

The Battle for New York:

A Case Study of Applied Digital Threat Modeling at the Enterprise Level

Rock Stevens, Daniel Votipka, Elissa Redmiles, Michelle Mazurek | University of Maryland
Patrick Sweeney | Wake Forest University
Colin Ahern | New York City Cyber Command

Threat Modeling

- ✓ What is it?
- Why do it?
- Where's the proof?

Threat Modeling

This study is the **first** empirical evaluation of a digital threat modeling framework at the enterprise level



Study Methods

Baseline

Educational Intervention

Individual Sessions Post-training Survey 30-day Follow-up

120-day Analysis

Six-part process over the span of 120 days

Baseline Survey

1-hour Educational Intervention

Educational Intervention

Center of Gravity




Actionable Defense Plan

Educational Intervention

Center of Gravity

Center of Gravity Worksheet



1-on-1 TMF Application Session

Immediate Post-training Survey

Export Output for Validation

30-Day Follow-up Survey

120-day Analysis of Logs

Perceived Efficacy
Accuracy
Actual Adoption
Actual Efficacy

Perceived Efficacy

What did participants think about the threat modeling framework?

Accuracy

Did participants produce relevant mitigating strategies?

Actual Adoption

What remained with the organization beyond initial training?

What impact did changes have on the enterprise?



Baseline

- 25 participants (37% of workforce)
- Commercial services
- Compliance standards
- Industry best practices

Perceived Efficacy

- 12/25 identified new aspects never before considered
- More confident in their abilities
- Empowered to communicate

"Plan effectively, document, track, monitor progress, and essentially understand our security posture"

Accuracy


- 96% ADP accuracy
- ◀ 16/25 ADPs ready for immediate implementation.

Accuracy

No work role, amount of education, IT experience, or combination thereof enjoyed a statistically significant advantage

Actual Adoption

- Securing accounts
- Crowdsourcing assessments
- Improving sensor coverage
- Reducing human error



- Securing accounts
- Crowdsourcing assessments
- Improving sensor coverage
- Reducing human error

Blocked account hijackings of five privileged user accounts

- Securing accounts
- Crowdsourcing assessments
- Improving sensor coverage
- Reducing human error

Discovered and remedied three vulnerabilities in public-facing web servers

- Securing accounts
- Crowdsourcing assessments
- Improving sensor coverage
- Reducing human error

Blocked 541 unique intrusion attempts

Limitations

- No TMF comparison
- Demand characteristics
- Representative environment?

Summary

- · <2-hr training made an immediate impact without additional costs
- · Identified 147 unique mitigation strategies
- · Quantitatively improved security over 120 days
- · Useful for empowering and communicating
- > Questions / Feedback? rstevens@cs.umd.edu | @ada95ftw



Security. Privacy. People Digital Threat Modeling at the Enterprise Level