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Not-quite-so-broken TLS: lessons in re-engineering a security protocol specification and implementation

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Abstract
Transport Layer Security (TLS) implementations have a history of security flaws. The immediate causes of these are often programming errors, e.g. in memory management, but the root causes are more fundamental: the challenges of interpreting the ambiguous prose specification, the complexities inherent in large APIs and code bases, inherently unsafe programming choices, and the impossibility of directly testing conformance between implementations and the specification.

We present nqsb-TLS, the result of our re-engineered approach to security protocol specification and implementation that addresses these root causes. The same code serves two roles: it is both a specification of TLS, executable as a test oracle to check conformance of traces from arbitrary implementations, and a usable implementation of TLS; a modular and declarative programming style provides clean separation between its components. Many security flaws are thus excluded by construction.

nqsb-TLS can be used in standalone Unix applications, which we demonstrate with a messaging client, and can also be compiled into Xen unikernels (specialised virtual machine image) with a trusted computing base (TCB) that is 4% of a standalone system running a standard Linux/OpenSSL stack, with all network traffic being handled in a memory-safe language; this supports applications including HTTPS, IMAP, Git, and Websocket clients and servers. Despite the dual-role design, the high-level implementation style, and the functional programming language we still achieve reasonable performance, with the same handshake performance as OpenSSL and 73% – 84% for bulk throughput.

1 Introduction
Current mainstream engineering practices for specifying and implementing security protocols are not fit for purpose: as one can see from many recent compromises of sensitive services, they are not providing the security we need. Transport Layer Security (TLS) is the most widely deployed security protocol on the Internet, used for authentication and confidentiality, but a long history of exploits shows that its implementations have failed to guarantee either property. Analysis of these exploits typically focusses on their immediate causes, e.g. errors in memory management or control flow, but we believe their root causes are more fundamental:

Error-prone languages: historical choices of programming language and programming style that tend to lead to such errors rather than protecting against them.

Lack of separation: the complexities inherent in working with large code bases, exacerbated by lack of emphasis on clean separation of concerns and modularity, and by poor language support for those.

Ambiguous and untestable specifications: the challenges of writing and interpreting the large and ambiguous prose specifications, and the impossibility of directly testing conformance between implementations and a prose specification.

In this paper we report on an experiment in developing a practical and usable TLS stack, nqsb-TLS, using a new approach designed to address each of these root-cause problems. This re-engineering, of the development process and of our concrete stack, aims to build in improved security from the ground up.

We demonstrate the practicality of the result in several ways: we show on-the-wire interoperability with existing stacks; we show reasonable performance, in both bulk transfer and handshakes; we use it in a test oracle, validating recorded packet traces which contain TLS sessions between other implementations; and we use it as part of a standalone instant-messaging client. In addition to use in such traditional executables, nqsb-TLS is usable in applications compiled into unikernels – type-safe, single-address-space VMs with TCBs that run directly
on a hypervisor [32]. This integration into a unikernel stack lets us demonstrate a wide range of working systems, including HTTPS, IMAP, Git, and Websocket clients and servers, while sidestepping a further difficulty with radical solutions in this area: the large body of legacy code (in applications, operating systems, and libraries) that existing TLS stacks are intertwined with.

We assess the security of nqsb-TLS also in several ways: for each of the root causes above, we discuss why our approach rules out certain classes of associated flaws, with reference to an analysis of flaws found in previous TLS implementations; and we test our authentication logic with a large corpus of certificate chains generated by using the Frankencert fuzzer [8], which found flaws in several previous implementations. We have also made the system publically available for penetration testing, as a Bitcoin Piñata, an example unikernel using nqsb-TLS. This has a TCB size roughly 4% of that of a similar system using OpenSSL on Linux.

We describe our overall approach in the remainder of the introduction. We then briefly describe the TLS protocol (§2), analyse flaws previously found in TLS implementations (§3), and the result of applying our approach, dubbed nqsb-TLS (§4). We demonstrate the duality of nqsb-TLS next by using its specification to validate recorded sessions (§5) and executing its implementation to provide concrete services (§6). We evaluate the interoperability, performance, and security (§7) of nqsb-TLS, describe related work (§8), and conclude (§9).

nqsb-TLS is freely available under a BSD license (https://nqsb.io), and the data used in this paper is openly accessible [27].

1.1 Approach

A precise and testable specification for TLS In principle, a protocol specification should unambiguously define the set of all implementation behaviour that it allows, and hence also what it does not allow: it should be precise. This should not be confused with the question of whether a specification is loose or tight: a precise specification might well allow a wide range of implementation behaviour. It is also highly desirable for specifications to be executable as test oracles: given an implementation behaviour (perhaps a trace captured from a particular execution), the specification should let one compute whether it is in the allowed set or not.

In practice, the TLS specification is neither, but rather a series of RFCs written in prose [13, 14, 15]. An explicit and precise description of the TLS state machine is lacking, as are some security-critical preconditions of its transitions, and there are ambiguities in various semi-formal grammars. There is no way such prose documents can be executed as a test oracle to directly test whether implementation behaviour conforms to the specification. TLS is not unique in this, of course, and many other specifications are expressed in the same traditional prose style, but its disadvantages are especially serious for security protocols.

For nqsb-TLS, we specify TLS as a collection of pure functions over abstract datatypes. By avoiding I/O and shared mutable state, these functions can be considered in isolation and each is deterministic, with errors returned as explicit values. The top-level function takes an abstract protocol state and an incoming message, and calculates the next state and any response messages. To do so, it invokes subsidiary functions to parse the message, drive the state machine, perform cryptographic operations, and construct the response. This top-level function can be executed as a trace-checker, on traces both from our implementation and from others, such as OpenSSL, to decide whether they are allowed by our specification or not. In building our specification, to resolve the RFC ambiguities, we read other implementations and tested interoperability with them; we thereby capture the practical de facto standard.

Reuse between specification and implementation

The same functions form the main part of our implementation, coupled with code for I/O and to provide entropy. Note that this is not an “executable specification” in the conventional sense: our specification is necessarily somewhat loose, as the server must have the freedom to choose a protocol version and cipher suite, and the trace checker must admit that, while our implementation rules out certain classes of associated flaws, there are other implementations that allow the trace to be checked offline.
Separation and modular structure  This focus on pure functional descriptions also enables a decomposition of the system (both implementation and specification) into strongly separated modules, with typed interfaces, that interact only by exchanging pure values, as shown in Fig. 1. These modules and their interfaces are arranged to ensure that localised concerns such as binary protocol formats, ASN.1 grammars and certificate validation are not spread throughout the stack, with no implicit dependencies via shared memory.

External resources are explicitly represented as modules, instead of being implicitly accessed, and each satisfies a module type that describes collections of operations over an abstract type, and that can be instantiated with any of several implementations. These include the Nocrypto cryptography layer and our PRNG, which depends on an external Entropy module type.

Communication with the outside world is factored out into an I/O component, Flows, that passes a byte sequence to the pure core, then transmits responses and handles timeouts, and is used by the top-level but not by the TLS engine itself. The pure TLS engine depends on some external data, such as the policy config and trust anchors.

Choice of language and style  The structure we describe above could be implemented in many different programming languages, but guarantees of memory and type safety are desirable to exclude many common security flaws (lack of memory safety was the largest single source of vulnerabilities in various TLS stacks throughout 2014, as shown in our §3 vulnerability analysis), and expressive statically checked type and module systems help maintain the strongly separated structure that we outlined. Our implementation of nqsb-TLS uses OCaml, a memory-safe, statically typed programming language that compiles to fast native code with a lightweight, embeddable runtime. OCaml supports (but does not mandate) a pure programming style, and has a module system which supports large-scale abstraction via ML functors – modules that can depend on other modules’ types. In OCaml, we can encode complex state machines (§4), with lightweight invariants statically enforced by the type checker (state machine problems were the second largest source of vulnerabilities). Merely using OCaml does not guarantee all the properties we need, of course (one can write imperative and convoluted code in any language); our specification and programming styles are equally important.

This is a significant departure from normal practice, in which systems software is typically written in C, but we believe our evaluation shows that it is viable in at least some compelling scenarios (§7).

Non-goals  For nqsb-TLS we are focussed on the engineering of TLS specifications and implementations, not on the security protocol itself (as we recall in §3, some vulnerabilities have been found there). We are also not attempting to advance the state of the art in side-channel defence, though we do follow current best practice. We are focussed on making a stack that is usable in practice and on security improvements achievable with better engineering processes, rather than trying to prove that a specification or implementation is correct or secure (see §8 for related work in that direction).

Current state  The entire set of TLS RFCs [13, 14, 15] are implemented in nqsb-TLS, apart from minor rarely used features, such as DSS certificates and anon and pre-shared keys ciphersuites. As we demonstrate in §7.1, nqsb-TLS can interoperate with many contemporary TLS implementations, but we are not attempting to support legacy options or those of doubtful utility. We neither support SSLv3 [1], nor use RC4 in the default configuration [39]. The crypto wars are over: we have not implemented ciphersuites to adhere to export restrictions, which gave rise to the FREAK and Logjam attacks.

nqsb-TLS is strict (see §7.2), which results in roughly 10% failing connections from legacy clients. But since our main goal is to provide security, we are not willing to make compromises for insecure implementations. In addition to TLS itself, we also implemented ASN.1, X.509 and crypto primitives. From a practical point of view, the largest missing part is elliptic curve cryptography.

2 TLS Background

TLS provides the twin features of authentication and confidentiality. Clients typically verify the server’s identity, the server can optionally verify the client’s identity, while the two endpoints establish an encrypted communication channel. This channel should be immune from eavesdropping, tampering and message forgery.

There have been three standardised versions of TLS, 1.0, 1.1 and 1.2, while the last SSL (version 3) is still in wide use. A key feature of TLS is algorithmic agility: it allows the two endpoints to negotiate the key exchange method, symmetric cipher and the message authentication mode upon connecting. This triple is called a cipher suite, and there are around 160 cipher suites standardised and widely supported. Together with a number of standardised extensions to the protocol that can be negotiated, this creates a large possible space of session parameters. This large variation in configuration options is a marked characteristic of TLS, significantly contributing to the complexity of its state machine.

Only a handful implementations of TLS are in wide use. The three major free or open-source implementations are OpenSSL, GnuTLS and Mozilla’s NSS. Microsoft supplies SChannel with their operating systems,
while Apple supplies Secure Transport with theirs, and Oracle Java runtime comes bundled with JSSE.

Structurally, TLS is a two-layered protocol. The outer layer preserves message boundaries and provides framing. It encapsulates one of five sub-protocols: handshake, change cipher spec, alert, application data or heartbeat. Both layers can contain fragmentation.

A TLS session is initiated by the client, which uses the handshake protocol to signal the highest protocol version, possible extensions, and a set of ciphersuites it supports. The server picks the highest protocol version it shares with the client and a mutually supported cipher-suite, or fails the handshake. The ciphersuite determines whether the server authenticates itself, and depending on the server configuration it requests the client to authenticate itself. After the security parameters for the authenticated encryption scheme are negotiated, the Change Cipher Spec message activates these, and the last handshake message authenticates the handshake. Either party can renegotiate the session over the established channel by initiating another handshake.

The handshake sub-protocol contains a complex state machine, which must be successfully traversed at least once. Handshake messages are independent of other sub-protocols, but some other sub-protocols are dependent of a successful handshake. For instance, it is not possible to exchange application data before a session is established, and it is impossible to affect the use of negotiated session parameters while the negotiation is still in progress.

Server and client authentication is performed by means of X.509 certificates. Usually path validation is used: after one party presents a sequence of certificates called the certificate chain, the other party needs to verify that a) each certificate in the chain is signed by the next certificate; b) the last certificate is signed by one of the trust anchors independent of connection; and c) that the first party owns the private key associated with the first certificate in the chain by transferring a signed message containing session-specific data. For correct authentication, the authenticating party also needs to verify general semantic well-formedness of the involved certificates, and be able to deal with three versions of X.509 certificates. For correct authentication, the authenticating party also needs to verify general semantic well-formedness of the involved certificates, and be able to deal with three versions of X.509 certificates.

TLS implementations contain an ad-hoc ASN.1 parser, codings (DER), and only some of the primitives. Some TLS implementations need to parse ASN.1, primarily for decoding X.509 certificates. While ASN.1 is a large and fairly complex standard, for the purposes of TLS, it is sufficient to implement one of its encodings (DER), and only some of the primitives. Some TLS implementations contain an ad-hoc ASN.1 parser.
Table 1: Vulnerabilities in TLS implementations in 2014.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product</th>
<th>CVE ID</th>
<th>Issue source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2014-8275</td>
<td>Certificate parsing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2014-2234</td>
<td>Certificate validation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2014-3599, 2010-5298</td>
<td>Shared mutable state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2014-0076</td>
<td>Timing side-channel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2014-3570</td>
<td>Wrong sqrt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSS</td>
<td>2014-1544</td>
<td>Memory management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2013-1740</td>
<td>State machine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2014-1490</td>
<td>Shared mutable state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2014-1569, 2014-1568</td>
<td>Certificate parsing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2014-1492</td>
<td>Certificate validation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2014-1491</td>
<td>DH param validation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SChannel</td>
<td>2014-6321</td>
<td>Memory management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secure Transport</td>
<td>2014-1266</td>
<td>State machine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSSE</td>
<td>2014-6593, 2014-0626</td>
<td>State machine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2014-0625</td>
<td>Memory exhaustion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2014-0411</td>
<td>Timing side-channel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Applications</td>
<td>2014-2734</td>
<td>Memory management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2014-3566</td>
<td>POODLE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

combining the core ASN.1 parsing task with the definitions of ASN.1 grammars, and this code operates as a part of certificate validation.

Unsurprisingly, ASN.1 parsing is a recurrent source of vulnerabilities in TLS and related software, dating back at least to 2004 (MS04-007, a remote code execution vulnerability), and 3 vulnerabilities in 2014 (CVEs 2014-8275, 2014-1568 and 2014-1569). Two examples are CVE-2015-1182, the use of uninitialised memory during parsing in PolarSSL, which could lead to remote code execution, and CVE-2014-1568, a case of insufficiently selective parsing in NSS, which allowed the attacker to construct a fake signed certificate from a large space of byte sequences interpreted as the same certificate.

This class of errors is due to ambiguity in the specification, and ad-hoc parsers in most TLS implementations. nqsb-TLS avoids this class of issues entirely by separating parsing from the grammar description (§4.4).

Certificate validation Closely related to ASN.1 parsing is certificate validation. X.509 certificates are nested data structures standardised in three versions and with various optional extensions, so validation involves parsing, traversing, and extracting information from complex compound data. This opens up the potential for errors both in the control-flow logic of this task and in the interpretation of certificates (multiple GnuTLS vulnerabilities are related to lax interpretation of the structures).

In 2014, there were 5 issues related to certificate validation. A prominent example in the control-flow logic is GnuTLS (CVE-2014-0092), where a misplaced goto statement lead to certificate validation being skipped if any intermediate certificate was of X.509 version 1.

Many implementations interleave the complicated X.509 certificate validation with parsing the ASN.1 grammar, leading to a complex control flow with subtle call chains. This illustrates another way in which the choice of programming language and style can lead to errors: the normal C idiom for error handling uses goto and negative return values, while in nqsb-TLS we return errors explicitly as values and have to handle all possible variants. OCaml’s typechecker and pattern-match exhaustiveness checker ensures this at compile time (§4.3).

State machine errors TLS consists of several sub-protocols that are multiplexed at the record level: (i) the handshake that initially establishes the secure connection and subsequently renegotiates it; (ii) alerts that signal out-of-band conditions; (iii) cipher spec activation notifications; (iv) heartbeats; and (v) application data. The majority of the TLS protocol specification covers the handshake state machine. The path to a successful negotiation is determined during the handshake and depends on the ciphersuite, protocol version, negotiated options, and
configuration, such as client authentication. Errors in the handshake logic often lead to a security breach, allowing attackers to perform active man-in-the-middle (MITM) insertion, or to passively gain knowledge over the negotiated security parameters.

There were 10 vulnerabilities in this class. Some led to denial-of-service conditions caused (for example) by NULL-pointer dereferences on receipt of an unexpected message, while others lead to a breakdown of the TLS security guarantees. An extensive study of problems in TLS state machine implementations has been done in the literature [2, 11].

A prominent example is Apple’s “goto fail” (CVE-2014-1266), caused by a repetition of a goto statement targeting the cleanup block of the procedure responsible for verifying the digital signature of the ServerKeyExchange message. This caused the procedure to skip the subsequent logic and return the value registered in the output variable. As this variable was initialised to “success”, the signature was never verified.

Another typical example is the CCS Injection in OpenSSL (CVE-2014-0224). ChangeCipherSpec is the message signalling that the just negotiated security parameters are activated. In the TLS state machine, it is legal only as the penultimate message in the handshake sequence. However, both OpenSSL (CVE-2014-0224) and JSSE (CVE-2014-6593) allowed a CCS message before the actual key exchange took place, which activated predictable initial security parameters. A MITM attacker can exploit this by sending a CCS during handshake, causing two parties to establish a deterministic session key and defeating encryption.

Some of these errors are due to missing preconditions of state machine transitions in the specification. In nqsb-TLS, our code structure (§4.1) makes the need to consider each of these clear. We encode the state machine explicitly, while state transitions default to failure.

**Protocol bugs** In 2014, two separate issues in the protocol itself were described: POODLE and triple handshakes. POODLE is an attack on SSL version 3, which does not specify the value of padding bytes in CBC mode. Triple handshake [3] is a MITM attack where one negotiates sessions with the same security parameters and resumes. We do not claim to prevent nor solve those protocol bugs in nqsb-TLS, we mitigate triple handshake by resuming sessions only if the extended master secret [4] was used. Furthermore, we focus on a modern subset of the protocol, not including SSL version 3, so neither attack is applicable.

**Timing side-channel leaks** Two vulnerabilities were related to timing side-channel leaks, where the observable duration of cryptographic operations depended on cryptographic secrets. These were implementation issues, related to the use of variable-duration arithmetic operations. The PKCS1.5 padding of the premaster secret is transmitted during an RSA key exchange. If the un-padding fails, there is computationally no need to decrypt the received secret material. But omitting this step leaks the information on whether the padding was correct through the time signature, and this can be used to obtain the secret. A similar issue was discovered in 2014 in various TLS implementations [34].

nqsb-TLS mitigates this attack by always computing the RSA operation, on padding failure with a fake value. To mitigate timing side-channels, which a memory managed programming language might further expose, we use C implementations of the low level primitives (§4.2).

**Usage of the libraries** Of the examined bugs, 10 were not in TLS implementations themselves, but in the way the client software used them. These included the high-profile anonymity software Tor [16], the instant messenger Pidgin and the widely used multi-protocol data transfer tool cURL.

TLS libraries typically have complicated APIs due to implementing a protocol with a large parameter space. For example, OpenSSL 1.0.2 documents 243 symbols in its protocol alone, not counting the cryptographic parts of the API. Parts of its API are used by registering callbacks with the library that get invoked upon certain events. A well-documented example of the difficulty in correctly using these APIs is the OpenSSL certificate validation callback. The library does not implement the full logic that is commonly needed (it omits name validation), so the client needs to construct a function to perform certificate validation using a mix of custom code and calls to OpenSSL, and supply it to the library. This step is a common pitfall: a recent survey [23] showed that it is common for OpenSSL clients in the wild to do this incorrectly. We counted 6 individual advisories stemming from improper usage of certificate validation API, which is a large number given that improper certificate validation undermines the authentication property of TLS and completely undermines its security.

The root cause of this error class is the large and complex legacy APIs of contemporary TLS stacks. nqsb-TLS does not mirror those APIs, but provides a minimal API with strict validation by default. This small API is sufficient for various applications we developed. OpenBSD uses a similar approach with their 11bit16 API.

### 4 The nqsb-TLS stack

We now describe how we structure and develop the nqsb-TLS stack, following the approach outlined in the introduction to avoid a range of security pitfalls.
4.1 TLS Core

The heart of our TLS stack is the core protocol implementation. By using pure, composable functions to express the protocol handling, we deal with TLS as a data-transformation pipeline, independent of how the data is obtained or transmitted.

Accordingly, our core revolves around two functions. One (handle_tls) takes the sequence of bytes seen on the wire and a value denoting the previous state, and produces, as new values, the bytes to reply with or to transfer to the application, and the subsequent state. Our state type encapsulates all the information about a TLS session in progress, including the state of the handshake, the cryptographic state for both directions of communication, and the incomplete frames previously received, as an immutable value. The other one (send_application_data) takes a sequence of bytes that the application wishes to send and the previous state, and produces the sequence ready to be sent and the subsequent state. Coupled with a few operations to extract session information from the state, these form the entire interface to the core protocol implementation.

Below the entry points, we segment the records, decrypt and authenticate them, and dispatch to the appropriate protocol handler. One of the places where OCaml helps most prominently is in handling of the combined state machine of handshake and its interdependent sub-protocols. We use algebraic data types to encode each possible handshake state as a distinct type variant, that symbolically denotes the state it represents and contains all of the data accumulated so far. The overall state type is simply the discriminated union of these variants. Every operation that extracts information from state needs to scrutinise its value through a form of multi-way branching known as pattern match. This syntactic construct combines branching on the particular variant of the state present with extraction of components. The resulting dispatch leads to equation-like code: branches that deal with distinct states follow directly from the values representing them, process the state data locally, and remain fully independent in the sense of control flow and access to values they operate on. Finally, each separately materialises the output and subsequent state.

This construction and the explicit encoding of state-machine is central to maintaining the state-machine invariants and preserving the coherence of state representation. It is impossible to enter a branch dedicated to a particular transition without the pair of values representing the appropriate state and appropriate input message, and, as intermediate data is directly obtained from the state value, it is impossible to process it without at the same time requiring that the state-machine is in the appropriate state. It is also impossible to manufacture a state-representation ahead of time, as it needs to contain all of the relevant data.

The benefit of this encoding is most clearly seen in CCS-injection-like vulnerabilities. They depend on session parameters being stored in locations visible throughout the handshake code, which are activated on receipt of the appropriate message. In the OpenSSL case (CVE-2014-0224), the dispatch code failed to verify whether all of these locations were populated, which implies that the handshake progressed to the appropriate phase. In our case, the only way to refer to the session parameters is to deconstruct a state-value containing them, and it is impossible to create this value without having collected the appropriate session parameters.

All of core’s inner workings adhere to a predictable, restricted coding style. Information is always communicated through parameters and result values. Error propagation is achieved exclusively through results, without the use of exceptions. We explicitly encode errors distinct from successful results, instead of overloading the result’s domain to mean error in some parts of its range. The type checker verifies both that each code path is dealing with exactly one possibility, and – through the exhaustiveness checker – that both forms have been accounted for. The repetitive logic of testing for error results and deciding whether to propagate the error or proceed is then abstracted away in a few higher-order functions and does not re-appear throughout the code.

This approach has also proven convenient when maintaining a growing code-base: when we had to add significant new capabilities, e.g. extending the TLS version support to versions 1.1 and 1.2 or implementing client authentication, the scope of changes was localised and the effects they had on other modules were flagged by the type checker.

4.2 Nocrypto

TLS cryptography is provided by Nocrypto, a separate library we developed for that purpose. It supports basic modular public-key primitives like RSA, DSA and DH; the two most commonly used symmetric block ciphers, AES and 3DES; the most important hash functions, MD5, SHA and the SHA2 family; and an implementation of the cryptographically strong pseudorandom number generator, Fortuna [20].

One of the fundamental design decisions was to use block-level symmetric encryption and hash cores written in C. For hashing, DES, and the portable version of AES, we use widely available public domain code. In addition, we wrote our own AES core using the Intel AES-NI instructions.

There are two reasons for using C at this level. Firstly, symmetric encryption and hashing are the most CPU-
intensive operations in TLS. Therefore, performance concerns motivate the use of C. Secondly, the security impact of writing cryptography in a garbage-collected environment is unclear. Performing computations over secret material in this context is a potential attack vector. The garbage collector pauses might act as an amplifier to any existing timing side-channel leaks, revealing information about the allocation rate. We side-step this issue by leaving the secret material used by symmetric encryption opaque to the OCaml runtime.

Such treatment creates a potential safety problem in turn: even if we manage to prevent certain classes of bugs in OCaml, they could occur in our C code. Our strategy to contain this is to restrict the scope of C code: we employ simple control flow and never manage memory in the C layer. C functions receive pre-allocated buffers, tracked by the runtime, and write their results there. The most complex control flow in these are driving loops that call the compression function (in the case of hashes), or the block transform (in the case of ciphers), over the contents of the input buffer. AES-NI instructions are particularly simplifying in this respect, as the code consists of a sequence of calls to compiler intrinsics.

Presently, only the AES-NI implementation of AES is protected from timing side-channel leaks, since the bulk of the cipher is implemented via constant-time dedicated instructions. The generic code path is yet to be augmented with code to pre-load substitution tables in a non-data-dependent manner.

More complex cryptographic constructions, like cipher modes (CBC, CTR, GCM and CCM) and HMAC are implemented in OCaml on top of C-level primitives. We benefit from OCaml’s safety and expressive power in these more complex parts of the code, but at the same time preserve the property that secret material is not directly exposed to the managed runtime.

Public key cryptography is treated differently. It is not block-oriented and is not easily expressed in straight-line code, while the numeric operations it relies on are less amenable to C-level optimisation. At the same time, there are known techniques for mitigating timing leaks at the algorithmic level [28], unlike in the symmetric case. We therefore implement these directly in OCaml using GMP as our bignum backend and employ the standard blinding countermeasures to compensate for potential sources of timing side-channels.

Our Fortuna CSPRNG uses AES-CTR with a self-rekeying regime and a system of entropy accumulators. Instead of entropy estimation, it employs exponential lagging of accumulators, a scheme that has been shown to asymptotically optimally recover from state compromise under a constant input of entropy of unknown quality [17]. To retain purity of the system and facilitate deterministic runs, entropy itself is required from the system as an external service, as shown later in §6.

For the sake of reducing complexity in the upper layers, the API of Nocrypto is concise and retains the applicative style, mapping inputs to outputs. We did make two concessions to further simplify it: first, we use OCaml exceptions to signal programming errors of applying cryptographic operations to malformed input (such as buffers which are not a multiple of the block size in CBC mode, or the use of RSA keys unsuitably small for a message). Secondly, we employ a global and changing RNG state, because operations involving it are pervasive throughout interactions with the library and the style of explicit passing would complicate the dependent code.

4.3 X.509

X.509 certificates are rich tree-like data structures whose semantics changes with the presence of several optional extensions. Although the core of the path-validation process is checking of the signature, a cryptographic operation, the correct validation required by the standard includes extensive checking of the entire data structure.

For example, each extension must be present at most once, the key usage extension can further constrain which exact operations a certificate is authorised for, and a certificate can specify the maximal chain length which is allowed to follow. There are several ways in which a certificate can express its own identity and the identity of its signing certificate. After parsing, a correct validation procedure must take all these possibilities into account.

The ground encoding of certificates again benefits from algebraic data types, as the control flow of functions that navigate this structure is directed by the type-checker. On a level above, we separate the validation process into a series of functions computing individual predicates, such as the certificate being self-signed, its validity period matching the provided time or conformance of the present extensions to the certificate version. The conjunction of these is clearly grouped into single top-level functions validating certificates in different roles, which describe the high-level constraints we impose upon the certificates. The entire validation logic amounts to 314 lines of easily reviewable code.

This is in contrast to 7 000 lines of text in the RFC [9], which go into detail to explain extensions – such as policies and name constraints – that are rarely seen in the wild. For the typical HTTPS setting, the RFC fails to clarify how to search for a trust anchor, and assumes instead the presence of exactly one. Due to cross signing there can be multiple chains with different properties which are not covered by the RFC.

nqsb-TLS initially strictly followed the RFC, but was not able to validate many HTTPS endpoints on the Internet. It currently follows the RFC augmented with
Mozilla’s guidelines and provides a self-contained condensation of these which can be used to clarify, or even supplant, the specification. We created an extensive test suite with full code coverage, the code has been evaluated (see §7.2) with the Frankencert tool, and it successfully parses most of ZMap’s certificate repositories. In addition, we also support signing and serialisation to PEM.

The interface to this logic is deterministic (it is made so by requiring the current time as an input). Our X.509 library provides operations to construct a full authenticator, by combining the validation logic with the current time at the moment of construction, which the TLS core can be parametrised with. We do not leave validation to the user of the library, unlike other TLS libraries [23]. Instead, we have full implementations of path validation with name checking [42] and fingerprint-based validation, and we use the type system to force the user to instantiate one of them and provide it to the TLS layer.

4.4 ASN.1

ASN.1 parsing creates a tension in TLS implementations: TLS critically relies on ASN.1, but it requires only a subset of DER encoding, and, since certificates are usually pre-generated, needs very little in the way of writing. For the purposes of TLS, it is therefore sufficient to implement just a partial parser.

When implementing ASN.1, a decision has to be made on how to encode the actual abstract grammar that will drive the parsing process, given by various TLS and X.509-related standards. OpenSSL, PolarSSL, JSSE and others, with the notable exception of GnuTLS, do not make any attempts to separate the grammar definition from the parsing process. The leaf rules of ASN.1 are implemented as subroutines, which are exercised in the order required by the grammar in every routine that acts as parser. In other words, they implement the parsers as ad-hoc procedures that interleave the code that performs the actual parsing with the encoding of the grammar to be parsed. Therefore the code that describes the high-level structure of data also contains details of invocation of low-level parsers and, in the case of C, memory management. Unsurprisingly, ASN.1 parsers provide a steady stream of exploits in popular TLS implementations.

We retain the full separation of the abstract syntax representation from the parsing code, avoiding the complexity of the code that fuses the two. At the same time, we avoid parser generators which output source code that is hard to understand.

Instead, we created a library for declaratively describing ASN.1 grammars in OCaml, using a functional technique known as combinatory parsing [21]. It exposes an opaque data type that describes ASN.1 grammar instances and provides a set of constants (corresponding to terminals) and functions over them (corresponding to productions). Nested applications of these functions to create data that describes ASN.1 grammars follow the shape of the actual ASN.1 grammar definitions. Internally, this tree-like type is traversed at initialisation-time to construct the parsing and serialisation functions.

This approach allows us to create “grammar expressions” which encode ASN.1 grammars, and derive parsers and serialisers. As the ASN.1-language we create is a fragment of OCaml, we retain all the benefits of its static type checking. Types of functions over grammar representations correspond to restrictions in the production rules, so type-checking grammar expressions amounts to checking their well-formedness without writing a separate parser for the grammar formalism. Moreover, type inference automatically derives the OCaml representation of the types defined by ASN.1 grammars.

Such an approach also makes testing much easier. The grammar type is traversed to generate random inhabitants of the particular grammar, which can be serialised and parsed back to check that the two directions match in their interpretation of the underlying ASN.1 encoding and to exercise all of the code paths in both.

A derived parsing function does not interpret the grammar data, but as its connections to component parsing functions are known only when synthesis takes place at run-time, we do not retain the benefit of inlining and inter-function optimisation a truly compiled parser would have. Nonetheless, given that it parses roughly 50 000 certificates per second, this approach does not create a major performance bottleneck. The result is a significant reduction in code complexity: the ASN.1 parsing logic amounts to 620 lines of OCaml, and the ASN.1 grammar code for X.509 certificates and signatures is around 1 000 lines. For comparison, PolarSSL 1.3.7 needs around 8 500 lines to parse ASN.1, while OpenSSL 1.0.1h has around 25 000 in its ASN.1 parser.

5 Using nqsb-TLS as a test oracle

One use of nqsb-TLS is as an executable test oracle, an application which reads a recorded TLS session trace and checks whether it (together with some configuration information) adheres to the specification that nqsb-TLS embodies. This recorded session can be a packet capture (using tcpdump) of a TLS session between various implementations (e.g. OpenSSL, PolarSSL, nqsb-TLS), or, for basic testing, a trace generated by nqsb-TLS itself.

To do this we must deal with the looseness of the TLS specification: a TLS client chooses its random nonce, set of ciphersuites, protocol version, and handshake extensions, while a TLS server picks its random nonce, the protocol version, the ciphersuite, possibly the DH group, and possibly extensions. Our test oracle does not make
those decisions, but rather takes the parameters recorded in the given session. To make this possible, given the on-the-wire encryption, some configuration information has to be provided to the trace checker, including private key material. In addition, both records and sub-protocols can be fragmented; our test oracle normalises the records to not contain any fragmentation for comparison.

Figure 2 shows how nqsb-TLS can be used to build such a test oracle (note that it does not instantiate the entropy source for this usage). The test oracle produces its initial protocol state from the given session. It calculates handle_{tls} with its state and the record input of the given session, together with the particular selection of protocol version, etc., resulting in an output state, potentially an output record, and potentially decrypted application data. It then compares equality of the output record and the given session. If successful, it uses the output state and next recorded input of the given session to evaluate handle_{tls} again, and repeats to the end of the trace. It thus terminates either when the entire trace has been accepted, which means success; or with a discrepancy between the nqsb-TLS specification and the recorded session, which means failure and needs further investigation. Such a discrepancy might indicate an error in the TLS stack being tested, an error in the nqsb-TLS specification, or an ambiguity in what TLS actually is.

A first test of this infrastructure was to use a recorded session of the change cipher spec injection (CVE-2014-0224): our test oracle correctly denied this session, identifying an unexpected message. We ran our test oracle and validated our 30 000 interoperability traces (see §7.1) and our Piñata traces (see §7.2), and also validated recorded TLS sessions between various implementations (OpenSSL, PolarSSL, nqsb-TLS) using tcpdump.

While running the test oracle we discovered interestingly varied choices in fragmentation of messages among existing stacks, which may be useful in fingerprinting.

The test oracle opens up the prospect of extensive testing of the behaviour of different TLS implementations, especially if combined with automated test generation.

6 Using nqsb-TLS in applications

Another use of nqsb-TLS is as a TLS implementation in applications. We ported nqsb-TLS to two distinct environments and developed a series of applications, some for demonstration purposes, others for regular use.

6.1 Porting nqsb-TLS

To use nqsb-TLS as an executable implementation, we have to provide it with implementations of entropy and flow (see Figure 1), and an effectful piece of code that communicates via the network and drives the core.

We pay special attention to prevent common client bugs which arise from complexity of configuring TLS stacks and correspondingly large APIs. In each instance, there is only one function to construct a TLS configuration which can be turned into an I/O interface, the function does extensive validation of the requested parameters, and the resulting configuration object is immutable. This restricts potentially error-prone interactions that configure TLS to a single API point.

Unix Porting nqsb-TLS to Unix was straightforward; we use the POSIX sockets API to build a flow and /dev/urandom as the entropy source. The exposed interface provides convenience functions to read certificates and private keys from files, and analogues of listen, connect, accept, read, write, and close for communication.

MirageOS The MirageOS variant allows nqsb-TLS to be compiled into a unikernel VM (see Figure 3). It uses the MirageOS OCaml TCP/IP library [31] to provide the
I/O flow, which is in turn coupled to Xen device drivers that communicate with the backend physical network device via shared memory rings [44]. The logger outputs directly to the VM console, and the certificates and the secret keys are compiled into OCaml data structures at build time and become part of the VM image. A key challenge when running in a virtualised environment is providing a suitable entropy source [18], especially in the common case of a VM having no access to physical hardware. Since specialised unikernels have very deterministic boot-sequences that make sources of entropy even scarcer, we had to extend MirageOS and Xen to avoid cryptographic weaknesses [25].

One way in which we solve this is by relying on dom0 to provide cross-domain entropy injection. We developed Xentropyd, a dom0 daemon which reads bytes from /dev/urandom and makes them available to VMs via an inter-VM shared memory channel. The entropy device is plugged in as a standard Xen device driver via Xenstore [22], and MirageOS has a frontend library that periodically injects entropy into the nqsb-TLS CSPRNG.

To avoid being fully reliant on dom0, we implement additional entropy harvesting within the unikernel itself. We do this by trapping the MirageOS event loop and using RDTSCP instruction to read the Time Stamp Counter (TSC) register on each external event. This provides us with the unpredictability inherent in the ambient events. This source is augmented with readings from the CPU RNG where available: we feed the results of RDSEED (or RDRAND) instruction into the entropy pool on each event.

To make the RNG more resilient, we do extra entropy harvesting at boot time. Following Whirlwind RNG [18], we employ a timing loop early in the boot phase, designed to take advantage of nondeterminism inherent in the CPU by way of internal races in the CPU state. This provides an initial entropy boost in the absence of Xentropyd and helps mitigate resumption-based attacks [18].

In an ideal scenario the entropy would be provided through both mechanisms, but we expect the usage to rely on one or the other, depending on deployment: on an ARM board lacking high-resolution timing and CPU RNG, the user is likely to have control over the hypervisor and be able to install Xentropyd. Conversely, in commercial hosting scenarios where the assistance of dom0 might not be available but the extra CPU features are, we expect the user to rely on the internal entropy harvesting.

### 6.2 Applications

An example application using the Unix interface is the terminal-based instant messaging client jackline using XMPP. The XMPP protocol negotiates features, such as TLS, over a plaintext TCP connection. Jackline performs an upgrade to TLS via the STARTTLS mechanism before authentication credentials are exchanged. The Unix port of nqsb-TLS contains an API that supports upgrading an already established TCP connection to TLS. Jackline can use either of the authentication APIs (path and fingerprint validation) depending on user configuration.

Istunnel also runs on Unix and accepts a TLS connection, forwards the application data to another service via TCP, similar to stud and stunnel. This has been deployed since months on some websites.

The Unix application certify generates RSA private keys, self-signed certificates, and certificate signing requests in PEM format. It uses nocrypto and X.509.

The OCaml Conduit library (also illustrated in Fig. 3) supports communication transports that include TCP, inter-VM shared memory rings. It provides a high-level API that maps URLs into specific transport mechanisms. We added nqsb-TLS support to Conduit so that any application that links to it can choose between the use of nqsb-TLS or OpenSSL, depending on an environment variable. As of February 2015, 42 different libraries (both client and server) use Conduit and its provided API and can thus indirectly use nqsb-TLS for secure connections.

The OPAM package manager uses nqsb-TLS as part of its mirror infrastructure to fetch 2 500 distribution files, with no HTTPS-related regressions encountered.

### 7 Evaluation

We now assess the interoperability, security, and performance of nqsb-TLS.

#### 7.1 Interoperability

We assess the interoperability of nqsb-TLS in several ways: testing against OpenSSL and PolarSSL on every commit; successfully connecting to most of the Fortune 500 web sites; testing X.509 certificates from ZMap; and by running a web server.

This web server, running since mid 2014, displays the live sequence diagram of a successful TLS session established via HTTPS. A user can press a button on the website which let the server initiate a renegotiation. The server configuration includes all three TLS protocol versions and eight different ciphersuites, picking a protocol version and ciphersuite at random. Roughly 30 000 traces were recorded from roughly 350 different client stacks (6230 unique user agent identifiers).

Of these, around 27% resulted in a connection establishment failure. Our implementation is strict, and does not allow e.g. duplicated advertised ciphersuites. Also, several accesses came from automated tools which evaluate the quality of a TLS server by trying each defined ciphersuite separately.
Roughly 50% of the failed connections did not share a ciphersuite with nqsb-TLS. Another 20% started with bytes which were not interpretable by nqsb-TLS. 12% of the failed connections did not contain the secure renegotiation extension, which our server requires. 5% of the failed traces were attempts to send an early change cipher spec. Another 4% tried to negotiate SSL version 3. 2.5% contained a ciphersuite with null (GOs6).

We parse more than 99% of ZMap’s HTTPS (20150615) and IMAP (20150604) certificate repository. The remaining failures are RSA-PESS signatures, requiring an explicit NULL as parameter, and unknown and outdated algorithm identifiers.

This four-fold evaluation shows that our TLS implementation is broadly interoperable with a large number of other TLS implementations, which also indicates that we are capturing the de facto standard reasonably well.

**Specification mismatches** While evaluating nqsb-TLS we discovered several inconsistencies between the RFC and other TLS implementations:

- Apple’s SecureTransport and Microsoft’s SChannel deny application data records while a renegotiation is in process, while the RFC allows interleaving.
- OpenSSL (1.0.1i) accepts any X.509v3 certificate which contains either digitalSignature or keyEncipherment in keyUsage. RFC [15] mandates digitalSignature for DHE, keyEncipherment for RSA.
- Some unknown TLS implementation starts the padding data [29] (must be 0) with 16 bit length.
- A TLS 1.1 stack sends the unregistered alert 0x80.

### 7.2 Security

We assess the security of nqsb-TLS in several ways: the discussion of the root causes of many classic vulnerabilities and how we avoid them; mitigation of other specific issues; our state machine was tested [11]; random testing with the Frankencert [8] fuzzing tool; a public integrated system protecting a bitcoin reward; and analysis of the TCB size of that compared with a similar system built using a conventional stack.

**Avoidance of classic vulnerability root causes** In Sections 3 and 4 we described how the nqsb-TLS structure and development process exclude the root causes of many vulnerabilities that have been found in previous TLS implementations.

**Additional mitigations** The TLS RFC [15] includes a section on implementation pitfalls, which contains a list of known protocol issues and common failures when implementing cryptographic operations. nqsb-TLS mitigates all of these.

Further issues that nqsb-TLS addresses include:

- Interleaving of sub-protocols, except between change of cipher spec and finished.
- Each TLS 1.0 application data is prepended by an empty fragment to randomise the IV (BEAST).
- Secure renegotiation [40] is required.
- SCSV extension [35] is supported.
- Best practices against attacks arising from mac-then-encrypt in CBC mode are followed (no mitigation of Lucky13 [19])
- No support for export restricted ciphersuites, thus no downgrade to weak RSA keys and small DH groups (FREAK and Logjam).

**State machine fuzzing** Researchers fuzzed [11] nqsb-TLS and found a minor issue: alerts we send are not encrypted. This issue was fixed within a day after discovery, and it is unlikely that it was security-relevant.

**Frankencert** Frankencert is a fuzzing tool which generates syntactically valid X.509 certificate chains by randomly mixing valid certificates and random data. We generated 10 000 X.509 certificate chains, and compared the verification result of OpenSSL (1.0.1i) and nqsb-TLS. The result is that nqsb-TLS accepted 120 certificates, a strict subset of the 192 OpenSSL accepted.

Of these 72 accepted by OpenSSL but not by nqsb-TLS, 57 certificate chains contain arbitrary data in X.509v3 extensions where our implementation allows only restricted values. An example is the key usage extension, which specifies a sequence of OIDs. In the RFC, 9 different OIDs are defined. Our X.509v3 grammar restricts the value of the key usage extension to those 9 OIDs. 12 certificate chains included an X.509v3 extension marked critical but not supported by nqsb-TLS.

Two server certificates are certificate authority certificates. While not required by the path validation, best practices from Mozilla recommend to not accept a server certificate which can act as certificate authority. The last certificate is valid for a Diffie-Hellman key exchange, but not for RSA. Our experimental setup used RSA, thus nqsb-TLS denied the certificate appropriately.

**Exposure to new vulnerabilities** Building nqsb-TLS in a managed language potentially opens us up to vulnerabilities that would not affect stacks written in C. Algorithmic complexity attacks are a low-bandwidth class of denial-of-service attacks that exploit deficiencies in many common default data structure implementations [10]. The modular structure of nqsb-TLS makes it easy to audit the implementations used within each component. The French computer security governmental office [37] assessed the security of the OCaml runtime in...
2013, which lead to several changes (such as distinction between immutable strings and mutable byte arrays).

**The Bitcoin Piñata** To demonstrate the use of nqsb-TLS in an integrated system based on MirageOS, and to encourage external code-review and penetration testing, we set up a public bounty, the Bitcoin Piñata. This is a standalone MirageOS unikernel containing the secret key to a bitcoin address, which it transmits upon establishing a successfully authenticated TLS connection. The service exposes both TLS client and server on different ports, and it is possible to bridge the traffic between the two and observe a successful handshake and the encrypted exchange of the secret.

The attack surface encompasses the entire system, from the the underlying operating system and its TCP/IP stack, to TLS and the cryptographic level. The system will only accept connections authenticated by the custom certificate authority that we set up for this purpose. Reward is public and automated, because if an attacker manages to access the private bitcoin key, they can transfer the bitcoins to an address of their choosing, which is attestable through the blockchain.

While this setup cannot prove the absence of security issues in our stack, it motivated several people to read through our code and experiment with the service.

At the end of June 2015, there were 230 000 accesses to the website from more than 50 000 unique IP addresses. More than 9 600 failed and 12 000 successful TLS connections from 1000 unique IPs were present. Although we cannot directly verify that all successful connection resulted from the service being short-circuited to connect to itself, there have been no outgoing transactions registered in the blockchain. The breakdown of failed connections is similar to §7.1. We collected 42 certificates which were tried for authentication, but failed (not well formatted, not signed, not signed by our trust anchor, private key not present). A detailed analysis of the captured traces showed that most of the flaws in other stacks have been attempted against the Piñata.

**Trusted computing base** The TCB size is a rough quantification of the attack surface of a system. We assess the TCB of our Piñata, compared to a similar traditional system using Linux and OpenSSL. Both systems are executed on the same hardware and the Xen hypervisor, which we do not consider here. The TCB sizes of the two systems are shown in Table 2 (using clcloc).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kernel</th>
<th>Linux/OpenSSL</th>
<th>Unikernel/nqsb-TLS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2560</td>
<td>102 (56)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: TCB (in kloc); portion of C code in parens

| RSA   | 698 hs/s | 723 hs/s | 672 hs/s |
| DHE-RSA | 601 hs/s | 515 hs/s | 367 hs/s |

Table 3: Handshake performance of nqsb-TLS, OpenSSL and PolarSSL, using 1024-bit RSA certificate and 1024-bit DH group.

The trusted computing base of the traditional system is 25 times larger than ours. Both systems provide the same service to the outside world and are hardly distinguishable for an external observer.

**7.3 Performance**

We evaluate the performance of nqsb-TLS, comparing it to OpenSSL 1.0.2c and PolarSSL 1.3.11. We use a single machine to avoid network effects. In the case of nqsb-TLS, we compile the test application as a Unix binary to limit the comparison to TLS itself.

The test machine has an Intel i7-5600 Broadwell CPU and runs Linux 4.0.5 and glibc 2.21. Throughput is measured by connecting the command line tool socat, linked against OpenSSL, to a server running the tested implementation, and transferring 100 MB of data from the client to the server. This test is repeated for various transmission block sizes. Handshakes are measured by running 20 parallel processes in a continuous connecting loop and measuring the maximum number of successful connection within 1 second; the purpose of parallelism is to negate the network latency.

Throughput rates are summarized in Figure 4. With 16 byte blocks, processing is dominated by the protocol overhead. This helps us gauge the performance impact of using OCaml relative to C, as nqsb-TLS implements protocol logic entirely in OCaml. At this size, we run at about 78% of OpenSSL’s speed.

At 8192 bytes, performance becomes almost entirely dominated by cryptographic processing. All three implementations use AES-NI, giving them roughly comparable speed. OpenSSL’s performance lead is likely due to its extensive use of assembly, and in particular the technique of stitching, combining parts of the cipher mode of operation and hashing function to saturate the CPU pipeline. PolarSSL’s performance drop compared
to nqsb-TLS is likely a consequence of our usage of simple software pipelining in the AES-NI code. nqsb-TLS reaches about 84% of OpenSSL’s speed in this scenario.

Handshake performance, summarized in Table 3, is roughly similar. We attribute OpenSSL’s advantage to their use of C in the protocol handling, and PolarSSL’s disadvantage to our use of faster bignum routines provided by GMP. The comparatively smaller cost nqsb-TLS pays for DH is a result of picking shorter exponents, matched to the security strength of the group modulus.

We ran miTLS 0.8.1 through Mono 4.0.1.44 on the same test machine. Using the bundled HTTP server, we achieve a peak throughput of 19 MB/s for a file transfer using the same cipher suite. As the Mono cryptography provider only contains C# AES implementations, we exclude this implementation from further analysis. We do note, however, that the throughput ratio between miTLS and OpenSSL is similar to the one its authors report [5].

The exact numbers are likely to vary with the choice of cipher suite, which places different weights on hashing and cipher performance, the CPU generation, which is utilised to a fuller extent by OpenSSL, and the testing scenario. The broad picture is that our usage of OCaml for all but the lowest-level cryptographic primitives is, in itself, not taking a prohibitive toll on performance.

8 Related Work

Security proofs Several research groups [36, 26, 24, 12, 38] have modelled and formally verified security properties of TLS. Because TLS is a complex protocol, most models use a simplified core, and formalising even these subsets is challenging work which is not very accessible to an implementer audience. Additionally, these models need to be validated with actual implementations, to relate to the de facto standard, but this is rarely done (to do so, some kind of trace checker or executable needs to be developed). Some of these models formalised the handshake protocol, but omitted renegotiation, in which a security flaw was present until discovered in 2009.

miTLS The miTLS [5] stack is developed in F7 with the possibility to extract executable F# code. It is both a formalisation of the TLS protocol and a runnable implementation. This formalisation allowed its developers to discover two protocol-level issues: alert fragmentation and triple handshake. As an implementation, it depends on the Common Language Runtime for execution, and uses its services for cryptographic operations and X.509 treatment (including ASN.1 parsing). In contrast, nqsb-TLS cannot be used for verifying security properties of TLS, but provides a test oracle and a fast runnable implementation which is easily deployable. It compiles to native code and implements the entire stack from scratch, making it self-contained. It can be used e.g. in MirageOS, which only provides the bare TCP/IP interfaces and has no POSIX layer or cryptographic services.

Language-oriented approach to security Mettler et al. propose Joe-E [33], a subset of Java designed to support the development of secure software systems. They strongly argue in favour of a particular programming style to facilitate ease of security reviews.

Our approach shares some of the ideas in Joe-E. By disallowing mutable static fields of Java classes, they effectively prohibit globally visible mutable state and enforce explicit propagation of references to objects, which serve as object capabilities. They also emphasise immutability to restrict the flows of data and achieve better modularity and separation of concerns.

The difference in our approach is that we use immutability and explicit data-passing not only on the module (or class) boundaries but pervasively throughout the code, aiming to facilitate code-review and reasoning on all levels. A further difference is that Joe-E focusses the proposed changes in style on security reviews only, aiming to help the reader of the code ascertain that the code does not contain unforeseen interactions and faithfully implements the desired logic. In contrast, we employ a fully declarative style. Our goals go beyond code review, as large portions of our implementation are accessible as a clarification to the specification, and we have an executable test oracle.

Finally, there is the difference between host languages. Java lacks some of the features we found to be most significant in simplifying the implementation, chiefly the ability to encode deeply nested data structures and traverse them via pattern-matching, and to express local operations in a pure fashion.
Brittle implementations of cryptography systems
Schneier et al.’s work [43] discovered several root causes for software implementing cryptographic systems, which explicitly mentions incorrect error handling and flawed API usage. We agree with their principles for software engineering for cryptography, and extend this further by proposing our approach: immutable data, value-passing interfaces, explicit error handling, small API footprint.

TLS implementations in high-level languages  Several high-level languages contain their own TLS stack. Oracle Java ships with JSEE, a memory-safe implementation. However its overall structure closely resembles the C implementations. For example, the state machine is built around accumulating state by mutations of shared memory locations, the parsing and validation of certificates are not clearly separated, and the certificate validation logic includes non-trivial control flow. This resulted in high-level vulnerabilities similar in nature to the ones found in C implementations, such as CCS Injection (CVE-2014-0626), and its unmanaged exception system led to several further vulnerabilities [34].

There are at least two more TLS implementations in functional languages, one in Isabelle [30] and one in Haskell. Interestingly, both implementations experiment with their respective languages’ expressivity to give the implementations an essentially imperative formulation. The Isabelle development uses a coroutine-like monad to directly interleave I/O operations with the TLS processing, while the Haskell development uses a monad stack to both interleave I/O and to implicitly propagate the session state through the code. In this way both implementations lose the clear description of data-dependencies and strong separation of layers nqsb-TLS has.

Protocol specification and testing  There is an extensive literature on protocol specification and testing in general (not tied to a security context). We build in particular on ideas from Bishop et al.’s work on TCP [6, 41], in which they developed a precise specification for TCP and the Sockets API in a form that could be used as a trace-checker, characterising the de facto standard. TCP has a great deal of internal nondeterminism, and so Bishop et al. resorted to a general-purpose higher-order logic for their specification and symbolic evaluation over that for their trace-checker. In contrast, the internal nondeterminism needed for TLS can be bounded as we describe in §5, and so we have been able to use simple pure functional programming, and to arrange the specification so that it is simultaneously usable as an implementation. We differ also in focussing on an on-the-wire specification rather than the endpoint-behaviour or end-to-end API behaviour specifications of that work. In contrast to the Sockets API specified in POSIX, there is no API for TLS. Every implementation defines its custom API, and many have a compatibility layer for the OpenSSL API.

9 Conclusion
We have described an experiment in engineering critical security-protocol software using what may be perceived as a radical approach. We focus throughout on structuring the system into modules and pure functions that can each be understood in isolation, serving dual roles as test-oracle specification and as implementation, rather than traditional prose specifications and code driven entirely by implementation concerns.

Our evaluation suggests that it is a successful experiment: nqsb-TLS is usable in multiple contexts, as test oracle and in Unix and unikernel applications, it has reasonable performance, and it is a very concise body of code. Our security assessment suggests that, while it is by no means guaranteed secure, it does not suffer from several classes of flaws that have been important in previous TLS implementations. In this sense, it is at least not quite so broken as some secure software has been.

In turn, this indicates that our approach has value. As further evidence of that, we applied the same approach to the off-the-record [7] security protocol, used for end-to-end encryption in instant messaging protocols. We engineered a usable implementation and reported several inconsistencies in the prose specification. The XMPP client mentioned earlier uses nqsb-TLS for transport layer encryption, and our OTR implementation for end-to-end encryption.

The approach cannot be applied everywhere. The two obvious limitations are (1) that we rely on a language runtime to remove the need for manual memory management, and (2) that our specification and implementation style, while precise and concise, is relatively unusual in the wider engineering community. But the benefits suggest that, where it can be applied, it will be well worth doing so.

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