
Protocol-Aware Recovery for Consensus-Based Storage


<u>Ramnatthan Alagappan</u>, Aishwarya Ganesan, Eric Lee*, Aws Albarghouthi, Vijay Chidambaram^{*}, Andrea Arpaci-Dusseau, and Remzi Arpaci-Dusseau

> University of Wisconsin – Madison *University of Texas at Austin

Redundancy helps distributed storage systems mask failures




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
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


Redundancy helps distributed storage systems mask failures

- ➡ system crashes
- network failures

System as a whole unaffected

- → data is available
- → data is correct




How About Faulty Data?

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Data could be faulty

- → corrupted (disk corruption)
- → inaccessible (latent errors)





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
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
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We call these storage faults










A widely used approach: delete the data on the faulty node and restart it

ZooKeeper fails to start? How can I fix? Try clearing all the state in Zookeeper: stop Zookeeper , wipe the Zookeeper data directory, restart it – A top Stackoverflow answer [1]




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- Recommendation from developers [2]

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
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
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
Looks reasonable: redundancy will help


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









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
The approach seems intuitive and works - all good, right?


















Surprisingly, can lead to a global data loss!



This majority has no idea about the committed data Committed data is lost!

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e.g., the delete + rebuild approach was oblivious to the protocol used by the system to update the replicated data

Our Proposal: Protocol-Aware Recovery (PAR)

To safely recover, a recovery approach should be carefully designed based on properties of underlying protocols of the distributed system

e.g., is there a dedicated leader? constraints on leader election? how is the replicated state updated? what are the consistency guarantees?

We call such an approach protocol-aware

Why RSM?

Why RSM?

→ most fundamental piece in building reliable distributed systems

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- most fundamental piece in building reliable distributed systems
- many systems depend upon RSM



Our Focus: PAR for Replicated State Machines (RSM)

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protecting RSM will improve reliability of many systems

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A hard problem

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A hard problem

strong guarantees, even a small misstep can break guarantees



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Our solution: CTRL (Corruption-Tolerant RepLication)

→ a PAR approach, exploits properties of RSM protocols

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- applied to LogCabin and ZooKeeper
- experimentally verified guarantees and little overheads (4%-8%)

Outline

Introduction


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
Summary and conclusion

RSM: a paradigm to make a program/state machine more reliable


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


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
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
Same

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Output


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
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


ensures SMs process commands in the same order






































































































































Log - commands are persistently stored


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


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


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Protocol-aware


→ use some protocol knowledge but incorrectly or ineffectively

- → use checksums and catch I/O errors
- → crash the node upon detection
- → popular in practical systems
- → safe but poor availability


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
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
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
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
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


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Crash

- → use checksums and catch I/O errors
- crash the node upon detection
- ➡ popular in practical systems
- → safe but poor availability



Restarting the node does not help

- → persistent fault, so remain in crash-restart loop
- need error-prone manual intervention (can lead to safety violations)

Truncate

Truncate

→ truncate "faulty" portions upon detection



•



Truncate

truncate "faulty" portions upon detection




Truncate

truncate "faulty" portions upon detection

However, can lead to safety violations





committed

Truncate

truncate "faulty" portions upon detection

However, can lead to safety violations

B B SI **S2** B B **S**2 Δ **S**3 B B **S4 S5** S2 - Leader Entry A A,B,C corrupted committed at SI



detect using

Truncate


truncate "faulty" portions upon detection



detect using

checksums

Δ



Truncate


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detect using

checksums



Truncate


truncate "faulty" portions upon detection





detect using

checksums




Truncate

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
detect using





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- However, can lead to safety violations



detect using

checksums

Α

16

Recovery Approaches Summary

Recovery Approaches Summary

Class	
Protocol- oblivious	
Protocol- aware	

Recovery Approaches Summary

Class	Approach
Protocol- oblivious	NoDetection
	Crash
	Truncate
	DeleteRebuild
Protocol- aware	MarkNonVote [1]
	Reconfigure [2]
	Byzantine FT

Class	Approach	Safety
Protocol-	NoDetection Crash	
oblivious	Truncate DeleteRebuild	
Protocol- aware	MarkNonVote [1] Reconfigure [2] Byzantine FT	

Class	Approach	Safety	Availa- bility	
Protocol-	NoDetection			
oblivious	Crash Truncate			
	DeleteRebuild			
Protocol- aware	MarkNonVote [1] Reconfigure [2] Byzantine FT			

[1] Chandra et al., PODC '07 [2] Bolosky et al., NSDI '11

Class	Approach	Safety	Availa- bility	Perform -ance	No intervention	No extra nodes	Fast recovery	Low complexity
	NoDetection							
Protocol- oblivious	Crash							
Oblivious	Truncate							
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Obinious	Truncate	\mathbf{S}					\mathbf{x}	
	DeleteRebuild	$\mathbf{\otimes}$			$\mathbf{\otimes}$		$\mathbf{\tilde{x}}$	
	MarkNonVote [1]	8	\bigotimes				8	
Protocol-	Reconfigure [2]		\mathbf{S}		$\mathbf{\otimes}$	$\mathbf{\overline{S}}$	$\mathbf{\tilde{S}}$	
aware	Byzantine FT	\bigcirc	8	8		8	NA	$\mathbf{\overline{S}}$
	CTRL	\bigcirc						

[1] Chandra et al., PODC '07 [2] Bolosky et al., NSDI '11

Outline

Introduction

Replicated state machines

Current approaches to storage faults

CTRL: Corruption-tolerant replication


- → fault model and guarantees
- → local storage layer
- → distributed recovery

Evaluation


Summary and conclusion

Two components


Two components Local storage layer




Two components Local storage layer Distributed recovery



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Exploit RSM knowledge to correctly and quickly recover faulty data

Standard failure assumptions

- → crashes
- network failures

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Augment with storage faults

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- network failures
- Augment with storage faults
 - → data blocks of log, snapshots, and metainfo can be faulty
 - depending on FS, return corrupted data or turn into errors

Standard failure assumptions

- → crashes
- network failures

Augment with storage faults

- → data blocks of log, snapshots, and metainfo can be faulty
 - depending on FS, return corrupted data or turn into errors
- → FS metadata blocks could also be faulty
 - e.g., inode of a log file corrupted
 - e.g., files/directories implementing the log may go missing
 - e.g., files may appear with fewer or more bytes

CTRL Guarantees

CTRL Guarantees


Committed data will never be lost


- → as long as one intact copy of a data item exists
- → correctly remain unavailable when all copies are faulty

CTRL Guarantees

Committed data will never be lost


- → as long as one intact copy of a data item exists
- → correctly remain unavailable when all copies are faulty
- Provide the highest possible availability





Main function: detect and identify

- whether log/snapshot/metainfo faulty or not?
- → what is corrupted? (e.g., which log entry?)




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- → low performance overheads
- → low space overheads



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Requirements

- → low performance overheads
- → low space overheads
- An interesting problem: disentangling crashes and corruptions in log
 - checksum mismatch due to crash or disk corruption?

 _	_	

			append()




|--|--|--|






Crash during append






Crash during append






Crash during append





Crash during append






Crash during append

recovery: can truncate entry - unacknowledged



disk corruption





disk

corruption

Crash during append

recovery: can truncate entry - unacknowledged



→ cannot truncate, may lose possibly committed data!





Crash during append

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
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Current systems conflate the two conditions – always truncate





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
Disk corruption

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
Current systems conflate the two conditions – always truncate

- CTRL: modified local update write additional information
 - enables disentanglement, performant more details in the paper...

CTRL Distributed Recovery



CTRL Distributed Recovery



Leader-based

→ single node acts as leader; all updates flow through the leader

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- → a slice of time; only one leader per slice/epoch
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leader guaranteed to have all committed data

Applies to Raft, ZAB, and most implementations of Paxos

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
leader guaranteed to have all committed data

Applies to Raft, ZAB, and most implementations of Paxos CTRL exploits these properties to perform recovery

Decouple follower and leader recovery


Decouple follower and leader recovery

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





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
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
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
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
Decouple follower and leader recovery



Fixing the leader is the tricky part


Fixing the leader is the tricky part First, a simple case: some follower has the entry intact


Leader





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
Leader
















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


However, sometimes cannot easily recover the leader's log

Leader AB




However, sometimes cannot easily recover the leader's log



Main insight: separate committed from uncommitted entries


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Main insight: separate committed from uncommitted entries

must fix committed, while uncommitted can be safely discarded

However, sometimes cannot easily recover the leader's log




Main insight: separate committed from uncommitted entries

- must fix committed, while uncommitted can be safely discarded
- → discard uncommitted as early as possible for improved availability


Leader queries for a faulty entry

Leader queries for a faulty entry


Leader queries for a faulty entry



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


Leader queries for a faulty entry



Leader queries for a faulty entry


- ➡ if majority say they don't have the entry → must be an uncommitted entry – can discard and continue
- if committed then at least one node in the majority would have the entry – can fix using that response




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
continue




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



fix using a response (will get at least one correct response because it is committed)

Leader queries for a faulty entry

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
continue


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



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
Leader queries for a faulty entry


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






Leader queries for a faulty entry


- \rightarrow if majority say they don't have the entry \rightarrow must be an uncommitted entry – can discard and continue
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 - entry can fix using that response



B B

continue


fix using a response (will get at least one correct response because it is committed)



either fix log or discard, depending on order

Leader queries for a faulty entry


- \rightarrow if majority say they don't have the entry \rightarrow must be an uncommitted entry – can discard and continue
- → if committed then at least one node in the majority would have the
 - entry can fix using that response



B B

continue


fix using a response (will get at least one correct response because it is committed)




either fix log or discard, depending on order

Leader queries for a faulty entry

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
fix using a response (will get at least one correct response because it is committed)


depending on order

29


Leader queries for a faulty entry

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fix using a response (will get at least one correct response because it is committed)



depending on order

More In The Paper...

More In The Paper...

Log recovery

- → faulty entry on follower unknown to leader
- ➡ nodes could be down during recovery
- → different entries at same log index

Snapshot recovery

Metainfo recovery

FS metadata fault handling

Outline

Introduction

Replicated state machines

Current approaches to storage faults

CTRL: Corruption-tolerant replication

Evaluation

Summary and conclusion


Evaluation


We apply CTRL in two systems LogCabin


→ based on Raft

ZooKeeper

→ based on ZAB








Original

- corruptions: 30% unsafe or unavailable
- → errors: 50% unavailable




Original


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CTRL


corruptions and errors: always safe and available



FS data blocks




Targeted entries




FS data blocks

Targeted entries




FS data blocks




all possible combinations (for thoroughness)






Lagging and crashed




FS data blocks




all possible combinations (for thoroughness)


Targeted entries




Lagging and crashed





Snapshots






Snapshots






Snapshots


Reliability Experiments Summary



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Original systems

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→ unsafe or unavailable in many cases

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CTRL versions

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
→ safe always and highly available


Original systems


→ unsafe or unavailable in many cases

CTRL versions


- → safe always and highly available
- → correctly unavailable in some cases (when all copies are faulty)








Workload: insert entries (IK) repeatedly, background snapshots



Original SCTRL
Original CTRL

Overheads (because CTRL's storage layer writes additional information for each log entry) – however, little: SSDs 4% worst case, disks: 8% to 10%

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CTRL: a protocol-aware recovery approach for RSM

guarantees safety and provides high availability, with little performance overhead

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http://research.cs.wisc.edu/adsl/Publications/par/

[1] Redundancy Does Not Imply Fault Tolerance - Ganesan et al., at FAST '17