How Double-Fetch Situations turn into Double-Fetch Vulnerabilities:

A Study of Double Fetches in the Linux Kernel

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OUTLINE

What is a double fetch?

A static pattern-based double fetch analysis.

Results and Findings.

Double Fetch First Appearance - Fermin J. Serna, CVE-2008-2252

Microsoft Security Bulletin MS08-061 - Important

Vulnerabilities in Windows Kernel Could Allow Elevation of Privilege (954211)

Published: October 14, 2008

Version: 1.0

General Information

Executive Summary

This security update resolves one publicly disclosed and two privately reported vulnerabilities in the Windows kernel. A local attacker who successfully exploited these vulnerabilities could take complete control of an affected system. The vulnerabilities could not be exploited remotely or by anonymous users.

This security update is rated Important for all supported editions of Microsoft Windows 2000, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, and Windows Server 2008. For more information, see the subsection, Affected and Non-Affected Software, in this section.

The security update addresses the vulnerabilities by correcting window property validation passed during the new window creation process, correcting the manner in which system calls from multiple threads are handled, and correcting validation of parameters passed to the Windows Kernel from user mode. For more information about the vulnerabilities, see the Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) subsection for the specific vulnerability under the next section, Vulnerability Information.

Recommendation. Microsoft recommends that customers apply the update at the earliest opportunity.

Known Issues. Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 954211 documents the currently known issues that customers may experience when installing this security update. The article also documents recommended solutions for these issues.

Affected and Non-Affected Software

The following software have been tested to determine which versions or editions are affected. Other versions or editions are either past their support life cycle or are not affected. To determine the support life cycle for your software version or edition, visit Microsoft Support Lifecycle.

Double Fetch First Study: Jurczyk & Coldwind - 2013

Bochspwn: Expl Conditions Found Patt

Mateusz "j00ru" Jurc SySca


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Stats: bochspwn vs Windows

- 89 potential new issues discovered
 - + part of the initial 27 bugs were also rediscovered
 - All were reported to Microsoft (Nov 2012 Jan 2013)
- 36 EoPs (+3 variants) addressed by: MS13-016, MS13-017, MS13-031, MS13-036
- 13 issues have been classified as Local DoS only
- 7 more are being analyzed / are scheduled to be fixed
- The rest were unexploitable / non-issues / etc

Tested: Windows 7 32-bit, Windows 8 32-bit and Windows 8 64-bit.

Double Fetch Exploit Instructions on GitHub - 2016




Double Fetch Vulnerabilities Today: Where are they?

Bochspwn	Is dynamic, slow and limited code coverage.			
Weakness	Did not show why double fetches happen.			
	Only workable for Windows.			
	Cannot analyze driver code without hardware.			


- Linux had double fetch vulnerabilities, but no dedicated audit has been done.
- We need a static analysis to cover the complete kernel including all drivers(44%).

Operating Systems: Separate Address Spaces



- Each user process has its own virtual memory space
- User spaces are isolated.
- Only the kernel can access all user spaces.


Operating Systems: System Call Interface



Fundamental Interface between application and kernel

- Arguments are copied
 - either directly or
 - as pointers to data structures

 The kernel cannot trust any data coming from the application!



Transfer Functions in Linux

 Linux uses dedicated functions to copy data between user and kernel space:

```
get_user(src)
copy_from_user(dst, src, size)
put_user(dst)
copy to user(dst, src, size)
```

Data in user space is not accessed directly:
 Ensures that the access is valid.

Double-fetch bug in Linux (CVE-2016-5728)

```
522 static int mic copy dp entry(...) {
            if (copy from user(&dd, argp, sizeof(dd))) {
533
536
                        return -EFAULT;
537
            dd config = kmalloc(mic_desc_size(&dd), GFP_KERNEL);
546
547
            if (dd config == NULL) {
                       return -ENOMEM;
            if (copy from user(dd config, argp, mic desc size(&dd))) {
552
                        ret = -EFAULT;
553
557
570
            for ( i = sizeof(struct mic_bootparam);
571
                i < MIC_DP_SIZE - mic_total_desc_size(dd_config);
572
                i += mic total desc size(devp)) {
573
                        devp = mdev -> dp + i;
574
577
578
591
            memcpy(devp, dd_config, mic_desc_size(dd_config));
            •••
597 }
```

Allocate buffer use 'size' from first fetch

Use 'size' from second fetch

Static Pattern-Based Approach


Pattern-based Double Fetch Analysis

Based on Coccinelle (Julia Lawall, LIP6 – France)


Program matching and transformation engine used for Linux checking

Developed two analyses:

- A simple analysis to identify double-fetch situations
- 2. A refined analysis to discover double-fetch bugs



Pattern-based Double Fetch Analysis



Manual Analysis

Characteristics

- How user data is transferred and used in the kernel
- Trigger and consequence


Details at C code level

- Context information
- Implementation details
- Add rules to refine the pattern


Categorization

- Size Checking
- Type Selection
- Shallow Copy


Categorization – Size Checking, Type Selection



Categorization – Shallow Copy



Refined Double Fetch Detection



Results and Findings

Evaluation - Basic Double Fetch Analysis

Category	Occı	ırrences	In Drivers		
Size Checking	30	33%	22	73%	
Type Selection	11	12%	9	82%	
Shallow Copy	31	34%	19	61%	
Other	18	20%	7	39%	
Total	90	100%	57	63%	
True Bugs	5	6%	4	80%	

- Most double fetches don't cause double-fetch bugs.
- Double fetches are more likely to occur in drivers.
 - About 63% (57 out of 90) of the cases were driver related.
 - About 80% (4 out of 5) of the true double-fetch bugs inside drivers.

Evaluation – Refined Detection

Kernel	Total Files	Reported Files			7 1
Linux 4.5	39,906	53	5	23	6
Android 6.0.1	35,313	48	3	18	6
FreeBSD	32,830	16	0	8	3

Totally 6 bugs found:

- 5 new bugs in newest Linux kernel 4.5.
- 2 shared between Android and Linux.
- 1 bug only showed in Android.
- No bug found in FreeBSD.

The Confirmed Bugs

CVE-2016-5728

MIC VOP (Virtio Over PCle) driver

Linux-4.5/drivers/misc/mic/host/mic_virtio.c

CVE-2016-6130

• IBM (z-Series) s390 platform driver

Linux-4.5/drivers/s390/char/sclp_ctl.c

CVE-2016-6136

Auditing subsystem

• Linux-4.5/kernel/auditsc.c

CVE-2016-6156

• Expose the Chrome OS Embedded Controller to user-space

• Linux-4.5/drivers/platform/chrome/cros_ec_dev.c

CVE-2016-6480

• The aacraid driver (adds support for Adaptec RAID controllers)

• Linux-4.5/drivers/scsi/aacraid/commctrl.c

CVE-2015-1420

File system

Android-6.0.1/fs/fhandle.c

Findings

Double fetches have a long history

- Windows, Linux, Android, FreeBSD
- Some double-fetch bugs existed over 10 years (CVE-2016-6480).

Some double fetches are inevitable

- Size checking, type selection, shallow copy
- Size checking is more likely to cause true bugs (5/6)

Benign double fetches are not all safe

- Can turn into harmful ones by code update (CVE-2016-5728).
- Can cause performance issue.

Conclusion

 Double fetches occur in operating systems and can cause bugs and vulnerabilities.

- With a static pattern-matching analysis, we analyzed the complete kernel (all drivers) and categorized bug prone scenarios.
- We found 6 true bugs (vulnerabilities), all have been confirmed by the maintainers and patched already.

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