



Hall Spoofing: A Noninvasive DoS Attack on Grid-Tied Solar Inverter

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Solar Inverter Market Growth





Hall Sensors Inside of Grid-Tied Inverters



Contributions

 \clubsuit A new attack on the Hall sensor

Algorithms and attack tool (i.e., Embedded Hall Spoofing Controller)

Validation in a testbed with a scaled-down model of a power grid

Evaluation in a medium-sized 2.3 MW grid

Countermeasures

Hall Sensor Basics



$$V_{hall} = k(rac{I_{bias}}{d} imes B)$$



Attack Model



The Embedded Hall Spoofing Controller







Attack Propagation from Hall sensors



Experimental Setup

Camouflaged attack tool placed 8cm away from the inverter



Spoofing the Grid-tied Inverter Voltage



Spoofing the Grid-Tied Inverter Frequency



Attack-Impact with Spoofing-Distance



Attack-Impact with Spoofing-Power



Attack Evaluation in a Practical Grid



Grid Synchronization Attack



False Real & Reactive Power Injection Attack



Countermeasures

Sensing presence of external magnetic field

Secured surrounding environment

Shielding: CO-NETICAA, NETIC S₃-6, and MuMETAL

Robust sensors: differential Hall effect sensors

Demonstration Video



https://sites.google.com/view/usenix-spoofing/home



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* Algorithms and attack tool (i.e., Embedded Hall Spoofing Controller)

Validation and evaluation of the attack model





Thank You for Your Attention

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