
# Don't Yank My Chain: Auditable NF Service Chaining

**Guyue (Grace) Liu**, Hugo Sadok, Anne Kohlbrenner, Bryan Parno, Vyas Sekar, Justine Sherry




## Network Function Virtualization (NFV)




**Commodity Server** 

### Academia Efforts To Promote NFV



### Cloud-based Network Functions



















Firewall

**VPN** 

## Enterprises Are Reluctant To Adopt NFV





### Current NFV Deployments Are Not Auditable






## Why?

Cannot meet government and industrial regulations requirements, e.g., HIPAA, FERPA, GDPR, and PCI.


## **Traditional Auditing Approach**

Traditional Network Function (NF) chain

## No Existing Tools To Audit Virtualized NFs



Modern virtualized NF chain




### **AuditBox Contribution**

Offer missing capabilities to audit NFV deployments



Coarse, manual correctness checks




Provable, continuous assurance of correctness





#### **AuditBox Contribution**

Offer missing capabilities to audit NFV deployments



### What Does Correctness Mean?

Runtime Correctness = Network implements the intended NF forwarding policies

- Packet correctness
- Flow correctness



Offline Auditability = Must provide a tamper-proof 'audit trail'

### Limitations of Prior Work

• Long history of work on verifying Internet paths [EPIC USENIX'20, OPT SIGCOMM'14, ICING CONEXT'11]

Assumptions:

Immutable Packets

Pre-known Paths

Stateless
Processing Nodes

## Assumptions Do Not Hold for NFV

• Long history of work on verifying Internet paths [EPIC USENIX'20, OPT SIGCOMM'14, ICING CONEXT'11]

Assumptions:

Immutable Packets

Pre-known

**Paths** 

VS

Mutable Packets

Dynamic Paths

Stateless Processing Nodes

Stateful Processing Nodes

## Assumptions Do Not Hold for NFV

 Long history of work on verifying Internet paths [EPIC USENIX'20, OPT SIGCOMM'14, ICING CONEXT'11]

• Assumptions:

<del>Immutable</del> <del>Packets</del>

Mutable Packets

Pre-knov Paths Assumptions do not hold for NFV

Dynamic Paths

Stateless
Processing Nodes

Stateful Processing Nodes

### Outline

1. Motivation

2. Our Insight


3. AuditBox Design

4. Evaluation

## Our Observation

Q


The complexity of auditing comes from NFs' internal processing



## Our Insight

Q

The complexity of auditing comes from NFs' internal processing




Run NFs within Trusted Execution Environment (TEEs), and only audit actions between NFs over the untrusted network.

## Our Insight




**Prior Work**: SafeBricks [NSDI'18], ShieldBox [SOSR'18], LightBox [CCS'19], S-NFV [SDN-NFV Security'16], etc.


Prior work focuses on securing individual NFs on a single server, not auditing the entire service chain across servers



### **Threat Model**



### Design Overview




### Design Overview

Control Controller **Audit Offline Auditability:** Trails (trusted) Plane Policy Secret Logging Administrator/ **Auditor** Secure Channels Intel SGX **Trusted NFs:** NF NF **Enclave** Data Verification shim (trusted) . . . Shim Shim Plane Host 1 Host N **Runtime Correctness:** A hop-by-hop verification protocol **Untrusted Network** 


(e.g., switches, routers)

## NF Hop-by-hop Verification Protocol

- A shim in each enclave implements the protocol
- Leverage transitive trust to verify packets and enforce policy




## Optimization 1: Simple AuditTrailer



One symmetric key for all NFs in the same policy pipelet

## Optimization 2: Updatable GMAC

# **Reuse** the first GMAC when computing the second GMAC to reduce overheads



### Outline

1. Motivation

2. Our Insight

3. AuditBox Design

4. Evaluation


#### **Evaluation**

 Proofs: We provide security proofs that AuditBox can achieve both runtime correctness and offline auditability

 Functionality Evaluation: AuditBox correctly detects a broad class of policy violations

 Performance Evaluation: AuditBox enables auditing for unmodified NFs with low overhead

## **Evaluation: NF Chain Goodput**



Achieves 18 Gbps goodput for a simple NF chain

## **AuditBox Summary**

- 1<sup>st</sup> NFV auditing system
- Leverages trusted execution environments to provide
  - Runtime correctness guarantees
  - Offline auditability
  - And still achieve good performance
- Promotes the adoption of NFV for security sensitive enterprises



#### Don't Yank My Chain: Auditable NF Service Chaining

Guyue Liu, Hugo Sadok, Anne Kohlbrenner,\* Bryan Parno, Vyas Sekar, Justine Sherry

Carnegie Mellon University \*Princeton University