multiplication protocol but differ considerably in techniques as our goal is to obtain GOD. Our approach is to manipulate and transform some of the protocol steps so that two other servers can locally compute the information required by a server in a round. However, this transformation is not straightforward since BLAZE was constructed with a focus towards providing only fairness (details appear in §3). The multiplication protocol forms a technical basis for our dot product protocol and
other PPML building blocks. We emphasise again that the (amortized) cost of our dot product protocol is independent of the vector size.

Third, extending to 4PC brings several performance improvements over 3PC. Most prominent of all is a conceptually simple jmp instantiation, which forgoes the broadcast channel while retaining the same communication cost; and a dot product with cost independent of vector size sans the 3PC amortization technique.

Fourth, we provide robust protocols for input sharing and output reconstruction phase in the SOC setting, wherein a user shares its input with the servers, and the output is reconstructed towards a user. The need for robustness and communication efficiency together makes these tasks slightly non-trivial. As a highlight, we introduce a super-fast online phase for reconstruction protocol, which gives 4× improvement in terms of rounds (apart from improvement in communication) compared to BLAZE. Although we aim for GOD, we ensure that an end-user is never part of a broadcast which is relatively expensive than atomic point-to-point communication.

Organisation of the paper. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. §2 describes the system model, preliminaries and notations used. §3 and §4 detail our constructs in the 3PC and respectively 4PC setting. These are followed by the Applications and benchmarking are detailed in §5. Additional preliminaries and ideal functionalities are elaborated in §A, §B and §C. Further details on the cost analysis and security are deferred to the full version of the paper [36].

2 Preliminaries

We consider a set of three servers \(\mathcal{P} = \{P_0, P_1, P_2\}\) that are connected by pair-wise private and authentic channels in a synchronous network, and a static, malicious adversary that can corrupt at most one server. We use a broadcast channel for 3PC alone, which is inevitable [18]. For ML training, several data-owners who wish to jointly train a model, secret share (using the sharing semantics that will appear later) their data among the servers. For ML inference, a model-owner and client secret share the model and the query, respectively, among the servers. Once the inputs are available in the shared format, the servers perform computations and obtain the output in the shared form. In the case of training, the output model is reconstructed towards the data-owners, whereas for inference, the prediction result is reconstructed towards the client. We assume that an arbitrary number of data-owners may collude with a corrupt server for training, whereas for the case of prediction, we assume that either the model-owner or the client can collude with a corrupt server. We prove the security of our protocols using a standard real-world / ideal-world paradigm. We also explore the above model for the four-server setting with \(\mathcal{P} = \{P_0, P_1, P_2, P_3\}\). The aforementioned setting has been explored extensively [11, 14, 15, 43, 45, 48].

Our constructions achieve the strongest security guarantee of GOD. A protocol is said to be robust or achieve GOD if all parties obtain the output of the protocol regardless of how the adversary behaves. In our model, this translates to all the data owners obtaining the trained model for the case of ML training, while the client obtaining the query output for ML inference. All our protocols are cast into: input-independent preprocessing phase and input-dependent online phase.

For 3/4PC, the function to be computed is expressed as a circuit ckt, whose topology is public, and is evaluated over an arithmetic ring \(\mathbb{Z}_{2^\ell}\) or boolean ring \(\mathbb{Z}_{2^\ell}\). For PPML, we consider computation over the same algebraic structure. To deal with floating-point values, we use Fixed-Point Arithmetic (FPA) [11, 14, 15, 43, 45, 48] representation in which a decimal value is represented as an \(\ell\)-bit integer in signed 2’s complement representation. The most significant bit (MSB) represents the sign bit, and x least significant bits are reserved.

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<th>Building Blocks</th>
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Table 1: 3PC and 4PC: Comparison of SWIFT with its closest competitors in terms of Communication and Round Complexity

– Notations: \(\ell\) - size of ring in bits, \(n\) - size of vectors for dot product.
for the fractional part. The $t$-bit integer is then treated as an element of $\mathbb{Z}_t$, and operations are performed modulo $2^t$. We set $t = 64$,$x = 13$, leaving $t - x - 1$ bits for the integer part.

The servers use a one-time key setup, modelled as a functionality $f_{\text{setup}}$ (Fig. 6), to establish pre-shared random keys for pseudo-random functions (PRF) between them. A similar setup is used in [3, 9, 14, 30, 43, 48, 50] for three server case and in [11, 15] for four server setting. The key-setup can be instantiated using any standard MPC protocol in the respective setting. Further, our protocols make use of a collision-resistant hash function, denoted by $H()$, and a commitment scheme, denoted by $\text{Com}()$. The formal details of key setup are deferred to §A.

**Notation 2.1.** The $i$th element of a vector $\mathbf{x}$ is denoted as $x_i$. The dot product of two $n$ length vectors, $\mathbf{x}$ and $\mathbf{y}$, is computed as $\mathbf{x} \cdot \mathbf{y} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} x_i y_i$. For two matrices $\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{Y}$, the operation $\mathbf{X} \circ \mathbf{Y}$ denotes the matrix multiplication. The bit in the $i$th position of an $t$-bit value $v$ is denoted by $v_i$.

**Notation 2.2.** For a bit $b \in \{0, 1\}$, we use $b^R$ to denote the equivalent value of $b$ over the ring $\mathbb{Z}_{2^t}$. $b^R$ will have its least significant bit set to $b$, while all other bits will be set to zero.

# 3 Robust 3PC and PPML

In this section, we first introduce the sharing semantics for three servers. Then, we introduce our new Joint Message Passing (jmp) primitive, which plays a crucial role in obtaining the strongest security guarantee of GOD, followed by our protocols in the three server setting.

**Secret Sharing Semantics** We use the following secret-sharing semantics.

- **[-] sharing:** A value $v \in \mathbb{Z}_{2^t}$ is $[-]$-shared among $P_1, P_2$, if $P_i$ for $s \in \{1, 2\}$ holds $|v|_s \in \mathbb{Z}_{2^t}$ such that $\forall v = |v|_1 + |v|_2$.
- **{ } sharing:** A value $v \in \mathbb{Z}_{2^t}$ is $\{\}$-shared among $P$, if there exists $v_0, v_1, v_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_{2^t}$ such that $\forall v = v_0 + v_1 + v_2$.

**Arithmetic and Boolean Sharing** Arithmetic sharing refers to sharing over $\mathbb{Z}_{2^t}$ while boolean sharing, denoted as $\{\}$, refers to sharing over $\mathbb{Z}_{2^t}$.

**Linearity of the Secret Sharing Scheme** Given $[-]$-shares of $v_1, v_2$, and public constants $c_1, c_2$, servers can locally compute $[-]$-share of $c_1 v_1 + c_2 v_2$ as $c_1 |v_1| + c_2 |v_2|$. It is trivial to see that linearity property is satisfied by $\{\}$ and $\{\}$ sharings.

## 3.1 Joint Message Passing primitive

The jmp primitive allows two servers to relay a common message to the third server such that either the relay is successful or an honest server (or a conflicting pair) is identified. The striking feature of jmp is that it offers a rate-1 communication i.e., for a message of $t$ elements, it only incurs a communication of $t$ elements (in an amortized sense). The task of jmp is captured in an ideal functionality (Fig. 8) and the protocol for the same appears in Fig. 1. Next, we give an overview.

Given two servers $P_i, P_j$ possessing a common value $v \in \mathbb{Z}_{2^t}$, protocol $\Pi_{\text{ jmp}}$ proceeds as follows. First, $P_i$ sends $v$ to $P_k$ while $P_j$ sends a hash of $v$ to $P_k$. The communication of hash is done once and for all from $P_j$ to $P_k$. In the simplest case, $P_k$ receives a consistent (value, hash) pair, and the protocol terminates. In all other cases, a trusted third party (TTP) is identified as follows without having to communicate $v$ again. Importantly, the following part can be run once and for all instances of $\Pi_{\text{ jmp}}$ with $P_i, P_j, P_k$ in same roles, invoked in the final 3PC protocol. Consequently, the cost due to this part vanishes in an amortized sense, yielding a rate-1 construction.

### Protocol $\Pi_{\text{ jmp}}(P_i, P_j, P_k, v)$

Each server $P_s$ for $s \in \{i, j, k\}$ initializes bit $b_s = 0$.

**Send Phase:** $P_i$ sends $v$ to $P_k$.

**Verify Phase:** $P_i$ sends $H(v)$ to $P_k$.
- If $P_k$ receives the hash $H(v)$ of $v$, it proceeds as follows.
- $P_k$ broadcasts $(\text{accuse}, P_i)$, if $P_i$ is silent and $\text{ TTP} = P_j$. Analogously for $P_j$.
- If $P_i$ receives both $P_i, P_j$, then $\text{ TTP} = P_i$. Otherwise, $P_k$ receives some $v$ and either sets $b_k = 0$ when the value and the hash are consistent or sets $b_k = 1$. $P_k$ then sends $b_k$ to $P_i, P_j$ and terminates if $b_k = 0$.
- If $P_i$ does not receive a bit from $P_k$, it broadcasts $(\text{accuse}, P_k)$ and $\text{ TTP} = P_i$. Analogously for $P_j$.
- If both $P_i, P_j$ accuse $P_k$, then $\text{ TTP} = P_k$. Otherwise, $P_s$ for $s \in \{i, j\}$ sets $b_s = b_k$.
- $P_i, P_j$ exchange their bits to each other. If $P_i$ does not receive $b_j$ from $P_j$, it broadcasts $(\text{accuse}, P_i)$ and $\text{ TTP} = P_k$. Analogously for $P_j$.
- Otherwise, $P_i$ resets its bit to $b_i \lor b_j$, and likewise $P_j$ resets its bit to $b_j \lor b_j$. $P_s$ for $s \in \{i, j, k\}$ broadcasts $H_s = H(v^s)$ if $b_s = 1$, where $v^s = v$ for $s \in \{i, j\}$ and $v^s = \neg v$ otherwise. If $P_k$ does not broadcast, terminate. If either $P_i$ or $P_j$ does not broadcast, then $\text{ TTP} = P_k$.
- Otherwise,
  - If $H_i \neq H_j$: $\text{ TTP} = P_k$.
  - Else if $H_i \neq H_k$: $\text{ TTP} = P_j$.
  - Else if $H_i = H_j = H_k$: $\text{ TTP} = P_k$.

![Figure 1: 3PC: Joint Message Passing Protocol](image-url)

Each $P_s$ for $s \in \{i, j, k\}$ maintains a bit $b_s$ initialized to 0, as an indicator for inconsistency. When $P_k$ receives an inconsistent (value, hash) pair, it sets $b_k = 1$ and sends the bit to both $P_i, P_j$, who cross-check with each other by exchanging the bit and turn on their inconsistency bit if the bit received from either $P_k$ or its fellow sender is turned on. A server broadcasts a hash of its value when its inconsistency bit is on. $P_s$'s value is the one it receives from $P_s$. At this stage, there are a bunch of possible cases and a detailed analysis determines an eligible TTP in each case.

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5 hash can be computed on a combined message across many calls of jmp.
When $P_k$ is silent, the protocol is understood to be complete. This is fine irrespective of the status of $P_k$—an honest $P_k$ never skips this broadcast with inconsistency bit on, and a corrupt $P_k$ implies honest senders. If either $P_i$ or $P_j$ is silent, then $P_k$ is picked as TTP which is surely honest. A corrupt $P_k$ could not make one of $\{P_i, P_j\}$ speak, as the senders (honest in this case) are in agreement on their inconsistency bit (due to their mutual exchange of inconsistency bit). When all of them speak and (i) the senders’ hashes do not match, $P_k$ is picked as TTP; (ii) one of the senders conflicts with $P_k$, the other sender is picked as TTP; and lastly (iii) if there is no conflict, $P_k$ is picked as TTP. The two first cases are self-explanatory. In the last case, either $P_i$ or $P_k$ is corrupt. If not, a corrupt $P_k$ can have honest $P_k$ speak (and hence turn on its inconsistency bit), by sending a $v$ whose hash is not same as that of $v$ and so inevitably, the hashes of honest $P_i$ and $P_k$ will conflict, contradicting (iii). As a final touch, we ensure that, in each step, a server raises a public alarm (via broadcast) accusing a server which is silent when it is not supposed to be, and the protocol terminates immediately by labelling the server as TTP who is neither the complainer nor the accused.

**Notation 3.1.** We say that $P_i, P_j$ jmp-send $v$ to $P_k$ when they invoke $\Pi_{jmp}(P_i, P_j, P_k, v)$.

**Using jmp in protocols.** As mentioned in the introduction, the jmp protocol needs to be viewed as consisting of two phases (send, verify), where send phase consists of $P_i$ sending $v$ to $P_k$ and the rest goes to verify phase. Looking ahead, most of our protocols use jmp, and consequently, our final construction, either of general MPC or any PPML task, will have several calls to jmp. To leverage amortization, the send phase will be executed in all protocols invoking jmp on the flow, while the verify for a fixed ordered pair of senders will be executed once and for all in the end. The verify phase will determine if all the sends were correct. If not, a TTP is identified, as explained, and the computation completes with the help of TTP, just as in the ideal-world.

### 3.2 3PC Protocols

We now describe the protocols for 3 parties/servers and refer readers to the full version [36] for the communication analysis and security proofs of our protocols.

**Sharing Protocol** Protocol $\Pi_{\text{sh}}\text{h}$ allows a server $P_i$ to generate $[\cdot]$-sharing of a value $v \in \mathbb{Z}_2$. In the preprocessing phase, $P_0, P_j$ for $j \in \{1, 2\}$ along with $P_i$ sample a random $[\alpha_j] \in \mathbb{Z}_2$, while $P_1, P_2, P_i$ sample random $\gamma_i \in \mathbb{Z}_2$. This allows $P_i$ to know both $\alpha_i$ and $\gamma_i$ in clear. During the online phase, if $P_i = P_0$, then $P_0$ sends $\beta_x = v + \alpha_i$ to $P_1, P_0, P_1$ then jmp-send $\beta_x$ to $P_2$ to complete the secret sharing. If $P_i = P_1, P_1$ sends $\beta_x = v + \alpha_i \text{ to } P_2$. Then $P_1, P_2$ jmp-send $\beta_x + \gamma_i$ to $P_0$. Case for $P_1 = P_2$ proceeds similarly to that of $P_i$. The correctness of the shares held by each server is assured by the guarantees of $\Pi_{\text{jmp}}$. We defer formal details of $\Pi_{\text{sh}}\text{h}$ to the full version [36].

**Joint Sharing Protocol** Protocol $\Pi_{\text{sh}}\text{h}$ (Fig. 9) allows two servers $P_i, P_j$ to jointly generate a $[\cdot]$-sharing of a value $v \in \mathbb{Z}_2$. To generate $[\cdot]$-sharing of $P_i$ to $P_j$ to $P_i, P_j$ to jointly generate a $[\cdot]$-sharing of a value $v \in \mathbb{Z}_2$ that is known to both. Towards this, servers execute the preprocessing of $\Pi_{\text{sh}}\text{h}$ to generate $[\alpha_i]$ and $[\gamma_i]$. If $(P_i, P_j) = (P_i, P_0)$, then $P_i, P_0$ jmp-send $\gamma_i = v + \alpha_i$ to $P_2$. The case when $(P_i, P_j) = (P_2, P_0)$ proceeds similarly. The case for $(P_i, P_j) = (P_1, P_2)$ is optimized further as follows: servers locally set $[\alpha_j] = [\alpha_i] = 0$. $P_1, P_2$ together sample random $\gamma_i \in \mathbb{Z}_2$. Set $\beta_x = v$ and jmp-send $\beta_x + \gamma_i$ to $P_0$. We defer the formal details of $\Pi_{\text{sh}}\text{h}$ to §B.

**Addition Protocol** Given $[\cdot]$-shares on input wires $x, y$, servers can use linearity property of the sharing scheme to locally compute $[\cdot]$-shares of the output of addition gate, $z = x + y$ as $[z] = [x] + [y]$. In addition, $P_0$ locally computes $\Gamma_{xy} = \alpha_x \alpha_y$ and generates $[\cdot]$-sharing of the same between $P_1, P_2$. Since,

$\beta_z = z + \alpha_z = xy + \alpha_z = (\beta_x - \alpha_x)(\beta_y - \alpha_y) + \alpha_z = \beta_x \beta_y - \beta_x \alpha_y - \beta_y \alpha_x + [\alpha_z] + [\gamma_z]$

servers $P_1, P_2$ locally compute $[\beta_z]_{j} = (j - 1)\beta_\gamma - \beta_x [\alpha_j] - \beta_y [\alpha_j] + [\alpha_j]$, during the online phase and mutually exchange their shares to reconstruct $\beta_z$. $P_i$ then sends $\beta_z + \gamma_z$ to $P_0$, completing the semi-honest protocol. The correctness that asserts $z = xy$ or in other words $\beta_z - \alpha_z = xy$ holds due to Eq. 1.

The following issues arise in the above protocol when a malicious adversary is considered:

1. When $P_0$ is corrupt, the $[\cdot]$-sharing of $\Gamma_{xy}$ performed by $P_0$ might not be correct, i.e. $\Gamma_{xy} \neq \alpha_x \alpha_y$.
2. When $P_1$ (or $P_2$) is corrupt, $[\cdot]$-share of $\beta_z$ handed over to the fellow honest evaluator during the online phase might not be correct, causing reconstruction of an incorrect $\beta_z$.
3. When $P_1$ is corrupt, the value $\beta_z + \gamma_z$ that is sent to $P_0$ during the online phase may not be correct.

All the three issues are common with BLAZE (copied verbatim), but we differ from BLAZE in handling them. We begin with solving the last issue first. We simply make $P_1, P_2$ jmp-send $\beta_z + \gamma_z$ to $P_0$ (after $\beta_z$ is computed). This either leads to success or a TTP selection. Due to jmp’s rate-1 communication, $P_1$ alone sending the value to $P_0$ remains as costly as using jmp in amortized sense. Whereas in BLAZE, the malicious version simply makes $P_2$ to send a hash of $\beta_z + \gamma_z$ to $P_0$ (in addition to $P_1$’s communication of $\beta_z, \gamma_z$ to $P_0$), who aborts if the received values are inconsistent.

For the remaining two issues, similar to BLAZE, we reduce both to a multiplication (on values unrelated to inputs) in the
preprocessing phase. However, our method leads to either success or TTP selection, with no additional cost.

We start with the second issue. To solve it, where a corrupt \( P_1 \) (or \( P_2 \)) sends an incorrect \([\cdot]\)-share of \( \beta_2 \), BLAZE makes use of server \( P_3 \) to compute a version of \( \beta_2 \) for verification, based on \( \beta_x \) and \( \beta_y \), as follows. Using \( \beta_x + \gamma_x, \beta_y + \gamma_y, \alpha_x, \alpha_y, \alpha_2 \) and \( \Gamma_{xy} \), \( P_3 \) computes:

\[
\beta_2^* = -(\beta_x + \gamma_x)\alpha_x - (\beta_y + \gamma_y)\alpha_y + 2\Gamma_{xy} + \alpha_2 \\
= (\beta_x - \beta_y, \beta_y) - (\gamma_x + \alpha_x - \gamma_y, \alpha_y - \Gamma_{xy}) \quad \text{[by Eq. 1]} \\
= (\beta_x - \beta_y, \beta_y) - \chi \quad \text{[where } \chi = \gamma_x\alpha_x + \gamma_y\alpha_y - \Gamma_{xy} \text{]} 
\]

Now if \( \chi \) can be made available to \( P_0 \), it can send \( \beta^*_2 + \chi \) to \( P_1 \) and \( P_2 \) who use the knowledge of \( \beta_x, \beta_y \), can verify the correctness of \( \beta_2 \) by computing \( \beta_x - \beta_y, \beta_y \) and checking against the value \( \beta^*_2 + \chi \) received from \( P_0 \). However, disclosing \( \chi \) on clear to \( P_0 \) will cause a privacy issue when \( P_0 \) is corrupt, because one degree of freedom on the pair \( (\gamma_x, \gamma_y) \) is lost and the same impact percolates down to \( (\beta_x, \beta_y) \) and further to the actual values \( (\gamma_x, \gamma_y) \) on the wires \( x, y \). This is resolved through a random value \( \psi \in Z_{2^{l'}} \), sampled together by \( P_1 \) and \( P_2 \). Now, \( \chi \) and \( \beta^*_2 \) are set to \( \gamma_x + \gamma_y, \alpha_x - \Gamma_{xy} + \psi \) and \( \beta_x - \beta_y, \beta_y + \psi \) and \( \chi \), respectively. And the check by \( P_1, P_2 \) involves computing \( \beta_x - \beta_y, \beta_y + \psi \) and \( \chi \), respectively.

The rest of the logic in BLAZE goes on to discuss how to enforce \( P_0 \)–(a) compute a correct \( \chi \) (when honest), and (b) to share correct \( \Gamma_{xy} \) (when corrupt). Tying the ends together, they identify the precise shared multiplication triple and map its components to \( \chi \) and \( \Gamma_{xy} \) so that these values are correct by virtue of the correctness of the product relation. This reduces ensuring the correctness of these values to doing a single multiplication of two values in the preprocessing phase.

### Protocol \( \Pi_{\text{mul}}(P, [x], [y]) \)

**Preprocessing:**

- \( P_0, P_j \) for \( j \in \{1,2\} \) together sample random \( [\alpha_z] \in Z_{2^{l'}} \), while \( P_1, P_2 \) sample random \( y_z \in Z_{2^{l'}} \).
- Servers in \( P \) locally compute \( \langle \cdot \rangle \)-sharing of \( d = \gamma_z + \alpha_z \) and \( e = \gamma_z + \alpha_z \) by setting the shares as follows (Ref. Table 2):
  \[
  (\alpha_z)_{i,j} = \alpha_z, \quad (\beta_z)_{i,j} = \beta_z, \quad (\gamma_z)_{i,j} = \gamma_z, \quad (\psi_z)_{i,j} = \psi_z,
  \]
- Servers in \( P \) execute \( \Pi_{\text{mulPre}}(P, d, e) \) to generate \( f \).
- \( P_0, P_j \) locally set \( [\chi]_1 = f_1 \), while \( P_0, P_2 \) locally set \( [\chi]_2 = f_0 \).
- \( P_1, P_2 \) locally compute \( \psi = f_2 - \chi, \gamma_z \).

**Online:**

- \( P_0, P_j \) for \( j \in \{1,2\} \), compute \( [\beta_z]_j = -(\beta_x + \gamma_x)\alpha_x - (\beta_y + \gamma_y)\alpha_y + \alpha_2 + [\chi]_j \).
- \( P_0, P_1 \) jmp-send \( [\beta_z]_1 \) to \( P_0 \) and \( P_2, P_2 \) jmp-send \( [\beta_z]_2 \) to \( P_1 \).
- \( P_1, P_2 \) compute \( \beta^*_2 = [\beta_z]_1 + [\beta_z]_2 \) and set \( \beta_x = \beta^*_2 + \beta_x \beta_y + \psi \).
- \( P_1, P_2 \) jmp-send \( \beta_x + \gamma_x \) to \( P_0 \).

**Figure 2:** 3PC: Multiplication Protocol \((x = x \cdot y)\)

We differ from BLAZE in several ways. First, we do not simply rely on \( P_0 \) for the verification information \( \beta_2^* + \chi \), as this may inevitably lead to abort when \( P_0 \) is corrupt. Instead, we find (a slightly different) \( \beta_2^* \) that, instead of entirely available to \( P_0 \), will be available in \([\cdot]\)-shared form between the two teams \( \{P_0, P_1\}, \{P_0, P_2\} \), with both servers in \( \{P_0, P_j\} \) holding \( \Gamma \) share \( \beta_2^* \). With this edit, the \( \Gamma \)th team can jmp-send the \( \Gamma \)th share of \( \beta_2^* \) to the third server which computes \( \beta_2^* \). Due to the presence of one honest server in each team, this \( \beta^*_2 \) is correct and \( P_1, P_2 \) directly use it to compute \( \beta_x \), with the knowledge of \( \gamma, \beta_x, \beta_y \). The outcome of our approach is a win-win situation i.e. either success or TTP selection. Our approach of computing \( \beta_x \) from \( \beta^*_2 \) is a departure from BLAZE, where the latter suggests computing \( \beta_x \) from the exchange \( P_1, P_2 \)’s respective share of \( \beta_2 \) (as in the semi-honest construction) and use \( \beta_2^* \) for verification. Our new \( \beta^*_2 \) and \( \chi \) are:

\[
\chi = \gamma_x, \alpha_x + \gamma_y, \alpha_y - \Gamma_{xy} + \psi \quad \text{and}
\]

\[
\beta^*_2 = -(\beta_x + \gamma_x)\alpha_x - (\beta_y + \gamma_y)\alpha_y + \alpha_2 + \chi
\]

Clearly, both \( P_0 \) and \( P_j \) can compute \( \beta^*_2 = -(\beta_x + \gamma_x)\alpha_x - (\beta_y + \gamma_y)\alpha_y + \alpha_2 + \chi \), given \( \chi \).

The rest of our discussion explains how a \( \Gamma \)th share of \( \chi \) can be made available to \( \{P_0, P_j\} \) and \( \psi \) can be derived by \( P_1, P_2 \), from a multiplication triple. Similar to BLAZE, yet for a different triple, we observe that \( (d,e,f) \) is a multiplication triple, where \( d = (\gamma_x + \alpha_x), e = (\gamma_x + \alpha_y), f = (\gamma_x, \gamma_y + \psi) + \chi \). If and only if \( \chi \) and \( \Gamma_{xy} \) are correct. Indeed,

\[
de = (\gamma_x + \alpha_x, \gamma_x + \alpha_x) = (\gamma_x, \gamma_x + \alpha_x, \gamma_y + \alpha_y, \Gamma_{xy})
\]

Based on this observation, we compute the above multiplication triple using a multiplication protocol and extract out the values for \( \psi \) and \( \chi \) from the shares of \( f \) which are bound to be correct. This can be executed entirely in the preprocessing phase. Specifically, the servers (a) locally obtain \( \langle \cdot \rangle \)-shares of \( d, e, f \) as in Table 2, (b) compute \( \langle \cdot \rangle \)-shares of \( f = (d,e) \), say denoted by \( f_0, f_1, f_2 \), using an efficient, robust 3-party multiplication protocol, say \( \Pi_{\text{mulPre}} \) (abstracted in a functionality Fig. 10) and finally (c) extract out the required preprocessing data \( \langle \cdot \rangle \)-locally as in Eq. 2.

### Table 2: The \( \langle \cdot \rangle \)-sharing of values \( d \) and \( e \)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>( \langle \cdot \rangle_d )</th>
<th>( \langle \alpha_z \rangle_1 )</th>
<th>( \langle \alpha_z \rangle_1 )</th>
<th>( \langle \gamma_z \rangle_1 )</th>
<th>( \langle \gamma_z \rangle_1 )</th>
<th>( \langle \psi_z \rangle_1 )</th>
<th>( \langle \gamma_z \rangle_1 )</th>
<th>( \langle \alpha_z \rangle_1 )</th>
<th>( \langle \gamma_z \rangle_1 )</th>
<th>( \langle \psi_z \rangle_1 )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( \langle \Gamma_{xy} \rangle_1 )</td>
<td>( f_0 )</td>
<td>( f_1 )</td>
<td>( f_2 )</td>
<td>( f_0 )</td>
<td>( f_1 )</td>
<td>( f_2 )</td>
<td>( f_0 )</td>
<td>( f_1 )</td>
<td>( f_2 )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We switch to \( \langle \cdot \rangle \)-sharing in this part to be able to use the best robust multiplication protocol of [9] that supports this form of secret sharing and requires communication of just 3 elements. Fortunately, the switch does not cost anything, as both the step
(a) and (c) (as above) involve local computation and the cost simply reduces to a single run of a multiplication protocol. According to (·)-sharing, both $P_0$ and $P_1$ obtain $f_1$ and hence obtain $[x'_1]$. Similarly, $P_0, P_2$ obtain $f_0$ and hence $[x'_2]$. Finally, $P_1, P_2$ obtain $f_2$ from which they compute $\psi = f_2 - y'_2 y'_1$. This completes the informal discussion.

To leverage amortization, only send phases of all the jmp-send are run on the flow. At the end of preprocessing, the verify phase for all possible ordered pair of senders are run. We carry on computation in the online phase only when the verify phases in the preprocessing are successful. Otherwise, the servers simply send their inputs to the elected TTP, which computes the function and returns the result to all the servers. Similarly, depending on the output of the verify at the end of the online phase, either the reconstruction is carried out or a TTP is identified. In the latter case, computation completes as mentioned before.

On the security of our framework: We emphasize that we follow the standard traditional (real-world / ideal-world based) security definition of MPC, according to which, in the 4-party setting with 1 corruption, exactly 1 party is assumed to be corrupt, and rest are honest. As per this definition, disclosing the honest party’s inputs to a selected honest party is not a breach of security. Indeed, in our framework, the data sharing and the computation on the shared data is done in a way that any malicious behaviour leads to establishment of a TTP who is enabled to receive all the inputs and compute the output on the clear. There has been a recent study on the additional requirement of hiding the inputs from a quorum of honest parties (treating them as semi-honest), termed as Friends-and-Foes (FaF) security notion [2]. This is a stronger security goal than the standard one and it has been shown that one cannot obtain FaF-secure robust 3PC. We leave FaF-secure 4PC for future exploration.

### 3.3 Building Blocks for PPML using 3PC

This section provides details on robust realizations of the following building blocks for PPML in 3-server setting—i) Dot Product, ii) Truncation, iii) Dot Product with Truncation, iv) Secure Comparison, and v) Non-linear Activation functions—Sigmoid and ReLU. We defer the communication analysis of our protocols and security proofs to the full version [36]. We begin by providing details of input sharing and reconstruction in the SOC setting.

**Input Sharing and Output Reconstruction in the SOC Setting** Protocol $\Pi_{sh}^{SOC}$ (Fig. 3) extends input sharing to the SOC setting and allows a user $U$ to generate the $[\cdot]$-shares of its input $v$ among the three servers. Note that the necessary commitments to facilitate the sharing are generated in the preprocessing phase by the servers which are then communicated to $U$, along with the opening, in the online phase. $U$ selects the commitment forming the majority (for each share) owing to the presence of an honest majority among the servers, and accepts the corresponding shares. Analogously, protocol $\Pi_{rec}^{SOC}$ (Fig. 3) allows the servers to reconstruct a value $v$ towards user $U$. In either of the protocols, if at any point, a TTP is identified, then servers signal the TTP’s identity to $U$. $U$ selects the TTP as the one forming a majority and sends its input in the clear to the TTP, who computes the function output and sends it back to $U$. 

---

- **Reconstruction Protocol** Protocol $\Pi_{rec}$ allows servers to robustly reconstruct value $v \in Z_{2^r}$ from its $[\cdot]$-shares. Note that each server misses one share of $v$ which is held by the other two servers. Consider the case of $P_0$ who requires $y'_r$ to compute $v$. During the preprocessing, $P_1, P_2$ compute a commitment of $y'_r$, denoted by $\text{Com}(y'_r)$ and jmp-send the same to $P_0$. Similar steps are performed for the values $[\alpha_i]_2$ and $[\alpha_i]_1$ that are required by servers $P_1$ and $P_2$ respectively. During the online phase, servers open their commitments to the intended server who accepts the opening that is consistent with the agreed upon commitment. We defer the details to the full version [36].

- **The Complete 3PC** For the sake of completeness and to demonstrate how GOD is achieved, we show how to compile the above primitives for a general 3PC. A similar approach will be taken for 4PC and each PPML task, and we will avoid repetition. In order to compute an arithmetic circuit over $Z_{2^r}$, we first invoke the key-setup functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{setup}}$ (Fig. 6) for key distribution and preprocessing of $\Pi_{sh}, \Pi_{mult}$ and $\Pi_{rec}$, as per the given circuit. During the online phase, $P_i \in \mathcal{S}$ shares its input $x_i$ by executing online steps of $\Pi_{sh}$. This is followed by the circuit evaluation phase, where servers evaluate the gates in the circuit in the topological order, with addition gates (and multiplication-by-a-constant gates) being computed locally, and multiplication gates being computed via online of $\Pi_{mult}$ (Fig. 2). Finally, servers run the online steps of $\Pi_{rec}$ on the output wires to reconstruct the function output. To leverage amortization, only send phases of all the jmp-send are run on the flow. At the end of preprocessing, the verify phase for all possible ordered pair of senders are run. We carry on computation in the online phase only when the verify phases in the preprocessing are successful. Otherwise, the servers simply send their inputs to the elected TTP, which computes the function and returns the result to all the servers. Similarly, depending on the output of the verify at the end of the online phase, either the reconstruction is carried out or a TTP is identified. In the latter case, computation completes as mentioned before. 

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MSB Extraction, Bit to Arithmetic Conversion and Bit Injection Protocols

We provide a high-level overview of three protocols that involve working over arithmetic and boolean rings in a mixed fashion and are used in PPML primitives. The bit extraction protocol, Π\text{bitex}, allows servers to compute boolean sharing of the most significant bit (msb) of a value v from its arithmetic sharing ([v]). The Bit2A protocol, Π\text{bit2a}, given the boolean sharing of a bit b, denoted as [b]B, allows the servers to compute the arithmetic sharing [b].

Here [b] denotes the equivalent value of b over ring Z_2^t (see Notation 2.2). Lastly, Bit Injection protocol, Π\text{bitinj}, allows servers to compute the arithmetic sharing [v] from boolean sharing of a bit b ([b]B) and arithmetic sharing of v ([v]).

The core techniques used in these protocols follow from BLAZE [48], where multiplication calls are replaced with our new Π\text{mult}, and private communications are replaced with jmp-send to ensure a successful run or TTP selection. These PPML building-blocks can be understood without details of the constructs and hence, are deferred to full version [36].

**Protocol** Π\text{SOC}^{\text{sh}}(U, v) and Π\text{SOC}^{\text{sc}}(U, [v])

**Input Sharing:**
- P_0, P_i, for s ∈ {1, 2}, together sample random \([α_s]_i \in \mathbb{Z}_{2^t}\), while P_1, P_2 together sample random \(γ_i \in \mathbb{Z}_{2^t}\).
- P_0, P_1 jmp-send Com([α_1]_i) to P_2, while P_0, P_2 jmp-send Com([α_2]_i) to P_1, and P_1, P_2 jmp-send Com(γ) to P_0.
- Each server sends (Com([α_1]_i), Com([α_2]_i), Com(γ)) to U who accepts the values that form majority. Also, P_0, P_2, for s ∈ {1, 2}, open [α_s]_i towards U while P_1, P_2 open γ_i towards U.
- U accepts the consistent opening, recovers [α_1]_i, [α_2]_i, γ_i, computes β_v = v + [α_1]_i + [α_2]_i, and sends β_v + γ_i to all three servers.
- Servers broadcast the received value and accept the majority value if it exists, and a default value, otherwise. P_1, P_2 locally compute β_v from β_v + γ_i using γ_i to complete the sharing of v.

**Output Reconstruction:**
- Servers execute the preprocessing of Π\text{rec}(P, [v]) to agree upon commitments of [α_1]_i, [α_2]_i and γ_i.
- Each server sends β_v + γ_i and commitments on [α_1]_i, [α_2]_i and γ_i to U, who accepts the values forming U.
- P_0, P_j for i ∈ {1, 2} open [α_1]_i to U while P_1, P_2 open γ_i to U.
- U accepts the consistent opening and computes v = (β_v + γ_i) - [α_1]_i - [α_2]_i - γ_i.

Figure 3: 3PC: Input Sharing and Output Reconstruction

**Dot Product**

Given the [\cdot] sharing of vectors \(\tilde{x}\) and \(\tilde{y}\), protocol Π\text{dot} allows servers to generate [\cdot] sharing of \(z = \tilde{x} \cdot \tilde{y}\) robustly. [\cdot] sharing of a vector \(\tilde{x}\) of size n, means that each element \(x_i \in Z_{2^t}\) of \(\tilde{x}\), for \(i \in [n]\), is [\cdot] shared. We borrow ideas from BLAZE for obtaining an online communication cost independent of n and use jmp primitive to ensure either success or TTP selection. Analogous to our multiplication protocol, our dot product offloads one call to a robust dot product protocol to the preprocessing. By extending techniques of [8, 9], we give an instantiation for the dot product protocol used in our preprocessing whose (amortized) communication cost is constant, thereby making our preprocessing cost also independent of n.

To begin with, \(z = \tilde{x} \cdot \tilde{y}\) can be viewed as n parallel multiplication instances of the form \(z_i = x_i y_i\) for \(i \in [n]\), followed by adding up the results. Let \(\beta^{p_i} = \sum_{j=1}^{n} \beta_j\).

\[\beta^{p_i} = -\sum_{j=1}^{n} (\beta_j + γ_j)γ_j + \sum_{j=1}^{n} (β_j + γ_j)α_j + α_j + χ \] (3)

where \(χ = \sum_{i=1}^{n} (γ_i α_j + γ_i α_j + Γ_{x_i y_i} - ψ_i)\).

Apart from the aforementioned modification, the online phase for dot product proceeds similar to that of multiplication protocol. P_0, P_1 locally compute [\beta^{p_i}] to as per Eq. 3 and jmp-send [\beta^{p_i}] to P_2. P_1 obtains [\beta^{p_i}] in a similar fashion. P_1, P_2 reconstruct \(β^{p_i} = [\beta^{p_i}] + [\beta^{p_i}]\) and compute \(β^{p_i} = \sum_{j=1}^{n} β_j + γ_j + ψ_i\). Here, the value ψ_i has to be correctly generated in the preprocessing phase satisfying Eq. 3.

Finally, P_1, P_2 jmp-send \(β^{p_i} + γ_j\) to P_0.

We now provide the details for the preprocessing phase that enable servers to obtain the required values (χ, ψ) with the invocation of a dot product protocol in a black-box way. Towards this, let \(d = [d_1, \ldots, d_n]\) and \(e = [e_1, \ldots, e_n]\), where \(d_i = γ_j + α_j\) and \(e_i = γ_j + α_j\) for \(i \in [n]\), as in the case of multiplication. Then for \(f = \tilde{d} \cdot \tilde{e}\),

\[f = \tilde{d} \cdot \tilde{e} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} d_i e_i = \sum_{i=1}^{n} (γ_j + α_j)(γ_j + α_j)\]

\[= \sum_{i=1}^{n} (γ_j γ_j + γ_j + γ_j + γ_j) + χ\]

\[= \sum_{i=1}^{n} (γ_j γ_j + γ_j + γ_j + γ_j) + [χ]_1 + [χ]_2 = f_2 + f_1 + f_0\]

where \(f_2 = \sum_{i=1}^{n} (γ_j γ_j + γ_j + γ_j + γ_j)\), \(f_1 = [χ]_1\) and \(f_0 = [χ]_2\).

Using the above relation, the preprocessing phase proceeds as follows: P_0, P_j for j ∈ {1, 2} sample a random \(α_j\) ∈ Z_2^t, while P_1, P_2 sample random γ_j. Servers locally prepare \(\langle \tilde{d}, \tilde{e} \rangle\) similar to that of multiplication protocol. Servers then execute a robust 3PC dot product protocol, denoted by Π\text{dotpre} (ideal functionality for the same appears in Fig. 11), that takes \(\langle \tilde{d}, \tilde{e} \rangle\) as input and compute \(f\) with \(f = \tilde{d} \cdot \tilde{e}\).

Given \(f\), the ψ and \([χ]\) values are extracted as follows (ref. Eq. 4):

\[ψ = f_2 - \sum_{i=1}^{n} γ_j γ_j, \quad [χ]_1 = f_1, \quad [χ]_2 = f_0\]

It is easy to see from the semantics of \(\langle \cdot \rangle\)-sharing that both P_0, P_2 obtain \(f_2\) and hence ψ. Similarly, both P_0, P_1 obtain \(f_1\) and hence \([χ]_1\), while P_0, P_2 obtain \([χ]_2\).

A trivial way to instantiate Π\text{dotpre} is to treat a dot product operation as n multiplications. However, this results in a communication cost that is linearly dependent on the feature size. Instead, we instantiate Π\text{dotpre} by a semi-honest dot product protocol.
protocol followed by a verification phase to check the correctness. For the verification phase, we extend the techniques of [8, 9] to provide support for verification of dot product tuples. Setting the verification phase parameters appropriately gives a $\Pi_{\text{dotprod}_\text{re}}$ whose (amortized) communication cost is independent of the feature size.

**Truncation** Working over fixed-point values, repeated multiplications using FPA arithmetic can lead to an overflow resulting in loss of significant bits of information. This put forth the need for truncation [11, 14, 43, 45, 48] that re-adjusts the shares after multiplication so that FPA semantics are maintained. As shown in SecureML [45], the method of truncation would result in loss of information on the least significant bits and affect the accuracy by a very minimal amount.

For truncation, servers execute $\Pi_{\text{trgen}}$ (Fig. 12) to generate $([r], [r^d])$-pair, where $r$ is a random element, and $r^d$ is the truncated value of $r$, i.e. the value $r$ right-shifted by $d$ bit positions. Recall that $d$ denotes the number of bits allocated for the fractional part in the FPA representation. Given $(r, r^d)$, the truncated value of $v$, denoted as $v^d$, is computed as $v^d = (v - r)^d + r^d$. The correctness and accuracy of this method was shown in ABY3 [43].

Protocol $\Pi_{\text{trgen}}$ is inspired from [15, 43] and proceeds as follows to generate $([r], [r^d])$. Analogous to the approach of ABY3 [43], servers generate a boolean sharing of an $\ell$-bit value $r = r_1 \oplus r_2$, non-interactively. Each server truncates its share of $r$ locally to obtain a boolean sharing of $r^d$ by removing the lower $d$ bits. To obtain the arithmetic shares of $(r, r^d)$ from their boolean sharing, we do not, however, rely on the approach of ABY3 as it requires more rounds. Instead, we implicitly perform a boolean to arithmetic conversion, as was proposed in Trident [15], to obtain the arithmetic shares of $(r, r^d)$. This entails performing two dot product operations and constitutes the cost for $\Pi_{\text{trgen}}$. We defer details to §B.

**Dot Product with Truncation** Given the $[\cdot]$-sharing of vectors $\vec{x}$ and $\vec{y}$, protocol $\Pi_{\text{dot}}$ allows servers to generate $[\vec{z}]^d$, where $z^d$ denotes the truncated value of $z = \vec{x} \odot \vec{y}$. A naive way is to compute the dot product using $\Pi_{\text{dot}}$, followed by performing truncation using the $(r, r^d)$ pair. Instead, we follow the optimization of BLAZE where the online phase of $\Pi_{\text{dot}}$ is modified to integrate the truncation using $(r, r^d)$ at no additional cost.

The preprocessing phase now consists of the execution of one instance of $\Pi_{\text{trgen}}$ (Fig. 12) and the preprocessing corresponding to $\Pi_{\text{dot}}$. In the online phase, servers enable $P_1, P_2$ to obtain $z^d - r$ instead of $\beta^d_s$, where $z^d = \beta^d_s - \alpha_s$. Using $z^d - r$, both $P_1, P_2$ then compute $(z - r)$ locally, truncate it to obtain $(z - r)^d$ and execute $\Pi_{\text{sh}}$ to generate $[(z - r)^d]$. Finally, servers locally compute the result as $[z^d] = [(z - r)^d] + [r^d]$. Formal details are deferred to the full version [36].

**Secure Comparison** Secure comparison allows servers to check whether $x < y$, given their $[\cdot]$-shares. In FPA representation, checking $x < y$ is equivalent to checking the $\text{msb}$ of $v = x - y$. Towards this, servers locally compute $[v] = [x] - [y]$ and extract the $\text{msb}$ of $v$ using $\Pi_{\text{bitext}}$. In case an arithmetic sharing is desired, servers can apply $\Pi_{\text{bit2A}}$ protocol on the outcome of $\Pi_{\text{bitext}}$ protocol.

**Activation Functions** We now elaborate on two of the most prominently used activation functions: i) Rectified Linear Unit (ReLU) and (ii) Sigmoid (Sig).

- **ReLU**: The ReLU function, $\text{relu}(v) = \text{max}(0, v)$, can be viewed as $\text{relu}(v) = \delta^r - v$, where bit $b = 1$ if $v < 0$ and $0$ otherwise. Here $\delta$ denotes the complement of b. Given $[v]$, servers execute $\Pi_{\text{bitext}}$ on $[v]$ to generate $[\delta]^B$. $[\delta]^B$-sharing of $\delta$ is locally computed by setting $\beta_B = 1 \oplus \beta_b$. Servers execute $\Pi_{\text{bitlog}}$ protocol on $[\delta]^B$ and $[v]$ to obtain the desired result.

- **Sig**: In this work, we use the MPC-friendly variant of the Sigmoid function [14, 43, 45]. Note that $\text{sig}(v) = \frac{1}{1 + e^{\text{ReLU}(v)}}$, can be performed using bit injection. To find the maximum value in vector $\vec{x}$, the servers first group the values in $\vec{x}$ into pairs and securely compare each pair to obtain the maximum of the two. This results in a vector of size $m/2$. This process is repeated for $O(\log m)$ rounds to obtain the maximum value in the entire vector. Convolutions, which form another important building block in PPML tasks, can be cast into matrix multiplication. Our protocol to compute a matrix of dimension $p \times r$ after multiplication requires only $p \times r$ multiplications. The details appear in the full version of the paper [36].

# 4 Robust 4PC

In this section, we extend our 3PC results to the 4-party case and observe substantial efficiency gain. First, the use of broadcast is eliminated. Second, the preprocessing of multiplication becomes substantially computationally light, eliminating the multiplication protocol (used in the preprocessing) altogether. Third, we achieve a dot product protocol with communication cost independent of the size of the vector, completely eliminating the complex machinery required as in the 3PC case. At the heart of our 4PC constructions lies an efficient 4-party jmp primitive, denoted as jmp4, that allows two servers to send a common value to a third server robustly. While we provide details for the protocols that vary significantly from their 3PC counterpart in this section, the details for other protocols along with the communication analysis and security proofs, are deferred to the full version [36].
Secret Sharing Semantics For a value \( v \), the shares for \( P_0, P_1 \) and \( P_2 \) remain the same as that for 3PC case. That is, \( P_0 \) holds \( (\alpha_v)_1, (\alpha_v)_2, b_0 \) while \( P_i \) for \( i \in \{1, 2\} \) holds \( (\alpha_v)_i, b_i, \gamma_i \). The shares for the fourth server \( P_3 \) is defined as \( (\alpha_v, \beta_v, \gamma_v) \). Clearly, the secret is defined as \( v = \beta_v - [\alpha_v]_1 - [\alpha_v]_2 \).

4PC Joint Message Passing Primitive The jmp4 primitive enables two servers \( P_i, P_j \) to send a common value \( v \in \mathbb{Z}_{2^l} \) to a third server \( P_k \), or identify a TTP in case of any inconsistency. This primitive is analogous to jmp (Fig. 1) in spirit but is significantly optimized and free from broadcast calls. Similar to the 3PC counterpart, each server maintains a bit and \( P_i \) sends the value, and \( P_j \) the hash of it to \( P_k \). \( P_k \) sets its inconsistency bit to 1 when the (value, hash) pair is inconsistent. This is followed by relaying the bit to all the servers, who exchange it among themselves and agree on the bit that forms majority (1 indicates the presence of inconsistency, and 0 indicates consistency). The presence of an honest majority among \( P_i, P_j, P_k \) guarantees agreement on the presence/absence of an inconsistency as conveyed by \( P_k \). Observe that inconsistency can only be caused either due to a corrupt sender sending an incorrect value (or hash), or a corrupt receiver falsely announcing the presence of inconsistency. Hence, the fourth server, \( P_3 \), can safely be employed as TTP. The protocol appears in Fig. 4.

![Protocol \( \Pi_{jmp4}(P_i, P_j, P_k, v, P_l) \)](image)

\( P_i, P_j \) initializes an inconsistency bit \( b_0 = 0 \). If \( P_i \) remains silent instead of sending \( b_0 \), any of the following rounds, the recipient sets \( b_0 \) to 1.

**Send Phase:** \( P_i \) sends \( v \) to \( P_k \).

**Verify Phase:** \( P_j \) sends \( H(v) \) to \( P_k \).

- \( P_k \) sets \( b_k = 1 \) if the received values are inconsistent or if the value is not received.
- \( P_k \) sets \( b_k = 1 \) if the received values are inconsistent or if the value is not received.
- \( P_j \) for \( s \in \{i, j, l\} \) sets \( b_s = b_k \).
- \( P_s \) for \( s \in \{i, j, l\} \) mutually exchange their bits. \( P_s \) resets \( b_s = b' \) where \( b' \) denotes the bit which appears in majority among \( b_i, b_j, b_l \).
- All servers set TTP = \( P_l \) if \( b' = 1 \), terminate otherwise.

**Figure 4: 4PC: Joint Message Passing Primitive**

Notation 4.1. We say that \( P_i, P_j \) jmp4-send \( v \) to \( P_k \) when they invoke \( \Pi_{jmp4}(P_i, P_j, P_k, v, P_l) \).

We note that the end goal of jmp4 primitive relates closely to the bi-convey primitive of FLASH [11]. Bi-convey allows two servers \( S_1, S_2 \) to convey a value to a server \( R \), and in case of an inconsistency, a pair of honest servers mutually identify each other, followed by exchanging their internal randomness to recover the clear inputs, computing the circuit, and sending the output to all. Note, however, that jmp4 primitive is more efficient and differs significantly in techniques from the bi-convey primitive. Unlike in bi-convey, in case of an inconsistency, jmp4 enables servers to learn the TTP’s identity unanimously. Moreover, bi-convey demands that honest servers, identified during an inconsistency, exchange their internal randomness (which comprises of the shared keys established during the key-setup phase) to proceed with the computation. This enforces the need for a fresh key-setup every time inconsistency is detected. On the efficiency front, jmp4 simply halves the communication cost of bi-convey, giving a 2x improvement.

**Sharing Protocol** To enable \( P_i \) to share a value \( v \), protocol \( \Pi_{sh4} \) proceeds similar to that of 3PC case with the addition that \( P_3 \) also samples the values \( [\alpha_v]_1, [\alpha_v]_2, \gamma_v \) using the shared randomness with the respective servers. On a high level, \( P_i \) computes \( \beta_v = v - [\alpha_v]_1 - [\alpha_v]_2 \) and sends \( \beta_v \) (or \( \beta_v + \gamma_v \)) to another server and they together jmp4-send this information to the intended servers.

**Multiplication Protocol** Given the [\( [\cdot] \)]-shares of \( x \) and \( y \), protocol \( \Pi_{mult4} \) (Fig. 5) allows servers to compute \( [z] \) with \( z = xy \). When compared with the state-of-the-art 4PC GOD protocol of FLASH [11], our solution improves communication in both, the preprocessing and online phase, from 6 to 3 ring elements. Moreover, our communication cost matches with the state-of-the-art 4PC protocol of Trident [15] that only provides security with fairness.

**Figure 5: 4PC: Multiplication Protocol (z = x · y)**

Recall that the goal of preprocessing in 3PC multiplication was to enable \( P_1, P_2 \) obtain \( \psi \), and \( P_0, P_3 \) for \( i \in \{1, 2\} \) obtain \( [\chi_i] \), where \( \chi_i = \gamma_i \alpha_v + \gamma_i \alpha_v + \gamma_i \). Here \( \psi \) is a random value known to both \( P_1, P_2 \). With the help of \( P_3 \), we let the servers obtain the respective preprocessing data as follows: \( P_0, P_3, P_3 \) together samples random \( \Gamma_{\chi_y} \in \mathbb{Z}_{2^l} \). \( P_0, P_3 \) locally compute \( \gamma_v = \alpha_v \), set \( \Gamma_{\chi_y} = \chi_y - [\Gamma_{\chi_y}]_1 \) and jmp4-send \( \Gamma_{\chi_y} \) to \( P_2 \). \( P_1, P_2, P_3 \) locally sample \( \psi, \gamma_v \) and generate [\( [\cdot] \)]-shares of \( \psi \) by setting \( [\psi_1] = r \) and \( [\psi_2] = \psi - r \). Then \( P_j, P_3 \) for \( j \in \{1, 2\} \) compute \( [\chi_j] = \chi_j - \gamma_v [\alpha_v]_j + [\chi_j]_1 \).
We observe that the technique of making the dot product cost with machines located in East Australia (works (NN). NN training requires additional tools to allow TTP for the πmp for communication. Since P3 is not involved in the online computation phase, we can safely assume P1 to serve as the TTP for the πmp executions in the online phase.

Reconstruction Protocol Given \([v]\), protocol πm4 enables servers to robustly reconstruct the value \(v\) among the servers. Note that every server lacks one share for reconstruction and the same is available with three other servers. Hence, they communicate the missing share among themselves, and the majority value is accepted. As an optimization, two among the three servers can send the missing share while the third one can send a hash of the same for verification. Notice that, unlike 3PC, this protocol does not require commitments.

5 Applications and Benchmarking

In this section, we empirically show the practicality of our protocols for PPML. We consider training and inference for Logistic Regression and inference for 3 different Neural Networks (NN). NN training requires additional tools to allow mixed world computations, which we leave as future work. We refer readers to SecureML [45], ABY3 [43], BLAZE [48], FALCON [56] for a detailed description of the training and inference steps for the aforementioned ML algorithms. All our benchmarking is done over the publicly available MNIST [39] and CIFAR-10 [37] dataset. For training, we use a batch size of \(B = 128\) and define 1 KB = 8192 bits.

In 3PC, we compare our results against the best-known framework BLAZE that provides fairness in the same setting. We observe that the technique of making the dot product cost independent of feature size can also be applied to BLAZE to obtain better costs. Hence, for a fair comparison, we additionally report these improved values for BLAZE. Further, we only consider the PPA circuit based variant of bit extraction for BLAZE since we aim for high throughput; the GC based variant results in huge communication and is not efficient for deep NNs. Our results imply that we get GOD at no additional cost compared to BLAZE. For 4PC, we compare our results with two best-known works FLASH [11] (which is robust) and Trident [15] (which is fair). Our results halve the cost of FLASH and are on par with Trident.

Benchmarking Environment We use a 64-bit ring (\(\mathbb{Z}_{2^{64}}\)). The benchmarking is performed over a WAN that was instantiated using n1-standard-8 instances of Google Cloud\(^6\), with machines located in East Australia (\(P_0\)), South Asia (\(P_1\)), South East Asia (\(P_2\)), and West Europe (\(P_3\)). The machines are equipped with 2.3 GHz Intel Xeon E5 v3 (Haswell) processors supporting hyper-threading, with 8 vCPUs, and 30 GB of RAM Memory and with a bandwidth of 40 Mbps. The average round-trip time (rtt) was taken as the time for communicating 1 KB of data between a pair of parties, and the rtt values were as follows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>P_0-P_1</th>
<th>P_0-P_2</th>
<th>P_0-P_3</th>
<th>P_1-P_2</th>
<th>P_1-P_3</th>
<th>P_2-P_3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>151.40ms</td>
<td>59.95ms</td>
<td>275.02ms</td>
<td>92.94ms</td>
<td>173.93ms</td>
<td>219.37ms</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Software Details We implement our protocols using the publicly available ENCRYPTO library [21] in C++17. We obtained the code of BLAZE and FLASH from the respective authors and executed them in our environment. The collision-resistant hash function was instantiated using SHA-256. We have used multi-threading, and our machines were capable of handling a total of 32 threads. Each experiment is run for 20 times, and the average values are reported.

Datasets We use the following datasets:
- MNIST [39] is a collection of 28 × 28 pixel, handwritten digit images along with a label between 0 and 9 for each image. It has 60,000 and respectively, 10,000 images in the training and test set. We evaluate logistic regression, and NN-1, NN-2 (cf. §5.2) on this dataset.
- CIFAR-10 [37] consists of 32 × 32 pixel images of 10 different classes such as dogs, horses, etc. There are 50,000 images for training and 10,000 for testing, with 6000 images in each class. We evaluate NN-3 (cf. §5.2) on this dataset.

Benchmarking Parameters We use throughput (TP) as the benchmarking parameter following BLAZE and ABY3 [43] as it would help to analyse the effect of improved communication and round complexity in a single shot. Here, TP denotes the number of operations (“iterations” for the case of training and “queries” for the case of inference) that can be performed in unit time. We consider minute as the unit time since most of our protocols over WAN requires more than a second to complete. An iteration in ML training consists of a forward propagation phase followed by a backward propagation phase. In the former phase, servers compute the output from the inputs. At the same time, in the latter, the model parameters are adjusted according to the difference in the computed output and the actual output. Inference can be viewed as one forward propagation of the algorithm alone. In addition to TP, we provide the online and overall communication and latency for all the benchmarked ML algorithms.

We observe that due to our protocols’ asymmetric nature, the communication load is unevenly distributed among all the servers, which leaves several communication channels underutilized. Thus, to improve the performance, we perform load balancing, where we run several parallel execution threads, each with roles of the servers changed. This helps in utilizing all channels and improving the performance. We report the communication and runtime of the protocols for online phase and total (= preprocessing + online).

5.1 Logistic Regression

In Logistic Regression, one iteration comprises updating the weight vector \(\hat{w}\) using the gradient descent algorithm (GD).
It is updated according to the function given below: \( \vec{w} = \vec{w} - \frac{\alpha}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} (\text{sig}(\vec{x}_i \cdot \vec{w}) - Y_i) \), where \( \alpha \) and \( \vec{x}_i \) denote the learning rate, and a subset, of batch size \( B \), randomly selected from the entire dataset in the \( i \)th iteration, respectively. The forward propagation comprises of computing the value \( \vec{x}_i \cdot \vec{w} \) followed by an application of a sigmoid function on it. The weight vector is updated in the backward propagation, which internally requires the computation of a series of matrix multiplications, and can be achieved using a dot product. The update function can be computed using \( \vec{w} \) shares as: \( \vec{w} = [\vec{w}] - \frac{\alpha}{n} [\vec{x}_i \cdot \vec{w}] \circ (\text{sig}(\vec{x}_i \cdot \vec{w}) - Y_i) \). We summarize our results in Table 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Setting</th>
<th>Ref</th>
<th>Online (TP in ( \times 10^3 ))</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3PC Training</td>
<td>BLAZE</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>50.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3PC Inference</td>
<td>SWIFT</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4PC Training</td>
<td>FLASH</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>88.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4PC Inference</td>
<td>SWIFT</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Logistic Regression training and inference. TP is given in (#it/min) for training and (#queries/min) for inference.

We observe that the online TP for the case of 3PC inference is slightly lower compared to that of BLAZE. This is because the total number of rounds for the inference phase is slightly higher in our case due to the additional rounds introduced by the verification mechanism (aka verify phase which also needs broadcast). This gap becomes less evident for more number of rounds, as is demonstrated in the case of NN (presented next), where verification for several iterations is clubbed together, making the overhead for verification insignificant.

For the case of 4PC, our solution outperforms FLASH in terms of communication as well as throughput. Concretely, we observe a 2× improvement in TP for inference and a 2.3× improvement for training. For Trident [15], we observe a drop of 15.86% in TP for inference due to the extra rounds required for verification that achieves GOD. This loss is, however, traded-off with the stronger security guarantee. For training, we are on par with Trident as the effect of extra rounds becomes less significant for more number of rounds, as will also be evident from the comparisons for NN inference.

As a final remark, note that our 4PC sees roughly 2.5× improvement compared to our 3PC for logistic regression.

### 5.2 NN Inference

We consider the following popular neural networks for benchmarking. These are chosen based on the different range of model parameters and types of layers used in the network. We refer readers to [56] for a detailed architecture of the neural networks.

**NN-1:** This is a 3-layered fully connected network with ReLU activation after each layer. This network has around 118K parameters and is chosen from [43, 48].

**NN-2:** This network –LeNet [38]– contains 2 convolutional layers and 2 fully connected layers with ReLU activation after each layer, additionally followed by maxpool for convolutional layers. It has approximately 431K parameters.

**NN-3:** This network –VGG16 [52]– was the runner-up of ILSVRC-2014 competition. It has 16 layers in total and comprises of fully-connected, convolutional, ReLU activation and maxpool layers. It has about 138 million parameters.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Network</th>
<th>Ref</th>
<th>Online</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NN-1</td>
<td>BLAZE</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>49275.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NN-2</td>
<td>BLAZE</td>
<td>4.77</td>
<td>536.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NN-3</td>
<td>BLAZE</td>
<td>15.58</td>
<td>52.58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: 3PC NN Inference. TP is given in (#queries/min).

Table 5 summarises NN inference for 4PC setting. Here, we outperform FLASH in every aspect, with the improvement in TP being at least 2.5× for each NN architecture. Further, we are on par with Trident [15] because the extra rounds required for verification get amortized with an increase in the number of rounds required for computing NN inference. This establishes the practical relevance of our work.

As a final remark, our 4PC sees roughly 3× improvement over our 3PC for NN inference. This reflects improvements brought in by the additional honest server in the system.

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References


A Preliminaries

Shared Key Setup: Let $F : \{0,1\}^k \times \{0,1\}^k \to X$ be a secure pseudo-random function (PRF), with co-domain $X$ being $\mathbb{Z}_{2^\ell}$. Servers establish the following keys for 3PC: (i) one key shared between every pair $-k_{01}, k_{02}, k_{12}$ for the servers $(P_0, P_1)$, $(P_0, P_2)$ and $(P_1, P_2)$, respectively, (ii) one shared key known to all the servers $-k_p$. Suppose $P_0, P_1$ wish to sample a random value $r \in \mathbb{Z}_{2^\ell}$ non-interactively. To do so they invoke $F_{k_0}(id_{01})$ and obtain $r$. Here, $id_0$ denotes a counter maintained by the servers, and is updated after each PRF invocation. The appropriate keys used to sample is implicit from the context, from the identities of the pair that sample or from the fact that it is sampled by all, and, hence, is omitted. The key setup is modelled via a functionality $F_{\text{setup}}$ (Fig. 6) that can be realised using any secure MPC protocol. Analogously, key setup functionality for 4PC is given in Fig. 7.

B 3PC Protocols

Joint Message Passing: The ideal functionality for jmp appears in Fig. 8.

Figure 6: 3PC: Ideal functionality for shared-key setup

Figure 7: 4PC: Ideal functionality for shared-key setup

To generate a 3-out-of-3 additive sharing of 0 i.e. $\zeta_s$ for $s \in \{0,1,2\}$ such that $P_i$ holds $\zeta_s$, and $\zeta_0 + \zeta_1 + \zeta_2 = 0$, servers proceed as follows. Every pair of servers, $P_s, P_{(s+1)}$, non-interactively generate $r_s$, as described earlier, and each $P_i$ sets $\zeta_i = r_{(s-i)}$.

Joint Sharing: The joint sharing protocol appears in Fig. 9.

When the value $v$ is available to both $P_i, P_j$ in the preprocessing phase, protocol $\Pi_{\text{sh}}$ can be made non-interactive in the following way: $P_i$ sample a random $r \in \mathbb{Z}_{2^\ell}$ and locally set their share according to Table 6.

Multiplication: The ideal functionality for $\Pi_{\text{mulPre}}$ appears in Fig. 10.
from $\mathcal{S}$ where $f = d e$. $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MulPre}}$ proceeds as follows:
- Reconstructs $d, e$ using the shares received from honest servers and compute $f = d e$.
- Compute $f(i+2)/3 = f - f_i - f(i+1)/3$ and set the output shares as $(f)_0 = (f_0, f_1, f_2), (f)_1 = (f_1, f_2), (f)_2 = (f_2, f_0)$.
- Send (Output, $(f)_1$) to server $P_1 \in \mathcal{P}$.

Figure 10: 3PC: Ideal functionality for $\Pi_{\text{mulPre}}$ protocol

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$(P_1, P_2)$</th>
<th>$(P_1, P_3)$</th>
<th>$(P_2, P_3)$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$[\alpha_j]_0 = 0, [\alpha_j]_1 = 0$</td>
<td>$[\beta_i]_0 = 0, [\gamma_i]_1 = r - v$</td>
<td>$[\alpha_j]_0 = 0, [\alpha_j]_1 = 0$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$[\beta_i]_1 = v, [\gamma_i]_1 = r - v$</td>
<td>$[\beta_i]_0 = 0, [v]_1 = r$</td>
<td>$[\beta_i]_1 = 0, [\gamma_i]_1 = -v$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$(0, 0, r)$</td>
<td>$(-v, 0, r)$</td>
<td>$(0, -v, r)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$(0, v, r - v)$</td>
<td>$(0, v, r - v)$</td>
<td>$(0, v, r - v)$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: The columns depict the three distinct possibilities of input contributing pairs. The first row shows the assignment to various components of the sharing. The last row, along with three sub-rows, specify the shares held by the three servers.

**Dot Product:** The ideal world functionality for realizing $\Pi_{\text{dotPre}}$ is presented in Fig. 11.

$\mathcal{F}_{\text{DotPPRe}}$ interacts with the servers in $\mathcal{P}$ and the adversary $\mathcal{S}$. $\mathcal{F}_{\text{DotPPRe}}$ receives $\ell$-shares of vectors $\mathbf{d} = (d_1, \ldots, d_n)$, $\mathbf{e} = (e_1, \ldots, e_n)$ from the servers. Let $v_j, \alpha_j$, for $j \in [n], s \in \{0, 1\}$ denote the share of $v_j$ such that $v_j = v_j, 0 + v_j, 1 + v_j, 2$. Server $P_i$, for $s \in \{0, 1\}$, holds $(d_j)_s = (d_1, d_j, d_j, (s+1)/3)$ and $(e_j)_s = (e_1, e_j, e_j, (s+1)/3)$ where $j \in [n]$. Let $P_0$ denote the server corrupted by $\mathcal{S}$. $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MulPre}}$ receives $(f)_i = (f_i, f(i+1)/3)$ from $\mathcal{S}$ where $f = \mathbf{d} \oplus \mathbf{e}$. $\mathcal{F}_{\text{DotPPRe}}$ proceeds as follows:
- Reconstructs $d_j, e_j$, for $j \in [n]$, using the shares received from honest servers and compute $f = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} d_i e_i$.
- Compute $f(i+2)/3 = f - f_i - f(i+1)/3$ and set the output shares as $(f)_0 = (f_0, f_1, f_2), (f)_1 = (f_1, f_2), (f)_2 = (f_2, f_0)$.
- Send (Output, $(f)_1$) to server $P_1 \in \mathcal{P}$.

Figure 11: 3PC: Ideal functionality for $\Pi_{\text{dotPre}}$ protocol

**Truncation:** We now give details of how to generate $([r], [r^d])$. For this, servers proceed as follows: $P_0, P_j$ for $j \in \{1, 2\}$ sample random $r_j \in Z_{2^d}$. Recall that the bit at $i$th position in $r$ is denoted as $r[i]$. Define $r[i] = r[i] \oplus r[j]$ for $i \in \{0, \ldots, \ell - 1\}$. For $\mathcal{S}$ defined as above, we have $r^d[i] = r[i] \oplus r[j] \oplus r[j] \oplus d + \sum_{j=0}^{i-1} r[i] \oplus r[j]$. Further, we have

$$r = \sum_{i=0}^{d-1} 2^i r[i] = \sum_{i=0}^{d-1} 2^i ([r^d[i]] + ([r^d[i]] \oplus [r^d[i]]))$$

$$= \sum_{i=0}^{d-1} 2^i ([r[i]^R] + (r[i]^R) - 2(r[i]^R) \cdot (r[i]^R))$$

$$= \sum_{i=0}^{d-1} 2^i ([r[i]^R] + (r[i]^R) - \sum_{i=0}^{d-1} (2^{i-1} (r[i]^R) \cdot (r[i]^R))$$

Similarly, for $r^d$ we have the following,

$$r^d = \sum_{i=0}^{d-1} 2^i (r[i]^R + (r[i]^R) - \sum_{i=0}^{d-1} 2^{i-1} (r[i]^R) \cdot (r[i]^R))$$

The servers non-interactively generate $\lfloor \cdot \rfloor$-shares (arithmetic shares) for each bit of $r_1$ and $r_2$ as in Table 6. Given their $\lfloor \cdot \rfloor$-shares, the servers execute $\Pi_{\text{dotPre}}$ twice to compute $\lfloor \cdot \rfloor$-share of $A = \sum_{i=0}^{d-1} 2^{i-1} (r[i]^R) \cdot (r[i]^R)$ and $B = \sum_{i=0}^{d-1} 2^{i-1} (r[i]^R) \cdot (r[i]^R)$. Using these values, the servers can locally compute the $\lfloor \cdot \rfloor$-shares for $(r, r^d)$ pair following Equation 5 and 6, respectively. Note that servers need $\lfloor \cdot \rfloor$-shares of $r$ and not $\lfloor \cdot \rfloor$-shares. The $\lfloor \cdot \rfloor$-shares can be computed from the $\lfloor \cdot \rfloor$-shares locally as follows. Let $(\alpha, \beta, \gamma)$ be the values corresponding to the $\lfloor \cdot \rfloor$-shares of $r$. Since $P_0$ knows the entire value $r$ in clear, and it knows $\alpha$, it can locally compute $\beta$. Now, the servers set $\lfloor \cdot \rfloor$-shares as: $(r_1^d = [\alpha]_1$ and $r_2^d = \beta - [\alpha]_2$. The protocol appears in Fig. 12.

**Protocol $\Pi_{\text{Trunc}}(P)$**

- To generate each bit $r[i]$ of $r$ for $i \in \{0, \ldots, \ell - 1\}$, $P_0, P_j$ for $j \in \{1, 2\}$ sample random $r_j \in Z_{2^d}$ and define $r[i] = r[i] \oplus r[j]$. Each server generates $\lfloor \cdot \rfloor$-shares of $(r[i]^R)$ for $i \in \{0, \ldots, \ell - 1\}, j \in \{1, 2\}$ non-interactively following Table 6.
- Define $\beta$ and $\gamma$ such that $x = 2^{i-1} (r[i]^R)$ and $y = (r[i]^R)$ respectively, for $i \in \{0, \ldots, \ell - 1\}$. Define $\beta$ and $\gamma$ such that $p_i = 2^{i-1} (r[i]^R)$ and $q_i = (r[i]^R)$ respectively, for $i \in \{0, \ldots, \ell - 1\}$. Servers execute $\Pi_{\text{dotPre}}$ to compute $\lfloor \cdot \rfloor$-shares of $A = \alpha \oplus \beta$ and $B = \beta \oplus \gamma$.
- Servers locally compute $[r^d] = \sum_{i=0}^{d-1} 2^{i-1} ([r[i]^R] + ([r[i]^R]) - A$, and $[r] = \sum_{i=0}^{d-1} 2^{i-1} ([r[i]^R] + ([r[i]^R]) - B]$. $P_0$ locally computes $\beta = r + \alpha$, $P_0, P_j$ set $r_1 = -[\alpha]_1$ and $P_0, P_2$ set $r_2 = [\beta] - [\alpha]_2$.

Figure 12: 3PC: Generating Random Truncated Pair $(r, r^d)$

C 4PC Protocols

**4PC Joint Message Passing Primitive:** The ideal functionality for jmp4 primitive appears in Fig. 13.

**Functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{jmp4}}$**

$\mathcal{F}_{\text{jmp4}}$ interacts with the servers in $\mathcal{P}$ and the adversary $\mathcal{S}$.

**Step 1:** $\mathcal{F}_{\text{jmp4}}$ receives $(\text{Input}, v_j)$ from senders $P_i$ for $i \in \{i, j\}$, $(\text{Input}, \bot)$ from receiver $P_i$ and fourth server $P_j$ while it receives $(\text{Select}, \text{ftp})$ from $\mathcal{S}$. Here ftp is a boolean value, with a 1 indicating that TTP $P_i$ should be established.

**Step 2:** If $v_j = v_j$ and ftp = 0, or if $\mathcal{S}$ has corrupted $P_i$, set $\text{msg}_i = \text{msg}_j = \bot$, $\text{msg}_k = v_j$, and go to **Step 4**.

**Step 3:** Else Set $\text{msg}_i = \text{msg}_j = \text{msg}_k = \text{msg}_l = P_i$.

**Step 4:** Send (Output, $\text{msg}_k$) to $P_j$ for $s \in \{0, 1, 2, 3\}$.

Figure 13: 4PC: Ideal functionality for jmp4 primitive
Joint Sharing: Protocol $\Pi_{\text{sh4}}$ (Fig. 14) enables a pair of servers $(P_1, P_2)$ to jointly generate a $[\cdot]$-sharing of value $v \in \mathbb{Z}_{2^j}$ known to both of them. In case of an inconsistency, the server outside the computation serves as a TTP.

**Protocol $\Pi_{\text{sh4}}(P_1, P_2, v)$**

**Preprocessing:**
- If $(P_1, P_2) = (P_1, P_2) : P_1, P_2, P_3$ sample $\gamma_v \in \mathbb{Z}_{2^j}$, Servers locally set $[\alpha_v]_1 = [\alpha_v]_2 = 0$.
- If $(P_1, P_2) = (P_1, P_0)$, for $s \in \{1, 2\}$ : Servers execute the preprocessing of $\Pi_{\text{sh4}}(P_s, v)$. Servers locally set $\gamma_v = 0$.
- If $(P_1, P_2) = (P_2, P_0)$, for $s \in \{0, 1, 2\}$ : Servers execute the preprocessing of $\Pi_{\text{sh4}}(P_s, v)$.

**Online:**
- If $(P_1, P_2) = (P_1, P_2) : P_1, P_2$ set $\beta_v = \nu$ and jmp4-send $\beta_v$ to $P_0$.
- If $(P_1, P_0) = (P_2, P_0)$, for $s \in \{1, 2, 3\} : P_1, P_0$ compute $\beta_v = \nu + [\alpha_v]_1 + [\alpha_v]_2$ and jmp4-send $\beta_v$ to $P_0$, where $(k \in \{1, 2\}) \land (k \neq s)$.
- If $(P_1, P_0) = (P_2, P_0)$, for $s \in \{1, 2\} : P_1, P_2$ compute $\beta_v + \gamma_v$, $P_1, P_2$ jmp4-send $\beta_v + \gamma_v$ to $P_0$, where $(k \in \{1, 2\}) \land (k \neq 3)$. In parallel, $P_2, P_3$ jmp4-send $\beta_v + \gamma_v$ to $P_0$.

Figure 14: 4PC: $[\cdot]$-sharing of a value $v \in \mathbb{Z}_{2^j}$ jointly by $P_1, P_2$.

When $P_3, P_0$ want to jointly share a value $v$ which is available in the preprocessing phase, protocol $\Pi_{\text{sh4}}$ can be performed with a single element of communication (as opposed to 2 elements in Fig. 14). $P_0, P_3$ can jointly share $v$ as follows. $P_0, P_3, P_1$ sample a random $r \in \mathbb{Z}_{2^j}$ and set $[\alpha_v]_1 = r$. $P_0, P_3$ set $[\alpha_v]_2 = -r + \nu$ and jmp4-send $[\alpha_v]_2$ to $P_2$. This is followed by servers locally setting $\gamma_v = \beta_v = 0$. We further observe that servers can generate a $[\cdot]$-sharing of $v$ non-interactively when $v$ is available with $P_0, P_1, P_2$. For this, servers set $[\alpha_v]_1 = [\alpha_v]_2 = \gamma_v = 0$ and $\beta_v = \nu$. We abuse notation and use $\Pi_{\text{sh4}}(P_0, P_1, P_2, v)$ to denote this sharing.

Input Sharing and Output Reconstruction in SOC Setting

We extend input sharing and reconstruction in the SOC setting as follows. To generate $[\cdot]$-shares for its input, $U$ receives each of the shares $[\alpha_v]_1, [\alpha_v]_2, \text{ and } \gamma_v$ from three out of the four servers as well as a random value $r \in \mathbb{Z}_{2^j}$ sampled together by $P_0, P_1, P_2$ and accepts the values that form the majority. $U$ locally computes $u = v + [\alpha_v]_1 + [\alpha_v]_2 + \gamma_v + r$ and sends $u$ to all the servers. Servers then execute a two round byzantine agreement (BA) [49] to agree on $u$ (or $\perp$). We refer the readers to [49] for the formal details of the agreement protocol. On successful completion of BA, $P_0$ computes $\beta_v + \gamma_v$ from $u$ while $P_1, P_2$ compute $\beta_v$ from $u$ locally. For the reconstruction of a value $v$, servers send their $[\cdot]$-shares of $v$ to $U$, who selects the majority value for each share and reconstructs the output. At any point, if a TTP is identified, the servers proceed as follows. All servers send their $[\cdot]$-share of the input to the TTP. TTP picks the majority value for each share and computes the function output. It then sends this output to $U$. $U$ also receives the identity of the TTP from all servers and accepts the output received from the TTP forming majority.

Dot Product

Given $[\cdot]$-shares of two $n$-sized vectors $x, y$, $\Pi_{\text{dot4}}$ enables servers to compute $[z]$ with $z = x \odot y$. This protocol is essentially similar to $n$ instances of multiplications of the form $z_i = x_i y_i$, for $i \in [n]$. But instead of communicating values corresponding to each of the $n$ instances, servers locally sum up the shares and communicate a single value. This helps to obtain a communication cost independent of the size of the vectors. Details are deferred to the full version [36].

Truncation

Given the $[\cdot]$-sharing of a value $v$, protocol $\Pi_{\text{regend}}(P)$ enables the servers to compute the $[\cdot]$-sharing of the truncated value $v^d$ (right shifted value by, say, $d$ positions). For this, given $[v]$ and a random truncation pair $((r), [r^d])$, the value $(v - r)$ is opened, truncated and added to $[r^d]$ to obtain $[v^d]$. To generate a random truncation pair, $P_0, P_3, P_j$, for $j \in \{1, 2\}$ sample random $R_j \in \mathbb{Z}_{2^j}$. $P_0, P_3$ sets $r = R_1 + R_2$ while $P_j$ sets $r = R_j$. Then, $P_0, P_3$ locally truncate $r$ to obtain $r^d$ and execute $\Pi_{\text{sh4}}(P_0, P_3, r^d)$ to generate $[r^d]$.

Dot Product with Truncation

Protocol $\Pi_{\text{dot4}}$ (Fig. 15) enables servers to generate $[\cdot]$-sharing of the truncated value of $z = x \odot y$, denoted as $z^d$, given the $[\cdot]$-sharing of $n$-sized vectors $x$ and $y$.}

**Protocol $\Pi_{\text{dot4}}(P, [\{x_i\}, [y_i])_{i \in [n]}\right)$**

**Preprocessing:**
- Servers execute the preprocessing phase of $\Pi_{\text{dot4}}(P, [\{x_i\}, [y_i])_{i \in [n]}\right)$.
- Servers execute $\Pi_{\text{regend}}(P)$ to generate the truncation pair $((r), [r^d])$. $P_0$ obtains the value $v$ in clear.

**Online:**
- $P_0, P_j$, for $j \in \{1, 2\}$, compute $[\Psi_j] = -\sum_{i=1}^{n}([\beta_{\nu_i} + \gamma_{\nu_i}]\alpha_{\nu_i} + [\beta_{\nu_j} + \gamma_{\nu_j}]\alpha_{\nu_j}) - [r^d]_j$ and sets $[z (r^d)]_j = [\Psi_j] + [x_i]$. $P_1, P_0$ jmp4-send $[z (r^d)]_1$ to $P_2$ and $P_3$. $P_3$ jmp4-send $[z (r^d)]_2$ to $P_1$.
- $P_1, P_2$ locally compute $(z (r^d))_1 = (z (r^d))_1 + (z (r^d))_2$ and set $(z (r^d)) = (z (r^d))^d + \sum_{i=1}^{n}([\beta_{\nu_i} + \gamma_{\nu_i}] + \Psi).$ $P_1, P_2$ locally truncate $(z (r^d))$ to obtain $(z (r^d))^d$ and execute $\Pi_{\text{sh4}}(P_1, P_2, (z (r^d))^d)$ to generate $(z (r^d))^d$.
- Servers locally compute $[z^d] = [(z (r^d))^d] + [r^d]$.

Figure 15: 4PC: Dot Product Protocol with Truncation

Special protocols

Similar to 3PC, we consider the following special protocols for 4PC – i) Bit Extraction, ii) Bit2A, and iii) Bit Injection. These are elaborated in the full version of the paper [36]. Protocols for secure comparison, maxpool, convolution and matrix multiplication, follow a similar outline as described for the 3PC case, except that the underlying primitives used will be based on 4PC (defined in §4).