

# Addra: Metadata-private voice communication over fully untrusted infrastructure


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Voice calls are ubiquitous and contain sensitive content



Voice call providers enable end-to-end encryption



Content is hidden!

Not hidden:

- Participants
- Time
- Duration

} Metadata

*Does end-to-end encryption provide enough privacy?*

# Metadata can be as revealing as content

Metadata absolutely tells you everything about somebody's life.


If you have enough metadata, you don't really need content.

Stewart Baker

Ex NSA General Counsel


# Metadata can be as revealing as content

Study by Mayers et. al.  
[PNAS '16]




# Metadata can be as revealing as content

Voice call metadata can be used for mass surveillance




*Can we make voice calls hiding metadata from a strong adversary?*

# Existing works either lack in scalability or privacy




# Two key challenges

**Challenge 1:** Unlinking the caller and callee



**Challenge 2:** Scaling with low latency



# Addra makes two key contributions

**Challenge 1:** Unlinking the caller and callee


**Solution 1:** A novel communication architecture exploiting Private Information Retrieval (PIR)

**Challenge 2:** Scaling with low latency

**Solution 2:** A new PIR scheme with faster processing time




# A brief background on Private Information Retrieval



# Addra's architecture

**Challenge 1:** Unlinking the caller and callee


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# Addra's architecture


**Challenge 1:** Unlinking the caller and callee

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
# The simple architecture provides advantages for voice call

1. Query can be reused over the entire call




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
2. A voice packet can be transferred in two hops

# A new PIR scheme: FastPIR

**Challenge 2:** Scaling with low latency

**Solution 2:** A new PIR scheme with faster processing time

Latency breakdown



Existing PIR schemes:

- XPIR [PETS '16]
- SealPIR [S&P '18]

**Trade off between processing and receive time!**

FastPIR

- Faster than both XPIR and SealPIR
- Small response size

Details available in our paper.

# Evaluation

- What is Addra's latency performance?

Setup



Baseline: 2 variants of Pung


- Pung-XPIR [OSDI '16]
- Pung-SealPIR [S&P '18]



# Evaluation

- What is Addra's latency performance?

## End-to-end latency



7x better than the best Pung variant

# Evaluation

- How does FastPIR compare to XPIR and SealPIR?

Setup: 1M elements, 256 bytes each

<b>PIR Scheme</b>	<b>Processing time (ms)</b>	<b>Response size (KB)</b>
FastPIR	947	64
XPIR-1	3,389	32
XPIR-2	1,894	288
SealPIR-1	76,216	32
SealPIR-2	2,556	320

Faster than all variants!

# Key takeaways from the talk

- Hiding voice call metadata is crucial for privacy
- Addra can hide voice call metadata with two key techniques:
  - A new mailbox architecture
  - A new PIR scheme FastPIR
- Addra can support 32K users with 726ms message latency

Thank You!

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Addra: <https://github.com/ishtiyaque/Addra>

FastPIR: <https://github.com/ishtiyaque/FastPIR>