

A Deep Dive into DNS Query Failures

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
²University of Chinese Academy of Sciences

³Queen Mary University of London




Why to study DNS Query Failures

- Failures prevent access to any services dependent on domain names
- High-level observation: **13.5%** of DNS queries fail



Passive DNS Data



end user's anonymized IP address, BGP prefix, ASN, recursive resolver's IP address, DNS query type, resource records, timestamp

- **14-day** samples (each sample consists of 10-minute logs), **~3.1 billion** logs

Identification of Failed Queries


- **No RCODE**: we turn to a heuristic method to filter out logs that are attributed to NXDOMAINs
- Check if the requested domain (QNAME) contains a *valid* answer
 - e.g., for an A query, at least one RR in the response is an A record of the QNAME
- Extract failed queries of the four most popular types of records that constitute 99.5% of all queries
- Filter out logs attributed to NXDOMAINs by removing logs containing domains that have never succeeded in the whole dataset
 - **2.8 billion logs** remain for subsequent analyses

A Primer on DNS Failures

Query Type	A	AAAA	PTR	MX	Others
#queries	86.2%	10.4%	2.8%	0.1%	0.5%
Success Rate	93.1%	35.8%	40.4%	82.9%	-


- **A queries** account for the majority and are successfully resolved most frequently
- Other query types manifest lower success rates
 - Surprisingly low success rate for **AAAA queries**

Failures Across Domains




- **A queries** exhibit high success rates
 - Nevertheless, as many as 7% of domains experience a success rate <50%

Failures Across Domains




- **AAAA queries:** ~60% domains have never been successfully resolved
 - Infrastructural limitations in how DNS supports IPv6

Failures Across Domains




- The concentrate of failures on a small set of domains

Failures Across Domains




- For most categories, **>80%** of the failures are attributed to the **top 3 SLDs**
- Some domain types are paramount in increasing failure rates
 - proxy, porn, parked domains.....

Failures Across Resolvers



- The majority of resolvers serving A queries have very high success rates

Failures Across Resolvers



- Some resolvers may not be IPv6 ready during our observation period

Failures Across Resolvers

- Testing public resolvers: **#queries (success rate)**

	114DNS	360DNS	AlibabaDNS	DNSPOD	GoogleDNS	OpenDNS	ISP	Others
A	296.4K(98.5%)	831.0K(95.9%)	667.8K(94.7%)	352.5K(99.6%)	333.4M(90.7%)	467.6K(86.3%)	48.7M(95.3%)	2.1B(93.5%)
AAAA	75.4K(14.5%)	50.3K(61.8%)	112.9K(52.4%)	15.5K(54.3%)	40.6M(43.4%)	31.0K(49.2%)	9.6M(22.8%)	252.6M(35.0%)

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- **GoogleDNS** dominates the most used public DNS service

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- Various success rates: DNSPOD vs OpenDNS

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- Various success rates: DNSPOD vs OpenDNS
- **AAAA queries**: notably lower success rate across all resolvers

Failures Across Resolvers


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- GoogleDNS dominates the most used public DNS service
- Various success rates: DNSPOD vs OpenDNS
- AAAA queries: notably lower success rate across all resolvers
- Why do public DNS resolvers differ in success rates?

Failures Across Resolvers


- Comparing infrastructures
 - Compare the success rates of the same domains handled by different resolvers



- Domains resolved by 114DNS and ISP are most likely to fail

Failures Across Resolvers

- Comparing infrastructures
 - Compare the success rates of the same domains handled by different resolvers



- DNSPOD and 360DNS have higher success rates


Failures Across TLDs

- Specifically explore two camps of TLDs
 - The new generic Top Level Domains
 - Those that have Internationalized Domain Name

	new gTLD	IDN
total	4.0M (79.3%)	0.26M (66.6%)
A	3.4M (88.6%)	0.17M (86.7%)
AAAA	0.6M (25.9%)	0.09M (26.4%)


- They show lower success rates, maybe because
 - Such gTLDs attract certain types of domain registrant
 - The presence of malicious domains which are unreliable

Failures Across TLDs



- The majority of domains map to a relatively small set of prefixes

Failures Across TLDs



- some /24 network segments serve a large number of domains

Failures Across TLDs

No.	subnet	AS num.	AS name	#IPs	#queries	#FQDN	#SLD	#resolvable
1	23.245.136.0/24	18978	Enzu Inc	252	201.9K (157.1K)	195.9K (152.2K)	483 (386)	0(0)
2	192.238.167.0/24	395954	Leaseweb	236	17.4K (14.8K)	16.3K (13.9K)	287 (243)	0 (0)
3	172.246.207.0/24	18978	Enzu Inc	236	15.7K (15.4K)	13.2K (13.0K)	443(434)	1 (1)
4	104.217.93.0/24	40676	Psychz Net	253	9.0K (1)	8.8K (1)	923 (1)	9(0)
5	47.89.58.0/24	45102	Alibaba	4	10.9K (469)	8.8K (114)	7.7K (107)	748 (7)

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- Extremely low rate of successful resolutions today

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- The number of queries is close to the number of FQDNs
 - These domains are short-lived and change frequently


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Corresponding to domains classified as malicious


- Two blacklists from VirusTotal and Qihoo 360
- Label a domain as malicious if any of the two blacklists classify it as so

Failures Across TLDs



- Malicious SLDs hosted in subnet 3 have a larger impact


Failures Across TLDs



- The subnets host different sites mapping to different TLDs

Implications on Systems Design


- Active measurement system
 - Distinguish between *resolvers* that support and do not support AAAA queries
 - Test whether a *domain* supports AAAA queries
 - Measure the *success rates*



Implications on Systems Design

- Active measurement system
 - Localization performance

114DNS	360DNS	AlibabaDNS	DNSPOD	GoogleDNS	OpenDNS	ISP	Others
91.2%	98.0%	95.9%	94.3%	64.6%	43.8%	71.7%	69.9%



Implications on Systems Design

- Such an *active measurement system* is useful for content publishers, ISPs and end users
- For **publishers**
 - help locate their content
- For **ISPs**
 - help estimate the IPv6 traffic
- For **users**
 - help to choose more suitable resolvers

Implications on Systems Design

Length	3	4	5	≥ 6
% of SLDs	0.1%	93.0%	6.1%	0.8%

- Extracting features from domain names may *not* work well for detecting malicious new gTLD domains
- To build a *malicious new gTLD domain detection system*, we could use features like
 - DNS query frequency
 - the number of FQDNs of an SLD
 - the resolved IP addresses
 - the corresponding ASes

Conclusion

- **Findings:** based on analysis using passive DNS logs covering over 3B queries from 3 ISPs in China
 - A small number of domains are responsible for the majority of failures
 - Domains and resolvers need to be upgraded for better IPv6 support
 - Diverse failure rates across the DNS resolvers
 - New gTLDs have higher failure rates largely because of malicious domains
- **Implications:** we propose two potential systems that could build on our findings
 - Active measurement system
 - Malicious new gTLD domain detection system

Thank you!