Formal verification methods are a possible way to find and diagnose such deep errors [23,24,29]. One option is explicit model checking, which systematically enumerates the possible states of the system. A basic model checker starts from an initial state and recursively generates successive system states by executing the nondeterministic events of the system. States are stored in a hash table to ensure that each state is explored at most once. This process continues either until the whole state space is explored, or until the model checker runs out of resources. When it works, this style of state graph exploration can achieve the effect of impractically massive testing by avoiding the redundancy that would occur in conventional testing.
Conventional model checkers usually assume that the design is described at a high level that abstracts away many details of the actual implementation. Verifying actual code using such a tool requires reconstructing this abstract description from the code. This process requires a great deal of manual effort, hampering the use of model checking in actual system design. Moreover, human errors in the manual abstraction process result in missing bugs and cause false alarms during verification, further increasing the cost and reducing the usefulness of model checking. Such errors can be introduced both when constructing the model and as a result of ``drift'' as the actual system evolves . For these reasons, it is a notable curiosity when software is model checked, rather than an everyday occurrence.
We introduce CMC (C Model Checker) to address some of these issues. CMC works on unmodified C or C++ implementations and explores large state spaces efficiently by storing states. Like traditional model checkers, CMC achieves the equivalent of executing astronomical numbers of tests in reasonable time. However, CMC does not require writing a separate high-level model of the code, nor extracting such a model from an implementation. More importantly, it finds the bugs that are actually in the implementation: it does not miss implementation bugs that would be omitted from a model, nor does it waste the user's time with bugs that appear in the model but not in the implementation.
The idea of model checking actual implementation code has been advocated in a small number of other tools. Verisoft , for instance, systematically executes C implementation code but does not store states. Other software model checking tools such as   are specialized to work only with certain classes of Java programs. CMC was designed to combine effective techniques from various research efforts within the verification community and apply them to software written in C and C++, the predominant programming languages in industry.
The ultimate goal of this work is to check systems code in general, but the initial focus is on networking code. Such code naturally follows an ``event-driven'' execution model which makes it a good fit for model checkers. The correctness of networking protocol implementations is especially important, since they are not only at the core of many services, but also the first target of external security attacks. Unfortunately, network protocols are difficult to design, implement and test because they involve complex interactions among multiple machines across a network and deal with various network failures such as packet losses or link failures, which are difficult to control in a test environment. Model checkers excel at checking such interactions.
CMC works well on real code, as demonstrated by the results of applying it to three implementations of the AODV networking protocol . The first implementation, mad-hoc , was released two years ago and has since been under active development. The second implementation, Kernel AODV , derives from the mad-hoc implementation and was released less than a year ago. The third implementation, AODV-UU  was released a year ago. The AODV specification is also in active development: the first version came out in 1997 and has subsequently undergone ten revisions. While it is difficult to measure quality absolutely, one measure is that there is a formal group devoted to testing AODV implementations that has used their testbed to check the mad-hoc and the AODV-UU implementations .
CMC found 34 unique errors in total (as of the date of this publication), a rate of roughly one bug per 328 lines of code. Several bugs were non-trivial ones, difficult to find by any other method. In an ironic twist, model checking the implementation found a bug in the specification of AODV itself (this last error was confirmed by the authors of the AODV specification ). Many protocol implementations are similar to that of AODV, and CMC has enhancements that will broaden its applicability to other concurrent systems. Hence, there is good reason to believe that CMC will be useful for many systems that are difficult to debug by any other means.