





NetWarden: Mitigating Network Covert Channels without Performance Loss

Jiarong Xing, Adam Morrison, Ang Chen
Rice University

Motivation: Mitigating network covert channels




Motivation: Mitigating network covert channels



- Covert channels:
 - Storage channels: changing the packet **header fields**.

Motivation: Mitigating network covert channels



- Covert channels:
 - Storage channels: changing the packet **header fields**.
 - Timing channels: changing the **timing** of packets.

State of the art: Existing channels

- **Covert storage channels:**

- TCP initial sequence number channel (Rowland, 1997)
- IP TTL channel (Qu, 2004)
- Partial ACK channel (Luo, 2009)

...


- **Covert timing channels:**

- IP timing channel (Cabuk, 2004)
- TCP timing channel (Luo, 2008)
- Physical layer channel (Lee, 2014)

...

- Covert channels can leak data **over long distance effectively**
- “Common Criteria” require protection against **both** channel types!

State of the art: Storage channel defense




Repeat for **EVERY** packets for **Tbps** traffic



...


- State-of-the-art solutions are software-based
 - Detection: Per-packet header inspection
 - Mitigation: Per-packet header modification
- As a result, they are very **inefficient!**

State of the art: Timing channel detection




- Detection: Statistics-based tests over packet gaps
 - Looking for signs of statistical deviation
 - → Not always accurate

State of the art: Timing channel mitigation



- Mitigation: Add random delay to each packet
 - Destroy the original timing of the packets

State of the art: Timing channel mitigation



- Mitigation: Add random delay to each packet
 - Destroy the original timing of the packets
- It will **increase the latency** of TCP connections

Problem: Performance penalty


- Detection:
 - **Per-packet** inspection required
 - **Software** cannot keep up with Tbps traffic
- Mitigation:
 - **Adding random delay to each packet** → Increase latency
 - **Collateral damage** → Affects legitimate traffic (e.g., false positives)

Key question

Can we mitigate covert channels
while **preserving performance?**



Approach: NetWarden



- **NetWarden:** A **performance-preserving** covert channel defense.


Key challenges and solutions

- **Challenge #1:** Efficient detection
 - **Solution:** Use programmable switches
- **Challenge #2:** Performance-preserving mitigation
 - **Solution:** Performance “boosting”
- **Challenge #3:** Hardware limitations
 - **Solution:** Fastpath/slowpath co-design

Outline

- ✓ - Motivation: Mitigating network covert channels
- ✓ - State of the art: Performance penalty
- ✓ - Approach: NetWarden
 - NetWarden design
 - Challenge #1: Efficient detection
 - Challenge #2: Performance-preserving mitigation
 - Challenge #3: Hardware limitations
 - Initial validation
 - Ongoing work
 - Conclusion

Challenge #1: Efficient detection



- Problem: Software-based detection cannot handle Tbps traffic.
- Solution: Detecting covert channels on **programmable switches**.
- Programmable switches have two layers:
 - **Control plane:** General purpose CPU.
 - **Data plane:** Programmable ASIC.


Challenge #2: Performance-preserving mitigation

- Problem: Existing mitigations incur performance loss.
- Solution: Temporarily boosting TCP performance to **neutralize** the performance penalty.
- Two boosters:
 - **ACK booster**: Generate ACK packets in advance.
 - **Receive window booster**: Enlarge receive window field temporarily.


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
Boosting performance: ACK booster




Boosting performance: ACK booster




Boosting performance: ACK booster



Boosting performance: ACK booster




Boosting performance: ACK booster



- Creates the **illusion** of a shorter latency as perceived by the sender.

Challenge #3: Hardware limitations



- Problem: The data plane has **hardware restrictions**
 - E.g., does not support packet caching
 - Or complex statistical tests
- Solution: Fastpath/slowpath co-design


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Experimental setup


- Proof-of-concept prototype:
 - P4 for fastpath
 - Python for slowpath
 - Runs in software-based simulator.
- Two covert channels:
 - Channel #1: TCP storage channel
 - Channel #2: IP timing channel
- Scenario: Client downloads file from NetWarden-protected server
- Baseline: A naïve defense without performance boosting

Results: Effectiveness



- Naïve defense: renders decoding to a random guess.
- NetWarden: very close to a random guess.
- NetWarden can mitigate covert channels **effectively**.

Results: Performance



- Naïve defense incurs 18% extra downloading time.
- NetWarden only incurs 3% extra downloading time.
- NetWarden can mitigate covert channels **with minimal performance loss.**

Ongoing work

- How should we divide the labor between fastpath and slowpath?
 - “Optimal” division of labor
- How much performance boosting should NetWarden perform?
 - Too much → unfair to other connections
 - Too little → cannot neutralize performance loss
- How can we make NetWarden effective for all TCP variants?

Conclusion

- Motivation: Mitigating network covert channels
- Key limitation of existing approaches:
 - **Performance penalty**
- Our approach: NetWarden
 - Using programmable data planes
 - Performance boosting
 - Fastpath/slowpath design
- The goal of NetWarden:
 - **Mitigating covert channels without performance loss!**

Questions?