Check out the new USENIX Web site.

USENIX Home . About USENIX . Events . membership . Publications . Students
13th USENIX Security Symposium — Abstract

Pp. 89–102 of the Proceedings

Side Effects Are Not Sufficient to Authenticate Software

Umesh Shankar, Monica Chew, and J.D. Tygar, UC Berkeley


Kennell and Jamieson recently introduced the Genuinity system for authenticating trusted software on a remote machine without using trusted hardware. Genuinity relies on machine-specific computations, incorporating side effects that cannot be simulated quickly. The system is vulnerable to a novel attack, which we call a substitution attack. We implement a successful attack on Genuinity, and further argue this class of schemes are not only impractical but unlikely to succeed without trusted hardware.
  • View the full text of this paper in HTML and PDF.
    Click here if you have forgotten your password Until August 2005, you will need your USENIX membership identification in order to access the full papers. The Proceedings are published as a collective work, © 2004 by the USENIX Association. All Rights Reserved. Rights to individual papers remain with the author or the author's employer. Permission is granted for the noncommercial reproduction of the complete work for educational or research purposes. USENIX acknowledges all trademarks within this paper.

  • If you need the latest Adobe Acrobat Reader, you can download it from Adobe's site.
To become a USENIX Member, please see our Membership Information.

?Need help? Use our Contacts page.

Last changed: 27 July 2004 aw
Technical Program
Security '04 Home