


Don't Trust Your Roommate, or, *Access Control and Replication in “Home” Environments*

HotStorage 2012

Vassilios Lekakis, Yunus Basagalar, Pete Keleher
University of Maryland


Building Blocks



Replication



Consistency




Update mechanism

Building Blocks

Replication


Update Mechanism




Consistency

Keep all devices synchronized


Personal Spaces



“Leaking” Spaces




The fourth element



Keep all devices synchronized


Eliminate information leakage

Leakage in action




Charlie Bob Alice


Leakage in action




Leakage in action



Leakage in action




Beach




Dorm

Leakage in action




Beach




Dorm

Leakage in action




Information leakage: Alice learns about
File₂

Can we do better?




Eliminate information leakage
Maintain a flexible update mechanism

Access control elements



Principals

Alice.OS-Notes




`type:Notes` & `class:OS`

What we consider leakage?

Any data access outside the realm of a role
Replicas should not reveal their roles to
other replicas


Leakage-free update

Bob.OS-Project



`type:Project` & `class:OS`


Alice.OS-Notes




`type:Notes` & `class:OS`

Leakage-free update

Bob.OS-Project




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



Leakage-free update

Bob.OS-Project




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


Leakage-free update

Bob.OS-Project




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
Kernel



Bloom filter





Why use a bloom filter?



Learn how to update peers without leaking information

Leakage-free update




Confidentiality:
Session Key Establishment

Leakage-free update



Leakage-free update



{OS-Project-Challenge}_{session_key}




{ HMAC(OS-Project-Challenge, OS-Notes.KEY) }_{session_key}



A horizontal row of 12 hexagonal cells. The first two cells are blue, the next four are white, the next three are red, and the last three are white.



Why the HMAC step?




To decide when to use a pure log exchange approach without leaking information

Leakage-free update

CMP { HMAC(OS-Project.CHALLENGE, OS-Notes.KEY)
HMAC(OS-Project.CHALLENGE, OS-Project.KEY) X


OS-Project Kernels




VS




Alice's Bloom Filter




Leakage-free update



Double hatted replicas




Orthogonal **VS** Intersecting
Roles




Consistency & information leakage

Bob.OS-Project



Alice.OS-Notes



~~type:Project & class:OS~~



type:Notes & class:OS

type:Project & class:OS

OR


type:Notes & date: June 14

Consistency & information leakage






Consistency & information leakage

Bob.OS-Project




Alice.OS-Notes



Kernel


Object-based consistency




Do nothing
Updates appear to intersecting roles

Object consistency **VS** Information leakage

Role-based consistency & forking objects



Role-based consistency & forking objects



Role-based consistency discussion

- ▶ No Information leakage between roles
- ▶ Storage overhead
- ▶ Programming complexity
- ▶ Local accesses become an issue

Takeaway

- ▶ Current protocols in a multi-user setting leak information
- ▶ Thesis: Security should become a major building block of personal data management systems
- ▶ Elimination of leakage through
 - ▶ Role-based access control
 - ▶ Object forking
 - ▶ Role-based consistency