


# **Personal Information Leakage by Abusing the GDPR 'Right of Access'**

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**EDM**

# **General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and 'Right of Access'**

## **GDPR**

- European framework, in effect since May 2018.
- European consumers and businesses.
- Generated a lot of startups.
- Substantial monetary penalties (20 000 000 euros or 4% of turnover).

## **Right of Access**

- Permits subjects to request all their personal information.
- For free and within a month (max. 2 months)
- Subject Access Request or Data Request (in our paper).

## **Research questions: Data Requests under 'Right of Access'**

- What information is requested by the organization to verify the identity of the consumer ?
- How is the requested information verified by the organization ?
- Can the requested information be forged by an adversary or can the organization be persuaded through social engineering to obtain personal information from someone else ?
- How can we improve the identity verification?

## Setting up experiment

- Impersonating 2 targeted individuals as an adversary to obtain their personal information by forging data requests.
- Targeted individuals = 2 authors.
- Contacted 55 organizations, primarily based on Alexa top 50. Independently from each other.
- Classified each organization in categories: Financial, Retail, News Outlet, Entertainment, Transport & Logistics and others.

# What credentials are requested or verified by the organization ?

## Combinations of the following:

- Login credentials
- Email address ownership
- ID card
- Home address
- Calling subject
- Specific user data

# Can we forge or extract the requested credentials ?

## Email address: Forgeable

- Create similar looking email. Old concept in phishing.

[mariano.dimartino@yahoo.com](mailto:mariano.dimartino@yahoo.com)

mariano.dlmartino@yahoo.com

[mariano.dimartino@gmail.com](mailto:mariano.dimartino@gmail.com)

mariano.dimartino@gmail.com

# Can we forge or extract the requested credentials ?

## Home address: Forgeable

- Apply some OSINT: Found for both individuals.
- Sometimes, only the city is required: social media.

# Can we forge or extract the requested credentials ?

## ID card

- Take picture of own ID card and photoshop name, date of birth and portrait photo of the targeted individual.
- Censor everything else.
- National Register Number and Passport ID number are rarely required, so censor it.

# Can we forge the requested credentials ?

## ID card: Photoshopped



## Can we persuade the organizations ?

**Org:** "Please send a request with an email address that is known to us."

**Adversary:** "Sorry, lost access to my account due to hackers. This is the reason why I am sending a data request. Trying to get a view of all personal information that may be leaked..."

**Success:** 1 / 5

**Org:** "We sent your personal data to an email address known to us."

**Adversary:** Wait until a few days before deadline -> "Didn't receive response to data request. Deadline has almost passed."

**Success:** 1 / 2

## Can we persuade the organizations ?

**Org:** "Please send proof A,B and C to verify your identity."

**Adversary:** Wait until a few days before deadline -> "Okay, here is proof A and C."

**Success:** 2 / 2

Overall strategy: pressure and legal talk.

## Results:

- From **55** organizations:
  - **37** accepted manual data requests
  - **14** provided an online platform to request data.
  - **4** didn't answer at all.
- **12** out of **37** organizations leaked the personal data of the targeted individual. Falsified credentials were never questioned.
- **3** out of **37** organizations leaked the personal data of someone else.

## Results:

- **Leaked data consists of:**

- **Financial:** Timestamped financial transactions, account numbers, services bought, ...
- **Retail:** serial numbers of products, delivery dates, products bought, ...
- **Entertainment:** profile preferences, products bought, ...
- **T&L:** Timestamped GPS locations, saved routes, purchased tickets, customer ID, ...
- **News outlets:** browsing history, profile preferences, ...

## **Recommendations:**

- **Consumers:**

- Basic hygiene

- **Organizations:**

- Require login credentials: significantly reduces risk (also, suggested by GDPR).
- Strictly verifying ownership of email address.
- Call subject and request specific user data.
- Don't ask for IDs!

## **Ethics:**

- Prior written permission of University Ethical Research Committee and targeted individuals.
- Vulnerable organizations were notified of research and recommendations.
- Organizations are anonymized.
- All organizations responded positively. 3 organizations requested a meeting to discuss the recommendations.

**Thank you.**

**Questions ?**

## References:

### Related work

Type of credentials: Boniface et al.

(<https://hal.inria.fr/hal-02072302/document>)

Risks of SARs: Amber Welch (<https://youtu.be/FAYGZ9COrto>)

### Future work

Cagnazzo et al.

(<https://www.syssec.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/media/emma/veroeffentlichungen/2019/08/05/ESORICS19-GDPIRated.pdf>)

Urban et al.

(<https://www.ei.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/media/emma/veroeffentlichungen/2019/08/05/DPM19-SAR-Study.pdf>)

## Interesting cases (1)

We requested personal information of our targeted individual:

**Ley Johnson**

We received the data of another individual:

Name: **Lesley John**

Address: **Sonarstreet nr.15**