Provenance and Privacy

Susan B. Davidson
Zhuowei Bao, Sanjeev Khanna, Sudeepa Roy, Julia Stoyanovich
University of Pennsylvania

Sarah Cohen-Boulakia
Universite Paris-Sud

Tova Milo
Tel Aviv University
Desiderata from men (BPs)

- Discrete

Secure
Need for provenance

Need for privacy

How has this tree been generated?

Which sequences have been used to produce this tree?

Biologist’s workspace
Workflow Provenance Repositories
Current situation

• To enable sharing and reuse, repositories of workflow specifications are being created
  – e.g. myExperiment.org
  – Keyword search is used to find specifications of interest (tags at level of workflow)

• Several workflow systems are also storing provenance information
  – Module executions, input parameters, input/output data
  – “Input-only”
Vision

• “Workflow Provenance” repositories store specifications as well as executions (i.e. provenance)
  – Searchable
  –Queryable

• Searching/querying these repositories can be used to
  – Find/reuse workflows
  – Understand meaning of a workflow
  – Correct/debug erroneous specifications
  – See the downstream effect of “bad” data
The Problem

• Owners/authors of workflows may wish to keep some of the provenance information private.
  – Intermediate data
  – Module behavior
  – Structure of the execution

➢ There is a tradeoff between the utility of provenance information and privacy guarantees.
➢ Search/query must respect privacy guarantees.
“You are better off designing in security and privacy... from the start, rather than trying to add them later.”
Privacy Concerns in Data-Oriented Workflows
Privacy and Workflow Provenance

• Privacy concerns are tied to the components of workflow provenance
  – Data that flows on edges
  – Modules that implement functions
  – Structure of provenance dependencies: “connections” between data and other data, or between data and module executions
Example 1: Data Privacy

Microarray data obtained from the experiment

Robots are used to perform microarray analysis

Data must be normalized to be interpreted correctly

Microarray companies provide normalization methods

Data from other groups is used in normalization

Normalized data

Normalization data should be kept secret
Example 2: Module Privacy

Patient record: Gender, smoking habits, Familial environment, blood pressure, blood test report, ...

\[(X_1, X_2, X_3, X_4, X_5)\]

Module functionality should be kept secret

From patient’s standpoint: output should not be guessed given input data values

From module owner’s standpoint: no one should be able to simulate the module and use it elsewhere.
Example 3: Structural Privacy

M1 compares the entire protein against already annotated genomes.

M2 compares domains of proteins (more precise but more time consuming).

Protein + Functional annotation

Relationships between certain data/module pairs should be kept secret.
Privacy concerns at a glance

- **Data Privacy**
  - Data items are private

- **Module Privacy**
  - Module functionality is private \((x, f(x))\)

- **Structural Privacy**
  - Execution paths between certain data is private

smoking habits, blood pressure, blood test report, ...

\[ P: (X_1, X_2, X_3, X_4) \]

\[ (X_1, X_2, X_3) \]

\[ (X_1, X_2, X_4) \]

\[ \text{DB} \]

\[ \text{Check for cancer} \]

\[ \text{Check for infectious disease} \]

\[ \text{Create Report} \]

\[ \text{report} \]
The questions we need to answer...

- Can we preserve privacy of private components in a workflow and maximize utility w.r.t. provenance queries with provable guarantees on both privacy and utility of the solution?

How do we measure privacy?

What information can we hide?

How do we find a good solution?

How do we measure utility?
Module Privacy (a hint)

Roy et al, PODS 2011

• A module $m = a$ function
• For every input $x$ to $m$, $m(x)$ value should not be revealed
  – Enough equivalent possible $m(x)$ values w.r.t. visible information

According to required privacy guarantee
Module Privacy (a hint)

• A module $m = a$ function
• For every input $x$ to $m$, $m(x)$ value should not be revealed
  – Enough equivalent possible $m(x)$ values w.r.t. visible information
• There is a knife, a fork and a spoon in this figure
Module Privacy (a hint)

• A module $m = a$ function
• For every input $x$ to $m$, $m(x)$ value should not be revealed
  – Enough equivalent possible $m(x)$ values w.r.t. visible information

• There is a knife, a fork and a spoon in this figure
**Γ-privacy**

- A module $m$ is Γ-private iff for every input $x$ the actual value of $m(x)$ is indistinguishable from Γ-1 other possible values wrt the visible data.

  - **Example:** Hiding $a_2$ and $a_4$ in the provenance table for $m_1$ guarantees 4-privacy. E.g. $m_1(0,0)$ could be (0,0,1), (0,1,1), (1,0,0) or (1,1,0).
Hierarchical Workflow Model
Composite Modules

• Composite modules encapsulate subworkflows
  – Extensively used in workflow design to enable reuse and sharing (top-down)
  – Also used to hiding portions of provenance to focus on “relevant” modules (bottom-up)

• Whether developed top-down or bottom up, composite modules can be used to create views of workflows or their provenance.

➤ Yields a hierarchical workflow model.
Workflow model, revisited

- A **simple workflow** is a connected DAG whose nodes model modules and edges model potential dataflow between modules.
- A **(hierarchical) workflow** is a pair \((W, \tau)\) where \(W\) is a finite set of simple workflows and \(\tau\) is a (partial) expansion function that maps some of the modules to simple workflows in \(W\).
- Expansion edges can be used to define an **expansion hierarchy**
Hierarchical workflow, example
Expansion hierarchy, example
View: Prefix of hierarchy
Views are useful...

- At the **specification level**, views can be used to control what is seen of module descriptions or the expansion to a subworkflow.
- View can also be projected to the execution level (**provenance**) to control what data is seen, hide structural information, or hide inferred module behavior.
Privacy-aware Search and Query
The Vision, recapped

• Workflow Provenance repositories will store specifications as well as executions (i.e. provenance)
  – Searchable, queryable

• Query results must respect privacy guarantees.
  – Data, module, structure.
Search

Workflows and modules are tagged.
Search

Query: “disease”, “parse”
Search result

“WISE: Searching workflow hierarchies”: Liu et al, VLDB 2007

- **Informative**: shows the expansion and dataflow relationships necessary to understand the match
- **Concise**: no subtree also contains a match

**Query**: “disease”, “parse”
Access Control Specification

- Each module/workflow $S$ has two actions
  - **Read**: authorized users can access keywords of $S$
  - **Expand**: authorized users can see the structure of $S$.

- The expand privileges for a user can be used to “trim” the expansion hierarchy and create an **access view**.

- The user’s access view and read privileges can be used to control what is returned in a search.

- **Access controlled repository** – same privileges on a module and on a workflow to which it expands.
Access Controlled Search

Query: “OMIM”, “SNP” User is not allowed to expand $W_2$ or read $W_3$.

No match
What about structural privacy?
Access (Security) Views

Poster with Bau and Milo
How can we separate hiding sensitive data/modules from hiding structure?
Dependency and Data Edges
Simple workflow

Composite module that expands to the simple workflow
Research Challenges

- “Workflow Provenance” repositories will store specifications as well as executions (i.e. provenance)
  - Searchable, queryable, privacy preserving

- **Formalizing privacy notions**
  - **Data privacy**: Hiding a data value may not be enough – how much is revealed from the displayed data values?
  - **Module privacy**: how to handle workflows with both private and public modules?
  - **Structural privacy**: What techniques should be used? What are the desired guarantees?
  - Can we use differential privacy?

- **Search**: efficiently identifying data that users can access
  - Users may have different privileges, yielding many different “access views”.

- **What is an appropriate provenance query language?**
  How does access control interact?
Research Challenges, cont.

• How to express security policies and ensure they are “obeyed”
• There is also related work on secure provenance, i.e. detecting and protecting against provenance tampering
• ...
Session Papers

• “A Framework for Policies over Provenance” (Tyrone)
  – Specify access control and redaction policies which transform provenance graph to hide sensitive information

• “Tracking Emigrant Data via Transient Provenance” (Stephanie)
  – Best security policies can be compromised by trusted party with malicious intent
  – Ghost objects track when data leaves system

• “One of These Records Is Not Like the Others” (Carrie)
  – Propose various techniques (crypto, consistency checks) to detect and correct errors in provenance
  – Consistency checks can be thwarted by rogue generator examining provenance records to supply info for new record: may need to secure provenance record for others than creator.

• “A Fine-Grained Wf Model with Provenance-Aware Security Views”
  – Specify for each module (atomic or composite) the input/output dependencies. Users are given a view at which level they can see the workflow provenance. This can be used for data/module/structural privacy.
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