

Taking a Look into Execute-Only Memory


Marc Schink, Johannes Obermaier, August 12, 2019




Introduction




Introduction




Introduction



Introduction




eXecute-Only Memory



eXecute-Only Memory

- Attacker model
 - Physical access
 - Privileged code execution
 - No hardware modifications



eXecute-Only Memory

■ NXP Semiconductors

- Kinetis K8x
- Kinetis KV1x
- Kinetis KV3x

■ STMicroelectronics

- STM32L0
- STM32L1
- STM32L4
- STM32F4
- STM32F7
- STM32H7

■ Texas Instruments

- TM4C12x
- MSP432

eXecute-Only Memory

■ NXP Semiconductors

- Kinetis K8x
- Kinetis KV1x
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
■ STMicroelectronics

- STM32L0
- STM32L1
- STM32L4
- STM32F4
- STM32F7
- STM32H7


■ Texas Instruments

- TM4C12x
- MSP432


eXecute-Only Memory




Conceptual weakness




Code recovery attack




Code recovery attack




Code recovery attack




Code recovery attack



Code recovery attack



Code recovery attack



Code recovery attack

Input state

R0: 0x0000 0080
R1: 0x2000 0000
R2: 0x0000 0084
R3: 0x2000 0000
R4: 0x0000 0088
R5: 0x2000 0000
R6: 0x0000 008c
R7: 0x2000 0000
APSR: 0x0000 0000



Target instruction

```
movs r0, #0x84
adds r0, r0, #4
  adds r0, #4
  orrs r0, r2
  movs r0, r2
  mov r0, r2
adds r0, r2, #0
lsls r0, r2, #0
  uxtb r0, r2
  uxth r0, r2
  sxth r0, r2
```



Output state

R0: 0x0000 0084
R1: 0x2000 0000
R2: 0x0000 0084
R3: 0x2000 0000
R4: 0x0000 0088
R5: 0x2000 0000
R6: 0x0000 008c
R7: 0x2000 0000
APSR: 0x0000 0000

Code recovery attack

Input state

R0: 0x0100 8081
R1: 0x0000 0000
R2: 0x0100 8085
R3: 0x0000 0000
R4: 0x0000 0000
R5: 0x0000 0000
R6: 0x0000 0000
R7: 0x0000 0000
APSR: 0x0000 0000



Target instruction

```
movs r0, #0x84
adds r0, r0, #4
  adds r0, #4
  orrs r0, r2
  movs r0, r2
  mov r0, r2
adds r0, r2, #0
lsls r0, r2, #0
  uxtb r0, r2
  uxth r0, r2
  sxth r0, r2
```



Output state

R0: 0x0100 8085
R1: 0x0000 0000
R2: 0x0100 0085
R3: 0x0000 0000
R4: 0x0000 0000
R5: 0x0000 0000
R6: 0x0000 0000
R7: 0x0000 0000
APSR: 0x0000 0000

Code recovery attack

Input state

R0: 0x0100 8081
R1: 0x0000 0000
R2: 0x0100 8085
R3: 0x0000 0000
R4: 0x0000 0000
R5: 0x0000 0000
R6: 0x0000 0000
R7: 0x0000 0000
APSR: 0x0000 0000



Target instruction

```
movs r0, #0x84  
adds r0, r0, #4  
  adds r0, #4  
  orrs r0, r2  
  movs r0, r2  
  mov r0, r2  
adds r0, r2, #0  
lsls r0, r2, #0  
  uxtb r0, r2  
  uxth r0, r2  
  sxth r0, r2
```



Output state

R0: 0x0100 8085
R1: 0x0000 0000
R2: 0x0100 0085
R3: 0x0000 0000
R4: 0x0000 0000
R5: 0x0000 0000
R6: 0x0000 0000
R7: 0x0000 0000
APSR: 0x0000 0000

Code recovery attack

Input state

R0: 0x0000 0000
R1: 0x0000 0000
R2: 0x8000 0001
R3: 0x0000 0000
R4: 0x0000 0000
R5: 0x0000 0000
R6: 0x0000 0000
R7: 0x0000 0000
APSR: 0x0000 0000



Target instruction

```
movs r0, #0x84  
adds r0, r0, #4  
  adds r0, #4  
  orrs r0, r2  
  movs r0, r2  
  mov r0, r2  
adds r0, r2, #0  
lsls r0, r2, #0  
  uxtb r0, r2  
  uxth r0, r2  
  sxth r0, r2
```



Output state

R0: 0x8000 0001
R1: 0x0000 0000
R2: 0x8000 0001
R3: 0x0000 0000
R4: 0x0000 0000
R5: 0x0000 0000
R6: 0x0000 0000
R7: 0x0000 0000
APSR: 0x0000 0000

Code recovery attack

Input state

R0: 0x0000 0000
R1: 0x0000 0000
R2: 0x8000 0001
R3: 0x0000 0000
R4: 0x0000 0000
R5: 0x0000 0000
R6: 0x0000 0000
R7: 0x0000 0000
APSR: 0x0000 0000



Target instruction

```
movs r0, #0x84  
adds r0, r0, #4  
  adds r0, #4  
  orrs r0, r2  
  movs r0, r2  
  mov r0, r2  
adds r0, r2, #0  
lsls r0, r2, #0  
  uxtb r0, r2  
  uxth r0, r2  
  sxth r0, r2
```



Output state

R0: 0x8000 0001
R1: 0x0000 0000
R2: 0x8000 0001
R3: 0x0000 0000
R4: 0x0000 0000
R5: 0x0000 0000
R6: 0x0000 0000
R7: 0x0000 0000
APSR: 0x0000 0000

Code recovery attack

Input state

R0: 0x0000 0000
R1: 0x0000 0000
R2: 0x8000 0001
R3: 0x0000 0000
R4: 0x0000 0000
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R6: 0x0000 0000
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APSR: 0x0000 0000



Target instruction

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movs r0, #0x84  
adds r0, r0, #4  
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adds r0, r2, #0  
lsls r0, r2, #0  
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  sxth r0, r2
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Output state

R0: 0x8000 0001
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Code recovery attack

Input state

R0: 0x0000 0000
R1: 0x0000 0000
R2: 0x8000 0001
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Target instruction

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movs r0, #0x84  
adds r0, r0, #4  
  adds r0, #4  
  orrs r0, r2  
  movs r0, r2  
  mov r0, r2  
adds r0, r2, #0  
lsls r0, r2, #0  
  uxtb r0, r2  
  uxth r0, r2  
  sxth r0, r2
```




Output state

R0: 0x8000 0001
R1: 0x0000 0000
R2: 0x8000 0001
R3: 0x0000 0000
R4: 0x0000 0000
R5: 0x0000 0000
R6: 0x0000 0000
R7: 0x0000 0000
APSR: 0x0000 0000

Code recovery attack


- Commutative properties

```
adds r0, r2, r4  
adds r0, r4, r2
```



- Algorithmic equivalence

```
movs r2, #0  
eors r2, r2
```



- Binary encoding


```
subs r0, r0, #1  
subs r0, #1
```



Code recovery attack


- Commutative properties

```
adds r0, r2, r4  
adds r0, r4, r2
```



- Algorithmic equivalence

```
movs r2, #0  
eors r2, r2
```



- Binary encoding

```
subs r0, r0, #1  
subs r0, #1
```



- No effect on the correct functionality of the recovered code

Code recovery attack

- Hint instructions

yield
sev

- Control instructions

dsb
isb
dmb



Code recovery attack

- Hint instructions

yield

sev


- Control instructions

dsb
isb
dmb



- Rarely used and only for special purposes


Code recovery attack



Code recovery attack

Demo:
Code recovery attack on **STM32L0**

What else?



What else?



Hardware implementation flaws

Conclusion

- Conceptual weakness allows code recovery attack
- Practicability of code recovery attacks demonstrated
- eXecute-Only Memory is inadequate for IP protection
- Hardware-backed isolation required

Contact Information



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