

# Encrypted Database Made Secure yet Maintainable

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


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
# Type-I EDB against data theft

- Trusted hardware (TEE) offers a **blackbox**
- Putting DBMS inside TEE → encrypted database (EDB)




# EDB bugs need diagnosis

- DBMS bugs occur! e.g., *misconfiguration* → *slow query*
- Typically handled by **experts**, i.e., database admin (DBAs)




# Type-II EDB: DBMS + Ops

- Compose primitive operators (via database extensions)
  - 1. Data kept encrypted → **privacy** *see next slide*
  - 2. DBMS states visible → **maintainability**




- Adopted by cloud DBaaS vendors, such as Azure, Alibaba

# Type-II workflow using ops




# Our discovery: Smuggle Attacks!

- Operators can be manipulated by insiders like DBAs
- Smuggle vs. leakage attacks<sup>[1]</sup>: **zero** prior knowledge




[1] SoK: Cryptographically Protected Database Search

# Dilemma: security vs. maintenance



✓ Security

✗ Maintenance



✓ Maintenance

✗ Security (e.g., Smuggle)

How to **resolve** this dilemma?

**Type-I EDB**


**Type-II EDB**

# Main challenges

- Can we build an EDB with **security** and **maintainability**?
- Challenge #1: Defense Smuggle
- Challenge #2: Maintain DBMS
- Challenge #3: Maintain Ops




# Observation: DBA works on standby



Insight: **isolate** DBAs from the EDB instances used by Users

# HEDB idea: a dual-mode architecture



Execution Mode

Fork

Maintenance Mode



Security + Maintenance Goals:


S: Operators inaccessible to DBAs

M: DBMS states still visible to DBAs


**Challenge:** how to mock operator invocations?

\*HEDB is pronounced [hardi:bi:]

# HEDB idea: a dual-mode architecture



# #2: How to securely fix DBMS bugs?



# Observation: inspection-fix asymmetry

Summarized from 50 experienced DBAs and 8 popular databases \*

*Deadlock?*      *Too many connections?*

*Wrong privilege?*      *No space left?*

*Index issues?*      *Insufficient buffer?*

*Network unreachable?*

Fix
<code>shared_buffer = [num]</code>
<code>cancel_backend(pid)</code>
<code>REINDEX TABLE [name]</code>
<code>VACUUM FULL [name]</code>


Inspection: arbitrary and complex

Fix: regular and structured

Insight: open for inspection, restrictive for fix


\* PostgreSQL, MySQL, MS SQL Server, and 5 cloud databases like Alibaba PolarDB, Amazon Aurora, Azure SQL, etc.

# HEDB idea: fork-discard-template-fix




# #3: What if ops have trouble?

- Ops can also be buggy! e.g., *correctness bugs*
- **Challenge:** ops contain *plaintext* user secrets



# Observation: control flow matters

- Ops are **stateless** (for crash consistency)
- Ops' control flow only depends on its **inputs**



control-flow equivalence      same bug

Insight: hide secrets using  
control-flow equivalence

Real input  $\leftrightarrow$  Fake input

control-flow equivalence pair


***Multiple inputs can lead to the same buggy control flow.***



# How to generate fake inputs?



**Challenge:** what kind of fake inputs are **secure** enough to preserve privacy?




modern data masking engine

- only one fake input needs to be generated
- satisfying **reproducibility**, **privacy** and **efficiency**


'Phone' **data masking rule:**  
\*\*\*4567890

Real input & SQL statement	Fake input #1	Fake input #2
Phone: <b>5105288649</b> ::VARCHAR(10) SELECT ... WHERE Phone LIKE ' <u>5105</u> %';	<b>5105101010</b> (leaks area code)	<b>0005101010</b> , LIKE ' <u>0005</u> %';


# How HEDB prevents Smuggle



# How HEDB maintains DBMS



# How HEDB maintains Ops



# Building HEDB on **real-world** hardware

- Implementation:

- Two modes: ARMv8 S-EL2, 100 LoC
- DBMS: PostgreSQL 13
- Operators: user-defined functions, 4K LoC
- Record-replay: KLEE + Z3, 1.8K LoC

- Trusted Hardware:

- **Confidential VM**: AMD SEV, Intel TDX, ARMv9 CCA, IBM PEF



# Evaluating maintainability

- Empirical study:
  - 6-month DB issues
  - 28K tickets from users
- Maintenance coverage (3/4)
  - common daily DBA tasks
  - DBA query rewriting may yield unseen ops invocations

Control-plane Management	HEDB
start, stop, switchover	✓
backup, migration	✓
Data-plane Troubleshooting	HEDB
analyze DBMS plans	✓
cancel hung queries	✓
Data-plane Tuning	HEDB
update configuration	✓
rewrite queries	✗
Data-plane Bug Reporting	HEDB
coredump DBMS	✓
reproduce ops bugs	✓

# Evaluating cost

- Workload: TPC-H (financial representative)
  - TPC-H requires '+', '/', '=' that can conduct smuggle attacks
- Runtime cost:




- Storage cost: < 10%

# Main contributions

- **#1 survey**: state-of-the-art encrypted databases (EDBs)
  - Type-I and Type-II
- **#2 attack**: an effective and efficient attack to real-world EDBs
  - Smuggle Attacks
- **#3 study**: empirical studies of modern DBA operations
  - Common DB issues + corresponding DBA actions
- **#4 system**: enabling DBA tasks without compromising user secrets
  - HEDB



# Summary



- *HEDB*: a **dual-mode** EDB that enables common DBA-based maintenance tasks without compromising user secrets.
- Future work:
  - support flexible DBA tasks (e.g., query rewriting)
  - cover concurrent write workloads (e.g., TPC-C)
- Learn HEDB tutorial at: <https://github.com/SJTU-IPADS/HEDB>
- For questions, feel free to contact Mingyu Li ([maxul@sjtu.edu.cn](mailto:maxul@sjtu.edu.cn))

