

# ASM: A Programmable Interface for Extending Android Security

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# Android Security Extensions (selected)

Security extensions focus on  
*specific use cases and/or security and privacy models*

## Privacy

*TaintDroid,  
AppFence,  
MockDroid*

## IPC Provenance

*QUIRE,  
IPC Inspection*

## Fine-Grained Permissions

*APEX, CRePE*

## Permission Constraints

*Kirin*

## Context-based Apps

*CRePE,  
ConXSense*

## App Communication

*Saint, XManDroid,  
TrustDroid,  
Aquifer*

## Mock Data


*MockDroid,  
TISSA, AppFence*

## Type Enforcement

*SEAndroid,  
FlaskDroid*


# Android Security Extensions

Access control (hooks) are embedded in sensitive components



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# Research Question

Is it possible to provide a *programmable* and *generic* security architecture on top of which many of these solutions can be instantiated?

# Observations

Diverse Goals, but use similar security hooks and mechanisms


System	Android ICC	Package Manager	Sensors / Phone Info	Fake Data	System Content Providers	File Access	Network Access	3rd Party Hooks
MockDroid		✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	
XManDroid	✓	✓	✓			✓	✓	
TrustDroid	✓	✓			✓	✓	✓	
FlaskDroid	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
CRoPE	✓		✓					
Quire	✓	✓						
TaintDroid	✓		✓			✓	✓	
Kirin		✓						
IPC Inspection	✓	✓						
AppFence	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
Aquifer	✓					✓	✓	
APEX	✓	✓	✓					
Saint	✓	✓						✓
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SEAndroid	✓	✓				✓	✓	
TISSA			✓	✓	✓			


# High-level Idea of ASM






# High-level Idea of ASM

- ♦ A modular access control architecture supporting *multiple stakeholders*




# High-level Idea of ASM

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


# Challenges


- ♦ **Fine-grained access control on all abstraction layers**
  - ♦ Handle the *semantics and peculiarities* of each layer
- ♦ **Preserve existing security invariants**
  - ♦ Don't overrule *denials* by *default Android access control*
  - ♦ Data modification by ASMs only in *well-defined bounds*
- ♦ **Efficiency**
  - ♦ Only activate hooks when they are *required*
  - ♦ Whitelisting for *root processes* and *system apps*
- ♦ **Policy Reconciliation**
  - ♦ Handle *decision conflicts* (currently consensus strategy)

**Design**


# ASM Framework



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


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





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
# Hook Invocation




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
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
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
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


# Evaluation


# Experiment Setup

- ♦ **LG Nexus 4**
- ♦ **Android 4.4 (with ASM extensions), Linux MSM Kernel 3.4**
- ♦ **Evaluated aspects include User Interface (Activity), Contact, File and Socket operations**
- ♦ **Considered impact of a plain ASM**
- ♦ **Automated Test Suite**
  - ♦ Performance Overhead: `Java System.nanoTime()`
  - ♦ Power Consumption: Qualcomm Trepn Profiler

# Performance



# Power Consumption



# Example Use Case

# ConXSense


## Context Aware Access Control

- Goal: Context-aware access control

# ConXSense

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
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  - Context-aware access control enforcing policies by user context profiling
  - Includes access control on sensors (e.g., GPS and camera), sensitive information (e.g., contacts) and apps



# ConXSense

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- Goal: Context-aware access control
  - Context-aware access control enforcing policies by user context profiling
  - Includes access control on sensors (e.g., GPS and camera), sensitive information (e.g., contacts) and apps
- ASM based implementation:



ConXSense [ASIACCS 2014]



# Conclusion

- ♦ **ASM greatly simplifies use-case specific solutions**
  - ♦ Developers don't need to modify system components
  - ♦ Implementation of security solutions as apps
- ♦ **Currently working on further use-cases**
  - ♦ Dual Persona Phone
  - ♦ Dynamic Application Behaviour Analysis
- ♦ **Port to new Android versions**
- ♦ **Push ASM to device vendors, AOSP**
  - ♦ Google, OEMs – please call us 😊

**Thank you!**

**Questions?**



<http://www.androidsecuritymodules.org>