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USENIX 2005 Annual Technical Conference, General Track — Abstract

Pp. 163–178 of the Proceedings

Attrition Defenses for a Peer-to-Peer Digital Preservation System

T.J. Giuli, Stanford University; Petros Maniatis, Intel Research; Mary Baker, Hewlett-Packard Labs; David S. H. Rosenthal, Stanford University; Mema Roussopoulos, Harvard University


In peer-to-peer systems, attrition attacks include both traditional, network-level denial of service attacks as well as application-level attacks in which malign peers conspire to waste loyal peers' resources. We describe several defenses for the LOCKSS peer-to-peer digital preservation system that help ensure that application-level attrition attacks even from powerful adversaries are less effective than simple network-level attacks, and that network-level attacks must be intense, widespread, and prolonged to impair the system.
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