



# The web tracking arms race: past, present, and future


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@random\_walker

# Canvas Fingerprinting: a sneaky tracking technique

1. Draw invisible text
2. Read it back as a sequence of bits

Tiny system differences

→ Bit string acts as device identifier



Found it on over 5,500 sites out of top 100,000

# “Third party” online tracking

Sites other than the one you’re visiting

typically invisible

compiling profiles of your browsing history

What if oversight of online tracking  
could be *automated*?

# OpenWPM is a mature, open-source tool

The screenshot shows the GitHub repository page for `citip / OpenWPM`. At the top right, there are buttons for `Unwatch` (61), `Unstar` (620), and `Fork` (111). Below this is a navigation bar with `Code` (selected), `Issues` (43), `Pull requests` (2), `Projects` (0), `Wiki`, `Insights`, and `Settings`. The repository description is "A web privacy measurement framework" with a link to <https://webtap.princeton.edu/> and an `Edit` button. Below the description, there are statistics: `773` commits, `3` branches, `14` releases, `16` contributors, and `GPL-3.0` license. At the bottom, there are buttons for `Branch: master`, `New pull request`, `Create new file`, `Upload files`, `Find file`, and `Clone or download`.

citip / OpenWPM

Unwatch 61 Unstar 620 Fork 111

Code Issues 43 Pull requests 2 Projects 0 Wiki Insights Settings

A web privacy measurement framework <https://webtap.princeton.edu/> Edit

Add topics


773 commits 3 branches 14 releases 16 contributors GPL-3.0

Branch: master New pull request Create new file Upload files Find file Clone or download

# New types of fingerprinting

Audio, Battery, WebRTC APIs in HTML5 are all being abused by third-party scripts for fingerprinting

# Audio fingerprint




Isn't it all anonymous?



Detecting PII exfiltration:  
an information-flow problem

# Detecting PII exfiltration: bait



# Rampant exfiltration of PII by third parties

'Session replay' scripts record everything  
(like someone looking over your shoulder)  
and send it to a third party.

Includes passwords, medical info

Exfiltration happens even if form never submitted

Exfiltration confirmed on about 8,000 sites

HIPAA-protected (Walgreens) and FERPA-protected data (Gradescope)

# Solutions

# Regulation?

The cookie settings on this website are set to 'allow all cookies' to give you the very best experience. If you continue without changing these settings, you consent to this - but if you want, you can change your settings at any time **at the bottom of this page.**

[Change settings](#)

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# Browser extensions?



Always playing catch-up

Tiny userbase

- Favors tech savvy users, exacerbates privacy divide

Poor privacy is a problem for democracy



# The role of web browsers

# Why haven't browsers acted?


- Not traditionally seen as a security problem
- Attempt at neutrality

Browsers being neutral on third-party tracking

≈

Email providers being neutral on spam

# Browser neutrality is not meaningful



Browser is a “choice architecture”

Trying to be neutral

→ reifying historical accidents


E.g. the web standard does not mandate that third-party cookies be silently allowed

**“Neutrality” reinforces power imbalances**

This has started to change

# What could browser vendors do? Three ideas


1. Publish clear policies on (un)acceptable tracking
2. Warn users when sites violate tracking policies



3. Create a tracking-protection mode analogous to private browsing mode

How far can we take this?

# Perceptual ad blocker



The web is being used for engineering society

Browser vendors cannot avoid taking a side

# Take-home message

The state of web privacy is a problem for society, not just for individuals

We have a collective moral responsibility to act

Browsers are **User-Agents**  
and should act in the interest of the user