Towards Adversarial Phishing Detection

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Motivation

Phishing Attacks
- Advances in technical security measures cause users to be victims of exploits
- Phishing attacks have exploited users for over two decades
- Numerous counter-measures have been developed to fight the problem

Contradictory Effectiveness (Marchal et al., 2018)
- Multiple reports claim frequency of attacks remain high (or increasing)
- State-of-the-art detection solutions report impressive evaluation measures$^1$
  - Causes: Biased evaluations and infeasible deployment

Adversarial Robustness
- Few methods evaluate their performance on attacks that seek to actively evade the proposed detection solution

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$^1$Accuracy of $\geq 99.9\%$. False Positive Rates of $\leq 1\%$. 
Adversarial Robustness

**Adaptive attacks**
Adaptive phishing attacks are attacks that remain undetected for a certain detection solution, yet maintain the functional properties of phishing attacks.

*Exists due to discrepancy between model and reality*

**Adversarial Robustness**
Given solutions are likely to face adaptive attacks in a practical setting, evaluations should seek quantify their performance towards these (Ho et al., 2019)

Set of phishing attacks (true)

Set of phishing attacks (detection solution)

△: Observed attacks
■: Adaptive attacks
Phishing Environments

- Attacks have existed across multiple environments
- We formalize the shared properties of such environments as:

**Environment for Phishing Attacks**

A *messaging environment* for which *messages* within this environment can fulfill the three axioms:

- Impersonating
- Inducive
- Scalable

**Messaging Environment**

An environment for which *messages* can be exchanged using a *channel* across multiple senders and recipients

**Message**

Contains some *content* and relate to a *sender* and *recipient*
Axioms

Lastdrager et al.'s Definition of Phishing Attacks

Phishing is a scalable act of deception whereby impersonation is used to obtain information from a target.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Impersonating</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Should deceive the recipient into trusting the fake identity of the sender</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inducive</th>
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<tr>
<td>Should induce some form of action that yields the attacker to obtain information</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Scalable</th>
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<tr>
<td>Crafting the attack should be inexpensive (time, $)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1These are merely abstract classes of information required to infer phishing, and does thereby not put logical constraints on the ability to obtain this information for concrete applications.
Assessment of Adversarial Robustness

- Examine the extend of which existing detection solutions have accounted for adversarial robustness
  - Selected work cover influential- and recent publications
- Derived a four of commonly used strategies for detecting attacks:
  - Visual Similarity, Reverse Search Credibility, Channel Meta-information, Statistical Modeling
- Discuss these strategies and their ability to account for the identified axioms
- Demonstrate techniques for creating perturbations that enable attacks to avoid detection
Visual Similarity

Phishing Attribute

*Sharing visual identity with an already observed benign message while originating from a different source.*

- Based on reflecting human perception in a computational setting
- Known to be a challenging and unsolved problem
- Incomplete coverage of axioms

**Axioms**

- ✓ Impersonating
- ÷ Inductive
- ✓ Scalable
Example: Normalized Compression Distance (Chen et al.)

- Compare visual similarity as intersection over union of byte compressions

Simple attack

1. Use a color space that align closely with human color perception
2. Perturb all colors by small steps (±1%)

- Our attack is remain imperceptible yet effectively breaks NCD:

$$\text{NCD}(x, x') - \text{NCD}(x, x) = -0.96 \pm 0.01$$
Reverse Search Credibility

Phishing Attribute
Absence of a given website in the most relevant search results returned by querying search engines with a signature derived from the given website.

- Relies *credit scoring* using search engines
- Search engines are black boxes → Uncertainty

Axioms
- ? Impersonating
- ? Inducive
- ✓ Scalable
Channel Meta-information

Strategy
Constrain information used for inference to only be within the scope of the *channel*, ignoring the content of the respective *messages*.

Phishing Attribute (*case: Web*)

*URLs resembling a URL from a known benign source.*

- Given: Inducive ⇔ Content of *messages*
- Predictiveness using this strategy signal bias
- Incomplete coverage of axioms

Axioms
- (✓) Impersonating
- ÷ Inducive
- ✓ Scalable
Statistical Modeling

Strategy
Given a dataset containing information related to messages, and the presence of attacks within them, approximate a function $f(x)$ that can detect attacks.

- Highly dynamic strategy, delimited by the information of the used dataset
- Selecting a model is often a trade-off between complexity and interpretability
- Parameters are selected using empirical performance
  - Assuming generalization to out-of-distribution inputs
- Complex functions can be in the magnitude of millions of parameters
  - WhiteNet (Abdelnabi et al., 2019): $\geq 100M$

Axioms
- ✓ Impersonating
- ✓ Inducive
- ✓ Scalable
WhiteNet (Abdelnabi et al., 2019)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Unperturbed</th>
<th>$\epsilon = 0.005$</th>
<th>$\epsilon = 0.01$</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Traditional Training</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WhiteNet</td>
<td>81.0%</td>
<td>72.8%</td>
<td>62.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WhiteNet (replica)</td>
<td>87.8%</td>
<td><strong>30.0%</strong></td>
<td><strong>24.6%</strong></td>
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<td><strong>30.8%</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table: Precision (closest match) for WhiteNet and our replica model across perturbations created using the FGSM attack for various threat models $\epsilon$.

- **Model**: Siamese Deep Neural Network (DNN) with $\geq 100M$ parameters.
- Given two visual representations of web sites yield a similarity measure
- **Adversarial examples (AE)** are a known vulnerability to DNNs
- Found that stated robustness towards AE to be inaccurate
  - Likely due to under-sampling during the creation of attacks
We introduce a set of design guidelines for future detection solutions to follow:

### Accessible
- Provide a widely available implementation
  - Statistical Models: Weights and/or dataset.
- Benefit: Allow for continuous evaluations (both empirical and adaptive)

### Explicit Attributes
- Clarify how information from the input space is used to infer attacks
  - (Complex) Statistical Models: Attribution Methods

### Align with Axioms
- Focus on using functional properties of attacks for detection
- Absence: Predictiveness stemming from bias (symptoms not cause)
Thanks for listening!

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