

# Security and Privacy of Wearable Computing

David Wagner

technology



















# Conclusion

## ShoeSense

- Wearable system
- Shoe-mounted sensor







continuous computer vision

continuous speech recognition

real-time, unobtrusive interaction with humans

applications



augmented reality



augmented reality



# augmented reality



augmented reality

personal assistant

augmented reality

personal assistant

collaborative sensing

augmented reality

personal assistant

health and monitoring

collaborative sensing

augmented reality

personal assistant

health and monitoring

sports and exercise

collaborative sensing

augmented reality

personal assistant

health and monitoring

real-time advice

sports and exercise

collaborative sensing

papers



# A Scanner Darkly: Protecting User Privacy From Perceptual Applications

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**Abstract**—Perceptual, “context-aware” applications that observe their environment and interact with users via cameras and other sensors are becoming ubiquitous on personal computers, mobile phones, gaming platforms, household robots, and augmented-reality devices. This raises new privacy risks. We describe the design and implementation of DARKLY, a general privacy protection system for the increasingly common scenario where an untrusted, third-party perceptual application is running on a trusted device. DARKLY is integrated with OpenCV, a popular computer vision library used by such applications to access visual inputs. It deploys multiple privacy protection mechanisms, including access control, algorithmic obfuscation, data transformation, and user audit.

We evaluate DARKLY on 20 perceptual applications that perform diverse tasks such as image recognition, object tracking, video surveillance, and face detection. These applications run DARKLY unmodified or with very few modifications with minimal performance overheads vs. native OpenCV. In all cases, privacy enforcement does not reduce the application’s functionality or accuracy. For the rest, we quantify the tradeoff between privacy and utility and demonstrate that

programmable robots, even moving around—raises interesting privacy issues for their users. Many people are already uncomfortable with law enforcement agencies conducting large-scale face recognition [2, 17]. Perceptual applications running in one’s home or a public area may conduct unauthorized surveillance, intentionally or unintentionally overcollect information (e.g., keep track of other people present in a room), and capture sensitive data such as credit card numbers, license plates, contents of computer monitors, etc. that accidentally end up in their field of vision.

General-purpose, data-agnostic privacy technologies such as access control and privacy-preserving statistical analysis are fairly blunt tools. Instead, we develop a *domain-specific* solution, informed by the structure of perceptual applications and the computations they perform on their inputs, and capable of applying protection at the right level of abstraction.

Our system, DARKLY, is a privacy protection layer

# A Scanner Darkly: Protecting User Privacy From Perceptual Applications

Suman Jana\*

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## Enabling Fine-Grained Permissions for Augmented Reality Applications With Recognizers

Suman Jana<sup>1</sup>, David Molnar<sup>2</sup>, Alexander Moshchuk<sup>2</sup>, Alan Dunn<sup>1</sup>, Benjamin Livshin<sup>1</sup>,  
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### Abstract

Augmented reality (AR) applications sense the environment, then render virtual objects on human senses. Examples include smartphone applications that annotate storefronts with reviews and Xbox Kinect games that show “avatars” mimicking human

### 1 Introduction

An *augmented reality* (AR) application takes natural user interactions (such as gestures, voice, eye gaze) as input and overlays digital content on top of the real world seen, heard, and experienced by the user. For example, on mobile phones augmented reality “browsers” such as Layar and Layar allow users to look through the phone and see annotations about a magazine article or a store

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Helen J. Wang<sup>2</sup>, and Eyal Ofek<sup>2</sup>

## Operating System Support for Augmented Reality Applications

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Molnar<sup>4</sup>, Alexander Moshchuk<sup>4</sup>, Eyal Ofek<sup>4</sup>, Franziska Roesner<sup>3</sup>, Scott Saponas<sup>4</sup>, Margus  
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### Abstract

Augmented reality (AR) takes natural user input

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discussion

## discussion

what technical problems should the  
research community be focusing on?

privacy for bystanders

privacy for wearer



# wearables in the corporate enterprise

what will attackers' motives and methods?

open discussion