Hiding Control Flow Changes within Non-Control Data

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- Event interception requires us to divert the control flow at runtime
- This is accomplished by installing hooks into the control flow

▶ Achilles Heel: Hooks

- Types
 - Change code (Code Hooks)

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⇒ How can we evade existing detection mechanisms?

▶ Hook Detection

Assumption

Hooks must target persistent control data

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Dynamic Hooks: Evade existing mechanisms by targeting transient control data

Outline

- Background & Motivation
- Dynamic Hooks
- 3 Experiments
- 4 Limitations
- Conclusion

▶ Idea

Apply exploitation techniques to the problem of hooking

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- ⇒ Target transient control data

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- Modify non-control data to trigger vulnerabilities
- Change control flow dynamically at runtime
- ⇒ Target transient control data
- ⇒ No evident connection between hook and control flow change

► Comparison to Traditional Exploits

We already **control** the target application

Dynamic Hooks

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We are not affected by most protection mechanisms

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- We are not affected by most protection mechanisms
- We can modify internal data structures and attack internal functions
- We can prepare our shellcode in advance

⇒ Much stronger attacker model

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Dynamic Hooks

▶ Example: Linux

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write-where-what


```
► [next + 8] = prev
```

▶ Example: Linux


write-where-what

- ▶ [*next* + 8] = *prev*
- ▶ [prev] = next

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▶ Suited Vulnerabilities

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mov [rax], rbx

▶ Types

Dynamic control hooks

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- Dynamic control hooks
- Dynamic data hooks

► Finding Dynamic Hooks

- Program Slicing
- Symbolic Execution

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 - mov [<destination>], <source>

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Program Slicing

- mov [<destination>], <source>
- backwards breadth-first search on the assembly-level
- extract path if destination and source originate from a global variable
- Implementation: Based on IDA Pro
- Symbolic Execution

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 - generate detailed information about controlled registers

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OS	Instructions	8-byte moves	Slices	Paths
Linux	1,976,441	42,130	1753	566
Windows	1,330,791	26,694	5450	379

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Prototype Limitations

- Program Slicing: no memory model
 - ⇒ **79,853** paths ignored

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Prototype Limitations

- Program Slicing: no memory model
 - ⇒ **79,853** paths ignored
- ► Symbol Execution: supports only a subset of x86 instruction set
 - ⇒ **5857** slices ignored

▶ Automated Path Extraction

Implemented three prototypes of dynamic hooks


- Control Hook: Interception of system calls (Linux)
- Data Hook: Backdoor (Linux)
- Ontrol Hook: Interception of process termination (Windows)

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Vulnerability may place restrictions on the hook

▶ Automated Path Extraction



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- Coverage?

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- Coverage?
- Side effects?

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- are more complex than traditional hooks
- are more fragile than traditional hooks