




Quantifying Memory Unsafety and Reactions to It

Alex Gaynor, Fish in a Barrel



Fish in a Barrel, not a real company



John Podesta, 2016



Security keys

Account takeover prevention rates, by challenge type



Memory Unsafety





Properties of memory unsafety

- Spatial:
 - Buffer overflow (heap or stack, read or write)
- Temporal:
 - Use-after-free
 - Use of uninitialized memory
 - Wild pointer dereference
- Type confusion



Languages

Memory safe:

- Rust
- Swift
- Python
- Java
- Go
- etc.

Memory unsafe:

- C
- C++
- Assembly



Case studies


- iOS 0-day (and n-day) exploits used against the Uighurs
- iOS and Android n-day exploits used against Tibetans
- iOS 0-day exploits used against Ahmed Mansoor
- WhatsApp 0-day exploit, with varied targets
- WannaCry
- HeartBleed

The stages of grief



Denial Symptoms:

“Programming in memory unsafe languages does not cause an increased rate of vulnerabilities.”





Denial: Data

- **Chrome:** 70% of high/critical vulnerabilities are memory unsafety
- **Firefox:** 72% of vulnerabilities in 2019 are memory unsafety
- **0days:** 81% of in the wild 0days (P0 dataset) are memory unsafety
- **Microsoft:** 70% of all MSRC tracked vulnerabilities are memory unsafety
- **Ubuntu:** 65% of kernel CVEs in USNs in a 6-month sample are memory unsafety
- **Android:** More than 65% of high/critical vulnerabilities are memory unsafety
- **macOS:** 71.5% of Mojave CVEs are due to memory unsafety



A Venn diagram consisting of two overlapping circles. The left circle is blue and contains the text "Safe languages". The right circle is brown and contains the text "Unsafe languages". The overlapping area in the center is a darker shade of brown and contains the text "Unsafe languages".


Safe languages

Unsafe languages

The vulnerability venn diagram

Anger symptoms:

“Yes, code in memory unsafe languages can have bugs. But if you were a better programmer, you wouldn’t have this problem.”





Anger: Complex systems


How Complex Systems Fail

(Being a Short Treatise on the Nature of Failure; How Failure is Evaluated; How Failure is Attributed to Proximate Cause; and the Resulting New Understanding of Patient Safety)

-- <https://how.complexsystems.fail/>

Bargaining symptoms:

“Ok, yes, memory unsafety is a problem. But surely we can address it with static analysis and fuzzing and sandboxing and mitigations and red-teaming.”






Bargaining: Response

- Chrome: Tens of thousands of fuzzing cores
- iOS: Every single app is sandboxed
- Windows: Extensive exploit mitigations, including KCFG
- Chrome: Aggressive multi-process sandboxed design
- All: Millions of dollars spent on bug bounties

Depression symptoms:

“Memory unsafety is a problem... but oh my god we have a trillion lines of C/C++, we can never rewrite all of it, everything is hopeless.”






Depression: Work smarter, not harder

- Identify high leverage places
 - Code that runs with high privileges
 - Code that acts as a key part of a security guarantee
 - Code that has a large user-accessible attack surface

Acceptance symptoms:

Asking how, not if.





A call to action

- Build a coalition who recognizes the gravity of this problem
- Find a memory safe language that's a good fit for your domain
- Stop the bleeding: make it possible for new code bases in your organization to be memory safe
- Find your highest leverage attack surfaces in existing memory unsafe code and get to work!
- Use language as a factor when assessing the security of projects



Proof that incremental migrations are possible

- Python Cryptographic Authority
- Rust-For-Linux
-
- Firefox
- Librsvg

Your project can be next!



Fin

Questions?

<https://alexgaynor.net>



Citations and references

1. <https://security.googleblog.com/2019/05/new-research-how-effective-is-basic.html>
2. <https://alexgaynor.net/2018/dec/13/optimize-for-auditability/>
3. <https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2019/08/a-very-deep-dive-into-ios-exploit.html>
4. <https://citizenlab.ca/2019/09/poison-carp-tibetan-groups-targeted-with-1-click-mobile-exploits/>
5. <https://citizenlab.ca/2016/08/million-dollar-dissident-iphone-zero-day-nso-group-uae/>
6. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/05/14/whatsapp-patches-security-flaw-that-allows-attackers-deliver-malware-through-calls/>
7. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WannaCry_ransomware_attack
8. <https://www.chromium.org/Home/chromium-security/memory-safety>
9. <https://ldpreload.com/p/kernel-modules-in-rust-lssna2019.pdf>
10. <https://alexgaynor.net/2020/feb/18/scaling-software-development/>
11. <https://how.complexsystems.fail/>