
Evaluating File System Reliability on Solid State Drives

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USENIX ATC '19

Introduction & Motivation

- Storage landscape has changed:
 - HDD s -> SSDs.
 - What about their failure characteristics?

≻Partial failures are a magnitude higher for SSDs!

- >FTL is prone to bugs during power faults.
- New/Evolved file systems:
 - ≻ext3 -> ext4 (journaling).
 - **>Btrfs** (copy-on-write).

F2FS (log-structured, tailored for flash).

• Our goal: How do these file systems deal with partial drive errors?

Research Questions & Methodology

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
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 - Only ext3, JFS, ReiserFS, NTFS (partial).
 - Hard disks only.
 - Does not consider file system checkers.

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
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
- What we want to know:
 - Btrfs, ext4, F2FS.
 - Can they detect errors?
 - Can they recover from errors?
 - Can the system checker (fsck) fix errors?


- What if the storage device starts misbehaving and generating errors?
- How exactly file systems deal with these errors?






































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


- Emulate the faults' manifestation!
 - Inject errors at the Block Layer.
- Device Mapper Module:
 - Intercept every I/O request.
 - Fail a request & return an error.
 - Silently drop a request.
 - Alter block contents online.




Targeted Error Injection


- Understand the effect of every injected error.
- Identify block types and specific data structures within each block!
- Target specific data structures and fields within them:
 - Trace all I/O requests (*blktrace*).
 - Logic inside our device mapper module.
 - FS tools, such as dump, to inspect the disk image offline.




- Each application focuses on one particular operation:
 - mkdir, creat, etc.
- Run an application and collect all accessed blocks.
- Targeted error injection:
 - Repeat the execution and inject a single error into each accessed block.
 - Target one block at a time.
- Better isolation and characterization of the file system's reaction to every injected error!



- Categorize each file system's detection and recovery policies:
 - Across all visible aspects, such as *logs*, *return* codes, etc.
 - Check how effectively *fsck* recovers the file system.



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OS

Application

Block-based FS

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
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
Detection


Error Code

Sanity



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





* Colors indicate severity.


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






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File System	Detection	Recovery

File System	Detection	Recovery
ext4		

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Btrfs		

File System	Detection	Recovery
ext4		
Btrfs		
F2FS		

ext4 Results

The Good News

- Capable of recovering from a large range of fault scenarios.
- Little use of checksums:
 - Still, it can deal with corruption and shorn writes due to a very rich set of sanity checks.
- System checker capable of reconstructing several data structures:
 - Inode bitmaps, block bitmaps, group descriptor block.

The Bad News

- Lost and Shorn writes:
 - A few data structures **cannot** be recovered:
 - \succ Inode block \rightarrow data loss.

The overall reliability of ext4 is significantly better compared to ext3!


Btrfs Results


The Good News


• Consistently detects all I/O errors, as well as corruption events (due to checksums).


The Bad News


- Metadata replication is disabled for SSDs*!
- Makes use of node level checksums...











Data Loss!

Btrfs Results

The Good News

• Consistently detects all I/O errors, as well as corruption events (due to checksums).

The Bad News

- Metadata replication is disabled for SSDs!
- Makes use of node level checksums → an entire node is removed even if a single byte becomes corrupted!
- Does not always make use of the existing redundancy:
 - Two independent data structures for a directory:
 - ≻DIR_ITEM and DIR_INDEX.
 - If one becomes corrupted, the other is not used for recovery!
- Several cases of unmountable file system; a few crashes:
 - The file system cannot be mounted even after *btrfsck* is invoked.

F2FS Results

The Good News

- Read errors are detected and appropriately propagated in nearly all cases.
- Inodes and checkpoints are protected using checksums.
- The file system checker can bring the file system to a consistent state in some cases!

The Bad News

- Consistently fails to detect and report any write errors!
- Cannot deal with *lost* and *shorn* writes effectively \rightarrow data loss.
- Corruption events can have severe repercussions.

Implications

- Verify the correctness of metadata through sanity checks, especially when metadata is not protected against corruption.
- Checksums can be a double-edged sword:
 - Increase error detection.
 - Coarse granularity checksums can lead to severe data loss.
- A few key data structures cause maximum recovery failures:
 - ext4: the journal's superblock and the inode of the root directory.
 - Btrfs: the root node of *fstree*.
 - **F2FS:** the inode of the root directory.

Thank you! Questions?

Github: <u>https://github.com/uoftsystems/dm-inject</u>