# HARDFS: Hardening HDFS with Selective and Lightweight Versioning





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### **Cloud Reliability**

#### Cloud systems

- Complex software
- Thousands of commodity machines
- "Rare failures become frequent" [Hamilton]

#### Failure detection and recovery


- "... has to come from the software" [Dean]
- "… must be a first-class operation" [Ramakrishnan et al.]

### Fail-stop failures

- Machine crashes, disk failures
- Pretty much handled
- Current systems have sophisticated crashrecovery machineries
  - Data replication
  - Logging
  - Fail-over

### Fail-silent failures

Exhibits incorrect behaviors instead of crashing
 Caused by memory corruption or software bugs
 Crash recovery is useless if fault can spread



# Fail-silent failure headlines

### BIGOOM

HOME APPLE CLEANTECH CLOUD DATA EUROPE MOBILE VIDEO

Jul 20, 2008 - 7:46PM PT

# S<sub>3</sub> Outage Highlights **Fragility of Web Services**

Home ▶ .NET ▶ Azure ▶ News

Gmail data loss bug causes complete data loss, calls for tape backups

By Chris Alexander, published on 02 Mar 2011 | Filed in Security Azure









### **Current** approaches


Replicated state machine using BFT library



N-Version programing



- High resource consumption
- High engineering effort
- Rare deployment



□ 2<sup>nd</sup> version models basic protocols of the system

Detects and isolates fail-silent behaviors

Exploits crash recovery machinery for recovery


# Selective and lightweight versioning (SLEEVE)


#### □ Selective

- Goal: small engineering effort
- Protects important parts
  - Bug sensitive
  - Frequently changed
  - Currently unprotected

#### Lightweight

- Avoids replicating full state
  - Encodes states to reduce space





### HARDFS


#### HARDFS - hardened version HDFS:

- Namespace management
- Replica management
- Read/write protocol
- HARDFS detects and recovers from:
  - 90% of the faults caused by random memory corruption
  - I00% of the faults caused by targeted memory corruption
  - 5 injected software bugs
- □ Fast recovery using micro-recovery
  - 3 orders of magnitude faster than full reboot
- Little space and performance overhead

### Outline

- Introduction
- HARDFS Design
   HARDFS Implementation
- Evaluation

# Case study: namespace integrity



### **SLEEVE layer components**




- State manager
- Action verifier
- Recovery module

### State manager

- Replicates subset of state of the main version Directory entries without modification time  $\Box$  Adds new state incrementally Adds permissions for security checks Understands semantics of various protocol messages and thread events to update state correctly
- Compresses state using compact encoding

### **Naïve: Full replication**




100% memory overhead

HDFS master manages millions of files

I00% memory overhead reduces HDFS master scalability [;login; 'II]

```
Lightweight:
Counting Bloom Filters
Space-efficient data structure
Supports 3 APIs
  insert("A fact")
  delete("A fact")
 exists("A fact")
```

# Lightweight: **Counting Bloom Filters**




insert("F is 10 bytes")  $\rightarrow$  NO

- Suitable for boolean checking
  - Does F exist?
  - Does F has length X?
  - Has block B been allocated?

# Challenges of using Counting Bloom Filters

Hard to check stateful system
 False positives

### **Non-boolean verification**



### **Non-boolean verification**




### **Stateful verification**

Ask Then Check

Checking stateful systems

Bloom Filter (boolean verification)

# **Dealing with False positive**



source

Bloom filters can give false positive

- 4 per billion
- I false positive per month (given 100 op/s)

Only leads to unnecessary recovery


### Outline

Introduction

#### HARDFS Design

- Lightweight
- Selective
- Recovery
- HARDFS Implementation
- Evaluation

#### 




Goals: small engineering effort

Selectively chooses namespace protection

Excludes security checks

### **Incorrect action examples**



#### All of these happen in practice

### **Action verifier**

Set of micro-checks to detect incorrect actions of the main version

#### Mechanisms:

- Expected-action list
- Actions dependency checking
- Timeout
- Domain knowledge to handle disagreement

### Outline

Introduction


#### HARDFS Design

- Lightweight
- ✓ Selective
- Recovery

#### HARDFS Implementation

Evaluation

#### 




Crash is good provided no fault propagation
 Detects and turns bad behaviors into crashes
 Exploits HDFS crash recovery machineries


### **HARDFS Recovery**

Full recovery (crash and reboot)
 Micro-recovery

 Repairing the main version
 Repairing the 2<sup>nd</sup> version



- □ Full state is reconstructed from trusted sources
- □ Full recovery may be expensive
  - Restarting an HDFS master could take hours



Repairs only corrupted state from trusted sources
 Falls back to full reboot when micro-recovery fails

# **Repairing main version**



Direct update F:200 ← F:100



Trusted source: checkpoint file

# **Repairing 2<sup>nd</sup> version**





Trusted source: checkpoint file

Solution: I. Start with an empty BF

2. Add facts as they are verified

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### Implementation

- Hardens three functionalities of HDFS
  - Namespace management (HARDFS-N)
  - Replica management (HARDFS-R)
  - Read/write protocol of datanodes (HARDFS-D)
- Uses 3 Bloom filters API
  - insert("a fact"), delete("a fact"), exists("a fact")
- Uses ask-then-check for non-boolean verification

# Protecting namespace integrity

- Guards namespace structures necessary for reaching data:
  - File hierarchy
  - File-to-block mapping
  - File length information
- Detects and recovers from namespacerelated problems:
  - Corrupt file-to-block mapping
  - Unreachable files

### Namespace management

Message	Logic of the secondary version
Create(F): Client request NN to create F	<pre>Entry:     If exists(F) Then reject;     Else         insert(F);         generateAction(txCreate[F]);     Return: check response;</pre>
AddBlock(F): client requests NN to allocate a block to file F	Entry: F:X = $ask-then-check(F)$ ; Return: B = addBlk(F); If $exists(F) \& !exists(B)$ Then $X' = X \cup \{B\}$ ; delete(F:X); insert(F:X'); insert(B@0); Else declare error;

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- Evaluation and Conclusion

### **Evaluation**

Is HARDFS robust against fail-silent faults?
How much time and space overhead incurred?
Is micro-recovery efficient?
How much engineering effort required?

# Random memory corruption results

Outcome	HDFS	HARDFS
Silent failure	117	9
Detect and reboot	-	140
Detect and micro-recover	-	107
Crash	133	268
Hang	22	16
No problem observed	728	460


# fail-silent failures reduced by factor of 10

Crash happens twice as often

### Silent failures


FIELD	HDFS	HARDFS
pathname	95	0
replication	I	0
modification time	6	8
permission	3	0
block size	12	I

# Namepsace management Space Overhead



#### HARDFS with Bloom filter incurs little space overhead (2.6%)

### **Recovery Time**



Reboot Micro-recovery Optimized Micro-recovery

- Rebooting NameNode is expensive
- Micro-recovery is 3 order of magnitude faster

# **Complexity (LOC)**

Functionality	HDFS	HAR	DFS
Namespace management	10114	1751	17%
Replica management	2342	934	40%
Read/write protocol	5050	944	19%
Others	13339	-	-

#### Lightweight versions are smaller

# Injecting software bugs

Bug	Year	Priority	Description
HADOOP-1135	2007	Major	Blocks in block report wrongly marked for deletion
HADOOP-3002	2008	Blocker	Blocks removed during safemode
HDFS-900	2010	Blocker	Valid replica deleted rather than corrupt replica
HDFS-1250	2010	Major	Namenode processes block report from dead datanode
HDFS-3087	2012	Critical	Decommission before replication during namenode restart

### Conclusion

Crashing is good To die (and be reborn) is better than to lie But lies do happen in reality □ HARDFS turns lies into crashes Leverages existing crash recovery techniques to resurrect

#### Thank you! Questions?





http://research.cs.wisc.edu/adsl/

http://wisdom.cs.wisc.edu/



http://ucare.cs.uchicago.edu/