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Introduction

Operating systems written in unsafe languages are efficient, but they crash too often. OS crashes are worse than user software crashes because an OS crash requires a time consuming reboot and may cause many users to lose data. The proliferation of embedded devices that manage non-transient data (like PDAs and digital cameras) translates lack of reliability into personal inconvenience. We believe system reliability should be a bigger goal for OS developers, and we believe that computer architects can do more to help OS developers write robust software.

The largest problem for OS reliability is device drivers, which according to one study, can have three to seven times as many bugs as the rest of the kernel [3]. Many operating systems, like Linux, load drivers into the address space of the running kernel. This makes calling them efficient because they share the kernel address space and run with full kernel privileges. But it also makes them dangerous, as a single driver bug can crash the whole system. Drivers are often buggy because writing a correct driver requires knowledge of poorly documented features of the kernel programming environment, and drivers are often written by device manufacturers who are not seasoned kernel developers.

Mondriaan Memory Protection (MMP) is a fine-grained hardware memory protection scheme that equips OS developers with a powerful and simple tool to increase reliability [7]. From an OS developer's perspective, MMP supersedes the protection part of a page table, providing permissions granularity down to single 32-bit words. It does not replace the page table structure, which is still needed if the system requires virtual address translation.

In this paper, we describe how MMP can be used to increase the robustness of an operating system, without compromising its performance. We can enforce the existing boundaries between dynamically loaded kernel modules and the core of the kernel, which is currently only protected by programmer convention. Although memory corruption is only one possible failure mode of a poorly behaved device driver (others include leaving interrupts disabled, breaking the lock discipline, or excessive resource consumption), it is the most common and the most difficult to guard against efficiently. Once boundaries with kernel modules are enforceable, we can begin dividing the core kernel into protected subcomponents to improve maintainability.


next up previous
Next: Mondriaan Memory Protection Up: Hardware Works, Software Doesn't: Previous: Abstract
Emmett Witchel 2003-06-12