4th USENIX Conference on File and Storage TechnologiesAbstract
Pp. 143154 of the Proceedings
Secure Deletion for a Versioning File System
Zachary N. J. Peterson, Randal Burns, Joe Herring,
Adam Stubblefield, and Aviel D. Rubin, The Johns Hopkins University
We present algorithms and an architecture for the secure
deletion of individual versions of a file. The principal
application of this technology is federally compliant storage;
it is designed to eliminate data after a mandatory retention
period. However, it applies to any storage system
that shares data between files, most notably versioning
file systems. We compare two methods for secure deletion
that use a combination of authenticated encryption
and secure overwriting. We also discuss implementation
issues, such as the demands that secure deletion places
on version creation and the composition of file system
metadata. Results show that new secure deletion techniques
perform orders of magnitude better than previous
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