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Shred-to-Shine Metamorphosis of (Distributed) Polynomial Commitments

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Abstract

Succinct non-interactive arguments of knowledge (SNARKs) rely on polynomial commitment schemes (PCSs) to verify polynomial evaluations succinctly. High-performance multilinear PCSs (MLPCSs) from linear codes reduce prover cost, and distributed MLPCSs cut it further by parallelizing commitment and opening across provers. Employing a fast Reed–Solomon interactive oracle proof of proximity (FRI), we propose $\textsc{Pip}_{\text{FRI}}$, an MLPCS that combines the linear-time proving of linear-time-encodable-code PCSs with the compact proofs and fast verification of Reed–Solomon (RS) PCSs. Reducing fast Fourier transform and hash overhead, $\textsc{Pip}_{\text{FRI}}$ is $10\times$ faster to prove than the RS-based DeepFold (USENIX Security '25) while keeping competitive proof size and verifier time. Measured against Orion (CRYPTO '22) from linear-time-encodable codes, $\textsc{Pip}_{\text{FRI}}$ proves $3.5\times$ faster and reduces proof size and verifier time by $15\times$. As a linearly scalable distributed variant, we propose $\textsc{DePip}_{\text{FRI}}$, which adds accountability and distributes a single polynomial across provers, enabling the first code-based distributed SNARK for general circuits. Notably, compared with DeVirgo (CCS '22), which lacks accountability and supports only multiple independent polynomials, $\textsc{DePip}_{\text{FRI}}$ improves prover time by $25\times$ and inter-prover communication by $7\times$. We identify shred-to-shine as the key insight: partitioning a polynomial into independently handled fragments while maintaining proof size and verifier time. Hitting the pairing regime, this insight yields a group-based MLPCS with a $16\times$ shorter structured reference string (SRS) and a $10\times$ faster opening time than a multilinear variant of Kate–Zaverucha–Goldberg (TCC '13).

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1 Introduction

Capturing polynomial evaluation claims succinctly, polynomial commitment schemes (PCSs) [19, 21] let a prover commit to a polynomial f in μ variables with degree bound d and later prove that $f(\boldsymbol{x}) = y$ at a public point $\boldsymbol{x}$. Succinct non-interactive arguments of knowledge (SNARKs) [13, 14] use PCSs with sublinear proof size and verifier cost in polynomial size d^{μ}. Modern SNARK constructions follow the "PIOP (polynomial interactive oracle proof) [14] + PCS" framework, so overall efficiency depends on both the PIOP and the PCS.

Suited to multilinear polynomials (degree <2 per variable, $\mu > 1$), multilinear PCSs (MLPCSs) [23, 32] pair naturally with linear-prover-time multilinear PIOPs [13, 28] in SNARKs. High-performance MLPCSs from linear codes [20, 41, 42] operate over finite fields, avoid the more costly group operations of group-based PCSs [11, 21], and thereby enable faster proving. Explicitly, we treat prover time, proof size, and verifier time as the *core metrics*. Representative applications include verifiable machine learning [1, 16], blockchain scalability [16, 29], multi-client oblivious RAM [15], and multi-writer searchable encryption with integrity against malicious writers [33]. Most such applications prioritize prover time. Accordingly, proof size and verifier time still matter because they determine the verification-circuit size and thus the prover cost in recursive SNARKs [36]. Notwithstanding this, known schemes face a sharp tradeoff among the core metrics.

Current code-based MLPCSs do not simultaneously achieve *linear prover time* (with low constants) and *polylogarithmic (polylog) proof size and verifier time* (with low constants). Specifically, MLPCSs based on Reed–Solomon (RS) codes [20, 40, 42] offer polylog proof size and verifier time with several-hundred-KB proofs, but their prover time is optimally quasi-linear due to RS encoding via fast Fourier transforms (FFTs). MLPCSs from linear-time encodable codes, in contrast, attain linear prover time but either have square-root proof size and verifier cost [19], or incur several-MB proofs and $10\times$ slower verifier time [37].

Distributed PCSs [24, 26, 34, 36] reduce prover time by

enabling multiple provers to commit and open collaboratively. They also enable distributed SNARKs via the "distributed PIOP [24, 26] + distributed PCS" paradigm. This paradigm accelerates proof generation when the prover can exploit distributed (parallel) computational resources. It has been deployed in practical systems such as cross-chain bridges [36]. A distributed PCS has *linear speedup* if, with ℓ provers, each prover does $1/\ell$ of the single-prover work. It has *full* linear speedup if proof size and verifier time also remain unchanged. In this setting, full linear speedup is the strongest scaling in ℓ one can hope for without increasing proof size or verifier time.

DeVirgo [36], the only code-based distributed (ML)PCS, achieves full linear speedup but has four drawbacks. First, it inherits quasi-linear opening complexity from its base non-distributed PCS Virgo [41]. Since Virgo is $10\times$ slower in prover time than recent linear-opening PCSs [20,42], DeVirgo needs at least 8 provers to match their prover times, increasing deployment costs. Second, unlike non-code-based distributed MLPCSs [24,34], DeVirgo distributes work only across multiple independent polynomials (one per sub-prover), and it cannot shard a single polynomial across provers. This prevents its use in distributed SNARKs for general circuits, since state-of-the-art prover-efficient schemes [24, 34] use distributed multilinear PIOPs, which require distributed PCSs supporting a single polynomial and, more generally, a linear number of polynomials. Third, DeVirgo lacks accountability [26, 34], so an honest master prover cannot detect malicious sub-provers. Finally, its concrete amortized communication can be hundreds of MBs and is impractical for low-bandwidth networks.

Summarizing, this gap raises two questions.

1. Must code-based MLPCSs trade prover efficiency for proof size and verifier time?
2. Can we design an *accountable* code-based distributed PCS that supports *sharding a single polynomial* across provers?

1.1 Our Contribution

PIP: Shred-to-Shine MLPCS-to-MLPCS Upgrade. We propose PIP, a simple and general framework that upgrades an MLPCS to reduce prover time with at most small increases in proof size and verifier time. Conceptually, PIP provides a metamorphosis from an existing PCS to an improved PCS. Instantiating PIP with code-based and group-based MLPCSs gives two MLPCSs, PIP_{FRI} (based on Fast Reed–Solomon interactive oracle proof of proximity [4], FRI) and PIP_{KZG} (based on the Kate–Zaverucha–Goldberg PCS [21], KZG), respectively, with different tradeoffs. We instantiate PIP in the distributed setting via $\text{DEPIP}_{\text{FRI}}$, showing that the approach extends beyond the single-prover model.

PIP_{FRI}: Efficient FRI-based MLPCS with zero knowledge. Table 1 compares code-based MLPCSs. PIP_{FRI} has linear opening complexity, unlike quasi-linear Virgo [41] and HyperPlonk [13]. Relative to recent FRI-based linear-opening MLPCSs (*e.g.*, PolyFRIM [42], DeepFold [20]), PIP_{FRI} reduces FFT-based committing costs from $O(N\log N)$ to $O(N\log m)$ by splitting N into $m\ell$ for tunable m. Using smaller Merkle trees, it cuts hash-based committing and opening costs from $O(N)$ to $O(m)$. Its opening cost stays at $O(N)$, but the linear term is a single $\mathbb{F}_{\mathsf{rlc}}$ pass, where the pass forms one random linear combination over $\mathbb{F}$. Table 2 reports micro-benchmarks showing $2\times$ and $5\times$ speedups in FFTs and Merkle trees. In our benchmarks, PIP_{FRI} outperforms Orion, a PCS from linear-time-encodable codes over RS-friendly fields, in prover time despite Orion's linear-time encoding.

We equip PIP_{FRI} with zero knowledge, which is essential for zk-SNARKs and is missing from several recent works [3, 13, 40, 42] (*cf.* Table 1).

$\text{DEPIP}_{\text{FRI}}$: Efficient code-based distributed PCS with workload generality and accountability. We propose $\text{DEPIP}_{\text{FRI}}$ with the following advantages (*cf.* Table 3):

1. **Distributed efficiency.** $\text{DEPIP}_{\text{FRI}}$ has *full linear speedup*, whereas DeDory [24] and concurrent works [38, 39] trade off proof size or verifier time to distribute the workload.
2. **Workload generality.** $\text{DEPIP}_{\text{FRI}}$ supports distributing *both* a single polynomial and multiple independent polynomials across provers. Single-polynomial support enables the first code-based distributed SNARK for *general* circuits, whereas DeVirgo [36] targets data-parallel circuits. This relies on the distributed FFT from PIP (*cf.* Section 1.2).
3. **Accountability.** We add mechanisms that make $\text{DEPIP}_{\text{FRI}}$ the first code-based scheme with accountability. Group-based distributed PCSs [26, 34] can often verify each sub-proof directly because it is generated locally. In code-based schemes, each sub-proof is generated jointly by multiple provers, so naïve checks do not isolate a malicious prover.
4. **Performance.** The amortized *prover* and *communication* costs for openings drop to $O(m/\ell)$, attaining optimal $1/\ell$ scaling in ℓ. This provides $O(\ell\log m)$-fold and $O(\ell)$-fold gains over DeVirgo. These gains combine PIP_{FRI}'s complexity improvements over Virgo with an improved distributed FRI sub-protocol. Since many code-based schemes rely on FRI [3, 20], our distributed FRI reduces opening complexity as a standalone component and can be reused in other FRI-based distributed PCSs.

Empirical Evaluation. Our implementations cover PIP_{FRI}, $\text{DEPIP}_{\text{FRI}}$, and (distributed) SNARKs built from them. PIP_{FRI} reduces prover (commit + open) time by $10\times$ versus FRI-based DeepFold and by $3.5\times$ versus Orion from linear-time codes, while keeping proof size and verifier time comparable to DeepFold and cutting both by $15\times$ versus Orion. PIP_{FRI} is the first FRI-based PCS achieving faster prover time than PCSs from linear-time codes. It is memory-efficient among code-based PCSs with polylog proof size, using $10\times$ less memory than DeepFold and $5\times$ less memory than Orion. It is the *first* to support size-2^{29} polynomials on 32 GB RAM. Overall, PIP_{FRI} leads to SNARKs with 2–$10\times$ faster provers

Table 1: Comparisons of code-based MLPCSs for polynomials of size $N = m\ell$ with λ-bit security

Scheme	Commit	Open	Verify	Proof size	zk
Brakedown [19]	$O(N)\,\mathbb{F}/\mathsf{H}$	$O(N)\,\mathbb{F}/\mathsf{H}$	$O(\sqrt{N})\,\mathbb{F}/\mathsf{H}$	$O(\lambda\sqrt{N})\,\mathbb{F}+O(\log N)\,\mathsf{H}$	○
Orion [37]	$O(N)\,\mathbb{F}/\mathsf{H}$	$O(N)\,\mathbb{F}/\mathsf{H}$	$O(\sqrt{N})\,\mathbb{F}/\mathsf{H}$, no preprocessing	$O(\lambda\log^2 N)\,\mathsf{H}$	◐
HyperPlonk [13]	$O(N\log N)\,\mathbb{F}, O(N)\,\mathsf{H}$	$O(N\log N)\,\mathbb{F}, O(N)\,\mathsf{H}$	$O(\lambda\log N)\,\mathbb{F}, O(\lambda\log^2 N)\,\mathsf{H}$	$O(\lambda\log N)\,\mathbb{F}, O(\lambda\log^2 N)\,\mathsf{H}$	○
Virgo [41]	$O(N\log N)\,\mathbb{F}, O(N)\,\mathsf{H}$	$O(N\log N)\,\mathbb{F}, O(N)\,\mathsf{H}$	$O(\lambda\log N)\,\mathbb{F}, O(\lambda\log^2 N)\,\mathsf{H}$	$O(\lambda\log N)\,\mathbb{F}, O(\lambda\log^2 N)\,\mathsf{H}$	●
PolyFRIM [42]	$O(N\log N)\,\mathbb{F}, O(N)\,\mathsf{H}$	$O(N)\,\mathbb{F}/\mathsf{H}$	$O(\lambda\log N)\,\mathbb{F}, O(\lambda\log^2 N)\,\mathsf{H}$	$O(\lambda\log N)\,\mathbb{F}, O(\lambda\log^2 N)\,\mathsf{H}$	○
BaseFold [40]	$O(N\log N)\,\mathbb{F}, O(N)\,\mathsf{H}$	$O(N)\,\mathbb{F}/\mathsf{H}$	$O(\lambda\log N)\,\mathbb{F}, O(\lambda\log^2 N)\,\mathsf{H}$	$O(\lambda\log N)\,\mathbb{F}, O(\lambda\log^2 N)\,\mathsf{H}$	○
DeepFold [20]	$O(N\log N)\,\mathbb{F}, O(N)\,\mathsf{H}$	$O(N)\,\mathbb{F}/\mathsf{H}$	$O(\lambda\log N)\,\mathbb{F}, O(\lambda\log^2 N)\,\mathsf{H}$	$O(\lambda\log N)\,\mathbb{F}, O(\lambda\log^2 N)\,\mathsf{H}$	◐
PIP$_{\text{FRI}}$	$O(N\log m)\,\mathbb{F}, O(m)\,\mathsf{H}, O(m)\,\mathsf{H}_\ell$	$O(N)\,\mathbb{F}_{\mathsf{rlc}}, O(m)\,\mathbb{F}/\mathsf{H}$	$O(\lambda\log m+\lambda\ell)\,\mathbb{F}, O(\lambda\log^2 m)\,\mathsf{H}$	$O(\lambda\log m+\lambda\ell)\,\mathbb{F}, O(\lambda\log^2 m)\,\mathsf{H}$	●

$\mathbb{F}$ is a field with large multiplicative cosets, and H is a hash function. Both denote operation time or size, as context requires. H_ℓ: hashing $O(\ell)$ entries (versus H for a constant number); $\mathbb{F}_{\mathsf{rlc}}$: one-time random linear combination over $\mathbb{F}$; implementations use $\log N \le \ell < \log^2 N$, $m = N/\ell$. ○: No zero-knowledge (zk) variant explicitly provided; ◐: No zk implementation provided; ●: Both are given.

Table 2: Micro-benchmarks of PolyFRIM and PIP$_{\text{FRI}}$

Type	Term	Time	Term	Time
FFT	$O(N\log N)\,\mathbb{F}$	620 ms	$O(N\log m)\,\mathbb{F}$	315 ms
Build MT	$O(N)\,\mathsf{H}$	2,258 ms	$O(m)\,\mathsf{H}, O(m)\,\mathsf{H}_\ell$	468 ms
RLC	–	–	$O(N)\,\mathbb{F}_{\mathsf{rlc}}$	52 ms

MT: Merkle tree; RLC: random linear combination over field $\mathbb{F}$; Figures are for size-2^{20} polynomials over a 64-bit finite field.

than DeepFold and 10–20× smaller proof sizes than Orion.[1]

DEPIP$_{\text{FRI}}$ achieves accountability and *full* linear speedup, unlike DeDory [24] and two concurrent proposals, FRItata [38] and HyperFond [39], which sacrifice proof size or verifier time. Compared to DeVirgo, DEPIP$_{\text{FRI}}$ cuts prover time by 25× and communication by 7×. By supporting distribution of a single polynomial, the resulting distributed SNARK for general circuits runs 8× faster for the prover and 5× faster for the verifier than HyperPianist [24].

PIP$_{\text{KZG}}$: Faster group-based PCS with a shorter SRS. Instantiating PIP with a multilinear KZG variant (mKZG) [27] gives PIP$_{\text{KZG}}$ (*cf.* Table 4). PIP$_{\text{KZG}}$ reduces the SRS size, opening cost, and verifier time. In contrast to *univariate* Bünz *et al.* [12] with a sublinear-size SRS in the generic group model (GGM) [18], PIP$_{\text{KZG}}$ is proved secure in the algebraic group model (AGM).

Relative to mKZG, PIP$_{\text{KZG}}$ has a 16× shorter SRS and 2× faster proving and verification, at a 1.8× increase in proof size (<3KB in most cases). Compared with group-based Dory [23] with transparent setup, PIP$_{\text{KZG}}$ requires a trusted setup but is more efficient by using type-1 groups and avoiding expensive target-group operations, resulting in a 2× faster prover, a 4× faster verifier, and a 10× smaller proof size.

[1] In our commitment implementation, the parallel FFT is up to 17× faster than a conventional baseline (*e.g.*, github.com/arkworks-rs).

1.2 Technical Overview

Construction of PIP. Our framework PIP produces PCS instantiations that improve a base PCS. It embodies a "shred-to-shine" approach: shredding a large multilinear polynomial into smaller sub-polynomials, handling each fragment with an efficient proof method, eliding dominant per-fragment costs to keep proof size and verifier time controlled, and regrouping fragment proofs via batching so performance shines. The same idea also shines across code-based and group-based PCS frameworks by cutting dominant costs in practice, including FFTs, Merkle-tree proofs, and group operations.

Technically, we use *tensor products* to reduce validation of a multilinear polynomial of size $N = m\ell$ to ℓ checks on size-m sub-polynomials. Since these sub-polynomials share the same evaluation point, we use a *batch PCS* to amortize the expensive steps in evaluation proofs.

Construction of PIP$_{\text{FRI}}$. We build PIP$_{\text{FRI}}$ by instantiating PIP with PolyFRIM [42]. The resulting PIP$_{\text{FRI}}$ outperforms DeepFold [20], suggesting that PIP can upgrade an FRI-based PCS instantiation into a state-of-the-art one. To build PIP$_{\text{FRI}}$, we face two challenges. (1) A direct instantiation builds $O(\ell)$ separate Merkle trees for $O(\ell)$ sub-polynomials in the committing phase, undermining the gains. (2) Sending sub-polynomial evaluations to the verifier leaks additional information, so zero knowledge is not preserved by default.

For challenge (1), by analyzing the structural patterns of opened entries in PolyFRIM, we aggregate entries likely opened together into a single leaf. This lets PIP$_{\text{FRI}}$ use a *single* Merkle tree in the commitment phase, reducing prover hash cost from $O(\ell\cdot m)\,\mathsf{H}$ to $O(m)\,\mathsf{H}_\ell + O(m)\,\mathsf{H}$.

For challenge (2), we first build zk-PolyFRIM by merging the tensor-product foldings inherent to PolyFRIM with a masking-coefficient strategy from DeepFold. As it suffices to prove one target evaluation rather than all sub-evaluations in a batch PCS, we exploit the linearity of RS codes to build the virtual target polynomial without sending the sub-evaluations.

Construction of DEPIP$_{\text{FRI}}$. Supporting sharding a single

Table 3: Distributed MLPCSs with ℓ provers supporting only ℓ size-m parallel polynomials or a single size-$m\ell$ polynomial as well

Scheme	Trans.	Workload	$\mathcal{P}_i$: Commit	$\mathcal{P}_i$: Open	Comm.: Commit	Comm.: Open	$\mathcal{V}$ & $\lvert\pi\rvert$	Acct.	Circuit
DemKZG [24, 34]	no	S+M	$O(m\frac{\log\lvert\mathbb{F}\rvert}{\log m})$	$O(m\frac{\log\lvert\mathbb{F}\rvert}{\log m})$	$O(\log(m\ell))$	$O(\log(m\ell))$	$O(\log(m\ell))$	yes	arbitrary
DeDory [24]	yes	S+M	$O(m\frac{\log\lvert\mathbb{F}\rvert}{\log m})$	$O(m\frac{\log\lvert\mathbb{F}\rvert}{\log m})$	$O(\log(m\ell))$	$O(\log(m\ell))$	$O(\log(m^2\ell))$	no	arbitrary
DeVirgo [36]	yes	M	$O(m\log m)$	$O(m\log m)$	$O(m)$	$O(m)$	$O(\lambda\ell+\lambda\log^2 m)$	no	data-parallel
DEPIP$_{\text{FRI}}$	**yes**	**S+M**	$O(m\log m)$	$\boldsymbol{O(m/\ell)}$	$O(m)$	$\boldsymbol{O(m/\ell)}$	$O(\lambda\ell+\lambda\log^2 m)$	**yes**	**arbitrary**

Trans.: transparent setup. Workload: S: shard one polynomial across provers; B: parallelize across independent polynomials; S+M = both. $\mathcal{P}_i/\mathcal{V}$: sub-prover/verifier complexity over a field. Note that $O(m)$ group multi-scalar exponentiations, as in DemKZG and DeDory, are equal to $O(m\frac{\log\lvert\mathbb{F}\rvert}{\log m})$ over a field where $\log\lvert\mathbb{F}\rvert = \omega(\log m)$ [19]. $\lvert\pi\rvert$: proof size. Comm.: amortized communication complexity. Acct.: accountability. Circuit: supported SNARK circuit type. The $O(\lambda\ell+\lambda\log^2 m)$ verifier complexity and proof size of DEPIP$_{\text{FRI}}$ are smaller than $O(\lambda\log^2(m\ell))$ as ℓ, the prover number, is usually smaller than $\log^2(m\ell)$, where $m\ell$ can be 2^{30} potentially in distributed proofs.

Table 4: Group-based MLPCSs for polynomial of size $N = m\ell$

Scheme	SRS size	Commit	Open	Verifier	Proof size
mKZG	$O(N)\,\mathbb{G}$	$O(N)\,\mathbb{G}$	$O(N)\,\mathbb{G}$	$O(\log N)\,P$	$O(\log N)\,\mathbb{G}$
PIP$_{\text{KZG}}$	$O(m)\,\mathbb{G}$	$O(N)\,\mathbb{G}$	$O(N)\,\mathbb{G}_{\mathsf{rlc}}$, $O(m)\,\mathbb{G}$	$O(\ell)\,\mathbb{G}$, $O(\log m)\,P$	$O(\ell)\,\mathbb{G}$, $O(\log m)\,\mathbb{G}$

$\mathbb{G}$: operations over a group. $\mathbb{G}_{\mathsf{rlc}}$: linear combination over group elements with field scalars. P: pairings. Efficiency: $\mathbb{G}_{\mathsf{rlc}} > \mathbb{G} > P$.

polynomial requires an efficient distributed FFT. Most FRI-based PCSs run linear-size FFTs, so a naïve distributed FFT becomes a bottleneck. Current approaches [35] distribute parallel FFTs but require cross-prover coordination across dependent steps. With a size-$m\ell$ vector spread across ℓ provers, this implies $O(m\log^2 m)$ amortized prover work and $O(m\ell)$ communication. Our shred-to-shine method avoids this coordination by reducing the FFT on a size-$m\ell$ polynomial to ℓ independent size-m FFTs. Each sub-prover then runs its sub-FFT locally, with $O(m\log m)$ work per prover and no communication for the FFT step. More broadly, shred-to-shine turns the size-$m\ell$ FFT into ℓ independent local FFTs by choosing a data layout aligned with tensor-product structure.

The opening phase also benefits from an improved distributed FRI. In round i, provers must compute the codeword $f_i|_{L_i}$ over domain L_i, where f_i is the folded size-$|L_i|$ polynomial for that round. In DeVirgo, each prover $\mathcal{P}_j$ holds a size-$2|L_i|$ polynomial $f_{i-1}^{(j)}$, computes the size-$|L_i|$ polynomial $f_i^{(j)}$ and its full codeword $f_i^{(j)}|_{L_i}$, and exchanges these to assemble $f_i|_{L_i}$. Since each $\mathcal{P}_j$ computes and sends an entire length-$|L_i|$ codeword, amortized prover work and communication are both $O(|L_i|)$. We instead assign $\mathcal{P}_j$ only the j-th segment of $f_i|_{L_i}$ of length $O(|L_i|/\ell)$. We develop a *distributed folded polynomial computation* that computes $f_i|_{L_i}$ jointly and directly, without first computing all $f_i^{(j)}|_{L_i}$ and then merging. This reduces amortized prover work and communication to $O(|L_i|/\ell)$. Combining the distributed FFT and the improved distributed FRI, we build DEPIP$_{\text{FRI}}$ over PIP$_{\text{FRI}}$.

Finally, we equip DEPIP$_{\text{FRI}}$ with **accountability**, overcoming the challenge of attributing faults in jointly generated proofs. We handle two failure modes, incorrect computation and inconsistent messaging. For the former, each sub-prover produces a local PolyFRIM sub-proof for its sub-polynomial, which uniquely determines the expected DEPIP$_{\text{FRI}}$ proof under the shred-to-shine structure. The master prover $\mathcal{P}_0$ reconstructs the honest DEPIP$_{\text{FRI}}$ proof and compares it with the received one. For the latter, we route inter-prover messages through $\mathcal{P}_0$ with commitments, so recipients see exactly what senders committed to and $\mathcal{P}_0$ can open and check consistency. In both cases, any discrepancy *pinpoints the exact* malicious sub-prover(s). Accountability preserves the sub-prover work and inter-prover communication asymptotically, while increasing $\mathcal{P}_0$'s cost from $O(\ell\log m)$ to $O(\ell\log^2 m)$, still below each sub-prover's $O(m\log m)$ cost for $m \gg \ell$.

1.3 Related Work

Code-based PCSs all rely on a low-degree test (LDT) to check that a committed vector is within a constant relative Hamming distance to a valid codeword. Standard LDTs include: 1) the direct LDT [2] underlies PCSs [8, 19, 37] from linear-time encodable codes, and 2) FRI(-like) LDTs for RS codes [4, 5, 40] underlie PCSs [20, 40–42]. The direct LDT applies to general constant-relative-distance linear codes but incurs proof size linear in the vector length. FRI-based LDTs yield polylogarithmic proofs but are specialized to RS codes.

PCSs from direct LDT. Brakedown [19] introduces a practical generalized Spielman (GS) code and an MLPCS with a linear-time prover relying on the direct LDT from Ligero [2]. It has square-root verifier complexity and proof size, which can reach tens of MBs. Orion [37] uses a code-based SNARK [41] to recursively prove the verification circuit of Brakedown, reducing the proof size to polylog. Nonetheless, the proofs remain several MBs and verifier complexity stays square-root without trusted preprocessing. Block *et al.* [8] modify the GS code in Brakedown into an expand-accumulate (EA) code with larger code distance and hence smaller proofs while leaving overall complexities unchanged. Blaze [10]

uses a repeat-accumulate-accumulate (RAA) code to tailor an MLPCS. Currently, it only works over binary fields.

PCSs from FRI. The univariate FRI-PCS [31] with linear opening complexity is not directly compatible with multilinear polynomials. Zeromorph [22], a generic MLPCS-from-univariate-PCS approach, requires quasi-linear openings when instantiated with FRI-PCS. Virgo [41] and HyperPlonk [13] build MLPCSs with $O(N \log N)$ openings due to committing size-$O(N)$ auxiliary polynomials.

PolyFRIM [42] refines FRI to avoid such committing, giving the first $O(N)$-opening MLPCS. BaseFold [40] treats FRI as a multilinear polynomial oracle and combines it with the multilinear sum-check, also resulting in $O(N)$ opening. This oracle approach weakens soundness, requiring more verifier queries and leading to proofs near 1 MB.[2] DeepFold [20] improves BaseFold's soundness and has concretely faster prover time and smaller proof size than PolyFRIM. Among these, only Virgo and DeepFold offer zero-knowledge variants.

Distributed PCSs enable multiple sub-provers, each handling a sub-polynomial, to jointly produce commitments and evaluation proofs. Multiple distributed PCSs target different polynomial forms using different primitives. Existing distributed MLPCSs include group-based DemKZG and DeDory [24], which can distribute single and multiple independent polynomials. In contrast, DeVirgo [36], the sole code-based distributed (ML)PCS, supports only the latter. When used for SNARKs, this would limit its usage to only data-parallel circuits, as current linear-prover distributed PIOPs for general circuits [24] involve a single linear-size polynomial.

Concurrent works of FRIttata [38] and HyperFond [39] propose distributed code-based PCSs and target code-based distributed SNARKs for general circuits. Against them, $\textsc{DePip}_{\text{FRI}}$ and our SNARK have lower prover time. They also do not achieve full linear speedup: the proof size or verifier time grows with the number of provers and is 3–1000× larger than ours in the compared regimes. Our shred-to-shine framework is compatible with any linear code, while HyperFond requires foldable linear codes [40], and FRIttata specializes to a specific PCS. Neither work targets accountability. We also contribute non-distributed instantiations via $\textsc{Pip}_{\text{FRI}}$ and $\textsc{Pip}_{\text{KZG}}$. Appendix A provides the comparison.

2 Preliminaries

$[n]$ denotes $\{1,\dots,n\}$ and $[m,n]$ denotes $\{m,m+1,\dots,n\}$ for non-negative integers $m<n$. Bold letters denote vectors over a finite field $\mathbb{F}$, and lowercase letters, *e.g.*, f, $\hat{f}$, and $\tilde{f}$, denote polynomials over $\mathbb{F}$. Let $\tilde{f}(x_1,\dots,x_\mu) = \sum_{\boldsymbol{e}\in\{0,1\}^\mu} f_{\boldsymbol{e}} \cdot \prod_{j=1}^{\mu} x_j^{e_j}$ be a μ-variate polynomial with degree bound d, and let $N=d^\mu$ (so $N=2^\mu$ when $\tilde{f}$ is multilinear). Index coefficients as $(f_1,\dots,f_N)$ by $i = 1+\sum_{j=1}^{\mu} e_j 2^{j-1}$ for $\boldsymbol{e}=(e_1,\dots,e_\mu)$, and let $f_i := f_{\boldsymbol{e}}$. Define the twisted univariate polynomial as $\hat{f}(X) = \sum_{i\in[N]} f_i \cdot X^{i-1}$. For $\boldsymbol{x}\in\mathbb{F}^n$, x_i is the i-th entry of $\boldsymbol{x}$. For $\boldsymbol{a},\boldsymbol{b}\in\mathbb{F}^n$, $\langle\boldsymbol{a},\boldsymbol{b}\rangle$ is the inner product and $\boldsymbol{a}\otimes\boldsymbol{b}$ is the tensor product, and we write $\otimes_{i=1}^{n}\boldsymbol{x}_i$ for $\boldsymbol{x}_1\otimes\cdots\otimes\boldsymbol{x}_n$. Let $L\subseteq\mathbb{F}$ be an evaluation domain. The Reed–Solomon code $\mathsf{RS}[L,\rho]\subseteq\mathbb{F}^{|L|}$ is $\{f|_L : \deg(f)<\rho\cdot|L|\}$, where $f|_L$ is the evaluation vector of f on L and $\rho\in(0,1)$ is the code rate.

A Merkle tree commits to a length-N vector with $O(N)$ prover time. For a query set I, opening and verification take $O(|I|\log N)$ time and the proof size is $O(|I|\log N)$. It comprises three algorithms. $\mathsf{rt}\leftarrow\mathsf{MT.Com}(\boldsymbol{v})$ outputs the Merkle root of vector $\boldsymbol{v}$. Given I, $(\{v_i\}_{i\in I},\mathsf{path})\leftarrow\mathsf{MT.Open}(\mathsf{rt},I,\boldsymbol{v})$ outputs the queried values and an authentication path. $\{0,1\}\leftarrow\mathsf{MT.Verify}(\mathsf{rt},I,\{v_i\}_{i\in I},\mathsf{path})$ accepts iff path is consistent with rt and authenticates $\{v_i\}_{i\in I}$. Our MT uses collision- and preimage-resistant hash functions.

Argument of Knowledge (AoK). An interactive argument for an NP relation $\mathcal{R}$ includes a public parameter generation algorithm $\mathcal{G}$ and a pair of interactive machines $\langle\mathcal{P},\mathcal{V}\rangle$. $\mathsf{pp}\leftarrow\mathcal{G}(1^\lambda)$ generates the public parameter. $\mathcal{P}$ and $\mathcal{V}$ represent a PPT prover and verifier, respectively. $\mathcal{P}$ tries to convince $\mathcal{V}$ of the existence of $\mathtt{w}$ s.t. $(\mathtt{x},\mathtt{w})\in\mathcal{R}$ for a statement $\mathtt{x}$ through interaction. An AoK further allows $\mathtt{w}$ to be efficiently extractable by an extractor.

More formally, $(\mathcal{G},\langle\mathcal{P},\mathcal{V}\rangle)$ is an AoK for $\mathcal{R}$ if it satisfies:

- **Completeness.** For every pp and all $(\mathtt{x},\mathtt{w})\in\mathcal{R}$, we have $\Pr[\langle\mathcal{P}(\mathtt{w}),\mathcal{V}\rangle(\mathsf{pp},\mathtt{x})=1]=1$.
- **Knowledge Soundness.** For any PPT $\mathcal{P}^*$, there exists an expected polynomial time extractor $\mathcal{E}^{\mathcal{P}^*}$ with access to $\mathcal{P}^*$'s randomness s.t. for all $\mathsf{pp}\leftarrow\mathcal{G}(1^\lambda)$ and $\mathtt{x}$, $\Pr\left[\langle\mathcal{P}^*(),\mathcal{V}\rangle(\mathsf{pp},\mathtt{x})=1\wedge(\mathtt{x},\mathtt{w})\notin\mathcal{R} \;\middle|\; \mathtt{w}\leftarrow\mathcal{E}^{\mathcal{P}^*}(\mathsf{pp},\mathtt{x})\right]\leq\mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$. $\mathcal{E}^{\mathcal{P}^*}$ means $\mathcal{E}$ has access to the randomness of $\mathcal{P}^*$.

A public-coin interactive AoK can be transformed into a non-interactive AoK via the Fiat–Shamir transformation. An AoK is succinct with proof size sublinear in $|\mathtt{w}|$.

Polynomial Commitment Scheme (PCS) and Distributed PCS. A PCS is specified by the following algorithms [19].

- $\mathsf{pp}\leftarrow\mathsf{Gen}(1^\lambda,d,\mu)$ takes security parameter λ, degree bound d, and arity μ, and outputs public parameters pp.
- $C\leftarrow\mathsf{Com}(\mathsf{pp},f)$ outputs a commitment C to polynomial f.
- $b\leftarrow\mathsf{VerPoly}(\mathsf{pp},C,f)$ verifies that C is a valid commitment to f under pp and outputs $b\in\{0,1\}$.
- $\mathsf{Eval}(\mathsf{pp},C,\boldsymbol{x},y;f)$ is an (interactive) argument between a prover $\mathcal{P}$ and a verifier $\mathcal{V}$. $\mathcal{P}$ and $\mathcal{V}$ hold C, $\boldsymbol{x}$, and y, and $\mathcal{P}$ additionally holds f. $\mathcal{P}$ proves that C commits to a polynomial f with degree bound d in μ variables and that $f(\boldsymbol{x})=y$, and $\mathcal{V}$ outputs $b\in\{0,1\}$.

A PCS satisfies the following security properties.

- **Completeness.** For any f with $\mathsf{pp}\leftarrow\mathsf{Gen}(1^\lambda,d,\mu)$, $C\leftarrow\mathsf{Com}(\mathsf{pp},f)$, and $f(\boldsymbol{x})=y$, $\Pr[\mathsf{Eval}(\mathsf{pp},C,\boldsymbol{x},y;f)=1]=1$.

[2] BaseFold offers an "FRI-like" LDT for foldable linear codes, which generalizes RS codes. PCS with this LDT is field-agnostic but less efficient.

- **Polynomial Binding.** For all $\mathsf{pp} \leftarrow \mathsf{Gen}(1^\lambda, d, \mu)$ and any PPT adversary $\mathcal{A}$, the following probability is $\mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$:

$$\Pr\left[\begin{array}{c}\mathsf{pp} \leftarrow \mathsf{Gen}(1^\lambda, d, \mu), (C, f_0, f_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\mathsf{pp}) \\ b_0 \leftarrow \mathsf{VerPoly}(\mathsf{pp}, C, f_0), b_1 \leftarrow \mathsf{VerPoly}(\mathsf{pp}, C, f_1): \\ b_0 = b_1 = 1 \wedge f_0 \neq f_1\end{array}\right].$$

- **Knowledge Soundness.** Eval is an AoK for the NP relation $\mathcal{R}_{\mathsf{Eval}}(\mathsf{pp})$ specified below given $\mathsf{pp} \leftarrow \mathsf{Gen}(1^\lambda, d, \mu)$: $\{(C, \boldsymbol{x}, y; f) : f \in \mathbb{F}[d^\mu] \wedge f(\boldsymbol{x}) = y \wedge \mathsf{VerPoly}(\mathsf{pp}, C, f) = 1\}$.

We say a PCS is zero knowledge [41] if it satisfies:

- **Honest-Verifier Zero Knowledge.** For all PPT adversaries $\mathcal{A}$, randomness $r_{\mathcal{A}}$, $\mathsf{pp} \leftarrow \mathsf{Gen}(1^\lambda, d, \mu)$, and size-$d^\mu$ polynomial f, there exists a simulator $\mathcal{S} = (\mathcal{S}_1, \mathcal{S}_2)$ s.t. the experiments in Figure 1 are computationally indistinguishable, *i.e.*, $|\Pr[\mathsf{Real}_{\mathcal{A},f}(\mathsf{pp}) = 1] - \Pr[\mathsf{Ideal}_{\mathcal{A},\mathcal{S}^{\mathcal{A}}}(\mathsf{pp}) = 1]| \leq \mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$. If the difference is 0, we call it perfect zero knowledge.

$\mathsf{Real}_{\mathcal{A},f}(\mathsf{pp})$:	$\mathsf{Ideal}_{\mathcal{A},\mathcal{S}^{\mathcal{A}}}(\mathsf{pp})$:
1: $C \leftarrow \mathsf{Com}(\mathsf{pp}, f)$	1: $C \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_1(1^\lambda, \mathsf{pp}, r_{\mathcal{A}})$
2: $\boldsymbol{x} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(C, \mathsf{pp})$	2: $\boldsymbol{x} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(C, \mathsf{pp})$
3: $y \leftarrow f(\boldsymbol{x})$	3: $y \leftarrow f(\boldsymbol{x})$
4: $1 \leftarrow \langle \mathcal{P}(f), \mathcal{A} \rangle(\mathsf{pp}, C, \boldsymbol{x}, y)$	4: $1 \leftarrow \langle \mathcal{S}_2, \mathcal{A} \rangle(\mathsf{pp}, C, \boldsymbol{x}, y)$, given oracle access to y
5: $b \leftarrow \mathcal{A}$ and output b	5: $b \leftarrow \mathcal{A}$ and output b

Figure 1: Experiments for zero knowledge in PCS

For distributed PCSs, we model a master prover that interacts with the verifier and coordinates sub-provers. In prior group-based distributed PCSs, sub-provers communicate only with the master prover. In our setting, sub-provers may also communicate with each other. Beyond the security properties of PCSs, we consider accountability [34]. An honest master prover can identify *all* sub-provers that produce incorrect proofs or send messages inconsistent with their local inputs.

FRI. *Fast Reed–Solomon interactive oracle proof of proximity* (FRI) [4] is a low-degree test for RS codes. Let L be a multiplicative coset of size M, and let $f|_L \in \mathbb{F}^M$ be the evaluation vector of f on L. FRI proves that $f|_L$ is δ-close to $\mathsf{RS}[L, \rho]$ in relative Hamming distance, for proximity parameter δ.

FRI has $\sigma = \log_2 M + 1$ rounds. In round $i \in [\sigma]$, the prover $\mathcal{P}$ sends a Merkle tree commitment to a codeword $f_{i-1}|_{L_{i-1}}$ of length $M/2^{i-1}$, where $f_0 = f$ and $L_0 = L$, or to f_σ when $i = \sigma$. The verifier $\mathcal{V}$ sends a random challenge α_i if $i \neq \sigma$. For $i \in [\sigma - 1]$, we have $L_i = \{x^2 \mid x \in L_{i-1}\}$ and $f_i(X) = g_{i-1}(X) + \alpha_i \cdot h_{i-1}(X)$, where g_{i-1}, h_{i-1} satisfy $f_{i-1}(X) = g_{i-1}(X^2) + X \cdot h_{i-1}(X^2)$. In the last round, $\mathcal{V}$ picks $q = O(\lambda)$ random queries in L and queries at most $2q$ evaluations on each $f_{i-1}|_{L_{i-1}}$ for consistency checks. Specifically, for query $\beta \in L$, $\mathcal{P}$ opens $\{f_{i-1}(\pm\beta^{2^{i-1}})\}_{i \in [\sigma]}$. $\mathcal{V}$ checks whether $(\pm\beta^{2^{i-1}}, f_{i-1}(\pm\beta^{2^{i-1}}))$ and $(\beta^{2^i}, f_i(\beta^{2^i}))$ are consistent with α_i; *i.e.*, these evaluation pairs lie on a common line. This shows the consistency of $\{f_i\}_{i \in [0,\sigma]}$.

Batch FRI [5] enables a single low-degree test for multiple RS codewords evaluated on the same domain. Each codeword is padded to a common maximal degree. $\mathcal{P}$ and $\mathcal{V}$ then run one FRI on a random linear combination of these codewords.

HyperPlonk, PolyFRIM, and Rolling Batch FRI. Given a size-$N = 2^\mu$ multilinear polynomial $\tilde{f}_0$ and an evaluation point $\boldsymbol{x}$, the prover $\mathcal{P}$ in HyperPlonk [13, §B] folds $\tilde{f}_0$'s twisted univariate polynomial f_0 to obtain and commit to $f_1, \ldots, f_{\mu+1}$, where f_i has size $N/2^i$ for $i \in [\mu + 1]$ and $f_{\mu+1}$ is a constant. This folding procedure mirrors FRI, except the folding parameter is x_i rather than the random challenge α_i. Next, $\mathcal{P}$ proves the low-degree properties of $f_0, \ldots, f_{\mu+1}$ via batch FRI. $\mathcal{V}$ also checks consistency as in FRI, replacing α_i with x_i.

Directly running batch FRI for $f_0, \ldots, f_{\mu+1}$ requires padding all polynomials to size N, leading to quasi-linear opening complexity for committing them. PolyFRIM [42] proposes a *rolling batch FRI* specialized to the LDTs of these polynomials. It observes that these codewords have the same code rate, and that the j-th FRI-folded polynomial derived from f_1 is evaluated over the same domain as f_{j+1}. It therefore combines their LDTs directly via random linear combination. Applying this observation recursively reduces the quasi-linear opening complexity to linear. We recall the rolling batch FRI in Protocol 1.

3 PIP: Shred-to-Shine MLPCS from MLPCS

We propose PIP, a PCS-improved-from-PCS (PIP) transformation that turns a base MLPCS into an upgraded MLPCS. The goal is to reduce dominant PCS costs, such as FFTs, Merkle-tree construction, and group multi-scalar multiplications. We reduce one evaluation claim for a size-N multilinear polynomial $\tilde{f}$, where $N = m\ell$, to ℓ independent claims for size-m sub-polynomials. Write the coefficients of $\tilde{f}$ as $(f_1, \ldots, f_N)$ and split them into ℓ consecutive blocks of size m. For $j \in [\ell]$, define a sub-polynomial $\tilde{f}_j$ with coefficient vector $\boldsymbol{f}_j = (f_{(j-1)m+1}, \ldots, f_{jm})$.

Without loss of generality, assume m and ℓ are powers of two. Let the evaluation point be $\boldsymbol{x} = (x_1, \ldots, x_{\log_2(m\ell)}) \in \mathbb{F}^{\log_2(m\ell)}$ and let $\tilde{f}(\boldsymbol{x}) = y$. Define a matrix $U \in \mathbb{F}^{\ell \times m}$ whose j-th row is $\boldsymbol{f}_j$. Define $\boldsymbol{v} = \otimes_{k \in [\log_2 m]}(1, x_k) \in \mathbb{F}^m$ and $\boldsymbol{w} = \otimes_{k \in [\log_2 \ell]}(1, x_{k+\log_2 m}) \in \mathbb{F}^\ell$. Then $y = \boldsymbol{w} U \boldsymbol{v}^\top$ [19, 32], or

$$y = \langle (\tilde{f}_1(\boldsymbol{v}), \ldots, \tilde{f}_\ell(\boldsymbol{v})), \boldsymbol{w} \rangle. \quad (1)$$

Equation (1) drives the construction. Instead of committing to $\tilde{f}$ directly, the prover commits to $\tilde{f}_1, \ldots, \tilde{f}_\ell$ and proves their claimed evaluations at the common point $\boldsymbol{v}$. The verifier checks these proofs and accepts if Equation (1) holds for the public vector $\boldsymbol{w}$. Since all $\tilde{f}_j$ share the same evaluation point, we open them via a batch PCS. Batch opening is supported by many schemes under diverse assumptions, *e.g.*, KZG [21],

Protocol 1 (**Rolling Batch FRI** [42]).
Inputs: *Secret codewords* $f_0|_{L_0}, \dots, f_\sigma|_{L_\sigma}$ *such that* $f_i|_{L_i} \in \mathsf{RS}[L_i, \rho]$ *for all* $i \in [0,\sigma]$. *Public multiplicative cosets* $\{L_i\}_{i\in[0,\sigma]}$ *such that* $L_i = \{x^2 \mid x \in L_{i-1}\}$ *for all* $i \in [0,\sigma]$. *Without loss of generality, assume* $\deg(f_\sigma) \le 1$.
Prover $\mathcal{P}$ *and verifier* $\mathcal{V}$ *prove* $f_i|_{L_i} \in \mathsf{RS}[L_i,\rho]$ *for all* $i \in [0,\sigma]$ *as follows:*

1. $\mathcal{P} \to \mathcal{V}$: $\{C_i\}_{i\in[0,\sigma]}$, *where* $C_i \leftarrow \mathsf{MT.Com}(f_i|_{L_i})$.
2. $\mathcal{P}$ *sets* $f'_0 = f_0$. *For each* $i \in [0,\sigma]$, $\mathcal{P}$ *and* $\mathcal{V}$ *do:*
   (a) $\mathcal{P}$: *decomposes* $f'_i(X)$ *uniquely as* $\ell_i(X^2) + X \cdot r_i(X^2)$.
   (b) $\mathcal{V} \to \mathcal{P}$: *a random challenge* $\alpha_i \in \mathbb{F}$.
   (c) $\mathcal{P} \to \mathcal{V}$: $\mathsf{MT.Com}(p_{i+1}|_{L_{i+1}})$ *when* $i \neq \sigma$, *or* $f'_{\sigma+1}$ *when* $i = \sigma$, *where* $p_{i+1}(X) = \ell_i(X) + \alpha_i \cdot r_i(X)$.
   (d) $\mathcal{P}$: *computes* $f'_{i+1}(X) = \ell_i(X) + \alpha_i \cdot r_i(X) + \alpha_i^2 \cdot f_{i+1}(X)$, *which equals* $p_{i+1}(X) + \alpha_i^2 \cdot f_{i+1}(X)$.
3. $\mathcal{P}$ *and* $\mathcal{V}$ *repeat the following steps* $q = O(\lambda)$ *queries:*
   (a) $\mathcal{V} \to \mathcal{P}$: *a random challenge* $\beta \in \mathbb{F}$.
   (b) $\mathcal{P}$: *opens* $\{f_i(\pm\beta^{2^i})\}_{i\in[0,\sigma]}$ *and* $\{p_i(\pm\beta^{2^i})\}_{i\in[\sigma]}$ *via* $\mathsf{MT.Open}$. $\mathcal{V}$ *checks them via* $\mathsf{MT.Verify}$. *For each* $i \in [\sigma]$, $\mathcal{V}$ *checks that* $(\beta^{2^{i-1}}, f'_{i-1}(\beta^{2^{i-1}}))$, $(-\beta^{2^{i-1}}, f'_{i-1}(-\beta^{2^{i-1}}))$, *and* $(\alpha_i, p_i(\beta^{2^i}))$ *lie on a common line. Note:* $f'_i(\pm\beta^{2^i})$ *can be computed from* $p_i(\pm\beta^{2^i})$ *and* $f_i(\pm\beta^{2^i})$.

Bulletproofs [11], and FRI-PCS [31]. Let n denote the base PCS size parameter, and in our setting $n = m$. If the base PCS has opening time $t_{\mathcal{P}}(n)$, verifier time $t_{\mathcal{V}}(n)$, and proof size $\pi(n)$ for a size-n polynomial, then for ℓ committed polynomials batch PCS yields opening time $t_{\mathcal{P}}(n) + O(\ell)$, verifier time $t_{\mathcal{V}}(n) + O(\ell)$, and proof size $\pi(n) + O(\ell)$. Protocol 2 gives PIP with batch PCS, and Theorem 3.1 states the resulting advantages, with proofs in Appendix B.

Theorem 3.1 (PIP: Shred-to-Shine MLPCS). *Let* $N = m\ell$. *Protocol 2 is an MLPCS for size-*N *multilinear polynomials with the following properties.*

- *The committing phase decomposes into* ℓ *independent commitments to size-*m *polynomials, and these commitments can be computed in parallel.*
- *The prover opening time is* $t_{\mathcal{P}}(m) + O(N)$. *The verifier time is* $t_{\mathcal{V}}(m) + O(\ell)$. *The proof size is* $\pi(m) + O(\ell)$.

Moreover, under the base-PCS cost regimes below, PIP *shines.*

- *If the base committing time satisfies* $t_{\mathsf{C}}(N) = O(N\log N)$, *then the committing time of* PIP *is* $O(N\log m)$.
- *If the base opening time satisfies* $t_{\mathcal{P}}(N) = O(N\log N)$, *then setting* $m = O(N/\log N)$ *and* $\ell = O(\log N)$ *yields prover opening time* $O(N)$.
- *If the base verifier time and proof size satisfy* $t_{\mathcal{V}}(N) = O(\log^c N)$ *and* $\pi(N) = O(\log^c N)$ *for a constant* $c \ge 1$, *then setting* $m = O(N/\log^c N)$ *and* $\ell = O(\log^c N)$ *keeps the verifier time and proof size asymptotically unchanged.*
- *If the base PCS uses a size-*$O(N)$ *SRS, then* PIP *uses a size-*$O(m)$ *SRS.*

Protocol 2 (**PIP**). *Let* $\mathsf{PC_b} = (\mathsf{Gen_b}, \mathsf{Com_b}, \mathsf{VerPoly_b}, \mathsf{Eval_b})$ *be a batch MLPCS.*

- $\mathsf{pp} \leftarrow \mathsf{Gen}(1^\lambda, 2, \mu)$. pp *includes* $(\mathbb{F}, \mu, m, \ell, \mathsf{pp_b})$, *where* $\mathsf{pp_b} = \mathsf{Gen_b}(1^\lambda, 2, \log m)$ *and* $m\ell = 2^\mu$.
- $C \leftarrow \mathsf{Com}(\mathsf{pp}, \tilde f)$. *Given* $\tilde f$ *and its coefficients,* $\mathcal{P}$ *does:*
  1. *Partition* $\tilde f$ *into* ℓ *consecutive blocks of length* m. *For each* $j \in [\ell]$, *define* $\tilde f_j$ *as the size-*m *multilinear polynomial with coefficients* $(f_{(j-1)m+1}, \dots, f_{jm})$.
  2. *Run* $C_j \leftarrow \mathsf{Com_b}(\mathsf{pp_b}, \tilde f_j)$, $j \in [\ell]$. *Output* $(C_1, \dots, C_\ell)$.
- $b \leftarrow \mathsf{VerPoly}(\mathsf{pp}, C, \tilde f)$. $\mathcal{V}$ *parses* $\tilde f$ *and runs* $b_j \leftarrow \mathsf{VerPoly_b}(\mathsf{pp_b}, C_j, \tilde f_j)$, $j \in [\ell]$. *Output* 1 *iff* $b_j = 1 \forall j \in [\ell]$.
- $b \leftarrow \mathsf{Eval}(\mathsf{pp}, C, \boldsymbol{x}, y; \tilde f)$. *Given* $\boldsymbol{x}$ *and* $y = \tilde f(\boldsymbol{x})$,
  1. $\mathcal{P}$ *and* $\mathcal{V}$: *compute public vectors* $\boldsymbol{v} = \otimes_{k\in[\log m]}(1, x_k)$ *and* $\boldsymbol{w} = \otimes_{k\in[\log \ell]}(1, x_{k+\log m})$.
  2. $\mathcal{P} \to \mathcal{V}$: $\boldsymbol{u} = (u_1, \dots, u_\ell)$, *where* $u_j = \tilde f_j(x_1, \dots, x_{\log m})$.
  3. $\mathcal{P}$ *and* $\mathcal{V}$: *run the batch evaluation protocol* $\mathsf{Eval_b}$ *to prove that* $\tilde f_j(x_1, \dots, x_{\log m}) = u_j$ *for all* $j \in [\ell]$.
  4. $\mathcal{V}$: *accepts iff* $\mathsf{Eval_b}$ *outputs* 1 *and* $\langle \boldsymbol{u}, \boldsymbol{w}\rangle = y$.

3.1 Comparisons with Other PCSs

Prior PCSs use tensor-product reductions [13, 19] and multi-instance batching [9, 32]. PIP combines these two tools by reducing one size-N claim to ℓ evaluations at a common point and then proving them via a batch PCS. To our knowledge, prior PCSs do not combine them this way. This yields a simple black-box construction compatible with diverse PCS instantiations supporting batch opening, with efficiency captured by Theorem 3.1. We compare PIP with Hyrax [32] and representative code-based PCSs [7, 19, 37].

Comparison with Hyrax. Hyrax is a PIP-like MLPCS framework, but it relies on commitment homomorphism. It arranges the coefficients of $\tilde f$ into a matrix U and writes the claim as $y = \boldsymbol{w} U \boldsymbol{v}^\top$ for public $\boldsymbol{v}$ and $\boldsymbol{w}$. Committing to the rows of U via group-based vector commitments lets the verifier homomorphically derive a commitment to $\boldsymbol{u} = \boldsymbol{w}U$. An inner-product argument (IPA) [11] then proves $\langle \boldsymbol{u}, \boldsymbol{v}\rangle = y$.

In contrast, PIP exploits the tensor-product structure of $\boldsymbol{v}$ to compute $U\boldsymbol{v}^\top$, *i.e.*, the ℓ row evaluations at the common point $\boldsymbol{v}$, and then checks their aggregation by $\boldsymbol{w}$. This avoids assuming commitment homomorphism and thereby extends to code-based PCSs. Instantiating PIP with an IPA-based PCS [11] recovers Hyrax, so Hyrax is a special case of PIP.

Comparison with Code-based PCSs. Brakedown also uses $y = \boldsymbol{w} U \boldsymbol{v}^\top$, but relies on row encoding and a direct LDT,

where the direct LDT lets the verifier check that a claimed $\boldsymbol{u} = \boldsymbol{w}U$ is consistent with the encoded matrix via a few column queries, and hence validate $\langle \boldsymbol{u}, \boldsymbol{v} \rangle = y$. The proof thus contains $\boldsymbol{u}$ and the opened columns, yielding $O(\sqrt{N})$ proof size and verifier cost (and $O(N)$ prover time) in its standard parameterization. In contrast, PIP replaces row encoding and direct LDT with a tensor-product reduction plus batch opening, so an FRI-based instantiation inherits polylogarithmic proof size and verifier time from the chosen base PCS.

Orion employs an FRI-based recursive SNARK [41] to prove the size-$O(\sqrt{N})$ verification circuit of Brakedown. Concretely, the recursive SNARK forces Orion to encode the columns of U, producing double-dimension codewords whose Merkle openings lead to several-MB proofs [13]. The prover also incurs overhead from proving a large verification circuit that depends on the (randomly) queried matrix columns [13]. Rather than a recursive SNARK, PIP uses PCS-level recursion (recursive PCSs), avoiding double-dimension codewords with an FRI-based instantiation. This makes PIP-based PCSs potentially more efficient than Orion.

Ligero++ is a SNARK for general circuits and is PCS-like since polynomial evaluation is a linear constraint. It encodes a witness matrix U row-wise and reduces checking to inner-product queries on public vectors and sampled columns, proved via the FRI-based IPA Virgo [41]. As in Brakedown, the induced double-dimension codewords make Merkle openings large. PIP uses recursive PCSs rather than IPA-style recursion, which unlocks a wider choice of inner PCS instantiations (including faster FRI-based ones) than fixing Virgo [41]. The prover time gap can exceed $10\times$ [42].

3.2 PIP$_{\text{KZG}}$: Instantiation of PIP with mKZG

With mKZG as PC_b, Protocol 2 yields PIP$_{\text{KZG}}$ with a slight modification such that the commitment homomorphism removes the need to send $\boldsymbol{u}$, further reducing the proof size. As shown in Table 4, PIP$_{\text{KZG}}$ improves over mKZG by shifting partially expensive group exponentiations and pairings into cheaper linear combinations of group elements with field scalars. This comes at a larger proof size. We present the construction and evaluation of PIP$_{\text{KZG}}$ in the full version [25].

4 PIP$_{\text{FRI}}$: Instantiation of PIP with Batch and Zero-Knowledge PolyFRIM

This section builds PIP$_{\text{FRI}}$ by combining PIP and PolyFRIM. We first construct batch and zero-knowledge PolyFRIM.

4.1 Batch and Zero-Knowledge PolyFRIM

Batch PolyFRIM. Given multilinear $\tilde{f}^{(1)}, \ldots, \tilde{f}^{(\ell)}$, our goal is to prove $\tilde{f}^{(j)}(\boldsymbol{x}) = y_j$ for all $j \in [\ell]$. In the i-th FRI-like round, folded $\hat{f}_i^{(1)}, \ldots, \hat{f}_i^{(\ell)}$ use the same folding parameter x_i. By RS linearity, we batch the ℓ openings into one for $\sum_{j=1}^{\ell} \gamma^j \tilde{f}^{(j)}(\boldsymbol{x})$ for a random γ. If $\tilde{f}^{(j)}(\boldsymbol{x}) \neq y_j$ for some j, $\sum_{j=1}^{\ell} \gamma^j \tilde{f}^{(j)}(\boldsymbol{x}) = \sum_{j=1}^{\ell} \gamma^j y_j$ holds with probability at most $\ell/|\mathbb{F}|$. PolyFRIM also requires low-degree tests for $\hat{f}^{(1)}, \ldots, \hat{f}^{(\ell)}$, which we batch via batch FRI [5] on their random linear combination.

A direct batch PolyFRIM yields proof size and verifier time $O((\lambda + \ell)\log N + \log^2 N)$. The $O(\ell \log N)$ term comes from opening ℓ Merkle trees for the size-$O(N)$ codewords of $\hat{f}^{(1)}, \ldots, \hat{f}^{(\ell)}$ in the first round. This scales poorly in ℓ.

To remove this term, we use an *optimized Merkle tree commitment* that packs same-position entries across codewords into one leaf. We denote this commitment by $\mathsf{MT.Com}([\hat{f}^{(1)}|_{L_0}, \ldots, \hat{f}^{(\ell)}|_{L_0}])$. In PolyFRIM (and in FRI), the verifier queries the same set of positions in each codeword in a given round. Thus, if position i is queried in $\hat{f}^{(j)}|_{L_0}$ for any $j \in [\ell]$, then position i is queried in $\hat{f}^{(j')}|_{L_0}$ for all $j' \in [\ell]$. Therefore, the prover can pack $\{(\hat{f}^{(j)}|_{L_0})_i\}_{j\in[\ell]}$ into one Merkle leaf and open a single tree. With this packing rule, the first-round opening cost drops from ℓ trees to one, giving $O(\lambda \log N + \ell + \log^2 N)$ proof size and verifier time.

For a size-N multilinear polynomial $\tilde{f}$, PolyFRIM can leak information from queries to $\hat{f}$ in the first round and from queries to folded polynomials in later rounds. We mask $\tilde{f}$ in two steps. First, we adopt the padding technique from DeepFold [20]. We extend $\tilde{f}$ to a masked polynomial $\tilde{f}'$ by padding the coefficient vector with random values so that $\tilde{f}(\boldsymbol{x}) = \tilde{f}'(\boldsymbol{x}, 0)$ for $\boldsymbol{x} = (x_1, \ldots, x_\mu)$. Since PolyFRIM processes this public vector one variable at a time, an extra round handles the appended variable fixed to 0.

Second, we add an independent random masking polynomial $\tilde{s}$. The prover commits to $\tilde{f}'$ and to $\tilde{s}$, claims $y = \tilde{f}(\boldsymbol{x})$ and $y_s = \tilde{s}(\boldsymbol{x})$, and runs PolyFRIM on $\hat{f}' + \alpha \cdot \hat{s}$, for a verifier-chosen random α. The verifier checks the claimed evaluation $y + \alpha \cdot y_s$. In the first round, opened evaluations are randomized by α, and in later rounds $\hat{s}$ prevents leakage.

We use batch zk-PolyFRIM as the sub-protocol to build PIP$_{\text{FRI}}$. Due to page limitations, we omit the formal scheme.

4.2 Construction of ZK-PIP$_{\text{FRI}}$

This subsection presents zk-PIP$_{\text{FRI}}$. A naïve instantiation of Protocol 2 using batch zk-PolyFRIM is not zero knowledge. The reason is that Protocol 2 sends $\boldsymbol{u} = (\tilde{f}_1(\boldsymbol{x}'), \ldots, \tilde{f}_\ell(\boldsymbol{x}'))$. These sub-polynomial evaluations are linear functions of $\tilde{f}$'s coefficients and thus leak information about $\tilde{f}$.

In zk-PIP$_{\text{FRI}}$, we avoid proving or sending all entries of $\boldsymbol{u}$, and we prove only the target evaluation $\tilde{f}(\boldsymbol{x}) = y$. We use RS linearity to define a virtual target polynomial and a virtual evaluation that the verifier can check without seeing $\boldsymbol{u}$. Let $\tilde{f}_1, \ldots, \tilde{f}_\ell$ be the size-m sub-polynomials of $\tilde{f}$ as in Protocol 2. Let $\boldsymbol{x}' = (x_1, \ldots, x_{\log m})$ and let $\boldsymbol{w} = \otimes_{k\in[\log \ell]}(1, x_{k+\log m})$. We mask each $\tilde{f}_j$ by extending it to a size-$2m$ polynomial $\tilde{f}^{(j)}$ such that $\tilde{f}^{(j)}(\boldsymbol{x}', 0) = \tilde{f}_j(\boldsymbol{x}')$. By Equation (1), this gives

$\tilde{f}(\boldsymbol{x}) = \sum_{j=1}^{\ell} w_j \cdot \tilde{f}^{(j)}(\boldsymbol{x}', 0)$. Since $\boldsymbol{w}$ is public, we define the virtual polynomial $\tilde{f}' = \sum_{j=1}^{\ell} w_j \cdot \tilde{f}^{(j)}$. It suffices to prove the single claim $\tilde{f}'(\boldsymbol{x}', 0) = \tilde{f}(\boldsymbol{x})$ via zk-PolyFRIM.

Protocol 3 gives the formal algorithms for zk-PIP_{FRI}. In Step 3, the prover commits to the FRI-like folded polynomials $\hat{f}_1, \dots, \hat{f}_{\sigma+1}$ as in zk-PolyFRIM for the input polynomial $\tilde{f}' + \alpha\tilde{s}$ and its twisted univariate form. In Step 4, the verifier checks the folding consistency. In Step 5, the verifier checks the low-degree properties of $\{\hat{f}_i\}_{i\in[\sigma+1]}$ and those of the input polynomials $\hat{f}^{(1)}, \dots, \hat{f}^{(\ell)}$.

Theorem 4.1. *Protocol 3 is a zk-PCS with committing complexity $O(N \log m)\,\mathbb{F} + O(m)\,\mathsf{H}_\ell + O(m)\,\mathsf{H}$. It has opening complexity $O(N)\,\mathbb{F}_{\mathsf{rlc}} + O(m)\,\mathbb{F} + O(m)\,\mathsf{H}$. Its verifier complexity and proof size are $O(\lambda \log m + \lambda\ell + \lambda \log^2 m)$.*

Complexity Analysis. *Commit*. Commitment generation runs ℓ FFTs on length-m vectors, costing $O(\ell m \log m) = O(N \log m)\,\mathbb{F}$. It also builds one Merkle tree with $O(m)$ leaves, each packing ℓ entries, costing $O(m)\,\mathsf{H}_\ell + O(m)\,\mathsf{H}$.

Open. In round i, $\mathcal{P}$ derives $\hat{f}_i|_{L_i}$ and its Merkle commitment from $\hat{f}_{i-1}|_{L_{i-1}}$ in $O(|L_{i-1}|)$ time. Summed over the $\log m$ rounds, this is $O(\sum_i |L_i|) = O(m)$ field and hash operations. $\mathcal{P}$ also runs a rolling batch FRI over the folded polynomials, which adds another $O(\sum_{i=0}^{\log m - 1} m/2^i) = O(m)$ field and hash operations. Finally, forming $\hat{f}_0$ from $\hat{f}^{(1)}, \dots, \hat{f}^{(\ell)}$ costs a one-time $O(N)\,\mathbb{F}_{\mathsf{rlc}}$ random linear combination.

Proof size and verify. $\mathcal{V}$ needs to open two Merkle trees at $O(\lambda)$ positions per round over $\log m$ rounds. This contributes to a proof size of $O(\lambda \log m)\,\mathbb{F}$ and $O(\lambda \log^2 m)\,\mathsf{H}$. In the first round, $\mathcal{V}$ additionally opens $O(\lambda)$ positions of the single packed Merkle tree with $O(m)$ leaves, contributing to a proof size of $O(\lambda\ell)\,\mathbb{F}$ and $O(\lambda \log m)\,\mathsf{H}$. The verifier complexity is of the same order for processing the transcript linearly.

Security Analysis. Appendix C proves completeness, binding, knowledge soundness, and zero knowledge.

Zero-knowledge intuition. First-round queries to each $\hat{f}^{(j)}$ are randomized by same-degree masking. From the second round on, folded-polynomial queries are randomized by $\hat{s}(X)$.

Protocol 3 (zk-PIP_{FRI}).

- $\mathsf{pp} \leftarrow \mathsf{Gen}(1^\lambda, 2, \mu)$*: pp includes $\mathbb{F}$, $\ell = O(\log N)$, $m = 2^\mu/\ell$, and a multiplicative coset L_0 of size $O(m)$. Fix a code rate $\rho \in (0,1)$ and choose $|L_0| = 2m/\rho$.*
- $C \leftarrow \mathsf{Com}(\mathsf{pp}, \tilde{f})$*: Given $\tilde{f}$ as input, the prover $\mathcal{P}$ does:*
  1. *Split $\tilde{f}$'s coefficients into ℓ size-m vectors, as in Protocol 2. Add m random entries to each. Denote these size-$2m$ twisted univariate polynomials by $\hat{f}^{(1)}, \dots, \hat{f}^{(\ell)}$.*
  2. *Pick a random size-$2m$ polynomial $\hat{s}$. Compute $C \leftarrow \mathsf{MT.Com}([\hat{f}^{(1)}|_{L_0}, \dots, \hat{f}^{(\ell)}|_{L_0}, \hat{s}|_{L_0}])$ obtained via the optimized Merkle tree commitment in Section 4.1.*
- $b \leftarrow \mathsf{VerPoly}(\mathsf{pp}, C, \hat{f}^{(1)}|_{L_0}, \dots, \hat{f}^{(\ell)}|_{L_0}, \hat{s}|_{L_0}, \tilde{f})$*: Decode $\hat{f}^{(1)}|_{L_0}, \dots, \hat{f}^{(\ell)}|_{L_0}$ to obtain $\hat{f}_1, \dots, \hat{f}_\ell$. Output 1 iff $C = \mathsf{MT.Com}([\hat{f}^{(1)}|_{L_0}, \dots, \hat{f}^{(\ell)}|_{L_0}, \hat{s}|_{L_0}]) \wedge \tilde{f} = \sum_{j\in[\ell]} w_j \tilde{f}^{(j)}$.*
- $b \leftarrow \mathsf{Eval}(\mathsf{pp}, C, \boldsymbol{x}, y, y_s; (\hat{f}^{(1)}, \dots, \hat{f}^{(\ell)}, \hat{s}))$*: Let $\sigma = \log m$.*
  1. *$\mathcal{P} \to \mathcal{V}$: claimed evaluations $y = \tilde{f}(\boldsymbol{x})$ and $y_s = \tilde{s}(\boldsymbol{x})$.*
  2. *$\mathcal{V} \to \mathcal{P}$: a random challenge $\alpha \in \mathbb{F}$ for zero knowledge.*
  3. *$\mathcal{P} \to \mathcal{V}$: $\{C_i\}_{i\in[\sigma]}, \hat{f}_{\sigma+1}$. For $i = 1, \dots, \sigma+1$:*
     a. *Uniquely write $\hat{f}_{i-1}(X) = \hat{g}_{i-1}(X^2) + X \cdot \hat{h}_{i-1}(X^2)$.*
     b. *Set $\hat{f}_i(X) \leftarrow \hat{g}_{i-1}(X) + x_i \cdot \hat{h}_{i-1}(X)$, where $x_{\sigma+1} = 0$.*
     c. *If $i \le \sigma$, set $L_i \leftarrow \{x^2 : x \in L_{i-1}\}$ and compute $C_i \leftarrow \mathsf{MT.Com}(\hat{f}_i|_{L_i})$. Set $\hat{f}_{\sigma+1}$ as the constant $y + \alpha y_s$.*
  4. ***Consistency check:** Repeat below for $q = O(\lambda)$ times:*
     a. *$\mathcal{V} \to \mathcal{P}$: a random challenge $\beta \in L_0$.*
     b. *$\mathcal{P} \to \mathcal{V}$: via $\mathsf{MT.Open}$, open from C $\{\hat{f}^{(j)}(\pm\beta)\}_{j\in[\ell]}$ and $\hat{s}(\pm\beta)$, and open from $\{C_i\}_{i\in[\sigma]}$ $\{\hat{f}_i(\pm\beta^{2^i})\}_{i\in[\sigma]}$.*
     c. *$\mathcal{V}$: verify all openings by $\mathsf{MT.Verify}$. Let $\beta_i := \beta^{2^i}$ for $i \in [0, \sigma]$. Set $\hat{f}_0(\pm\beta_0) := \sum_{j\in[\ell]} w_j \cdot \hat{f}^{(j)}(\pm\beta_0) + \alpha\hat{s}(\pm\beta_0)$. For each $i \in [\sigma]$, check that $(\pm\beta_{i-1}, \hat{f}_{i-1}(\pm\beta_{i-1}))$ and $(x_i, \hat{f}_i(\beta_i))$ lie on a common line. Also check that $(\pm\beta_\sigma, \hat{f}_\sigma(\pm\beta_\sigma))$ and $(x_{\sigma+1}, \hat{f}_{\sigma+1})$ lie on a common line.*
  5. ***Validity check:** $\mathcal{P}$ and $\mathcal{V}$ invoke rolling batch FRI to prove the low-degree properties, i.e., $\forall i \in [\sigma+1]$, $\hat{f}_{i-1}|_{L_{i-1}} \in \mathsf{RS}[L_{i-1}, \rho]$. $\hat{f}_0$ is proved via a batch FRI on $\hat{f}^{(1)}, \dots, \hat{f}^{(\ell)}$ and $\hat{s}$. The FRI uses $q' = O(\lambda)$ queries over $\{L_{i-1}\}$, reusing the consistency-check queries.*
  6. *$\mathcal{V}$ outputs 1 iff all checks pass and $\hat{f}_{\sigma+1} = y + \alpha y_s$.*

5 $\text{DEPIP}_{\text{FRI}}$: Distributed Version of PIP_{FRI}

We introduce $\text{DEPIP}_{\text{FRI}}$, a distributed PIP_{FRI} that improves generality, accountability, and efficiency via a distributed FRI with lower opening communication and computation.

5.1 Improved Distributed FRI

We formalize and improve the distributed FRI underlying DeVirgo [36]. Let $\mathcal{P}_0$ be the master prover and $\mathcal{P}_1, \dots, \mathcal{P}_\ell$ be sub-provers, where $\mathcal{P}_j$ holds $f^{(j)}$. Given a coset L and code rate ρ, distributed FRI proves $f^{(j)}|_L \in \mathsf{RS}[L, \rho]$ for all $j \in [\ell]$. The key idea is a single batch FRI on $\sum_{j\in[\ell]} \alpha^{j-1} \cdot f^{(j)}(X)$, which requires distributed commitment and opening across all rounds. We use i for rounds, and $j, k \in [\ell]$ for sub-provers.

Distributed commitment generates a Merkle commitment to $f^{(1)}|_L, \dots, f^{(\ell)}|_L$, where $\mathcal{P}_j$ holds $f^{(j)}|_L$. Let $d = |L|/\ell$. For each $k \in [\ell]$, each $\mathcal{P}_j$ sends the segment $f^{(j)}|_L[(k-1)d + 1], \dots, f^{(j)}|_L[kd]$ to $\mathcal{P}_k$. In DeVirgo, $\mathcal{P}_k$ builds a local Merkle tree whose leaves are these $d\ell$ field elements. We use the Merkle tree packing rule in Section 4.1. For a fixed position h,

the ℓ entries $\{f^{(j)}|_L[h]\}_{j\in[\ell]}$ are queried together, or none is queried at all. Thus, each leaf of $\mathcal{P}_k$ packs the same-index entries across the ℓ codewords, *i.e.*, $\{f^{(j)}|_L[h]\}_{j\in[\ell]}$ for all $h \in [(k-1)d+1, kd]$. Each $\mathcal{P}_k$ commits to a local sub-tree with d packed leaves and sends its sub-root $\mathsf{H}^{(k)}$ to $\mathcal{P}_0$. Then, $\mathcal{P}_0$ aggregates $\{\mathsf{H}^{(k)}\}_{k\in[\ell]}$ into a global tree with m leaves.

Distributed openings require provers to compute the i-th round polynomial $f_i(X) = g_{i-1}(X) + \alpha_i h_{i-1}(X)$ for $i \in [\log m]$. Let $f_0(X) = \sum_{j\in[\ell]} \alpha^{j-1} \cdot f^{(j)}(X)$. These polynomials satisfy $f_{i-1}(X) = g_{i-1}(X^2) + X \cdot h_{i-1}(X^2)$, where the odd-even decomposition is unique, and α_i is the i-th round challenge. In the first round, $f_0(X)$ can be computed via the distributed commitment above. DeVirgo does not describe the remaining rounds and implicitly assumes the same method can be applied. However, applying the first-round method above in later rounds is less efficient, as detailed below.

A less efficient approach. Sub-provers locally compute sub-codewords, exchange segments, and commit. Fix a round i and let α_i be the (common) challenge. For each $j \in [\ell]$, let $f^{(j)}_{i-1}(X) = g^{(j)}_{i-1}(X^2) + X \cdot h^{(j)}_{i-1}(X^2)$ be the unique odd-even decomposition. Define the local folded polynomial $f^{(j)}_i(X) = g^{(j)}_{i-1}(X) + \alpha_i \cdot h^{(j)}_{i-1}(X)$. Let the target folded polynomial be $f_i(X) = g_{i-1}(X) + \alpha_i \cdot h_{i-1}(X)$. Assuming $f_{i-1}(X) = \sum_{j\in[\ell]} f^{(j)}_{i-1}(X)$, uniqueness implies $g_{i-1}(X) = \sum_{j\in[\ell]} g^{(j)}_{i-1}(X)$ and $h_{i-1}(X) = \sum_{j\in[\ell]} h^{(j)}_{i-1}(X)$. Thus, $f_i(X) = \sum_{j\in[\ell]} f^{(j)}_i(X)$.

Let the i-th domain be L_i and let $d_i = |L_i|/\ell$. Each $\mathcal{P}_j$ sends the segment $f^{(j)}_i|_{L_i}[(k-1)d_i+1], \ldots, f^{(j)}_i|_{L_i}[kd_i]$ to $\mathcal{P}_k$. Then $\mathcal{P}_k$ aggregates $f_i|_{L_i}[h] = \sum_{j\in[\ell]} f^{(j)}_i|_{L_i}[h]$ for all $h \in [(k-1)d_i + 1, kd_i]$ and builds a commitment $\mathsf{H}^{(k)}_i$. Finally, the sub-provers jointly obtain a commitment to the i-th round codeword $f_i|_{L_i}$.

Complexity. For $i > 1$, each $\mathcal{P}_j$ computes $f^{(j)}_i|_{L_i}$ locally, which costs $O(|L_i|)$ time. Each $\mathcal{P}_j$ additionally aggregates $d_i = |L_i|/\ell$ positions of $f_i|_{L_i}$, which costs $O(|L_i|/\ell)$ time. Each $\mathcal{P}_j$ receives $(\ell-1)d_i = (\ell-1)|L_i|/\ell$ field elements from other sub-provers, so the total communication per prover is $O(|L_i|)$.

Our distributed opening. To build the distributed Merkle tree commitment in round i, $\mathcal{P}_j$ must output its segment of $f_i|_{L_i}$ of length $d_i = |L_i|/\ell$, namely $f_i|_{L_i}[(j-1)d_i+1], \ldots, f_i|_{L_i}[jd_i]$. In the less efficient approach, $\mathcal{P}_j$ derives these d_i entries from all ℓ local contributions per entry via $\{f^{(k)}_i|_{L_i}[(j-1)d_i + 1], \ldots, f^{(k)}_i|_{L_i}[jd_i]\}_{k\in[\ell]}$, which costs $d_i \cdot \ell$ field elements.

We build an optimal distributed method using the folding locality of FRI. For any $a \in [|L_i|]$, there exists a function F such that $f_i|_{L_i}[a] = F(f_{i-1}|_{L_{i-1}}[a], f_{i-1}|_{L_{i-1}}[a + |L_{i-1}|/2], \alpha_i)$. Hence, as long as the vector $f_{i-1}|_{L_{i-1}}$ is *collectively held* by the provers, $\mathcal{P}_k$ can compute its d_i outputs (*e.g.*, $f_i|_{L_i}[a]$ for some a) from the corresponding $2d_i$ predecessor entries (*e.g.*, $f_{i-1}|_{L_{i-1}}[a]$ and $f_{i-1}|_{L_{i-1}}[a + |L_{i-1}|/2]$), fetched from the provers holding them. It suffices to justify collective holding for $i = 1$, since later rounds use the same local folding



Figure 2: Comparison of two approaches in the first-round distributed opening for $\ell = 2$ and $|L_0| = 4$ (so $|L_1| = 2$)

map. In the distributed commitment, $\mathcal{P}_k$ holds $\{f^{(j)}_0|_{L_0}[(k-1)d_0+1], \ldots, f^{(j)}_0|_{L_0}[kd_0]\}_{j\in[\ell]}$, and can compute $f_0|_{L_0}[h] = \sum_{j\in[\ell]} \alpha^{j-1} \cdot f^{(j)}_0|_{L_0}[h]$ for all $h \in [(k-1)d_0 + 1, kd_0]$. Thus, $f_0|_{L_0}$ is evenly distributed, with $\mathcal{P}_k$ holding its own segment.

Complexity. In round i, $\mathcal{P}_j$ computes $2d_i = 2|L_i|/\ell$ entries in $O(|L_i|/\ell)$ time, instead of $O(|L_i| + |L_i|/\ell)$. It receives at most $2|L_i|/\ell$ field elements, instead of $O(|L_i|)$.

Figure 2 illustrates the first round of distributed opening. In the beginning, $\mathcal{P}_1$ holds $f^{(1)}_0|_{L_0}$ and $f^{(2)}_0|_{L_0}[1], f^{(2)}_0|_{L_0}[2]$; $\mathcal{P}_2$ holds $f^{(2)}_0|_{L_0}$ and $f^{(1)}_0|_{L_0}[3], f^{(1)}_0|_{L_0}[4]$. To compute and commit $f_1|_{L_1}$, the baseline computes $|L_1| + |L_1|/\ell = 3$ entries and receives $(\ell-1)\cdot|L_1|/\ell = 1$ entries per sub-prover. Our method computes $|L_0|/\ell = 2|L_1|/\ell = 2$ entries and receives at most $2|L_1|/\ell = 2$ entries per sub-prover. Here, "at most" accounts for local availability of the required predecessors (*e.g.*, $\mathcal{P}_1$ holds $f^{(1)}|_{L_0}[1]$ and $f^{(2)}|_{L_0}[1]$ and can compute $f|_{L_0}[1] = f^{(1)}|_{L_0}[1] + \alpha f^{(2)}|_{L_0}[1]$). For $\ell \geq 4$, $(\ell-1)|L_1|/\ell > 2|L_1|/\ell$, so communication and computation strictly decrease.

Protocol 4 formalizes distributed FRI from our distributed commitment and opening. It includes distributed commitment (Step 1), distributed opening for the first $\log(m/\ell)$ rounds (Step 3), and non-distributed opening for the last $\log \ell$ rounds (Step 4). After $\log(m/\ell)$ rounds, each sub-prover holds a codeword of length ℓ, so they send these codewords to $\mathcal{P}_0$, who completes the remaining rounds non-distributedly.

Theorem 5.1. *Protocol 4 is a distributed FRI. In the committing and opening phases, respectively, the sub-prover complexity is $O(m \log m)$ and $O(m/\ell)$, and the amortized communication complexity (per sub-prover) is $O(m)$ and $O(m/\ell)$. The master prover complexity is $O(\ell \log m)$. The proof size and verifier complexity are $O(\lambda \log m + \lambda\ell + \lambda \log^2 m)$.*

Proof. **Complexity.** We first analyze the costs.

Prover. Sub-prover $\mathcal{P}_j$ runs an FFT to compute $f^{(j)}|_{L_0}$ in $O(m \log m)$ time. In round i, $\mathcal{P}_j$ receives at most $2|L_i|/\ell$ en-

Protocol 4 (Distributed FRI)**.** *Let $\mathcal{P}_0$ be the master prover and $\mathcal{P}_1,\dots,\mathcal{P}_\ell$ the sub-provers.*
Secret inputs: ℓ size-m polynomials $f^{(1)},\dots,f^{(\ell)}$.
Public inputs: a size-$O(m)$ multiplicative coset L_0.
For $i\in[0,\log m]$, define $L_i=\{x^2\mid x\in L_{i-1}\}$ and $d_i=|L_i|/\ell$.
To prove $f^{(j)}|_{L_0}\in \mathsf{RS}[L_0,\rho]$ for all $j\in[\ell]$, $\mathcal{P}$ and $\mathcal{V}$ run:

1. ***(Commit)***
   (a) *$\mathcal{P}_j$: computes $f^{(j)}|_{L_0}$ and sends to each $\mathcal{P}_k$ the block $f^{(j)}|_{L_0}[(k-1)d_0+1],\dots,f^{(j)}|_{L_0}[kd_0]$.*
   (b) *$\mathcal{P}_j\to\mathcal{P}_0$: a Merkle sub-root $\mathsf{H}_0^{(j)}$ with d_0 leaves under the packing rule (Section 4.1), where the leaf at index $h\in[(j-1)d_0+1,jd_0]$ contains $f^{(1)}|_{L_0}[h]\|\cdots\|f^{(\ell)}|_{L_0}[h]$.*
   (c) *$\mathcal{P}_0\to\mathcal{V}$: root C obtained by aggregating $\{\mathsf{H}_0^{(j)}\}_{j\in[\ell]}$.*
2. ***(Challenge)** $\mathcal{V}\to\mathcal{P}_0$: random $\alpha\in\mathbb{F}$ for batch FRI. $\mathcal{P}_0$ forwards α to all $\mathcal{P}_j$.*
3. ***(Open)** For $i\in[\sigma]$, $\sigma=\log(m/\ell)$:*
   (a) *$\mathcal{V}\to\mathcal{P}_0$: random $\alpha_i\in\mathbb{F}$. $\mathcal{P}_0$ assigns α_i to each $\mathcal{P}_j$.*
   (b) *$\mathcal{P}_0\to\mathcal{V}$: a Merkle tree commitment C_i to $f_i|_{L_i}$.*
      i. *$\mathcal{P}_j$: computes its segment $\{f_i|_{L_i}[h]\}_{h=(j-1)d_i+1}^{jd_i}$ by the FRI folding rule $f_i|_{L_i}[a]=F(f_{i-1}|_{L_{i-1}}[a],f_{i-1}|_{L_{i-1}}[a+|L_{i-1}|/2],\alpha_i)$. For $i=1$, each $\mathcal{P}_j$ first forms its segment of $f_0|_{L_0}[n]=\sum_{k\in[\ell]}\alpha^k\cdot f^{(k)}|_{L_0}[n]$ for the needed indices n.*
      ii. *$\mathcal{P}_j\to\mathcal{P}_0$: a Merkle sub-root $\mathsf{H}_i^{(j)}$ over its segment. If $i=\sigma$, $\mathcal{P}_j$ also sends its segment values so that $\mathcal{P}_0$ holds the full $f_i|_{L_i}$.*
      iii. *$\mathcal{P}_0$: aggregates $\{\mathsf{H}_i^{(j)}\}_{j\in[\ell]}$ into C_i*
4. ***(Local Open)** $\mathcal{P}_0$ and $\mathcal{V}$ proceed non-distributedly for $i\in[\sigma+1,\log m+1]$:*
   (a) *$\mathcal{V}\to\mathcal{P}_0$: random challenge $\alpha_i\in\mathbb{F}$.*
   (b) *$\mathcal{P}_0\to\mathcal{V}$: $\mathcal{P}_0$ locally folds $f_{i-1}|_{L_{i-1}}$ into $f_i|_{L_i}$ and commits via a Merkle tree, or sends $f_{i=(\log m+1)}$.*
5. ***(Verification)** Repeat the following for $q=O(\lambda)$ times:*
   (a) *$\mathcal{V}\to\mathcal{P}_0$: random query $\beta\in L_0$. This means that $\mathcal{V}$ needs to query $f_i(\pm\beta^{2^i})$ for all $i\in[0,\log m]$.*
   (b) *$\mathcal{P}_j\to\mathcal{P}_0$: For $i\in[\log(m/\ell)]$, if $f_i(\pm\beta^{2^i})$ corresponds to root $\mathsf{H}_i^{(j)}$, $\mathcal{P}_j$ sends values and tree path to $\mathcal{P}_0$.*
   (c) *$\mathcal{P}_0\to\mathcal{V}$: For last $\log\ell$ rounds, $\mathcal{P}_0$ opens C_i herself. Otherwise, $\mathcal{P}_0$ forwards the above values and tree path.*
   (d) *$\mathcal{V}$: verifies Merkle trees by $\mathsf{MT.Verify}$. Check if $2f_i(\beta^{2^i})=f_{i-1}(\beta^{2^{i-1}})+f_{i-1}(-\beta^{2^{i-1}})+\alpha_i/\beta^{2^{i-1}}\cdot(f_{i-1}(\beta^{2^{i-1}})-f_{i-1}(-\beta^{2^{i-1}}))$. Accept iff all pass.*

tries, computes its $|L_i|/\ell$ entries of $f_i|_{L_i}$, and builds or opens a local Merkle tree with $|L_i|/\ell$ leaves. Summed over rounds, this costs $O(\sum_i|L_i|/\ell)=O(m/\ell)$. Each sub-prover spends $O(m\log m)$ time in committing and $O(m/\ell)$ time in opening.

For the master prover $\mathcal{P}_0$, receiving ℓ sub-roots and aggregating them costs $O(\ell)$ time per round. Over $O(\log m)$ rounds, this is $O(\ell\log m)$. In the last $\log\ell$ rounds, $\mathcal{P}_0$ acts as a non-distributed prover on size-ℓ codewords, costing $O(\ell\log\ell)\subseteq O(\ell\log m)$. Overall, $\mathcal{P}_0$ costs $O(\ell\log m)$.

Proof size and verifier complexity. In the first round, the verifier receives λ queried leaves from an optimized Merkle tree with $O(m)$ leaves, where each leaf contains ℓ field elements. This contributes $O(\lambda\ell)\,\mathbb{F}+O(\lambda\log m)\,\mathsf{H}$ to both proof size and verifier cost. In each subsequent round, the verifier receives $O(\lambda)$ field elements and verifies their Merkle paths, costing $O(\lambda)\,\mathbb{F}+O(\lambda\log m)\,\mathsf{H}$ per round. Over $O(\log m)$ rounds, this totals $O(\lambda\log m)\,\mathbb{F}+O(\lambda\log^2 m)\,\mathsf{H}$. Hence, the total proof size and verifier complexity follow.

Communication. Each sub-prover sends ℓ segments of size $O(m/\ell)$ in round 1, so the total communication is $O(m\ell)$, *i.e.*, amortized $O(m)$ per sub-prover. In round i, each sub-prover receives at most $2|L_i|/\ell$ entries, for amortized communication $O(\sum_i|L_i|/\ell)=O(m/\ell)$ over all opening rounds. The master prover receives ℓ sub-roots per round, for total $O(\ell\log m)$.

Security. As with several other distributed PCSs [24, 26, 36], we assume all sub-provers are honest here. We discuss the accountability of $\textsc{DePip}_{\textsf{FRI}}$ in Section 5.3. From the verifier's view, the transcript is the same as that of a batch FRI [5] (up to the packed Merkle commitment). Hence, the security properties reduce to those of batch FRI. □

5.2 Construction of $\textsc{DePip}_{\textsf{FRI}}$

We build $\textsc{DePip}_{\textsf{FRI}}$ by applying the shred-to-shine method of $\textsc{Pip}_{\textsf{FRI}}$ to the distributed setting. We split a size-N multilinear polynomial $\tilde{f}$ into ℓ size-m polynomials $\tilde{f}^{(1)},\dots,\tilde{f}^{(\ell)}$. This replaces the FFT of $\hat{f}$ by ℓ local FFTs for $\hat{f}^{(1)},\dots,\hat{f}^{(\ell)}$, avoiding a single hard-to-distribute linear-size FFT [35].

Distributed committing. Let $\mathcal{P}_1,\dots,\mathcal{P}_\ell$ be the sub-provers, where $\mathcal{P}_j$ holds $\tilde{f}^{(j)}$. Each $\mathcal{P}_j$ runs an FFT to obtain $\hat{f}^{(j)}|_{L_0}$. Then committing is exactly Step 1 of Protocol 4.

Distributed opening. We realize the opening of $\textsc{DePip}_{\textsf{FRI}}$ by reusing the distributed committing and opening of distributed FRI (Steps 1, 3, 4) and then extending the resulting batch FRI into a distributed rolling batch FRI. Step 3 of $\textsc{Pip}_{\textsf{FRI}}$ follows FRI folding, except that the folding parameters are the evaluation-point coordinates rather than random challenges. Accordingly, the sub-provers mimic Steps 3 and 4 of Protocol 4 to generate, commit, and open $\hat{f}_1,\dots,\hat{f}_\sigma$, where $\sigma=\log m$. Thereafter, they run a batch FRI over $\hat{f}^{(1)},\dots,\hat{f}^{(\ell)}$ and a rolling batch FRI over $\hat{f}_1,\dots,\hat{f}_\sigma$.

We next extend the distributed batch FRI on $\hat{f}^{(1)},\dots,\hat{f}^{(\ell)}$ to a distributed rolling batch FRI that also incorporates $\hat{f}_1,\dots,\hat{f}_\sigma$. After the distributed folding produces $\hat{f}_1|_{L_1},\dots,\hat{f}_\sigma|_{L_\sigma}$, each $\mathcal{P}_j$ holds the j-th segment of $\hat{f}_i|_{L_i}$ of length $d_i=|L_i|/\ell$ for all $i\in[\sigma]$. In round i, distributed batch FRI also gives $\mathcal{P}_j$ the

Protocol 5 (DEPIP$_{\text{FRI}}$)**.** *Let $\mathcal{P}_0$ be the master prover and $\mathcal{P}_1,\dots,\mathcal{P}_\ell$ the sub-provers.*

- $\mathsf{pp} \leftarrow \mathsf{Gen}(1^\lambda, 2, \mu)$*: pp includes $\mathbb{F}$, power-of-two integers $\ell = O(\log N)$ and $m = N/\ell$, and a multiplicative coset L_0. Let $\sigma = \log m$. For $i \in [\sigma]$, define $L_i = \{x^2 \mid x \in L_{i-1}\}$.*
- $C \leftarrow \mathsf{Com}(\mathsf{pp}, \tilde{f}, \tilde{f}^{(1)},\dots,\tilde{f}^{(\ell)})$*: Given $\tilde{f}$, split it into ℓ size-m polynomials $\tilde{f}^{(1)},\dots,\tilde{f}^{(\ell)}$ as in Protocol 2. Assign $\tilde{f}^{(j)}$ to $\mathcal{P}_j$. The sub-provers invoke Step 1 of Protocol 4 to commit to $\tilde{f}^{(1)},\dots,\tilde{f}^{(\ell)}$ and obtain C.*
- $b \leftarrow \mathsf{VerPoly}(\mathsf{pp}, C, [\hat{f}^{(1)}|_{L_0},\dots,\hat{f}^{(\ell)}|_{L_0}], \tilde{f})$*. This algorithm is the same as in PIP$_{\text{FRI}}$, and we omit it.*
- $b \leftarrow \mathsf{Eval}(\mathsf{pp}, C, \boldsymbol{x}, y; (\hat{f}^{(1)},\dots,\hat{f}^{(\ell)}))$*.*

  1. $\mathcal{P}_0$ and the sub-provers run Steps 3–4 of Protocol 4 to generate $\hat{f}_1,\dots,\hat{f}_\sigma$ and their commitments, and to derive the constant $\hat{f}_{\sigma+1}$. Each $\hat{f}_i$ is computed as in Step 3 of Protocol 3, with the replacements below.
  (a) $\alpha^j \mapsto w_j$ for $j \in [\ell]$, where $\boldsymbol{w} = \otimes_{k=1}^{\log \ell}(1, x_{k+\log m})$.
  (b) $\alpha_i \mapsto x_i$ for $i \in [\sigma]$.
  At the end, $\mathcal{P}_j$ holds the j-th part of each $\hat{f}_i|_{L_i}$.

  2. $\mathcal{P}_0$ and the sub-provers prove low degree as follows.
  (a) Run Steps 3–4 of Protocol 4 on $\{\hat{f}^{(j)}\}_{j\in[\ell]}$.
  (b) Extend the same steps into a distributed rolling batch FRI on $\hat{f}_1,\dots,\hat{f}_\sigma$. In round i, $\mathcal{P}_j$ holds the j-th part of $\hat{f}_{i-1}|_{L_{i-1}}$ and $f'_{i-1}|_{L_{i-1}}$. For $i = 1$, set $f'_0|_{L_0} = \sum_{j=1}^{\ell} \alpha^j \cdot \hat{f}^{(j)}|_{L_0}$. Each $\mathcal{P}_j$ folds f'_{i-1} to obtain its part of $f_i|_{L_i}$, then computes its part of $f'_i|_{L_i}$ via Equation (2).

  3. The verifier performs the same consistency and low-degree checks as in PIP$_{\text{FRI}}$. Merkle openings follow Step 5 of Protocol 4.

j-th segment of $f_i|_{L_i}$, where f_i is the i-th folded codeword for $\hat{f}^{(1)},\dots,\hat{f}^{(\ell)}$. To run rolling batch FRI, the sub-provers additionally compute $f'_{i+1}|_{L_{i+1}}$ such that

$$\begin{aligned} f'_{i+1}(X) &= g_i(X) + \alpha_i \cdot h_i(X) + \alpha_i^2 \cdot \hat{f}_{i+1}(X) \\ &= f_{i+1}(X) + \alpha_i^2 \cdot \hat{f}_{i+1}(X), \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

where $f_i(X)$ is uniquely decomposed as $g_i(X^2) + X \cdot h_i(X^2)$ and $f_{i+1}(X) = g_i(X) + \alpha_i \cdot h_i(X)$. Since $\mathcal{P}_j$ can compute its segment of $f_{i+1}|_{L_{i+1}}$ and already holds its segment of $\hat{f}_{i+1}|_{L_{i+1}}$, it can also compute its segment of $f'_{i+1}|_{L_{i+1}}$. This adds only $O(|L_i|/\ell)$ work per round over distributed FRI, leaving the overall complexity unchanged.

With the distributed rolling batch FRI, DEPIP$_{\text{FRI}}$ is built in Protocol 5. For simplicity, we give a non-zk version. Extending it to zero knowledge is straightforward. In Com, each prover holds a sub-polynomial of the target $\tilde{f}$. They invoke the distributed commitment of distributed FRI on the twisted univariate representations of these sub-polynomials.

In Step 1 of Eval, the provers run a variant of distributed FRI to generate $\hat{f}_1,\dots,\hat{f}_{\sigma+1}$ and commit to $\hat{f}_1,\dots,\hat{f}_\sigma$. The folding parameters are derived from the evaluation point, as in PIP$_{\text{FRI}}$ and PolyFRIM [42]. In Step 2, the provers invoke a generalized distributed rolling batch FRI to prove the low-degree properties of the input and folded polynomials.

In Step 3, the verifier checks the folded-polynomial consistency via a variant of distributed FRI. The verifier also checks the low-degree properties of the input and folded polynomials.

Theorem 5.2. *Protocol 5 is a distributed MLPCS. The complexities are the same as those of Protocol 4 in Theorem 5.1.*

Security and Complexity. Assuming each sub-prover is honest, DEPIP$_{\text{FRI}}$ is equivalent to PIP$_{\text{FRI}}$ from the verifier's view. The security properties follow from Theorem 4.1. DEPIP$_{\text{FRI}}$ invokes distributed FRI twice, and one instance is generalized to a distributed rolling batch FRI without affecting complexities. The complexity claim follows from Theorem 5.1, with sub-prover complexity $O(m \log m)$, total communication complexity $O(m\ell)$, and proof size and verifier complexity $O(\lambda \log m + \lambda\ell + \lambda \log^2 m)$.

5.3 Achieving Accountability

Section 5.2 assumes honest sub-provers. We next add accountability so an honest $\mathcal{P}_0$ can flag malicious sub-provers. Our goal is to identify all such sub-provers.

In DEPIP$_{\text{FRI}}$, all messages to the verifier go through $\mathcal{P}_0$. Thus, $\mathcal{P}_0$ can locally check (i) Merkle openings and (ii) algebraic consistency of queried triples, *e.g.*, checking in round i (Step 4 of Protocol 3) whether $\hat{f}_i(\beta^{2^i}) = F(\hat{f}_{i-1}(-\beta^{2^{i-1}}), \hat{f}_{i-1}(\beta^{2^{i-1}}), x_i)$.[3] Merkle-path failures are easy to attribute because each sub-prover opens its own subtree. We thus focus on algebraic inconsistencies.

Even if $\mathcal{P}_0$ detects an inconsistent triple, it may not identify the culprit because the three queried values may come from different sub-provers. Figure 3 illustrates three representative cases. In Case (1), malicious $\mathcal{P}_{j_1}$ commits and opens $\hat{f}_2(\beta^4)$ but sends a fake value $\hat{f}_2^*(\beta^4)$ to an honest recipient. In Case (2), malicious $\mathcal{P}_{j_4}$ computes a wrong $\hat{f}_1(\beta^2)$. In Case (3), even if the middle value is correct, a wrong input value in the first round can still evade a naive "exclude all inconsistent holders" rule. In short, malice manifests in two ways: (M-I) Sending inconsistent entries to different recipients (Case (1)), or (M-II) Incorrect computation (Cases (2)–(3)).

To address M-I, we route inter-prover messages through $\mathcal{P}_0$. Any entry that $\mathcal{P}_{j_1}$ sends to $\mathcal{P}_{j_2}$ is first sent to $\mathcal{P}_0$, who forwards it to $\mathcal{P}_{j_2}$ (green arrows in Case (1) of Figure 3). Then $\mathcal{P}_0$ checks that each forwarded value matches the committed and opened value, so each message is bound to a single value.

We address M-II by requiring each sub-prover to additionally send a PolyFRIM sub-proof for its sub-polynomial.[4]

[3] $\mathcal{P}_0$ can also check the cross-round consistency conditions in the rolling batch FRI (*cf.* Step 5 in Protocol 3). We omit similar checks for brevity.

[4] We can use PIP$_{\text{FRI}}$ for sub-proofs, but this complicates the description.



Figure 3: Three malice patterns in distributed opening: Red marks malicious provers/values ($*$ = incorrect), and green marks honest provers and messages routed via $\mathcal{P}_0$.

These sub-proofs uniquely determine the expected DePIP$_{\mathrm{FRI}}$ proof under the shred-to-shine structure. Using the received sub-proofs, $\mathcal{P}_0$ constructs an honest reference proof and compares it with the assembled DePIP$_{\mathrm{FRI}}$ proof. Any mismatch identifies the malicious sub-prover(s).

The concrete modifications are described as follows.

1. For each $j \in [\ell]$, sub-prover $\mathcal{P}_j$ runs Com of PolyFRIM on $\tilde{f}^{(j)}$ and sends the commitment to $\mathcal{P}_0$. Sub-prover $\mathcal{P}_j$ also sends the claimed value $\tilde{f}^{(j)}(\boldsymbol{v})$ to $\mathcal{P}_0$. Master prover $\mathcal{P}_0$ sets the target claim as $\tilde{f}(\boldsymbol{x}) = \sum_{j\in[\ell]} w_j \cdot \tilde{f}^{(j)}(\boldsymbol{v})$. See Equation (1) for $\boldsymbol{v}$ and $\boldsymbol{w}$. All provers invoke Com of DePIP$_{\mathrm{FRI}}$.
2. Run the following two protocols in parallel.
   (a) All provers invoke Eval of DePIP$_{\mathrm{FRI}}$ with verifier-sampled challenges. All inter-prover messages $\mathcal{P}_j \to \mathcal{P}_k$ are routed as $\mathcal{P}_j \to \mathcal{P}_0 \to \mathcal{P}_k$. The master prover $\mathcal{P}_0$ receives the full DePIP$_{\mathrm{FRI}}$ transcript.
   (b) For each $j \in [\ell]$, sub-prover $\mathcal{P}_j$ invokes Eval of PolyFRIM on $\tilde{f}^{(j)}$ with $\mathcal{P}_0$ as the verifier. The challenges in (b) are identical to those in (a).
3. The master prover $\mathcal{P}_0$ checks all routed messages against the corresponding committed and opened values. Any mismatch identifies the sender as malicious.
4. If all sub-proofs in (b) pass, then for each query point used in DePIP$_{\mathrm{FRI}}$, $\mathcal{P}_0$ obtains the corresponding *sub* evaluations from each $\tilde{f}^{(j)}$. Using Equation (1), $\mathcal{P}_0$ reconstructs the expected evaluations of the *aggregated* objects in DePIP$_{\mathrm{FRI}}$ (*e.g.*, $\hat{f}_0(\pm\beta)$) as the weighted sum $\sum_{j\in[\ell]} w_j \cdot \hat{f}_0^{(j)}(\pm\beta)$. Comparing the reconstructed values with the values appearing in the DePIP$_{\mathrm{FRI}}$ transcript identifies any sub-prover that contributed incorrect entries.

Security. We argue accountability by handling M-I and M-II. For M-I, routing all inter-prover messages through $\mathcal{P}_0$ and binding them to Merkle openings ensures a sender cannot equivocate between recipients. Thus, any detected inconsistency cannot be blamed on inconsistent forwarding. For M-II, $\mathcal{P}_0$ verifies PolyFRIM sub-proofs under the same challenges as DePIP$_{\mathrm{FRI}}$. If a sub-proof fails, $\mathcal{P}_0$ flags the corresponding sub-prover. If all sub-proofs verify, then with high probability the queried sub-evaluations are correct, and Equation (1) lets $\mathcal{P}_0$ reconstruct the expected aggregated evaluations. Any mismatch with the DePIP$_{\mathrm{FRI}}$ transcript identifies the sub-prover(s) that supplied incorrect entries.

Complexity. Each sub-prover additionally produces one PolyFRIM sub-proof on a size-m instance, matching its existing $O(m \log m)$ work. Master prover $\mathcal{P}_0$ verifies ℓ sub-proofs, increasing its work from $O(\ell \log m)$ to $O(\ell \log^2 m)$. Routing messages via $\mathcal{P}_0$ preserves asymptotic communication and adds only constant-factor overhead to the existing exchanges.

6 Implementation and Evaluation

We implement PIP$_{\mathrm{FRI}}$ and DePIP$_{\mathrm{FRI}}$ in Rust using the arkworks ecosystem. Non-distributed benchmarks run on an AMD Ryzen 3900X CPU (12 cores, 32 GB RAM). Distributed benchmarks run on an Intel Xeon Platinum 8255C CPU (24 cores). In distributed runs, each sub-prover is pinned to a single core, for a total of 2–16 cores. We report averages over 10 executions. We do not parallelize within a prover.

6.1 Evaluation of PCSs

Our comparison includes code-based MLPCSs Virgo, Orion, PolyFRIM, and DeepFold. We exclude the schemes below.

- HyperPlonk [13] and BaseFold [40] are dominated by DeepFold [20] in our benchmark setting.
- Brakedown [19] and Block *et al.* [8] are field-agnostic linear-time schemes, and are reported or estimated to underperform Orion on RS-friendly fields, which we test.
- Blaze [10] runs over binary fields. We run over prime fields.

We also include group-based mKZG [13] and Hyrax [32]. mKZG has $O(\log N)$ proof size and verification but requires a trusted setup. Hyrax is transparent with $O(\sqrt{N})$ proof size and verification. We omit Dory [23], dominated by mKZG.

Parameters. We use the Goldilocks field[5] $\mathbb{F}_p$ with $p = 2^{64} - 2^{32} + 1$, as in plonky2[6]. The number of sub-polynomials ℓ is set to the nearest power-of-two to $\log_2(4N)$, typically 64 or 128. For most schemes, the RS code rate is set to $\rho = 1/8$, as in PolyFRIM and DeepFold. Additionally, we implement a

[5] All our benchmarks, except Orion in C++, use arkworks in Rust. All code-based benchmarks use $\mathbb{F}_p$, except Orion uses $\mathbb{F}_{q^2}$ where $q = 2^{61} - 1$. Basic operations over $\mathbb{F}_{q^2}$ (*e.g.*, FFTs) can be about 70% slower than over $\mathbb{F}_p$. We account for this arithmetic gap when interpreting Orion's timings.

[6] https://github.com/0xPolygonZero/plonky2/blob/main/plonky2

PIP$_{\text{FRI}}$ variant with $\rho = 1/2$ to explore the proof-size–prover-time tradeoff. We set the security level to $\lambda = 100$ bits. For FRI-based schemes, we set the repetition parameter (q' in Protocol 3) to $-\lambda/\log_2 \rho$, following prior work [5, 20, 29, 36, 37, 41, 42]. This targets conjectured λ-bit security for list polynomial binding, and DEEP-FRI [6] can reduce the residual list to one with slight overhead. For Orion's direct LDT, we (re-)set the queried column number to $-\lambda/\log_2(1-d/3)$ [17, 19], where d is the GS code distance.

Performance of PIP$_{\text{FRI}}$. We target faster prover time with minimal impact on proof size and verifier time. Figure 4 compares *non-zk* MLPCSs for polynomial sizes from 2^{18} to 2^{27}. Prover time is committing time plus opening time. Missing points are due to out-of-memory, except Orion, which we could not run beyond polynomial size 2^{23}. We benchmark all schemes up to $\mu = 22$, and only PIP$_{\text{FRI}}$ and Hyrax also run up to $\mu = 27$. At $\mu = 27$, PIP$_{\text{FRI-1/8}}$ has a 115 s prover time, a 2.8 ms verifier time, and a 358 KB proof size.

Against mKZG, PIP$_{\text{FRI-1/8}}$ is 10–15× faster in prover time and 5× faster in verifier time, despite worse asymptotics.. Its proof can be 100× larger. However, mKZG needs a trusted setup. Compared with Hyrax, PIP$_{\text{FRI-1/8}}$ is 10× faster in prover time and 30–300× faster in verifier time. For small μ, Merkle openings make the proofs of PIP$_{\text{FRI-1/8}}$ larger, but for $\mu \geq 27$ its proofs become smaller due to lower complexity.

Against Virgo and PolyFRIM, PIP$_{\text{FRI-1/8}}$ is 20× faster in prover time, 1.1–1.6× faster in verifier time, and 1.4–1.8× smaller in proof size. Compared with DeepFold, PIP$_{\text{FRI-1/8}}$ is 5× faster in committing and 40× faster in opening, for a 14× faster prover time overall. Its proof size and verifier time are competitive, ranging from 5% better to 7% worse.

Relative to Orion (linear prover complexity), PIP$_{\text{FRI-1/8}}$ has only 5% slower prover time, but 30× smaller proof size and verifier time. With code rate $1/2$, PIP$_{\text{FRI-1/2}}$ has a 3.5× faster prover time, with 15× lower proof size and verifier time. To our knowledge, this is the first FRI-based PCS with a competitive or faster prover than Orion.

Figure 4(e) compares memory costs, which are crucial for large-scale SNARKs. For example, zkLLM [30] targets models with about 13 billion parameters, suggesting $\mu \approx 34$. In memory use, PIP$_{\text{FRI-1/8}}$ matches Orion, and both use 4× less memory than mKZG and more than 10× less than Virgo, PolyFRIM, and DeepFold. PIP$_{\text{FRI-1/2}}$ uses 3× less memory than PIP$_{\text{FRI-1/8}}$ due to shorter RS codewords, and about 30% less than Hyrax. With 32 GB RAM, PIP$_{\text{FRI-1/2}}$ is the only PCS in Figure 4 that supports $\mu = 29$. This advantage persists as μ grows, improving headroom for larger instances.

Further comparisons with WHIR. This comparison favors WHIR in two ways. First, WHIR replaces FRI as a sub-protocol, so its verifier and proof-size gains come from a lower-complexity LDT. In principle, the same upgrade pattern in PIP can be instantiated with WHIR's LDT in place of FRI. Second, WHIR reports a faster FRI baseline than our implementation, likely due to different Merkle-tree engineering. We view these gaps as implementation-dependent rather than inherent to PIP$_{\text{FRI}}$. Overall, these factors indicate that PIP$_{\text{FRI}}$ can achieve better time performance in practice.

Table 5: Comparison of several code-based (zk-)PCSs

Scheme	Size	$\mathcal{P}$ (s)	$\mathcal{V}$ (ms)	π (KB)	Size	$\mathcal{P}$	$\mathcal{V}$	π
WHIR [3]	2^{18}	0.84	0.8	72	2^{20}	3.8	0.9	85
PIP$_{\text{FRI}}$		0.18	1.1	114		0.8	1.5	156
zk-FRI-PCS	2^{18}	4.8	2.3	242	2^{20}	22.1	2.9	306
zk-Virgo		23.2	1.8	212		102.3	2.1	265
zk-DeepFold		5.1	1.3	137		22.5	1.6	169
zk-PIP$_{\text{FRI}}$		0.4	1.3	132		1.8	1.6	175

Performance of zk-PCSs. We expect PIP$_{\text{FRI}}$'s advantages to persist with zero knowledge. Table 5 compares zk-PIP$_{\text{FRI}}$ with zk-PCSs including Virgo and DeepFold. We omit Orion due to lack of a compatible implementation. For zk-DeepFold, we estimate performance for μ variables from reported results at $\mu + 1$ variables [20], since masking doubles the instance size. We also implement a univariate zk-FRI-PCS baseline via the folklore method of running FRI-PCS [31] twice. Table 5 shows that zk-PIP$_{\text{FRI}}$ is 10–50× faster than zk-FRI-PCS and zk-Virgo [41] in prover time, with 1.3–1.8× faster verification and 1.5–1.8× smaller proofs. It is also 10× faster than zk-DeepFold while matching its proof size and verifier cost.

Notably, (zk-)PIP$_{\text{FRI}}$ outperforms (zk-)FRI-PCS in all three metrics. Although both rely on FRI with comparable total instance size, PIP replaces one large instance with multiple smaller instances that can be committed and opened more efficiently. This may seem counterintuitive: FRI-based PCSs invoke FRI on a comparable total codeword mass across rounds. We improve constants via shred-to-shine: we run more but smaller FRI instances and aggregate them with our packed Merkle commitment, reducing per-instance overhead.

6.2 Evaluation of SNARKs

Figure 5 reports SNARK performance for combinations of PCSs and PIOPs in Spartan [28] and HyperPlonk [13], which are state-of-the-art linear-prover PIOPs for R1CS and Plonkish. Spartan offers two PIOPs. We use the linear-verifier variant, since the sublinear-verifier implementation is integrated with the Hyrax PCS. Accordingly, Spartan-based schemes in Figure 5 have linear verifier time.

With HyperPlonk, PIP$_{\text{FRI}}$ proves an R1CS instance with 2^{23} constraints in 100 s. It is 2× faster than DeepFold, with only 3% worse proof size and verifier time. Against Orion, PIP$_{\text{FRI}}$+HyperPlonk has a 2% worse prover time, but is 10–20× better in proof size and verifier time.

With Spartan, PIP$_{\text{FRI}}$ proves a 2^{23}-constraint instance in 10 s. It is 10× faster than DeepFold, while keeping proof size and verifier time close. Compared with Orion, PIP$_{\text{FRI}}$+Spartan reduces proof size by 20×, with similar prover time and slightly faster verification. Overall, PIP$_{\text{FRI}}$



Figure 4: Performance comparison of PIP_{FRI}, mKZG, Hyrax, and several other code-based MLPCSs



Figure 5: SNARKs from code-based PCSs and varied PIOPs



Figure 6: (a) Times for PIP_{FRI}/$\text{DEPIP}_{\text{FRI}}$ with 2–16 provers; (b) Times for $\text{DEPIP}_{\text{FRI}}$/DemKZG with 4 or 16 provers

improves existing SNARK instantiations by reducing prover time without materially worsening the other metrics.

Our goal is full linear speedup for the prover time of PIP_{FRI}. Figure 6(a) shows scaling from 2 to 16 provers. At size 2^{22}, $\text{DEPIP}_{\text{FRI}}$ reaches 0.66 s with 8 provers. Across these settings, proof size and verifier time remain close to PIP_{FRI}. See Figure 6(a) and Table 6. Figure 6(b) and Table 6 compare $\text{DEPIP}_{\text{FRI}}$ with DemKZG [24] and DeVirgo[7]. We omit DeDory [24], which is less efficient than DemKZG in our reported metrics. With the same number of provers, $\text{DEPIP}_{\text{FRI}}$ is 40× faster than DemKZG in prover time, and 20× faster than DeVirgo (estimated). Code-based $\text{DEPIP}_{\text{FRI}}$ trades off with group-based DemKZG, with faster verification but larger proof size and communication. Notably, $\text{DEPIP}_{\text{FRI}}$ reduces the amortized communication of DeVirgo by 7×, while keeping proof size and verifier time competitive.

For accountable $\text{DEPIP}_{\text{FRI}}$, prover time increases by 6× due to local PCS proofs on sub-polynomials, but remains 3× faster than non-accountable DeVirgo. Amortized communication increases by about 20% due to routing entries via $\mathcal{P}_0$, and has a limited impact in our measurements.

[7] We could not obtain an open-source implementation of DeVirgo. We estimate its performance from Virgo, assuming full linear speedup, and estimate communication from our distributed Merkle tree implementation.

Table 6: Performance of distributed PCSs/SNARKS

Scheme	$\mathcal{P}$ (s)	$\mathcal{V}$ (ms)	π (KB)	Per comm. (KB)
DemKZG [24, 34]	14.3	17.0	2.3	1.7
DeVirgo [36]	7.7	2.2	213	110,000
$\text{DEPIP}_{\text{FRI}}$	0.39	2.1	198	15,000
Accountable **$\text{DEPIP}_{\text{FRI}}$**	2.05	2.1	198	18,775
DemKZG + HyperPianist	35.7	17.4	10.7	16
$\text{DEPIP}_{\text{FRI}}$ + HyperPianist	4.3	2.5	206	46,000

Figures are for size-2^{22} polynomials or circuits with 16 provers. We did not count the time for communication.

Table 7: Prover times of Kaizen by Virgo or PIP_{FRI}

Batch Size	$N=2$		$N=4$	
Kaizen [1] for LeNet	Virgo	PIP_{FRI}	Virgo	PIP_{FRI}
PCS (s)	15.6	3.4	27.8	5.7
Others (s)	17.8		23.5	
Total (s)	33.4	21.2	51.3	29.2

Table 6 compares distributed SNARKs that use the HyperPianist PIOP and either DemKZG or $\text{DEPIP}_{\text{FRI}}$. $\text{DEPIP}_{\text{FRI}}$ delivers an 8× faster prover and a 7× faster verifier. It also yields a *general* SNARK with 46 MB amortized communication, versus the reported 125 MB for a *non-general* SNARK from DeVirgo. This gap grows when a PIOP requires multiple distributed PCSs, as HyperPianist uses three [24] while the DeVirgo SNARK uses one.

6.3 Applications to Machine Learning

PIP_{FRI} has low prover time and low memory overhead, making it suitable for large-scale computations. Kaizen [1] uses Virgo as its code-based PCS, where PCS commitment reportedly exceeds 50% of the prover time. Replacing the PCS with PIP_{FRI} reduces prover time by 36%–42% (*cf.*, Table 7). For 4 batches of LeNet ($N=4$), PIP_{FRI} reduces PCS time from 27.8 s to 5.7 s, reducing the PCS share from 54.2% to 19.5%.

7 Conclusion and Future Work

We presented PIP, a prover-efficiency upgrade framework for multilinear polynomial commitments. The core idea is to shred a large multilinear polynomial into sub-polynomials, make batch-MLPCS commitments to them, and combine their evaluations to answer the target query. We instantiated PIP in group-based and code-based settings as PIP_{KZG} and PIP_{FRI}. We further built $\text{DEPIP}_{\text{FRI}}$, a distributed PIP_{FRI} that supports general circuits and provides accountability for identifying misbehaving sub-provers. Our evaluation shows improved prover-side performance with competitive proof size and verifier time in relevant regimes, and demonstrates end-to-end gains when integrated into SNARK constructions.

Future work includes extending PIP to additional PCS families and sub-protocols beyond the instantiations studied here. Another direction is to combine PIP with alternative low-degree tests to reduce proof size and verifier time without sacrificing prover efficiency.

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Ethical Considerations

Stakeholder Identification and Impacts. We structure this section as a stakeholder-based analysis, distinguishing direct stakeholders (those who design, implement, or deploy our schemes) from indirect stakeholders (people and organizations affected by systems that depend on them). Direct stakeholders include the research team and organizations that integrate the schemes into blockchain, privacy, or verifiable computation platforms. Indirect stakeholders include end users whose assets or data rely on such platforms, regulators and auditors responsible for oversight, and adversaries who may attempt to abuse or subvert these systems.

Research Team. Our work involves no human subjects, no physical experiments, and no collection of real-world private data. We explicitly acknowledge and respect the intellectual contributions of each team member, ensuring that authorship reflects meaningful involvement.

Blockchain and Privacy Technology Companies. Companies using SNARKs (*e.g.*, zk-rollups and private smart contracts) may adopt our schemes to improve efficiency. However, adoption may require significant engineering effort to integrate new protocols, incur audit costs for security review, and lead to degraded performance under certain conditions. We have documented quantitative performance benchmarks (*e.g.*, prover time, proof size, and verification time) and known limitations (*e.g.*, large proof size for resource-constrained scenarios).

Cryptography Community and Society.

Beneficence. We propose (distributed) polynomial commitment schemes (PCSs) and SNARKs, which support verifiable computation while preserving privacy. This work aligns with ethical standards regarding data security and privacy by strengthening confidentiality and integrity guarantees without requiring access to users' raw data.

Respect for Persons. We have carefully cited prior work to ensure accurate attribution and to avoid plagiarism.

Justice. The mathematical nature of our work, which is free from proprietary dependencies or specialized infrastructure, is intended to keep the core ideas accessible to researchers and developers worldwide. We have documented the schemes thoroughly to reduce knowledge disparities.

Respect for Law and Public Interest. Our research complies with all relevant academic and cryptographic research policies and guidelines. By advancing the state of the art in SNARKs, this work serves the public interest by enabling more trustworthy, efficient, and auditable digital infrastructure.

Publication Impacts. Our schemes may influence future research directions, *e.g.*, by enabling more efficient (distributed) PCSs and SNARKs. To reduce misuse or misinterpretation, we have documented key design tradeoffs to guide responsible adoption, such as the impact of m and ℓ in our PIP framework, and compatibility with alternative PCSs.

Potential Harms Analysis. We acknowledge that the protocols may create negative impacts if used by illicit actors to conceal their activities, for example, to hide financial flows or other unlawful conduct within privacy-preserving systems. There is also a risk of harm to honest users if immature, misconfigured, or unreviewed implementations of the schemes are deployed in production, since cryptographic failures can lead to loss of funds, privacy breaches, or service disruptions. We strongly encourage responsible use of these protocols strictly within the bounds of applicable law and regulation, and we expect deployers to combine our schemes with appropriate governance, monitoring, and legal compliance processes. In addition, we have documented security assumptions and recommended parameter choices to reduce the risk of unsafe deployment.

Decision to Conduct and Publish. This research was initiated to improve the efficiency of existing PCSs and SNARKs. The project was approved internally after assessing its technical merit and alignment with our team's research agenda. We considered potential dual-use risks associated with more efficient schemes and judged that the likely benefits to privacy-preserving systems outweigh the risk of misuse when deployment follows appropriate legal and technical controls.

The decision to publish was made after rigorous internal validation, including peer review among team members, proof verification, and implementation benchmarking. We believe our technical contributions have sufficient novelty, correctness, and utility to merit dissemination to the broader cryptographic community.

We did not identify ethical concerns during our internal review sufficient to warrant withholding publication, given the mitigations and usage expectations described above, although residual dual-use risks remain. We believe that open sharing of our results promotes accountability, reduces duplication of effort, and supports innovation in cryptography research, in line with community norms.

Open Science

Our code and data are available at 10.5281/zenodo.17867141.

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A Comparisons with Concurrent Work

FRIttata [38] proposes a "fold-and-batch" distributed FRI, sharing our goal of distributed code-based PCSs while focusing on empirical communication savings. Asymptotically, we improve master prover complexity, proof size, and verifier complexity, with the same total communication complexity.

FRIttata does not achieve full linear speedup, with verifier time and proof size worsening as the number of provers grows. Our prover efficiency comes from the improved distributed opening with $O(m/\ell)$ sub-prover and amortized communication, which could also accelerate theirs.

We build distributed code-based PCSs and SNARKs for general circuits via an MLPCS and the multilinear PIOP in HyperPianist [24]. Instead, FRIttata uses a bivariate PCS with the bivariate PIOP in Pianist [26], which is incompatible with our multilinear technique. Our faster FRI and linear-time PIOP yield a faster prover for distributed PCS and SNARK.[8]

[8] FRIttata did not report figures for their distributed PCSs and SNARKs.

Accountability is also not in their scope. Their PCS distributes only bivariate polynomials of the form $f(X,Y) = \sum_i f_i(X)L_i(Y)$ by assigning *independent* $f_i(X)$ to provers. In contrast, shred-to-shine enables distributed FFTs and supports (single) univariate, bivariate, and multilinear polynomials. It also speeds up the prover of *non-distributed* FRI-PCS. Its benefits extend to other PCSs as well, *e.g.*, FRIttata's or mKZG.

HyperFond [39] builds a distributed MLPCS over the non-distributed BaseFold [40]. $\text{DEPIP}_{\text{FRI}}$ matches the HyperFond PCS in prover complexity while improving proof size and verifier complexity at the expense of higher communication complexity. HyperFond does not achieve *full* linear speedup, and it cannot simultaneously optimize proof size/verifier complexity and communication complexity. HyperFond does not report concrete PCS timings, but its prover time can be estimated. Our non-distributed PIP_{FRI} already has a faster prover time than DeepFold and hence BaseFold on RS-friendly fields. With *optimal* full linear speedup, our distributed $\text{DEPIP}_{\text{FRI}}$ would inherit this prover-time advantage over HyperFond.

The distributed encoding of the HyperFond PCS splits the coefficient vector $\boldsymbol{f}$ and lets prover $\mathcal{P}_i$ encode $\boldsymbol{f}^{(i)}$. To recover the codeword $\mathsf{Enc}(\boldsymbol{f})$ of $\boldsymbol{f}$, HyperFond uses a specific foldable-linear-code property by linearly combining $\mathsf{Enc}(\boldsymbol{f}^{(1)}),\ldots,\mathsf{Enc}(\boldsymbol{f}^{(\ell)})$. This approach does not apply to other codes like RS codes that lack this property. Our shred-to-shine method is more general and compatible with any linear codes by transforming f into sub-polynomials $f^{(1)},\ldots,f^{(\ell)}$ and reconstructing the evaluation of f from sub-evaluations.

Experimental details appear in the full version [25].

B Security Proof of PIP Framework

Proof. For Equation (1), define $d_v = \log m$, $d_w = \log \ell$, and $d = d_v + d_w$. Define $b_k(i) \in \{0,1\}$ as the k-th bit of the binary representation of i, for $i \in [N]$. Define $c_k(a) \in \{0,1\}$ as the k-th bit of the binary representation of a, for $a \in [m]$. Define $d_k(j) \in \{0,1\}$ as the k-th bit of the binary representation of j, for $j \in [\ell]$. By definition of $\boldsymbol{v}$ and $\boldsymbol{w}$, we have $v_a = \prod_{k=1}^{d_v} x_k^{c_k(a)}$ and $w_j = \prod_{k=1}^{d_w} x_{k+d_v}^{d_k(j)}$. For each $j \in [\ell]$, we rewrite $\tilde{f}_j(\boldsymbol{v})$ as $\tilde{f}_j(\boldsymbol{v}) = \sum_{a=1}^{m} f_{(j-1)\cdot m+a} \cdot \prod_{k=1}^{d_v} x_k^{c_k(a)}$.

By definition of multilinear evaluation, $y = \tilde{f}(\boldsymbol{x}) = \sum_{i=1}^{N} f_i \cdot \prod_{k=1}^{d} x_k^{b_k(i)}$. Write $i = (j-1)\cdot m + a$, and expand as $y = \sum_{j=1}^{\ell} \sum_{a=1}^{m} f_{(j-1)\cdot m+a} \cdot \prod_{k=1}^{d} x_k^{b_k(i)}$. For $1 \le k \le d_v$, we have $b_k(i) = c_k(a)$. For $d_v + 1 \le k \le d$, we have $b_k(i) = d_{k-d_v}(j)$. Hence, $\prod_{k=1}^{d} x_k^{b_k(i)} = \left(\prod_{k=1}^{d_v} x_k^{c_k(a)}\right) \cdot \left(\prod_{k=1}^{d_w} x_{k+d_v}^{d_k(j)}\right) = v_a \cdot w_j$. Substituting, $y = \sum_{j=1}^{\ell} \sum_{a=1}^{m} f_{(j-1)\cdot m+a} \cdot v_a \cdot w_j$. Reindexing yields $y = \sum_{j=1}^{\ell} w_j \left(\sum_{a=1}^{m} f_{(j-1)\cdot m+a} \cdot v_a\right) = \sum_{j=1}^{\ell} w_j \cdot \tilde{f}_j(\boldsymbol{v})$.

Completeness and Binding. Completeness follows from the completeness of PC_ℓ applied to each committed sub-polynomial. For binding, suppose there exist $\tilde{f} \neq \tilde{f}'$ such that $\mathsf{VerPoly}(\mathsf{pp}, C, \tilde{f}) = \mathsf{VerPoly}(\mathsf{pp}, C, \tilde{f}') = 1$. Then there exists $j \in [\ell]$ with $\tilde{f}_j \neq \tilde{f}'_j$ such that $\mathsf{VerPoly}(\mathsf{pp}_\ell, C_j, \tilde{f}_j) = \mathsf{VerPoly}(\mathsf{pp}_\ell, C_j, \tilde{f}'_j) = 1$. This contradicts the binding of PC_ℓ.

Knowledge Soundness. Let $\mathcal{E}_\ell$ be the extractor for Eval_ℓ with expected running time $\mathsf{poly}(m)$. The extractor $\mathcal{E}$ runs $\mathcal{E}_\ell$ sequentially to obtain $\tilde{f}_j$ consistent with the claimed evaluation u_j, for all $j \in [\ell]$. $\mathcal{E}$ then concatenates the coefficients of $\{\tilde{f}_j\}_{j\in[\ell]}$ to output $\tilde{f}$ such that $\tilde{\boldsymbol{f}} = (\tilde{\boldsymbol{f}}_1,\ldots,\tilde{\boldsymbol{f}}_\ell)$. The running time is $\ell \cdot \mathsf{poly}(m) = \mathsf{poly}(N)$. Knowledge soundness follows.

Complexity. The ℓ commitments $C_1,\ldots,C_\ell$ can be generated independently and in parallel. The total commitment complexity is $\ell \cdot t_{\mathsf{C}}(m)$, which is $O(N \log m)$ when $t_{\mathsf{C}}(m) = O(m \log m)$. The opening complexity, verifier complexity, and proof size follow by substituting m and ℓ into the batch PCS bounds. If the proof size for a size-N polynomial is $\log^c N$, then $O(\log^c(N/\log^c N) + \log^c N) = O(\log^c N)$. The verifier complexity is similar. As the prover handles size-m polynomials, the size of SRS, if required, is m. □

C Security Proof of zk-PIP_{FRI}

Completeness follows from the completeness of rolling batch FRI, the linearity of the RS code, and the equivalence between multilinear evaluation and the FRI-like folding in Step 3 of Protocol 3. We state this equivalence as Lemma 1 (distilled from PolyFRIM [42]).

Lemma 1 ([42]). *For any size-$m = 2^{\sigma+1}$ multilinear polynomial $\tilde{f}_0$ and any evaluation point $\boldsymbol{x} = (x_1,\ldots,x_\sigma,x_{\sigma+1})$, if Step 3 of Protocol 3 is followed to fold $\tilde{f}_0$ to obtain the constant $\hat{f}_{\sigma+1}$, then $\hat{f}_{\sigma+1} = \tilde{f}_0(x_1,\ldots,x_\sigma,x_{\sigma+1})$.*

Based on Lemma 1, we obtain the claimed evaluation used in our protocol by instantiating the folding point as required by Protocol 2. By construction of Protocol 2, we have $\sum_{j\in[\ell]} w_j \cdot \tilde{f}^{(j)}(\boldsymbol{x}) = \langle \boldsymbol{w}, \boldsymbol{u} \rangle = \tilde{f}(x_1,\ldots,x_\mu) = y$. Completeness follows.

Polynomial Binding. The Merkle commitment fixes the committed vectors $\hat{f}^{(1)}|_{L_0},\ldots,\hat{f}^{(\ell)}|_{L_0}$ uniquely under collision resistance. Assuming the proximity parameter $\delta = (1-\rho)/2$ is within the unique decoding radius, each committed vector determines a unique polynomial $\hat{f}^{(j)}$ consistent with it (within δ), and thus determines a unique target polynomial $\tilde{f}$.

Knowledge Soundness. PIP_{FRI} is an argument of knowledge in the random oracle model. By extractability of Merkle-tree commitments, an extractor can recover the opened leaf values and hence the committed RS codewords. The extractor decodes $\hat{f}^{(1)}|_{L_0},\ldots,\hat{f}^{(\ell)}|_{L_0}$ (*e.g.*, via Berlekamp–Welch) to obtain ℓ low-degree polynomials. From their coefficient vectors, it discards the unused half and recovers multilinear polynomials $\tilde{f}^{(1)},\ldots,\tilde{f}^{(\ell)}$. It then reconstructs the extracted witness polynomial $\tilde{f} := \sum_{j=1}^{\ell} w_j \cdot \tilde{f}^{(j)}$. If the extracted $\tilde{f}$ satisfies $\tilde{f}(\boldsymbol{x}) \neq y$, we upper bound the verifier acceptance probability by conditioning on the extractor output.

- $C \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_1\left(1^\lambda, \mathsf{pp}\right)$

1. Randomly pick a size-N multilinear polynomial $\tilde{f}'$, split it as ℓ size-m polynomials, and add m random entries to the right end of each polynomial's coefficients. Denote these size-$2m$ univariate polynomials as $\hat{f}'^{(1)}, \ldots, \hat{f}'^{(\ell)}$.
2. Randomly select a size-$2m$ polynomial $\hat{s}'$.
3. Run $C \leftarrow \mathsf{MT.Com}([\hat{f}'^{(1)}|_{L_0}, \ldots, \hat{f}'^{(\ell)}|_{L_0}, \hat{s}'|_{L_0}])$.

- $\langle \mathcal{S}_2, \mathcal{A}\rangle(\mathsf{pp}, C, \boldsymbol{x})$

1. Send $(y, \tilde{s}'(\boldsymbol{x}, 0))$ to $\mathcal{A}$ given oracle access to $y = \tilde{f}(\boldsymbol{x})$.
2. Receive α from $\mathcal{A}$.
3. Given the consistency and validity queries $B = \{\beta_j\}_{j\in[Q]}$, $\mathcal{S}_2$ outputs a size-m polynomial $\tilde{f}_1'$. Let $\hat{f}_1'$ be its twisted univariate form. Let $\hat{f}_0' := \sum_{i=1}^{\ell} w_i \hat{f}'^{(i)}$, where $\boldsymbol{w} = \otimes_{k\in[\log \ell]}(1, x_{k+\log m})$.
   - For each $\beta_j \in B$, set

$$\hat{f}_1'(\beta_j^2) = \frac{\hat{f}_0'(\beta_j) + \alpha \hat{s}'(\beta_j) + \hat{f}_0'(-\beta_j) + \alpha \hat{s}'(-\beta_j)}{2} + x_1 \cdot \frac{\hat{f}_0'(\beta_j) + \alpha \hat{s}'(\beta_j) - \hat{f}_0'(-\beta_j) - \alpha \hat{s}'(-\beta_j)}{2\beta_j}.$$

   - $\tilde{f}_1'(x_2, x_3, \ldots, x_{\log m}, 0) = y$.

   $\mathcal{S}_2$ opens $\hat{f}'^{(1)}, \ldots, \hat{f}'^{(\ell)}$ to open $\hat{f}_0'$ honestly, sets $\hat{f}_1'$ as the second-round polynomial, and acts honestly thereafter.

Figure 7: Simulator $\mathcal{S} = (\mathcal{S}_1, \mathcal{S}_2)$ of zk-$\mathrm{PIP}_{\mathrm{FRI}}$

- Case 1. Some $\hat{f}_i$ for $i \in [0, \mu+1]$ has size $> 2^{\mu+1-i}$. We argue that the soundness error in this case is $|L_0|/|\mathbb{F}| + ((1+\rho)/2)^{q'} + \mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$. This follows from the soundness of rolling batch FRI as analyzed in PolyFRIM. Intuitively, the only difference is that rolling batch FRI starts from a single input codeword, whereas our LDT starts from multiple input codewords. Still, by the generalized correlated agreement over span spaces [5], if $\sum_{i\in[\ell]} \alpha^i \cdot \boldsymbol{u}_i$ is close to a codeword $\boldsymbol{v} \in \mathrm{RS}[L_0, \rho]$ for vectors $\boldsymbol{u}_1, \ldots, \boldsymbol{u}_\ell \in \mathbb{F}^{|L_0|}$ and random challenge α, then with high probability each $\boldsymbol{u}_i$ is close to some codeword in $\mathrm{RS}[L_0, \rho]$. Here, "close" refers to Hamming distance. Further, the agreement positions between each vector and its corresponding codeword are the same.

- Case 2. For all $i \in [0, \mu+1]$, $\deg(\hat{f}_i) \le 2^{\mu+1-i}$, and all evaluation proofs verify. Since $\tilde{f}(\boldsymbol{x}) \ne y$, the equality $\tilde{f}(\boldsymbol{x}) + \alpha \cdot \tilde{s}(\boldsymbol{x}, 0) = y + \alpha \cdot y_s$ holds with probability at most $1/|\mathbb{F}|$ over uniform α. Otherwise, there exists i such that $\hat{f}_i(X) \ne \hat{g}_{i-1}(X) + x_i \cdot \hat{h}_{i-1}(X)$ but the equality holds at the verifier query β. By the Schwartz–Zippel lemma, this event has probability at most $2m/|L_0|$ since $\deg(\hat{f}_i) \le 2m$. With q independent queries, the probability is at most $(2m/|L_0|)^q$.

Using the union bound argument, the soundness error is $\mathsf{negl}(\lambda) + |L_0|/|\mathbb{F}| + (2^{\mu+1}/|L_0|)^q + ((1+\rho)/2)^{q'}$. By appropriate choices of parameters, this error can be negligible.[9]

For the soundness of Case 1, we adapt some notation from PolyFRIM. Define functions $\{\mathsf{back}_i\}_{i\in[0,\sigma+1]}$ and sets $\{\mathsf{err}_i\}_{i\in[0,\sigma+1]}$. Define $\mathsf{back}_0(A_0) = A_0$ for $A_0 \subseteq L_0$, and $\mathsf{back}_i(A_i) = \mathsf{back}_{i-1}(A_{i-1})$ for $A_i = \{x^2 | x \in A_{i-1}\}$ and $i \ge 1$. Define $\mathsf{err}_0 = \emptyset$. For $i \in [\sigma+1]$, let the set E be $\{x \in L_{i-1} : \ell_i(x^2) + \alpha r_i(x^2) + \alpha_i^2 \hat{f}_i(x^2) \ne \hat{f}_i'(x^2)\}$, where $\hat{f}_i'(X) = \ell_i(X^2) + X \cdot r_i(X^2)$. Define $\mathsf{err}_i = \mathsf{err}_{i-1} \cup \mathsf{back}_{i-1}(E)$. For $i \in [\sigma+1]$, suppose that $\hat{h}^{(i)}|_{L_i} \in \mathrm{RS}[L_i, \rho]$ and set $A_i = \{x \in L_i | \hat{f}_i'(x) = \hat{h}^{(i)}(x)\}$. Define $\varepsilon_i(\cdot) : L_i \to \{0,1\}$ such that $\varepsilon_i(A_i) = |\mathsf{back}_i(A_i) \cap \mathsf{err}_i|/|L_0| + (1 - |A_i|/|L_i|)$. By definition, $|\mathsf{back}_i(A_i)| = 2^i |A_i|$, $A_i \subseteq L_i$, and $\mathsf{err}_i \subseteq L_i$. Intuitively, $\varepsilon_i(A_i)$ refers to the probability that the verifier finds an inconsistency in the i-th round. Further, $\varepsilon_{\sigma+1}(A_{\sigma+1})$ refers to the probability that the verifier finds an inconsistency and rejects with a single query in Step 5 of Protocol 3. Suppose:

$$\Pr[\varepsilon_{\sigma+1}(A_{\sigma+1}) \ge (1-\rho)/2] \ge 1 - |L_0|/|\mathbb{F}|. \quad (3)$$

That is, with probability at least $1 - |L_0|/|\mathbb{F}|$, the verifier can catch an inconsistency of about $\delta = (1-\rho)/2$ if it picks only one query. For q' queries, the probability that a malicious prover cheats successfully will be $(1-\delta)^{q'} = ((1+\rho)/2)^{q'}$.

According to PolyFRIM [42, Theorem 3.1], to prove Inequality (3), it suffices to prove $\Pr[\varepsilon_1(A_1) \ge \delta] \ge 1 - |L_0|/|\mathbb{F}|$ in three cases below: (a) For all $i \in [1, \sigma]$, $\Delta(\hat{f}_i'|_{L_i}, \mathrm{RS}[L_i, \rho]) \le \delta$; (b) For all $i \ge 2$, $\Delta(\hat{f}_i|_{L_i}, \mathrm{RS}[L_i, \rho]) \le \delta$; (c) At least one of $\Delta(\hat{f}_0'|_{L_0}, \mathrm{RS}[L_0, \rho]) > \delta$ and $\Delta(\hat{f}_1|_{L_1}, \mathrm{RS}[L_1, \rho]) > \delta$ holds.

In the cases above, (a) and (b) are good ones. We only need to focus on (c). Here, $\hat{f}_0'(X) = \sum_{i=1}^{\ell} \alpha_0^{i-1} \hat{f}^{(i)}(X)$ and $\hat{f}_1'(X) = \hat{f}_0'(X) + \alpha_0^{\ell} \hat{f}_1(X)$. By Lemma 2, for random α_0, with a probability of $1 - |L_0|/|\mathbb{F}|$, it holds that $\Delta(\hat{f}_1'|_{L_1}, \mathrm{RS}[L_1, \rho]) \ge \delta$. The soundness of Case 1 hence follows.

Lemma 2 (The generalized correlated agreement [5])**.** *For $\delta < (1-\rho)/2$, $\{\hat{f}_i\}_{i\in[n-1]}$, multiplicative coset L, and code rate ρ, if $\Pr_{\alpha \leftarrow_\$ \mathbb{F}}[\Delta(\sum_{i=0}^{n-1} \alpha^i \cdot \hat{f}_i|_L, \mathrm{RS}[L, \rho]) \le \delta] \ge |L|/|\mathbb{F}|$, where $\Delta(\boldsymbol{a}, \boldsymbol{b})$ is the relative Hamming distance between $\boldsymbol{a}$ and $\boldsymbol{b}$, there exists $L' \subset L$ and $\hat{p}_i$ with the same degree bounds as $\hat{f}_i$ s.t. $|L'|/|L| \ge 1 - \delta$ and $\hat{f}_i|_{L'} = \hat{p}_i|_{L'}$ for $i \in [0, n-1]$.*

Zero Knowledge. Figure 7 defines the simulator $\mathcal{S} = (\mathcal{S}_1, \mathcal{S}_2)$. For each j, $\hat{f}'^{(j)}$ appends m fresh random coefficients, which statistically hides evaluations at any query set B with $|B| = O(\lambda) \ll m$. After round 1, the masking polynomial $\hat{s}'$ further randomizes all opened values, making the openings statistically independent of the witness given the verifier challenges. The simulator need not know α in advance, since α only instantiates the linear constraints that $\mathcal{S}_2$ enforces on $\tilde{f}_1'$. The simulator is efficient because $\tilde{f}_1'$ is obtained by solving a linear system with m variables and $|B|+1$ constraints.

[9] We prove polynomial binding and knowledge soundness in the unique decoding radius for simplicity, *i.e.*, with proximity parameter $\delta = (1-\rho)/2$. It extends to the list decoding radius via the techniques of DEEP-FRI [6] with little efficiency loss. In the list decoding radius, many polynomials may be close to the committed codeword. This list can be reduced to size one [6, 20].