

The Multi-Principal OS Construction of the Gazelle Web Browser

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Abstract

Original web browsers were applications designed to view static web content. As web sites evolved into dynamic web applications that compose content from multiple web sites, browsers have become multi-principal operating environments with resources shared among mutually distrusting web site *principals*. Nevertheless, no existing browsers, including new architectures like IE 8, Google Chrome, and OP, have a multi-principal operating system construction that gives a browser-based OS the *exclusive* control to manage the protection of all system resources among web site principals.

In this paper, we introduce Gazelle, a secure web browser constructed as a multi-principal OS. Gazelle’s browser kernel is an operating system that *exclusively* manages resource protection and sharing across web site principals. This construction exposes intricate design issues that no previous work has identified, such as cross-protection-domain display and events protection. We elaborate on these issues and provide comprehensive solutions.

Our prototype implementation and evaluation experience indicates that it is realistic to turn an existing browser into a multi-principal OS that yields significantly stronger security and robustness with acceptable performance.

1 Introduction

Web browsers have evolved into a multi-principal operating environment where a principal is a web site [43]. Similar to a multi-principal OS, recent proposals [12, 13, 23, 43, 46] and browsers like IE 8 [34] and Firefox 3 [16] advocate and support programmer abstractions for protection (e.g., `<sandbox>` in addition to `<iframe>` [43]) and cross-principal communication (e.g., `PostMessage` [24, 43]). Nevertheless, no existing browsers, including new architectures like IE 8 [25], Google Chrome [37], and OP [21], have a multi-principal OS construction that gives a browser-based OS, typically called the browser kernel, the *exclusive* control to manage the protection and fair sharing of all system resources among browser principals.

In this paper, we present a multi-principal OS construction of a secure web browser, called Gazelle. Gazelle’s browser kernel *exclusively* provides cross-principal protection and fair sharing of *all* system re-

sources. In this paper, we focus only on resource protection in Gazelle.

In Gazelle, the browser kernel runs in a separate protection domain (an OS process in our implementation), interacts with the underlying OS directly, and exposes a set of system calls for web site principals. We use the same web site principal as defined in the same-origin policy (SOP), which is labeled by a web site’s origin, the triple of $\langle \text{protocol}, \text{domain name}, \text{port} \rangle$. In this paper, we use “principal” and “origin” interchangeably. Unlike previous browsers, Gazelle puts web site principals into separate protection domains, completely segregating their access to all resources. Principals can communicate with one another only through the browser kernel using inter-process communication. Unlike all existing browsers except OP, our browser kernel offers the same protection to plugin content as to standard web content.

Such a multi-principal OS construction for a browser brings significant security and reliability benefits to the overall browser system: the compromise or failure of a principal affects that principal alone, leaving other principals and the browser kernel unaffected.

Although our architecture may seem to be a straightforward application of multi-principal OS construction to the browser setting, it exposes intricate problems that did not surface in previous work, including display protection and resource allocation in the face of cross-principal web service composition common on today’s web. We will detail our solutions to the former and leave the latter as future work.

We have built an Internet-Explorer-based prototype that demonstrates Gazelle’s multi-principal OS architecture and at the same time uses all the backward-compatible parsing, DOM management, and JavaScript interpretation that already exist in IE. Our prototype experience indicates that it is feasible to turn an existing browser into a multi-principal OS while leveraging its existing capabilities.

With our prototype, we successfully browsed 19 out of the top 20 Alexa-reported popular sites [5] that we tested. The performance of our prototype is acceptable, and a significant portion of the overhead comes from IE instrumentation, which can be eliminated in a production implementation.

We expect that the Gazelle architecture can be made fully backward compatible with today’s web. Neverthe-

less, it is interesting to investigate the compatibility cost of eliminating the insecure policies in today’s browsers. We give such a discussion based on a preliminary analysis in Section 9.

For the rest of the paper, we first give an in-depth comparison with related browser architectures in Section 2. We then describe Gazelle’s security model 3. In Section 4, we present our architecture, its design rationale, and how we treat the subtle issue of legacy protection for cross-origin script source. In Section 5, we elaborate on the problem statement and design for cross-principal, cross-process display protection. We give a security analysis including a vulnerability study in Section 6. We describe our implementation in Section 7. We measure the performance of our prototype in Section 8. We discuss the tradeoffs of compatibility vs. security for a few browser policies in Section 9. Finally, we conclude and address future work in Section 10.

2 Related Work

In this section, we discuss related browser architectures and compare them with Gazelle.

2.1 Google Chrome and IE 8

In concurrent work, Reis *et al.* detailed the various process models supported by Google Chrome [37]: monolithic process, process-per-browsing-instance, process-per-site-instance, and process-per-site. A browsing instance contains all interconnected (or inter-referenced) windows including tabs, frames and subframes *regardless* of their origin. A site instance is a group of same-site pages within a browsing instance. A site is defined as a set of SOP origins that share a registry-controlled domain name: for example, *attackerAd.socialnet.com*, *alice.profiles.socialnet.com*, and *socialnet.com* share the same registry-controlled domain name *socialnet.com*, and are considered to be the same site or principal by Chrome. Chrome uses the process-per-site-instance model by default. Furthermore, Reis *et al.* [37] gave the caveats that Chrome’s current implementation does *not* support strict site isolation in the process-per-site-instance and process-per-site models: embedded principals, such as a nested `iframe` sourced at a different origin from the parent page, are placed in the same process as the parent page.

The monolithic and process-per-browsing-instance models in Chrome do not provide memory or other resource protection across multiple principals in a monolithic process or browser instance. The process-per-site model does not provide failure containment across site instances [37]. Chrome’s process-per-site-instance

model is the closest to Gazelle’s two processes-per-principal-instance model, but with several crucial differences: (1) Chrome’s principal is site (see above) while Gazelle’s principal is the same as the SOP principal. (2) A web site principal and its embedded principals co-exist in the same process in Chrome, whereas Gazelle places them into separate protection domains. Pursuing this design led us to new research challenges including cross-principal display protection (Section 5). (3) Plugin content from different principals or sites share a plugin process in Chrome, but are placed into separate protection domains in Gazelle. (4) Chrome relies on its rendering processes to enforce the same-origin policy among the principals that co-exist in the same process. These differences indicate that in Chrome, cross-principal (or -site) protection takes place in its rendering processes and its plugin process, in addition to its browser kernel. In contrast, Gazelle’s browser kernel functions as an OS, managing cross-principal protection on all resources, including display.

IE 8 [25] uses OS processes to isolate tabs from one another. This granularity is insufficient since a user may browse multiple mutually distrusting sites in a single tab, and a web page may contain an `iframe` with content from an untrusted site (e.g., ads).

Fundamentally, Chrome and IE 8 have different goals from that of Gazelle. Their use of multiple processes is for failure containment across the user’s browsing sessions rather than for security. Their security goal is to protect the host machine from the browser and the web; this is achieved by process sandboxing [9]. Chrome and IE 8 achieved a good milestone in the evolution of the browser architecture design. Looking forward, as the world creates and migrates more data and functionality into the web and establishes the browser as a dominant application platform, it is critical for browser designers to think of browsers as operating systems and protect web site principals from one another in addition to the host machine. This is Gazelle’s goal.

2.2 Experimental browsers

The OP web browser [21] uses processes to isolate browser components (i.e., HTML engine, JavaScript interpreter, rendering engine) as well as pages of the same origin. In OP, intimate interactions between browser components, such as JavaScript interpreter and HTML engine, must use IPC and go through its browser kernel. The additional IPC cost does not add much benefits: isolating browser components within an instance of a web page provides no additional security protection. Furthermore, besides plugins, basic browser components are fate-shared in web page rendering: the failure of any one browser component results in most web pages not

functioning properly. Therefore, process isolation across these components does not provide any failure containment benefits either. Lastly, OP’s browser kernel does not provide all the cross-principal protection needed as an OS because it delegates display protection to its processes.

Tahoma [11] uses virtual machines to completely isolate (its own definition of) web applications, disallowing any communications between the VMs. A web application is specified in a manifest file provided to the virtual machine manager and typically contains a suite of web sites of possibly different domains. Consequently, Tahoma doesn’t provide protection to existing browser principals. In contrast, Gazelle’s browser kernel protects browser principals first hand.

The Building a Secure Web Browser project [27, 28] uses SubOS processes to isolate content downloading, display, and browser instances. SubOS processes are similar to Unix processes except that instead of a user ID, each process has a SubOS ID with OS support for isolation between objects with different SubOS IDs. SubOS instantiates a browser instance with a different SubOS process ID for each URL. This means that the principal in SubOS is labelled with the URL of a page (protocol, host name plus path) rather than the SOP origin as in Gazelle. Nevertheless, SubOS does not handle embedded principals, unlike Gazelle. Therefore, they also do not encounter the cross-principal display-sharing issue which we tackle in depth. SubOS’s principal model would also require all cross-page interactions that are common within a SOP origin to go through IPC, incurring significant performance cost for many web sites.

3 Security model

3.1 Background: security model in existing browsers

Today’s browsers have inconsistent access and protection model for various resources. These inconsistencies present significant hurdles for web programmers to build robust web services. In this section, we give a brief background on the relevant security policies in existing browsers. Michal Zalewski gives an excellent and perhaps the most complete description of existing browsers’ security model to date [48].

Script. The same-origin policy (SOP) [39] is the central security policy on today’s browsers. SOP governs how scripts access the HTML document tree and remote store. SOP defines the *origin* as the triple of `<protocol, domain-name, port>`. SOP mandates that two documents from different origins cannot access each other’s HTML documents using the Document Object Model (DOM), which is the platform- and language-

neutral interface that allows scripts to dynamically access and update the content, structure and style of a document [14]. A script can access its document origin’s remote data store using the XMLHttpRequest object, which issues an asynchronous HTTP request to the remote server [45]. (XMLHttpRequest is the cornerstone of AJAX programming.) SOP allows a script to issue an XMLHttpRequest only to its enclosing page’s origin. A script executes as the principal of its enclosing page though its source code is not readable in a cross-origin fashion.

For example, an `<iframe>` with source `http://a.com` cannot access any HTML DOM elements from another `<iframe>` with source `http://b.com` and vice versa. `http://a.com`’s scripts (regardless of where the scripts are hosted) can issue XMLHttpRequests to only `a.com`. Furthermore, `http://a.com` and `https://a.com` are different origins because of the protocol difference.

Cookies. For cookie access, by default, the principal is the host name and path, but without the protocol [19, 32]. For example, if the page `a.com/dir/1.html` creates a cookie, then that cookie is accessible to `a.com/dir/2.html` and other pages from that directory and its subdirectories, but is not accessible to `a.com/`. Furthermore, `https://a.com/` and `http://a.com/` share the cookie store unless a cookie is marked with a “secure” flag. Non-HTTPS sites may still set secure cookies in some implementations, just not read them back [48]. A web programmer can make cookie access less restrictive by setting a cookie’s domain attribute to a postfix domain or the path name to be a prefix path. The browser ensures that a site can only set its own cookie and that a cookie is attached only to HTTP requests to that site.

The path-based security policy for cookies does not play well with SOP for scripts: scripts can gain access to all cookies belonging to a domain despite path restrictions.

Plugins. Current major browsers do not enforce any security on plugins and grant plugins access to the local operating system directly. The plugin content is subject to the security policies implemented in the plugin software rather than the browser.

3.2 Gazelle’s security model

Gazelle’s architecture is centered around protecting principals from one another by separating their respective resources into OS-enforced protection domains. Any sharing between two different principals must be explicit using cross-principal communication (or IPC) mediated by the browser kernel.

We use the same principal as the SOP, namely, the triple of `<protocol, domain-name, port>`. While it is tempting to have a more fine-grained principal,

we need to be concerned with co-existing with current browsers [29, 43]: the protection boundary of a more fine-grained principal, such as a path-based principal, would break down in existing browsers. It is unlikely that web programmers would write very different versions of the same service to accommodate different browsers; instead, they would forego the more fine-grained principal and have a single code base.

The resources that need to be protected across principals [43] are memory such as the DOM objects and script objects, persistent state such as cookies, display, and network communications.

We extend the same principal model to all content types except scripts and style sheets (Section 4): the elements created by `<object>`, `<embed>`, ``, and certain types of `<input>`¹ are treated the same as an `<iframe>`: the origin of the included content labels the principal of the content. This means that we *enforce* SOP on plugin content². This is consistent with the existing movement in popular plugins like Adobe Flash Player [20]. Starting with Flash 7, Adobe Flash Player uses the exact domain match (as in SOP) rather than the earlier “superdomain” match (where `www.adobe.com` and `store.adobe.com` have the same origin) [2]; and starting with Flash 9, the default ActionScript behavior only allows access to same-origin HTML content unlike the earlier default that allows full cross-origin interactions [1].

Gazelle’s architecture naturally yields a security policy that partitions all system resources across the SOP principal boundaries. Such a policy offers consistency across various resources. This is unlike current browsers where the security policies vary for different resources. For example, cookies use a different principal than that of scripts (see the above section); descendant navigation policy [7, 8] also implicitly crosses the SOP principal boundary (more in Section 5.1).

It is feasible for Gazelle to enable the same security policies as the existing browsers and achieve backward compatibility through cross-principal communications. Nevertheless, it is interesting to investigate the tradeoffs between supporting backward compatibility and eliminating insecure policies in today’s browsers. We gave a preliminary discussion on this in Section 9.

4 Architecture

4.1 Basic Architecture

Figure 1 shows our basic architecture. A principal is the *unit of protection*. Principals need to be completely isolated in resource access and usage. Any sharing must

be made explicit. Just as in desktop applications, where instances of an application are run in separate processes for failure containment and independent resource allocation, a principal instance is the *unit of failure containment* and the *unit of resource allocation*. For example, navigating to the same URL in different tabs corresponds to two instances of the same principal; when `a.com` embeds two `b.com` iframes, the `b.com` iframes correspond to two instances of `b.com`. However, the frames that share the same origin as the host page are in the same principal instance as the host page by default, though we allow the host page to designate an embedded same-origin frame or object as a separate principal instance for independent resource allocation and failure containment. Principal instances are isolated for all runtime resources, but principal instances of the same principal share persistent state such as cookies and other local storage. Protection unit, resource allocation unit, and failure containment unit can each use a different mechanism depending on the system implementation. Because the implementation of our principal instances contains native code, we use OS processes for all three purposes.

Our principal instance is similar to Google Chrome’s site instance [37], but with two crucial differences: 1) Google Chrome considers the sites that share the same registrar-controlled domain name to be from the same site, so `ad.datacenter.com`, `user.datacenter.com`, and `datacenter.com` are considered to be the same site and belong to the same principal. In contrast, we consider them as separate principals. 2) When a site, say `a.com`, embeds another principal’s content, say an `<iframe>` with source `b.com`, Google Chrome puts them into the same site instance. In contrast, we put them into separate principal instances.

The browser kernel runs in a separate protection domain and interposes between browser principals and the traditional OS. The browser kernel mediates the principals’ access to system resources and enforces security policies of the browser. Essentially, the browser kernel functions as an operating system to browser principals and manages the protection and sharing of system resources for them. The browser kernel also manages the browser chrome, such as the address bar and menus. The browser kernel receives all events generated by the underlying operating system including user events like mouse clicks or keyboard entries; these events are then dispatched to the appropriate principal instance. When the user navigates a window by clicking on a hyperlink that points to an URL at a different origin, the browser kernel creates the protection domain for the URL’s principal instance (if one doesn’t exist already) to render the target page, destroys the protection domain of the hyperlink’s host page, and re-allocates and re-initializes the window to the URL’s principal instance. The browser

¹ `<input>` can be used to include an image using a “src” attribute.

² OP [21] calls this plugin policy the *provider domain policy*.




Figure 1: The Gazelle architecture

kernel is agnostic of DOM and content semantics and has a relatively simple logic.

The runtime of a principal instance performs content processing and is essentially an instance of today's browser components including HTML and style sheet parser, JavaScript engine, layout renderer, and browser plugins. The only way for a principal instance to interact with system resources, such as networking, persistent state, and display, is to use browser kernel's system calls. Principals can communicate with one another using message passing through the browser kernel, in the same fashion as inter-process communications (IPC).

It is necessary that the protection domain of a principal instance is a restricted or sandboxed OS process. The use of process guarantees the isolation of principals even in the face of attacks that exploit memory vulnerabilities. The process must be further restricted so that any interaction with system resources is limited to the browser kernel system calls. Native Client [47] and Xax [15] have established the feasibility of such process sandboxing.

This architecture can be efficient. By putting all browser components including plugins into one process, they can interact with one another through DOM intimately and efficiently as they do in existing browsers. This is unlike the OP browser's approach [21] in which all browser components are separated into processes; chatty DOM interactions must be layered over IPCs through the OP browser kernel, incurring unnecessary overhead without added security.

Unlike all existing browsers except OP, this architecture can enforce browser security policies on plugins, namely, plugin content from different origins are segregated into different processes. Any plugin installed is unable to interact with the operating system and is only provided access to system resources subject to the browser kernel allowing that access. In this architecture, the payload that exploits plugin vulnerabilities will only com-




Figure 2: Supporting legacy protection

promise the principal with the same origin as the malicious plugin content, but not any other principals nor browser kernel.

The browser kernel supports the following system calls related to content fetching in this architecture (a more complete system call table is shown in Table 3):

- *getSameOriginContent (URL)*: Fetch the content at *URL* that has the same origin as the issuing principal regardless of the content type.
- *getCrossOriginContent (URL)*: Fetch the script or style sheet content from *URL*; *URL* may be from different origin than the issuing principal. The content type is determined by the `content-type` header of the HTTP response.
- *delegate (URL, windowSpec)*: Delegate a display area to a different principal of *URL* and fetch the content for that principal.

The semantics of these system calls is that the browser kernel can return cross-origin script or style content to a principal based on the content-type header of the HTTP response, but returns other content if and only if the content has the same origin as the issuing principal, abiding the same-origin policy. All the security decisions are made and enforced by the browser kernel alone.

4.2 Supporting Legacy Protection

The system call semantics in the basic architecture has one subtle issue: cross-origin script or style sheet sources are readable by the issuing principal, which does not conform with the existing SOP. The SOP dictates that a script can be executed in a cross-origin fashion, but the access to its source code is restricted to same origin only.

A key question to answer is that whether a script should be processed in the protection domain of its

provider (indicated in “src”), in the same way as frames, or in the protection domain of the host page that embeds the script. To answer this question, we must examine the primary intent of the script element abstraction. Script is primarily a *library* abstraction (which is a necessary and useful abstraction) for web programmers to include in their sites and runs with the privilege of the includer sites [43]. This is in contrast with the frame abstractions: Programmers put content into cross-origin frames so that the content runs as the principal of its own provider and be protected from other principals. Therefore, a script should be handled by the protection domain of its includer.

In fact, it is a flaw of the existing SOP to offer protection for cross-origin script source. Evidence has shown that it is extremely dangerous to hide sensitive data inside a script [22]. Numerous browser vulnerabilities exist for failing to provide the protection.

Unfortunately, web sites that rely on cross-origin script source protection, exist today. For example, GMail’s contact list is stored in a script file, at the time of writing. Furthermore, it is increasingly common for web programmers to adopt JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) [31] as the preferred data-interchange format. Web sites often demand such data to be same-origin access only. To prevent such data from being accidentally accessed through <script> (by a different origin), web programmers sometimes put “while (1);” prior to the data definition or put comments around the data so that accidental script inclusion would result in infinite loop execution or a no-op.

In light of the existing use, new browser architecture design must also offer the cross-origin script source protection. One way to do this is to strip all authentication-containing information, such as cookies and HTTP authentication headers, from the HTTP requests that retrieve cross-origin scripts so that the web servers will not supply authenticated data. The key problem with this approach is that it is not always clear what in an HTTP request may contain authentication information. For example, some cookies are used for authentication purposes and some are not. Stripping all cookies may impair functionality when the purpose of some cookies are not for authentication purposes. In another example, a network may use IP addresses for authentication, which are impossible to strip out.

We address the cross-origin script source protection problem by modifying our architecture slightly, as shown in Figure 2. The modification is based on the following observation. Third-party plugin software vulnerabilities have surged recently [36]. Symantec reports that in 2007 alone there are 467 plugin vulnerabilities [42], which is about one magnitude higher than that of browser software. Clearly, plugin software should be trusted much

less than browser software. Therefore, for protecting cross-origin script or style sheet source, we place more trust in the browser code and let the browser code retrieve and protect cross-origin script or style sheet sources: for each principal, we run browser code and plugin code in two separate processes. The plugin instance process *cannot* issue the `getCrossOriginContent()` and it can only interact with cross-origin scripts and style sheets through the browser instance process.

In this architecture, the quality of protecting cross-origin script and style-sheet source relies on the browser code quality. While this protection is not perfect with native browser code implementation, the architecture offers the same protection as OP, and stronger protection than the rest of existing browsers. The separation of browser code and plugin code into separate processes also improves reliability by containing plugin failures.

In recent work, Native Client [47] and Xax [15] have presented a plugin model that uses sandboxed processes to contain each browser principal’s plugin content. Their plugin model works perfectly in our browser architecture. We do not provide further discussions on plugins in our paper.

5 Cross-Principal, Cross-Process Display and Events Protection

Cross-principal service composition is a salient nature of the web and is commonly used in web applications. When building a browser as a multi-principal OS, this composition raises new challenges in display sharing and event dispatching: when a web site embeds a cross-origin frame (or objects, images), the involved principal instances share the display at the same time. Therefore, it is important that the browser kernel 1) discerns display and events ownership, 2) enforces that a principal instance can only draw in its own display areas, 3) dispatches UI events to only the principal instance with which the user is interacting. An additional challenge is that the browser kernel must accomplish these without access to any DOM semantics.

From a high level, in Gazelle principal instances are responsible for rendering content into bitmap objects, and our browser kernel manages these bitmap objects and chooses when and where to display them. Our architecture provides a clean separation between the act of rendering web content and the policies of how to display this content. This is a stark contrast to today’s browsers that intermingle these two functions, which has led to numerous security vulnerabilities [18, 44].

Our display management fundamentally differs from that of the traditional multi-user OSes, such as Unix and Windows. Traditional OSes offer no cross-principal dis-

play protection. In X, all the users who are authorized (through `.Xauthority`) to access the display can access one another’s display and events. Experimental OSes like EROS [41] have dealt with cross-principal display protection. However, the browser context presents new challenges that are absent in EROS, such as dual ownership of display and cross-principal transparent overlays.

5.1 Display Ownership and Access Control

We define *window* to be a unit of display allocation and delegation. Each window is allocated by a *landlord* principal instance or the browser kernel; and each window is delegated to (or rented to) a *tenant* principal instance. For example, when the web site *a.com* embeds a frame sourced at *b.com*, *a.com* allocates a window from its own display area and delegates the window to *b.com*; *a.com* is the landlord of the newly-created window, while *b.com* is the tenant of that window. The same kind of delegation happens when cross-origin object and image elements are embedded. The browser kernel allocates top-level windows (or tabs). When the user launches a site through address-bar entry, the browser kernel delegates the top-level window to the site, making the site a tenant. We decided against using “parent” and “child” terminologies because they only convey the window hierarchy, but not the principal instances involved. In contrast, “landlord” and “tenant” convey both semantics.

Window creation and delegation result in a `delegate(URL, position, dimensions)` system call. For each window, the browser kernel maintains the following state: its landlord, tenant, position, dimensions, pixels in the window, and the URL location of the window content. The browser kernel manages a three-dimensional display space where the position of a window also contains a stacking order value (toward the browsing user). A landlord provides the stacking order of all its delegated windows to the browser kernel. The stacking order is calculated based on the DOM hierarchy and the CSS z-index values of the windows.

Because a window is created by a landlord and occupied by a tenant, the browser kernel must allow reasonable window interactions from both principal instances without losing protection. When a landlord and its tenant are from different principals, the browser kernel provides access control as follows:

- *Position and dimensions*: When a landlord embeds a tenant’s content, the landlord should be able to retain control on what gets displayed on the landlord’s display and a tenant should not be able to reposition or resize the window to interfere with the landlord’s display. Therefore, the browser kernel enforces that only the landlord of a window can change the position and the dimensions of a window.

	Landlord	Tenant
position (x,y,z)	RW	
dimensions (height, width)	RW	R
pixels		RW
URL location	W	RW

Table 1: Access control policy for a window’s landlord and tenant

- *Drawing isolation*: Pixels inside the window reflect the tenant’s private content and should not be accessible to the landlord. Therefore, the browser kernel enforces that only the tenant can draw within the window. (Nevertheless, a landlord can create overlapping windows delegated to different principal instances.)
- *Navigation*: Setting the URL location of a window navigates the window to a new site. Navigation is a fundamental element of any web application. Therefore, both the landlord and the tenant are allowed to set the URL location of the window. However, the landlord should not obtain the tenant’s navigation history that is private to the tenant. Therefore, the browser kernel prevents the landlord from reading the URL location. The tenant can read the URL location as long as it remains being the tenant. (When the window is navigated to a different principal, the old tenant will no longer be associated with the window and will not be able to access the window’s state.)

Table 1 summarizes the access control policies in the browser kernel. In existing browsers, these manipulation policies also vaguely exist. However, their logic is intermingled with the DOM logic and is implemented at the object property and method level of a number of DOM objects which all reside in the same protection domain despite their origins. This had led to numerous vulnerabilities [18, 44]. In Gazelle, by separating these security policies from the DOM semantics and implementation, and concentrating them inside the browser kernel we achieve more clarity in our policies and much stronger robustness of our system construction.

The browser kernel ensures that principal instances other than the landlord and the tenant cannot manipulate any of the window states. This includes manipulating the URL location for navigation. Here, we depart from the existing descendant navigation policy in most of today’s browsers [7, 8]. Descendant navigation policy allows a landlord to navigate a window created by its tenant even if the landlord and the tenant are different principals. This is flawed in that a tenant-created window is a resource that belongs to the tenant and should not be controllable by a different principal.

Existing literature [7, 8] supports the descendant navigation policy with the following argument: since existing browsers allow the landlord to draw over the tenant, a landlord can simulate the descendant navigation by overrawing. Though overrawing can *visually* simulate navigation, navigation is much more powerful than overrawing because a landlord with such descendant navigation capability can interfere with the tenant’s operations. For example, a tenant may have a script interacting with one of its windows and then effecting changes to the tenant’s backend; navigating the tenant’s window requires just one line of JavaScript and could effect undesirable changes in the tenant’s backend. With overrawing, a landlord can imitate a tenant’s content, but the landlord cannot send messages to the tenant’s backend in the name of the tenant.

5.2 Cross-Principal Events Protection

The browser kernel captures all events in the system and must accurately dispatch them to the right principal instance to achieve cross-principal event protection. Networking and persistent-state events are easy to dispatch. However, user interface events pose interesting challenges to the browser kernel in discerning event ownership, especially when dealing with overlapping, potentially transparent cross-origin windows: major browsers allow web pages to mix content from different origins along the z-axis where content can be occluded, either partially or completely, by cross-origin content. In addition, current standards allow web pages to make a frame or portions of their windows transparent, further blurring the lines between principals. Although these flexible mechanisms have a slew of legitimate uses, they can be used to fool users into thinking they are interacting with content from one origin, but are in fact interacting with content from a different origin. Zalewski [48] gave a taxonomy on “UI redressing” or clickjacking attacks which illustrated some of the difficulties with current standards and how attackers can abuse these mechanisms.

To achieve cross-principal events protection, the browser kernel needs to determine the *event owner*, the principal instance to which the event is dispatched. There are two types of events for the currently active tab: stateless and stateful. The owner of a stateless event like a mouse event is the tenant of the window (or display area) on which the event takes place. The owner of a stateful event such as a key-press event is the tenant of the current in-focus window. The browser kernel interprets mouse clicks as focus-setting events and keeps track of the current in-focus window and its principal instance.

The key problem to solve then is to determine the window on which a stateless or focus-setting event takes place. We consider a determination to have high *fidelity*

if the determined event owner corresponds to the user intent. Different window layout policies directly affect the fidelity of this determination. We elaborate on our explorations of three layout policies and their implications on fidelity.

Existing browsers’ policy. The layout policy in existing browsers is to draw windows according to the DOM hierarchy and the z-index values of the windows. Existing browsers then associate a stateless or focus-setting event to the window that has the highest stacking order. Today, most browsers permit page authors to set transparency on cross-origin windows [48]. This ability can result in poor fidelity in determining the event owner in the face of cross-principal transparent overlays. When there are transparent, cross-origin windows overlapping with one another, it is impossible for the browser kernel to interpret the user’s intent: the user is guided by what she sees on the screen; when two windows present a mixed view, some user interfaces visible to the user belong to one window, and yet some belong to another. The ability to overlay transparent cross-origin content can be extremely dangerous: a malicious site can make an iframe sourced at a legitimate site transparent and overlaid on top of the malicious site [48], fooling the users to interact with the legitimate site unintentionally.

2-D display delegation policy. This is a new layout policy that we have explored. In this policy, the display is managed as two-dimensional space for the purpose of delegation. Once a landlord delegates a rectangular area to a tenant, the landlord cannot overdraw the area. Thus, no cross-principal content can be overlaid. Such a layout constraint will enable perfect fidelity in determining an event ownership that corresponds to the user intent. It also yields better security as it can prevent all UI redressing attacks except clickjacking [48]. Even clickjacking would be extremely difficult to launch with this policy on our system since our cross-principal memory protection makes reading and writing the scrolling state of a window an exclusive right of the tenant of the window.

However, this policy can have a significant impact on backward compatibility. For example, a menu from a host page cannot be drawn over a nested cross-origin frame or object; many sites would have significant constraints with their own DOM-based pop-up windows created with divs and such (rather than using `window.open` or `alert`), which could overlay on cross-origin frames or objects with existing browsers’ policy; and a cross-origin image cannot be used as a site’s background.

Opaque overlay policy. This policy retains existing browsers’ display management and layout policies as much as possible for backward compatibility (and additionally provides cross-principal events protection), but lets the browser kernel enforce the following layout invariant or constraint: for any two dynamic content-

containing windows (e.g., frames, objects) win_1 and win_2 , win_1 can overlay on win_2 iff $(Tenant_{win_1} == Tenant_{win_2}) \parallel (Tenant_{win_1} \neq Tenant_{win_2} \&\& win_1 \text{ is opaque})$. This policy effectively constrains a pixel to be associated with just one principal, making event owner determination trivial. This is in contrast with the existing browsers’ policy where a pixel may be associated with more than one principals when there are transparent cross-principal overlays. This policy allows same-origin windows to transparently overlay with one another. It also allows a page to use a cross-origin image (which is static content) as its background. Note that no principal instance other than the tenant of the window can set the background of a window due to our memory protection across principal instances. So, it is impossible for a principal to fool the user by setting another principal’s background. The browser kernel associates a stateless event or a focus-setting event with the dynamic content-containing window that has the highest stacking order.

This policy eliminates the attack vector of overlaying a transparent victim page over an attacker page. However, by allowing overlapping opaque cross-principal frames or objects, it allows not only legitimate uses, such as those denied by the 2D display delegation policy, but it also allows an attacker page to cover up and expose selective areas of a nested cross-origin victim frame or object. The latter scenario can result in infidelity. We leave as future work the mitigation of such infidelity by determining how much of a principal’s content is exposed in an undisturbed fashion to the user when the user clicks on the page.

We implemented the opaque overlay policy in our prototype.

6 Security Analysis

In Gazelle, the trusted computing base encompasses the browser kernel and the underlying OS. If the browser kernel is compromised, the entire browser is compromised. If the underlying OS is compromised, the entire host system is compromised. If the DNS is compromised, all the non-HTTPS principals can be compromised. When the browser kernel, DNS, and the OS are intact, our architecture guarantees that the compromise of a principal instance does not give it any capabilities in addition to those already granted to it through browser kernel system call interface (Section 4).

Next, we analyze Gazelle’s security over classes of browser vulnerabilities. We also make a comparison with popular browsers with a study on their past, known vulnerabilities.

- Cross-origin vulnerabilities:

By separating principals into different protection domains and making any sharing explicit, we can much more easily eliminate cross-origin vulnerabilities. The only logic for which we need to ensure correctness is the origin determination in the browser kernel.

This is unlike existing browsers, where origin validations and SOP enforcement are spread through the browser code base [10], and content from different principals coexists in shared memory. All of the cross-origin vulnerabilities illustrated in Chen et al. [10] simply do not exist in our system; *no* special logic is required to prevent them because all of those vulnerabilities exploit implicit sharing.

Cross-origin script source can still be leaked in our architecture if a site can compromise its browser instance. Nevertheless, only that site’s browser instance is compromised, while other principals are intact, unlike all existing browsers except OP.

- Display vulnerabilities:

The display is also a resource that Gazelle’s browser kernel protects across principals, unlike existing browsers (Section 5). Cross-principal display and events protection and access control are enforced in the browser kernel. This prevents a potentially compromised principal from hijacking the display and events that belong to another principal. Display hijacking vulnerabilities have manifested themselves in existing browsers [17, 26] that allow an attacker site to control another site’s window content.

- Plugin vulnerabilities:

Third-party plugins have emerged to be a significant source of vulnerabilities [36]. Unlike existing browsers, Gazelle’s design requires plugins to interact with system resources only by means of browser kernel system calls so that they are subject to our browser’s security policy. Plugins are contained inside sandboxed processes so that basic browser code doesn’t share fate with plugin code (Section 4). A compromised plugin affects the principal instance’s plugin process only, and not other principal instances nor the rest of the system. In contrast, in existing browsers except OP, a compromised plugin undermines the entire browser and often the host system as well.

A DNS rebinding attack results in the browser labeling resources from different network hosts with a common origin. This allows an attacker to operate within SOP and access unauthorized resources [30]. Although Gazelle does not fundamentally address this vulnerability, the fact that plugins must interact with the network through browser kernel system

	IE 7	Firefox 2
Origin validation error	6	11
Memory error	38	25
GUI logic flaw	3	13
Others	-	28
Total	47	77

Table 2: Vulnerability Study for IE 7 and Firefox 2

calls defeats the multipin form of such attacks.

We analyzed the known vulnerabilities of two major browsers, Firefox 2 [3] and IE 7 [35], since their release to November 2008, as shown in Table 2. For both browsers, memory errors are a significant source of errors. Memory-related vulnerabilities are often exploited by maliciously crafted web pages to compromise the entire browser and often the host machines. In Gazelle, although the browser kernel is implemented with managed C# code, it uses native .NET libraries, such as network and display libraries; memory errors in those libraries could still cause memory-based attacks against the browser kernel. Memory attacks in principal instances are well-contained in their respective sandboxed processes.

Cross-origin vulnerabilities, or origin validation errors, constitute another significant share of vulnerabilities. They result from the implicit sharing across principals in existing browsers and can be much more easily eliminated in Gazelle because cross-principal protection is exclusively handled by the browser kernel and because of Gazelle’s use of sandboxed processes.

In IE 7, there are 3 GUI logic flaws which can be exploited to spoof the contents of the address bar. For Gazelle, the address bar UI is owned and controlled by our browser kernel. We anticipate that it will be much easier to apply code contracts [6] in the browser kernel than in a monolithic browser to eliminate many of such vulnerabilities.

In addition, Firefox had other errors which didn’t map into these three categories, such as JavaScript privilege escalation, URL handling errors, and parsing problems. Since Gazelle enforces security properties in the browser kernel, any errors that manifest as the result of JavaScript handling and parsing are limited in the scope of exploit to the principal instance owning the page. URL handling errors could occur in our browser kernel as well.

7 Implementation

We have built a Gazelle prototype mostly as described in Section 4. We have not yet ported an existing plugin onto our system. Our prototype runs on Windows Vista with

.NET framework 3.5 [4]. We next discuss the implementation of two major components shown in Figure 2: the browser kernel and the browser instance.

Browser Kernel. The browser kernel consists of approximately 5k lines of C# code. It communicates with principal instances using system calls and upcalls, which are implemented as asynchronous XML-based messages sent over named pipes. An overview of browser kernel system calls and upcalls is presented in Table 3. System calls are performed by the browser instance or plugins and sometimes include replies. Upcalls are messages from the browser kernel to the browser instance.

Display management is implemented as described in Section 5 using .NET’s Graphics and Bitmap libraries. Each browser instance provides the browser kernel with a bitmap for each window of its rendered content using a `display` system call; each change in rendered content results in a subsequent `display` call. For each top-level browsing window (or tab), browser kernel maintains a stacking order and uses it to compose various bitmaps belonging to a tab into a single master bitmap, which is then attached to the tab’s `PictureBox` form. This straightforward display implementation has numerous optimization opportunities, many of which have been thoroughly studied [33, 38, 40], and which are not the focus of our work.

Browser instance. Instead of undertaking a significant effort of writing our own HTML parser, renderer, and JavaScript engine, we borrow these components from Internet Explorer 7 in a way that does not compromise security. Relying on IE’s Trident renderer has a big benefit of inheriting IE’s page rendering compatibility and performance. In addition, such an implementation shows that it is realistic to adapt an existing browser to use Gazelle’s secure architecture.

In our implementation, each browser instance embeds a Trident `WebBrowser` control wrapped with an *interposition layer* which enforces Gazelle’s security properties. The interposition layer uses Trident’s COM interfaces, such as `IWebBrowser2` or `IWebBrowserEvents2`, to hook sensitive operations, such as navigation or frame creation, and convert them into system calls to the browser kernel. Likewise, the interposition layer receives browser kernel’s upcalls, such as keyboard or mouse events, and synthesizes them in the Trident instance.

For example, suppose a user navigates to a web page `a.com`, which embeds a cross-principal frame `b.com`. First, the browser kernel will fetch `a.com`’s HTML content, create a new `a.com` process with a Trident component, and pass the HTML to Trident for rendering. During the rendering process, we intercept the frame navigation event for `b.com`, determine that it is cross-principal, and cancel it. The frame’s DOM element in `a.com`’s DOM is left intact as a placeholder, making the interpo-

Type	Call Name	Description
syscall	getSameOriginContent(URL)	retrieves same origin content
syscall	getCrossOriginContent(URL)	retrieves script or css content
syscall	delegate(URL, delegatedWindowSpec)	delegates screen area to a different principal
syscall	postMessage(windowID, msg, targetOrigin)	cross-frame messaging
syscall	display(windowID, bitmap)	sets the display buffer for the window
syscall	back()	steps back in the window history
syscall	forward()	steps forward in the window history
syscall	navigate (windowID, URL)	navigates a window to URL
syscall	createTopLevelWindow (URL)	creates a new browser tab for the URL specified
syscall	changeWindow (windowID, position, size)	updates the location and size of a window
syscall	writePersistentState (type, state)	allows writing to origin-partitioned storage
syscall	readPersistentState (type)	allows reading of origin-partitioned storage
syscall	lockPersistentState (type)	locks one type of origin-partitioned storage
upcall	destroy(windowID)	closes a browser instance
upcall	resize(windowID, windowSpec)	changes the dimensions of the browser instance
upcall	createPlugin(windowID, URL, content)	creates a plugin instance
upcall	createDocument(windowID, URL, content)	creates a browser instance
upcall	sendEvent(windowID, eventInfo)	passes an event to the browser instance

Table 3: Some Gazelle System Calls

sition transparent to `a.com`. We extract the frame’s position, dimensions, and CSS properties from this element through DOM-related COM interfaces, and send this information in a `delegate` system call to the browser kernel to allow the landlord `a.com` to “rent out” part of its display area to the tenant `b.com`. The browser kernel then creates a new `b.com` process (with a new instance of Trident), and asks it to render `b.com`’s frame. For any rendered display updates for either `a.com` or `b.com`, our interposition code obtains a bitmap of display content from Trident using the `IViewObject` interface and sends it to the browser kernel for rendering.

One intricacy we faced was in rerouting all network requests issued by Trident instances through the browser kernel. We found that interposing on all types of fetches, including frame, script, and image requests, to be very challenging with COM hooks currently exposed by Trident. Instead, our approach relies on a *local web proxy*, which runs alongside the browser kernel. We configure each Trident instance to use our proxy for all network requests, and the proxy converts each request into a corresponding system call to the browser kernel, which then enforces our security policy and completes the request.

One other implementation difficulty that we encountered was to properly manage the layout of cross-origin images. It is easy to render a cross-origin image in a separate process, but difficult to extract the image’s correct layout information from the host page’s Trident instance. We anticipate this to be an overcomable implementation issue. In our current prototype, we are keeping cross-origin images in the same process as their host page for

proper rendering of the pages.

Our interposition layer ensures that our Trident components are never trusted with sensitive operations, such as network access or display rendering. However, if a Trident renderer is compromised, it could bypass our interposition hooks and compromise other principals using the underlying OS’s APIs. To prevent this, we are in the process of implementing an OS-level sandboxing mechanism, which would prevent Trident from directly accessing sensitive OS APIs. The feasibility of such a browser sandbox has already been established in Xax [15] and Native Client [47].

To verify that such an implementation does not cause rendering problems with popular web content, we used our prototype to manually browse through the top 20 Alexa [5] web sites. We checked the correctness of Gazelle’s visual output against unmodified Internet Explorer and briefly verified page interactivity, for example by clicking on links. We found that 19 of 20 web sites rendered correctly. The remaining web site exposed a (fixable) bug in our interposition code, which caused it to load with incorrect layout. Two sites experienced crashes (due to more bugs) when trying to render embedded cross-principal `<iframe>`’s hosting ads. However, the crashes only affected the `<iframe>` processes; the main pages rendered correctly with the exception of small blank spaces in place of the failed `<iframe>`’s. This illustrates a desirable security property of our architecture, which prevents malicious or misbehaving cross-origin tenants from affecting their landlords or other principals.

	Gazelle		Internet Explorer 7		Google Chrome	
	Time	Memory Used	Time	Memory Used	Time	Memory Used
1. Browser startup (no page)	668 ms	9 MB	635 ms	14 MB	500 ms	25 MB
2. New tab (blank page)	602 ms	14 MB	115 ms	0.7 MB	230 ms	1.8 MB
3. New tab (google.com)	939 ms	16 MB	499 ms	1.4 MB	480 ms	7.6 MB
4. Navigate from google.com to google.com/ads	955 ms	6 MB	1139 ms	3.1 MB	1020 ms	1.4 MB
5. Navigate to nytimes.com (with a cross-origin frame)	5773 ms	88 MB	3213 ms	53 MB	3520 ms	19.4 MB

Table 4: Loading times and memory overhead for a sequence of typical browser operations.

8 Evaluation

In this section, we measure the impact of our architecture on browser performance. All tests were performed on an Intel 3.00Ghz Core 2 Duo with 4GB of RAM, running 32-bit Windows Vista with a gigabit Ethernet connection. To evaluate Gazelle’s performance, we measured page loading latencies, the memory footprint, and responsiveness of our prototype in comparison with IE7, a monolithic browser, and Google Chrome v1, a multi-process browser. We found that while Gazelle performs on-par with commercial browsers while browsing within an origin, it introduces some overhead for cross-origin navigation and rendering embedded cross-origin principals (e.g., frames). Nevertheless, our main sources of overhead stem from our interposition layer, various initialization costs for new browser instances, and the unoptimized nature of our prototype. We point out simple optimizations that would eliminate much of the overhead along the way.

Page load latency. Table 4 shows the loading times for a series of browser operations a typical user might perform using our prototype, IE7, and Google Chrome. The operations are repeated one after another within the same browser. A web page’s loading time is defined as the time between pressing the “Go” button and seeing the fully-rendered web page. All operations include network latency.

Operation 1 measures the time to launch the browser and is similar for all three browsers. Although Gazelle’s browser kernel is small and takes only 225 ms to start, Gazelle also initializes the local proxy subsystem (see Section 7), which takes an additional 443 ms. Operations 2 and 3 each carry an overhead of creating a new process in Gazelle and Chrome, but not IE7. Operation 4 reuses the same `google.com` process in Gazelle to render a same-origin page to which the user navigates via a link on `google.com`. Here, Gazelle is slightly faster than both IE7 and Chrome, possibly because Gazelle does not yet manage state such as browsing history between nav-

igations. Finally, operation 5 causes Gazelle to create a new process for `nytimes.com` to render the popular news page³. In addition, NYTimes contains an embedded cross-principal `<iframe>`, which triggers window delegation and another process creation event in Gazelle. Gazelle’s overall page load latency of 5773 ms includes the rendering times of both the main page and the embedded `<iframe>`, with the main page becoming visible and interactive to the user in 5085 ms.

Compared to both IE7 and Chrome, it is expected that Gazelle will have a performance overhead due to extra process creation costs, messaging overhead, and the overhead of our Trident interposition layer as well as Trident itself. Table 5 breaks down the major sources of overhead involved in rendering the three sites in Table 4.

Our Trident interposition layer is a big source of overhead, especially for larger sites like NYTimes.com, where it consumes 813 ms. Although we plan to optimize our use of Trident’s COM interfaces, we are also limited by the Trident host’s implementation of the hooks that we rely on, and by the COM layer which exposes these hooks. Nevertheless, we believe we could mitigate most of this latency if Trident were to provide us with a direct (non-COM) implementation for a small subset of its hooks that Gazelle requires.

Our local proxy implementation for network interposition constitutes another large source of overhead, for example 541 ms for NYTimes.com. Much of this overhead would disappear if Trident were to make direct network system calls to the browser kernel, rather than going through an extra proxy indirection. Another part of this overhead stems from the fact that the browser kernel currently releases web page data only when a whole network transfer finishes; instead, it could provide browser instances with chunks of data as soon as they arrive (e.g., by changing `getContent` system calls to the semantics of a UNIX `read()` system call), allowing them to better overlap network transfers with rendering.

Process creation is an expected source of overhead that

³In contrast, Chrome reuses the tab’s old `google.com` process

increases whenever sites embed cross-principal content, such as NYTimes’s cross-origin <iframe>. As well, each process must instantiate and initialize a new Trident object, which is expensive. As an optimization, we could use a worker pool of a few processes that have been pre-initialized with Trident. This would save us 275 ms on NYTimes’s load time and 134 ms on google.com’s load time.

We encountered an unexpected performance hit when initializing named pipes that we use to transfer system calls: a new process’s first write to a pipe stalls for a considerable time. This could be caused by initialization of an Interop layer between .NET and the native Win32 pipe interfaces, on which our implementation relies. We can avoid this overhead by either using an alternate implementation of a system call transfer mechanism, or pre-initializing named pipes in our worker pool. This would save us 439 ms in NYTimes’s render time.

Retrieving bitmap display updates from Trident and sending them to the browser kernel is expensive for large, complex sites such as NYTimes.com, where this takes 422 ms. Numerous optimizations are possible, including image compression, VNC-like selective transfers, and a more efficient bitmap sharing channel between Trident and the browser kernel. Our mechanism for transferring bitmap updates currently performs an inefficient .NET-based serialization of the image’s data (which takes 176 ms for NYTimes); passing this data directly would further improve performance.

Overall, we believe that with the above optimizations, Gazelle’s performance would be on par with production browsers like Chrome or IE8; for example, we anticipate that NYTimes.com could be rendered in about 3.6 s.

Memory overhead. As a baseline measurement, the browser kernel occupies around 9MB of memory after a page load. This includes the user interface components of the browser to present the rendered page to the user and the buffers allocated for displaying the rendered page. Memory measurements do not include shared libraries used by multiple processes.

Table 4 shows the amount of memory for performing various browsing operations. For example, to open a new tab to a blank page, Gazelle consumes 14MB, and to open a new tab for google.com, Gazelle consumes an additional 16MB. Each empty browser instance uses 1.5MB of internal storage plus the memory required for rendered content. Given our implementation, the latter closely corresponds to Trident’s memory footprint, which at the minimum consists of 14MB for a blank page. In the case of NYTimes, our memory footprint further increases because of structures allocated by the interposition layer, such as a local DOM cache.

Responsiveness. We evaluated the response time of a user-generated event, such as a mouse click. When the

browser kernel detects a user event, it issues a *sendEvent* upcall to the destination principal’s browser instance. Such calls take only 2 ms on average to transfer, plus 1 ms to synthesize in Trident. User actions might lead to display updates; for example, a display update for google.com would incur an additional 77 ms. Most users should not perceive this overhead and will experience good responsiveness.

Process creation. In addition to latency and memory measurements we also have tested our prototype on the top 100 popular sites reported by Alexa [5] to provide an estimate of the number of processes created for different sites. Here, we place a cross-origin image into a separate process to evaluate our design. The number of processes created is determined by the use of different-origin content on sites, which is most commonly image content. For the top 100 sites, the median number of processes required to view a single page is 4, the minimum is 1, and the maximum is 28 (caused by skyrock.com, which uses an image farm). Although creation of many processes introduces additional latency and memory footprint, we did not experience difficulties when Gazelle created many processes during normal browsing. Our test machine easily handles a hundred running processes, which are enough to keep 25 average web sites open simultaneously.

9 Discussions on compatibility vs. security

While Gazelle’s architecture can be made fully backward compatible with today’s web, it is interesting to investigate the compatibility cost of eliminating the insecure policies in today’s browsers. We have considered several policies that differ from today’s browsers but offer better security. We conducted a preliminary study on their compatibility cost. This is by no means a conclusive or complete study, but only a first look on the topic.

We mostly used the data set of the front pages of the top 100 most popular web sites ranked by Alexa [5]. We used a combination of browser instrumentation with automatic script execution and manual inspection in our study. We consider any visual differences in the rendering of a web page to be a violation of compatibility. We discuss our findings below.

Subdomain treatment Existing browsers and SOP make exceptions for subdomains (e.g., *news.google.com* is a subdomain of *google.com*) [39]: a page can set the `document.domain` property to suffixes of its domain and assume that identity. This feature was one of the few methods for cross-origin frames to communicate before the advent of `postMessage` [25]. Changing `document.domain` is a dangerous practice and violates the Principle of Least Privilege: Once a subdomain sets its domain to a suffix, it has no control over which other

Location	Overhead	Latency		
		blank site	google.com	nytimes.com
Browser kernel	Overhead before rendering - process creation	44 ms	40 ms	78 ms
Browser instance	- creating interposed instances of Trident	94 ms	94 ms	197 ms
Browser instance	- named pipe initialization	137 ms	145 ms	439 ms
Browser instance	Overhead during rendering - proxy-based network interposition	4 ms	134 ms	541 ms
Browser instance	- other Trident interposition	127 ms	122 ms	813 ms
Browser instance	Overhead after rendering - bitmap capture	13 ms	35 ms	196 ms
Browser instance	- bitmap transfer	37 ms	67 ms	226 ms
Browser kernel	- display rendering	10 ms	11 ms	101 ms

Table 5: A breakdown of Gazelle’s overheads involved in page rendering. Note that nytimes.com creates *two* processes for itself and an `<iframe>`; the other two sites create one process.

subdomains can access it. This is also observed by Zalewski [48]. Therefore, it would be more secure not to allow a subdomain to set `document.domain`.

Our experiments indicate that six of the top 100 Alexa sites set `document.domain` to a different origin, though restricting write access to `document.domain` might not actually break the operation of these web sites.

Mixed HTTPS and HTTP Content. When an HTTPS site embeds HTTP content, browsers typically warn users about the mixed content, since the HTTPS site’s content can resist a network attacker, but the embedded HTTP content could be compromised by a network attacker.

When an HTTPS site embeds other HTTP principals (through `<iframe>`, `<object>`, etc.), HTTPS principals and HTTP principals will have different protection domains and will not interfere with each other.

However, when an HTTPS site embeds a script or style sheet delivered with HTTP, existing browsers would allow the script to run with the HTTPS site’s privileges (after the user ignores the mixed content warning). This is dangerous because a network attacker can then compromise the HTTP-transmitted script and attack the HTTPS principal despite its intent of preventing network attackers. Therefore, a more secure policy is to deny rendering of HTTP-transmitted scripts or style sheets for an HTTPS principal. Instead of the Alexa top 100, we identified a few different sites that provide SSL sessions for parts of their web application: *amazon.com*, *mail.google.com*, *mail.microsoft.com*, *blogger.com*, and a few popular banking sites where we have existing accounts. This allows us to complete the login process during testing. These sites do not violate this policy. In addition, we have also gathered data from one of the author’s browsing sessions over the course of a few months and found that out of 5,500 unique SSL URLs seen, less

than two percent include HTTP scripts and CSS.

Layout policies. The opaque overlay policy allows only opaque (and not transparent) cross-origin frames or objects (Section 5.2). We test this policy with the top 100 Alexa sites by determining if any cross-origin frames or objects are overlapped with one another. We found that two out of 100 sites attempt to violate this policy. This policy does not generate rendering errors; instead, we convert transparent cross-origin elements to opaque elements when displaying content.

We also tested the 2D display delegation policy that we analyzed in Section 5.2. We found this policy to have higher compatibility cost than our opaque overlay policy: six of the top 100 sites attempt to violate this policy.

Sites that attempt to violate either policy have reduced functionality, and will render differently than what the web page author intends.

Plugins. Existing plugin software must be adapted (ported or binary-rewritten) to use browser kernel system calls to accomplish its tasks. Of top 100 Alexa sites, 34 sites use Flash, but no sites use any other kinds of plugins. This indicates that porting or adapting Flash alone can address a significant portion of the plugin compatibility issue.

10 Concluding Remarks

We have presented Gazelle, the first web browser that qualifies as a multi-principal OS for web site principals. This is because Gazelle’s browser kernel *exclusively* manages resource protection, unlike all existing browsers which allow cross-principal protection logic to reside in the principal space. Gazelle enjoys the security and robustness benefit of a multi-principal OS: a compromise or failure of one principal leaves other principals and the browser kernel intact.

Our browser construction exposes challenging design issues that were not seen in previous work, such as providing legacy protection to cross-origin script source and cross-principal, cross-process display and event protection. We are the first to provide comprehensive solutions to them.

The implementation and evaluation of our IE-based prototype shows promise of a practical multi-principal OS-based browser in the real world.

In our future work, we are exploring the fair sharing of resources among web site principals in our browser kernel and a more in-depth study of the tradeoffs between compatibility and security in browser policy design.

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