



Learning Sensitive Indoor Location From Unprotected Sensors On Mobile Devices

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Privacy Concerns

Data collection scandal and protection









Particularly, Mobile Data








Various Sensors










Permission Mechanism















Unprotected

Motion Sensors: Accelerometer, Gyroscope...









Unprotected

Ambient Sensors: Magnetometer, Barometer, Light Sensor, Thermal Sensor ...












Side-channel Attack



[1]S. Narain, T. D. Vo-Huu, K. Block and G. Noubir, "Inferring User Routes and Locations Using Zero-Permission Mobile Sensors," 2016 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), San Jose, CA, 2016, pp. 397-413.


[2]Y. Michalevsky, A. Schulman, G. A. Veerapandian, D. Boneh, G. Nakibly, "Powerspy: Location tracking using mobile device power analysis", *Proceedings of the 24th USENIX Conference on Security Symposium*, pp. 785-800, Aug. 2015





Key Observations

- Indoor? Complicated Design---> Pattern
- Sensitive? Victims Frequently Visit











Question

- Unprotected sensors as side channels
- Feasibility of detecting sensitive indoor locations when users pass by?
- ONE location is enough






System Design

Training phase:

- Target identification
- Data collection
- Data processing
- Model construction







Sensitive Locations







Just Need a Label

- Quick Self-developed Dataset
- Beacons, Wi-Fi, By Hand











Pre-processing











Build A Classifier

- Naive Bayesian
- K Nearest Neighbors
- Decision Tree
- Random Forest
- Support Vector Machine
- Neural Network



$$P(c \mid X) = P(x_1 \mid c) \times P(x_2 \mid c) \times \cdots \times P(x_n \mid c) \times P(c)$$








System Design

Attack phase:

- Spyware installed
- Monitoring
- Pattern occurs
- Deliver to attacker







Risk of Leakage

●15 Locations, 5 devices, 4 sensors, 5 victims

Devices	LG G3,
	Google Pixel,
	HTC U Ultra,
	Redmi Note4X,
	Samsung Galaxy S8
Selected Sensors	Accelerometer,
	Gyroscope,
	Magnetic Field Sensor,
	Linear Acceleration Sensor

Recognizer	Weighted Average
	F1-score
Decision Tree + Euclidean Norm(DTEN)	41.15%
Decision Tree + Rotation Matrix(DTRM)	52.09%
Random Forest + Euclidean Norm(RFEN)	62.86%
Random Forest + Rotation Matrix(RFRM)	73.26%





Threatening?

- Immune to Antivirus
- Massive Users, Cross Reference
- Plus Social Engineering





Upcoming Focus

Potential Defense

- Permission List
- Background Limit
- Frequency Limit
- Functional API

Attack Improve

- Stateful Inference
- Sensor Fusion
- Webpage Implant
- More Sensors



