

Virtual U: Defeating Face Liveness Detection by Building Virtual Models From Your Public Photos



Yi Xu, True Price, Jan-Michael Frahm, and Fabian Monroe

Department of Computer Science, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

USENIX Security

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
Face Authentication: Convenient Security



[image source](#)


Evolution of Adversarial Models

- **Attack:** Still-image Spoofing




Evolution of Adversarial Models

- **Attack:** Still-image Spoofing
- **Defense:** Liveness Detection




Evolution of Adversarial Models

- **Attack:** Still-image Spoofing
- **Defense:** Liveness Detection
- **Attack:** Video Spoofing




Evolution of Adversarial Models

- **Attack:** Still-image Spoofing
- **Defense:** Liveness Detection
- **Attack:** Video Spoofing
- **Defense:** Motion Consistency



Evolution of Adversarial Models

- **Attack:** Still-image Spoofing
- **Defense:** Liveness Detection
- **Attack:** Video Spoofing
- **Defense:** Motion Consistency
- **Attack:** 3D-Printed Masks




Virtual U: A New Attack


We introduce a new **VR-based attack** on face authentication systems solely **using publicly available photos** of the victim




Virtual U: A New Attack





Leveraging Social Media




Landmark Extraction



3D Face Model




3D Face Model




3D Face Model

$$S = \boxed{\bar{S}} + \boxed{A^{id}} \boxed{\alpha^{id}} + \boxed{A^{exp}} \boxed{\alpha^{exp}}$$



3D Face Model



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Pose
 α^{id}
 α^{exp}

3D Face Model



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


Pose
 α^{id}
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3D Face Model





3D Face Model




3D Face Model




3D Face Model



Pose
 α^{exp}



Pose
 α^{exp}




Pose
 α^{exp}



Pose
 α^{exp}

} α^{id}

Multi-Image Modeling



Texturing



Direct Texturing



2D Poisson Editing

Texturing



Direct Texturing




2D Poisson Editing



3D Poisson Editing


Gaze Correction



Gaze Correction



Virtual U: A New Attack



Expression Animation

$$S = \bar{S} + A^{id} \alpha^{id} + A^{exp} \alpha^{exp}$$



Smiling



Laughing



Blinking



Raising Eyebrows

VR Display



Printed Marker




VR System




Authentication Device

VR Display



Experiments



Experiments

- 20 participants
 - Aged 24 to 44
 - 14 males, 6 females
 - Various ethnicities
- Two tests
 - Indoor photo of the subject in the same environment as registration
 - Publicly accessible photos
 - Anywhere from 3 to 27 photos per person
 - Low-, medium-, and high-quality
 - Potentially strong changes in appearance over time

Experiments



KeyLemon



Mobius




TrueKey




BioID



1U



Indoor Image
(Single frontal image)



Online

Avg. # Tries

100%

85%

1.6

100%

80%

1.5

100%

70%

1.3

100%

55%

1.7


100%

0%

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

Observations

- Medium- and high-resolution photos work best
 - Photos from professional photographers (weddings, etc.)
- Group photos provide consistent frontal views
 - Often lower resolution
- Only a small number of photos required
 - One or two forward-facing photos
 - One or two higher-resolution photos





Experiments

How does resolution affect reconstruction quality?




Experiments

How does rotation affect reconstruction quality?





Experiments

Combining high-res rotation
with low-res front-facing?



+




Experiments

- Virtual U is successful against **liveness detection**




Experiments

- Virtual U is successful against **liveness detection**
- Also successful against **motion consistency**






Experiments






- “Seeing Your Face is Not Enough: An Inertial Sensor-Based Liveness Detection for Face Authentication” (Li et al., ACM CCS’15)
 - Device motion measured by **inertial sensor data**
 - **Head pose** estimated from input video
 - Train a classifier to identify **real data (correlated signals)** versus spoofed video data









Experiments

Training Data (Pos. Data vs. Neg. Data)	Test Result (Accept Rate)		
	Real Face	Video Spoof 	VR Spoof 
Real vs. Video 	<u>98.0%</u>	<u>1.3%</u>	<u>97.5%</u>

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Experiments

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Real vs. Video  + VR 	<u>70.0%</u>	0.0%	<u>50.0%</u>
Real vs. VR 	<u>73.7%</u>	-	<u>50.0%</u>

Mitigations

- Alternative/additional hardware
 - Infrared imaging (e.g. Windows Hello)
 - Random structured light projection



[image source](#)

Mitigations

- Alternative/additional hardware
 - Infrared imaging (e.g. Windows Hello)
 - Random structured light projection
- Improved defense against low-resolution synthetic textures



Original

Downsized to 50px

Conclusion



- We introduce a new **VR-based attack** on face authentication systems solely **using publicly available photos** of the victim
- This attack bypasses existing defenses of **liveness detection** and **motion consistency**
- At a minimum, face authentication software must improve against VR-based **attacks with low-resolution textures**
- The **increasing ubiquity of VR** will continue to challenge computer-vision-based authentication systems

Thank you!

Questions?